Pension Schemes Bill

The defined contribution, or DC, workplace pensions market prioritises competition on cost rather than on the overall value. The Bill introduces a value-for-money framework to enable a shift in focus away from cost towards a longer-term consideration of value. This new framework looks to standardise how value is assessed, in a transparent, consistent and comparable way. It will require schemes to disclose standardised metrics, undertake a holistic assessment of value, and take improvement actions where needed.

Automatic enrolment has been a huge success, ensuring that millions more people are now saving for their retirement. However, frequent job changes mean that individuals are often enrolled into a new pension scheme by each employer, leaving them with multiple small pots over their working life, often with very small amounts saved. This has created a challenge across the workplace pensions market, with current estimates suggesting that within the system there are more than 13 million pots worth less than £1,000 each. This is hugely expensive for pension schemes to administer, with an estimated cost of £240 million a year, ultimately resulting in poorer value for members.

Through the Bill, we are taking powers to introduce automatic consolidation of these dormant small pension pots through a multiple default consolidator model. Opportunity for member choice will be built in; members can choose a consolidator scheme or choose to opt out entirely if they wish. This will simplify the system, reduce costs and support members so they can better track their retirement savings.

There is strong evidence that larger pension schemes mean better outcomes for members through efficiencies of scale, stronger governance and better investment opportunities at lower cost. The Bill will therefore drive scale by accelerating the consolidation of multi-employer DC schemes.

From 2030, schemes used for auto-enrolment must reach at least £25 billion in assets in a single main scale default arrangement, or £10 billion on a transition pathway with a credible plan to reach £25 billion within five years. This is about harnessing the power of scale: larger schemes can negotiate better deals, access more diverse investments and deliver better outcomes for savers.

On asset allocation, earlier this year, the Mansion House Accord was signed by 17 major pension providers, which, between them, manage about 90% of active savers’ DC pensions. This initiative was led by industry, and the signatories pledged to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets, such as infrastructure, by 2030. The purpose of this voluntary commitment is, as the signatories put it,

“to facilitate access for savers to the higher potential net returns that can arise from investment in private markets as part of a diversified portfolio, as well as boosting investment in the UK”.

The Bill includes a backstop provision that would permit the Government, with Parliament’s approval, to require DC pension providers of auto-enrolment schemes to invest a fixed percentage of their default funds in specific asset classes. The Government do not anticipate exercising the power, unless they consider that the industry has not delivered the change on its own. There are also strong safeguards around it.

All workplace pension schemes are required to have a default arrangement, where contributions are invested if members do not choose an investment option. Most members go into a default arrangement and remain there throughout their scheme membership. There are currently thousands of different default arrangements in pension schemes, creating fragmentation, inefficiency and poorer outcomes for members.

The Bill introduces new requirements to review those default arrangements, with a power to make regulations as needed, following the review, to require default arrangements to be consolidated into a main scale default arrangement. There is also a power to make regulations for new default arrangements to be subject to regulatory approval. That will ensure that savers benefit from economies of scale and improved governance by reducing the fragmentation in the pensions market.

Many pension schemes, especially legacy ones, are not delivering good outcomes for savers. As contract-based schemes rely on individual contracts between firms and members, firms usually need individual members’ consent to make any changes, even when the change would improve outcomes for members. Obtaining this consent is often difficult and costly, especially when members are disengaged, even when a scheme offers poor value. This leaves members stuck in poor-value schemes.

To address that, the Government are introducing the contractual override power in the Bill. It will allow the providers of FCA-regulated DC workplace pensions to transfer members to a different pension arrangement, make a change which would otherwise require consent, or vary the terms of members’ contracts without the need for individual member consent, but only when the legal and regulatory requirements are met. That includes rigorous consumer safeguards such as the best interests test, which must be met and certified by an independent expert before a contractual override can take place.

At retirement, DC scheme savers face complex financial decisions. They need to evaluate the different options to suit their own individual circumstances, assess risks and uncertainty in financial products, and factor in their own estimation of their life expectancy. We know that savers do not always use the support available: only 16% used a regulated source, such as Pension Wise or a professional financial adviser.

The Bill puts new duties on trustees to develop and provide one or more default pension plans at retirement to help members access their savings without these complex decisions. These plans will provide a straightforward income solution for most members, with opt-out rights for those who prefer alternatives. Trustees must design plans based on member needs, communicate options clearly and publish a pension benefits strategy, which will be overseen by the Pensions Regulator. The Bill also requires the FCA to make rules that deliver default pension plans in relation to pension schemes regulated by the FCA, ensuring consistency and better outcomes for savers.

Superfunds are commercial consolidators that offer a new route for employers to secure the legacy liabilities of closed DB schemes that cannot secure an insurance buyout. Building on the current interim regime, the Bill establishes a permanent legislative framework for superfunds. It introduces an authorisation and supervisory regime with robust governance, funding and continuity arrangements, so that members of those schemes can have the confidence that their pensions are properly protected. Superfunds may invest more productively because of their scale, expertise and buying power, so they are good for members, employers and the wider economy.

Part 4 contains a range of important measures. Following the Virgin Media court case, certain DB pension benefit alterations could be treated as void if schemes cannot produce actuarial confirmation that they met the minimum standards in place at the time. This affects schemes that were contracted out between 1997 and 2016. The court judgment has the potential to cause pension schemes significant cost and uncertainty, even where the schemes did, in fact, meet the minimum standards required. To resolve that, the Bill allows schemes to ask their actuary to confirm that past benefit alterations would not have caused the scheme to fall below the relevant minimum standards.

The Chancellor announced in the Budget that the Government will introduce pre-1997 indexation into the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme—the PPF and the FAS—to address the long-standing issue faced by members. As noble Lords will be aware, those are the compensation schemes that provide a safety net for members of DB schemes. Currently, payments in respect of service before 1997 are not uprated with inflation, and affected members have seen the real value of their compensation decrease significantly in recent years.

The Bill will pave the way to introduce increases on PPF and FAS payments for pensions built up before 6 April 1997. These will be CPI-linked and capped at 2.5%, and will apply prospectively for members whose former schemes provided for these increases. That will help those members’ pensions keep pace with the cost of living. This is a step change that will make a meaningful difference to over 250,000 members. Incomes will be boosted by an average of around £400 for PPF members and £300 for FAS members after the first five years. Our changes strike an affordable balance of interests for all parties, including eligible members, levy payers, taxpayers and the PPF’s ability to manage future risk. The Bill makes some other changes to the PPF and the FAS that will benefit the members of these schemes and the levy payers supporting the PPF, including around terminal illness and the levies.

Finally, some noble Lords may have seen that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published its report on the Bill last night. I emphasise that the Government recognise the importance of getting the right balance when taking delegated powers and using them appropriately. The pensions industry is highly technical and rapidly evolving, and there is a complex interaction between legislative requirements, regulatory oversight and changes in practice or innovation. In pensions legislation, it is common for a mix of requirements and principles to be set out in primary legislation, with finer detail, which is liable to frequent development, to be set out in secondary legislation. That allows for a quicker response to developments in the industry, including to protect scheme members. We think we have the right balance in the Bill, but I thank the committee for its report and will respond in due course.

This Bill will initiate systemic changes to the pensions landscape, with the aim of building a pensions system that is fit for the future—one that is strong, fair and sustainable, and that delivers for savers, employers and the economy. At its core, the Bill is about making sure that people’s hard-earned savings work as hard for them as they have worked to save, while galvanising the untapped benefits that private pensions can offer the economy at large. I look forward to our discussions today. I beg to move.

However, while there is much to commend, there are also areas where we believe the Bill falls short, and in ways that matter deeply to the millions depending on it. The most striking omission in the Bill is the absence of any meaningful progress on pension adequacy. The uncomfortable truth is that too many people are simply not saving enough to secure a decent standard of living in retirement: a situation made all the more difficult in the current economic circumstances.

Auto-enrolment was never intended to be the finished article. It was a foundation, not the building itself. Yet the Bill proceeds as though the task were complete. The central question of whether current savings levels are sufficient is not confronted but deferred: pushed into the second stage of the review. This is not reform: it is a holding space, in which difficult but necessary decisions risk being postponed rather than resolved.

Adequacy should have been the organising principle of this legislation. Instead, it has been quietly parked for another day. In its place, the Government have focused on taxing pension contributions, increasing the cost of employment, and layering additional regulation on to the terms and conditions of work. We are regulating, taxing and constraining the very mechanisms through which retirement savings are generated, yet we have failed to address the most basic and consequential question of all: are people saving enough to retire with security and dignity?

A further missed opportunity is the failure to support the self-employed with new and innovative ways to save affordably for their retirement—more than 4 million people who drive our economy, create jobs and take risks, yet too often face retirement with no provision at all. Only around one in five self-employed workers earning over £10,000 a year currently saves into a pension. This is not a marginal problem; it is a structural gap in our pensions system. We need practical and pioneering solutions to support this growing group, and the Bill should have set that direction. We have spoken directly to the self-employed in preparation for this legislation, and in Committee we stand ready to assist the Minister by bringing that engagement and evidence to bear.

Our wider engagement also brought into sharper focus the Bill’s treatment of public sector pensions. This Bill is, in our view, decidedly LGPS-light. We will therefore table amendments to address that omission, ensuring that the scheme operates with greater clarity, flexibility and accountability. At the heart of our concern is the need for a more transparent, simpler and reformed approach to reviewing employer contribution rates for local authorities. This is not about loosening discipline or weakening the scheme. It is about prudent financial management and giving councils the tools they need to govern responsibly. This is what local authorities deserve and it is good financial governance.

The Bill shows no enthusiasm for addressing excessive prudence and the record surpluses within the Local Government Pension Scheme. We are not naive enough to suggest that the LGPS surpluses can be extracted or treated in the same way as those of private defined benefit schemes. But, under the Chancellor’s revised fiscal rules, those surpluses are now treated as assets offsetting public debt. That may be fiscally convenient but it represents a missed opportunity to enhance councils’ resilience. In appropriate circumstances, those surpluses could—and should—be used to support reductions in employer contribution rates. However, too often, overly cautious actuarial methodologies, excessive prudence and a lack of transparency have locked councils into contribution rates that are simply too high.

Proportionality and openness in how assumptions are set and decisions are reached are pivotal. Without transparency, those assumptions cannot be properly challenged through due diligence, and Section 151 officers cannot fully discharge their statutory duties. We must therefore ensure that interim reviews of employer contributions are more accessible, transparent and accountable, through clearer statutory trigger conditions, published policies, improved actuarial transparency and strengthened statutory guidance.

Kensington and Chelsea demonstrated precisely that approach in the aftermath of the Grenfell tragedy. Yet, across the country, councils are still forced into an exhausting and uncertain process to navigate the existing regulatory framework simply to secure interim contribution reductions after a formal valuation. We look forward to engaging constructively with the Government to ensure that councils are properly supported in delivering services while fully meeting their LGPS obligations.

Finally, I turn to what I regard as the most troubling element of the Bill: the proposed reserve power to mandate pension fund investment strategies within master trusts and group personal pension schemes used for automatic enrolment. Mandation is not a neutral tool; it is the quiet nationalisation of pension investment strategy. It is a fundamental shift in who ultimately controls investment decisions. Automatic enrolment has succeeded because it is trusted. Mandation threatens that trust: automatic enrolment is trusted by employers, by industry, and above all by millions of ordinary savers who have neither the time nor the confidence to manage complex financial decisions themselves.

It is therefore deeply concerning that this power is targeted specifically at automatic enrolment default funds. These are the schemes used disproportionately by those with the least means and the least financial confidence: the very people who rely most heavily on the integrity and independence of the system we have built over decades.

This is where the injustice bites. Those with the fewest means and the least financial confidence are the ones Labour’s mandation would trap. The savviest can opt out; the poorest get locked in. That is the injustice of mandation. Those savers need our protection, not a situation in which their pension outcomes become indirectly shaped by ministerial preferences, however well intentioned. Conservatives built automatic enrolment; Labour now stands a chance of threatening it.

We built automatic enrolment on a simple settlement: the state sets the framework, but trustees make the investment decisions. The Bill risks blurring that line. At stake here is trustee independence and fiduciary duty, principles that sit at the very heart of pensions policy. Trustees are bound, both legally and morally, to act in the best financial interests of their beneficiaries. Pension schemes exist to serve savers, not to serve the shifting political priorities of the day.

In this context, I am reminded of the warning offered by the respected pensions expert Tom McPhail, who invoked Chekhov’s famous dramatic device: the gun on the wall. If the gun is hung on the backdrop of the stage in the first act, it will be fired by the third. Once a Government arm themselves with a power, no matter how benignly it is presented, history suggests that it will eventually be used. If the Government do not intend to use the power, why is it in the Bill?

Rather than relying on the logic of “mandation as a backstop”, I urge the Minister and her team to step back and address the underlying reasons why pension funds are not investing more in the UK in the first place. Low domestic investment is not simply a collective action problem, as the Government suggest. It reflects real structural barriers, and the Government should compile the relevant evidence and report back on how those obstacles might be removed.

Will the Minister undertake to do this? There are better and far less constitutionally troubling ways to unlock long-term investment. I offer her just one example. Solvency rules continue to constrain insurers from investing in productive UK assets that offer stable long-term returns. Reforming those outdated rules could, according to Aviva, unlock billions of pounds over the next decade. That is how we should be driving growth, by removing barriers to investment and not by inserting the state into decisions that properly belong to independent trustees acting solely in the interest of savers. It is therefore striking that the Government have chosen to expend so much political capital on a mandation policy that commands little support beyond the DWP and lacks a wider consensus across the industry. Can the Government provide assurances that savers in auto-enrolment pension schemes will not subsequently discover that their pension providers have been instructed to invest in specific entities such as Thames Water?

I close by reaffirming our commitment to work constructively with the Government. Stability and confidence in the pensions market are paramount. It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill. Where improvements can be made, we will table amendments. We will engage in good faith to ensure that the detail is right and that the framework ultimately serves savers, schemes and the wider economy. We broadly support the direction of travel that the Government are pursuing. However, as today’s debate has made clear, there remain important questions around the detail, the intent of forthcoming regulations and what has been omitted from the Bill.

When closing today’s debate, my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie will expand on these points, set out further concerns and put several direct questions to the Minister. We hope that the Government will reflect carefully on those issues as the Bill progresses. I look forward to working with the Minister in the weeks and months ahead and to continuing this constructive, robust dialogue as we seek to strengthen the legislation.

It is not entirely clear how those two outcomes may be traded off, but I would be grateful if the Minister could say more about government thinking on member protection in release and distribution of surplus. I know that my noble friend Lord Thurso, who cannot be here today because he is undergoing a medical procedure in Inverness, will also wish to test the Government’s thinking in this area in Committee.

Then there is the critical question of mandated asset allocation. This Bill, as everyone knows, contains a reserve power to authorise DC master trusts and group personal pensions used for automatic enrolment to invest a minimum proportion of assets in “productive” investments, including UK assets. On the face of it, this cuts directly across trustees’ fiduciary duties and members’ best interest tests. It risks political direction of asset allocation. Does anyone really believe that the Government would be better at allocating funding than the markets? This mandation may well create significant market distorting effects if, for example, the demand for such “productive” assets outpaces their availability.

There is also the risk that such a power may be extended over time to influence allocation on an even larger scale than might be currently envisaged. It is worrying that the Governor of the Bank of England has been reported as saying that he does not favour mandation. The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said in a written submission:

“The criteria for Master Trust authorisation were intended to produce a safe and reliable savings environment and we do not believe the concept of qualifying assets belongs there”.

This power to mandate

“introduces a commercial conflict between pension providers and trustees over asset allocation, weakening the fiduciary accountability of the trustees … It is also premature to give the Government a sweeping power it does not expect to make use of (we note the percentage of mandated assets cannot be increased after 2035 but that might encourage a government to ‘use it or lose it’.) We would urge Parliamentarians to consider the implications of a future government—of any configuration—having a power to define qualifying assets as any project that the government of the day can meaningfully define, charging the capital costs to the auto-enrolled pension savings of the nation … Should mandating schemes to invest in accordance with Government direction proceed, it needs to be made clear what the respective responsibilities of Government and trustees are”

as the finances work themselves through.

I would be very grateful if the Minister could set out for us how mandation and fiduciary duty can be reconciled without complicating or diluting the proper exercise of fiduciary duty. Perhaps a definition of “productive” would be a useful start. My noble friend Lady Kramer, who is attending a funeral this afternoon, had intended to speak to this point and wanted to ask for a detail and risk profile of assets that will qualify as “productive”.

Most people contribute through auto-enrolment into default funds. They have few resources and should not be in high-risk investments—and certainly not without their permission. Ministers have promised statutory guidance to help resolve the issue of potential conflict between mandation and fiduciary duty. On Report in the Commons, Torsten Bell said

“I intend to bring forward legislation that will allow the Government to develop statutory guidance for the trust-based private pensions sector”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/25; col. 1043.]

He did not specify what kind of legislation or when. The Minister has told us that this guidance will not amount to direction and will have the usual force, or lack of force, present in the many existing “have regards” that exist in the financial services arena. She has also told us that this draft guidance will not be available before Committee begins. This is surely not ideal.

Can the Minister reassure us that, at the very least, this draft guidance will be available before the end of Committee stage? We need to be able to discuss the details of the guidance before we agree to legislation. That is especially the case if the Government intend to rely on the use of SIs, which would of course deprive Parliament of any effective means of scrutiny at all. May I ask her to take another look at the timing, so that we may be able to take guidance properly into account in our discussions of mandation?

Perhaps the Minister can also explain why the mandation currently has sunset provisions for expiry in 2035 if no regulations are in fact made. Why not use, for example, the Mansion House targets to generate a significantly earlier cut-off?

Then there are questions of value for money and consolidations, which have been discussed already. The ABI, as I am sure the Minister knows, pushes for regulatory mechanisms to force consolidation only when it clearly benefits customers. I heard the Minister endorse that approach. The key word here is “clearly”—what does this mean? What will be the test, and who will be doing the testing?

As important as any of these things is the question of pensions adequacy or inadequacy. It is very disappointing that the Bill does nothing to tackle such things as low contribution rates, self-employed exclusion and early savings barriers. The question of whether people are saving enough is probably easy enough to answer, but what to do about it is entirely absent from the Bill. We will want to discuss this further.

Finally, there is no substantive mention of climate issues in the Bill and no reference to, for example, the Paris Agreement. There is an obvious asymmetry here. The Bill provides for increasing investment in productive assets, which are to be defined. It says nothing about which assets should be avoided or minimised. Industry analysts caution that, if the mandation favours domestic growth sectors without, or which do not have strong, climate screening, schemes could be nudged into assets misaligned with the 1.5 to 2 degrees pathway. That would certainly conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Paris Agreement, and it would damage everybody and every enterprise.

Proposed new Clause 19, brought forward at Third Reading in the Commons by my honourable friend Manuela Perteghella, addresses this issue. This new clause, not voted on, would have required the Government and the FCA to make regulations and rules restricting exposure of some occupational and workplace pension schemes to thermal coal investments, and to regularly review whether the restriction should be extended to other fossil fuels. We will bring forward a similar amendment in Committee.

This is a very important Bill with some obviously welcome proposals but also some deep causes for concern, especially as regards mandation and the failure to address pension inadequacy. We look forward to a constructive discussion with the Government and detailed examination of the Bill.

I am not clear when the Secretary of State intends to make the relevant regulations, but to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, I would suggest that it should not be done until the first pensions dashboard is fully operational and accessible to the public. As I understand it, that will not be until late 2027. Perhaps the Minister could provide a brief update on that. Also, there should be a clear requirement that any such transfer, carried out in a situation where no response has been received from the individual, should be clearly flagged on the dashboard to help people track them down.

The second issue I want to raise is more important. Here, I fear that a trend is beginning to emerge already—and that, most unusually, I am going to find myself in disagreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. This is the power for the Government to mandate the asset allocation of a master trust or group personal pension scheme. Pension schemes should be managed for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustees have a fiduciary duty to that effect. The Government mandating that a proportion—and there is no limit to this in the Bill—should be directed into types of assets and locations chosen by them rides a coach and horses through that principle. Who will be liable if such investments are not suitable or go badly wrong? I do not see any indemnification of trustees here. What makes the Government think that they know better than a professional qualified pension manager as to what is best for scheme members? The track record of government investing is not stellar, to say the least.

Of course, the reason for this is to push more pension funds into UK assets, often described as “productive assets”. Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I have that in inverted commas here, but even that makes little sense in this respect. Let us look at the sorts of assets that the Bill refers to. The first is private equity. Now, private equity may be a good place for a pension fund to put some of its money. Over time, returns have generally exceeded public markets and bonds, primarily because of the use of leverage, but I would love to understand why the Government think this would be a good thing for the country.

What private equity does is buy existing assets, then leverage them up with high levels of debt, thereby gearing up the possible returns that can be made on normal levels of growth. That reduces the corporation tax payable by the company because debt interest is tax-deductible, and the debt is often located in overseas low-tax jurisdictions. Typically, then, overheads and costs are reduced as far as they can be to make the company appear more profitable for sale after three to five years, and that often has the effect of reducing investment in the company and often leads to job reductions.

So where is the benefit to the country from this? If noble Lords do not believe me, I give them Thames Water, left underinvested and indebted by Macquarie, which took out billions in the process, or Debenhams, where the three private equity owners collected £1.2 billion of dividends financed by debt and property sales that left the company to go bust. Others we could mention would be Southern Cross Healthcare and Silentnight, where, ironically, pensioners also lost out, and we have the current anti-competitive situation with veterinary practices. Of course, this is a generalisation, and there are exceptions, but the idea that PE generates growth is doubtful at best—venture capital, development capital, growth capital, yes; PE, not so much. Why do the Government think it would be a good idea to force pension funds to invest in private equity?

Amazingly, the Bill does not actually set out that allocations must be made into UK assets. The wording is drafted so widely that the only assets globally that cannot be prescribed are assets listed on a recognised exchange; nor does it set any limits to what percentage should be allocated into the assets the Government prescribe. In theory, 100% could be allocated. The only safeguard in the Bill—contrary to the Minister’s comment that there are many safeguards—is that the Secretary of State must review the effects of any such regulation within five years of the regulations coming into force. We should note that this is not an independent review; it is a review by the Secretary of State, the very person who made the regulations. That does not fill me with huge confidence. Anyway, if things have gone wrong after five years, what can be done? Is the Secretary of State to be liable for the losses that scheme members have incurred because of the Government overriding the fiduciary duty?

We are an outlier in terms of our pension funds investing in their own country’s productive assets, especially when compared with countries such as Canada and Australia, so I understand why the Government wish to change that, but the way to achieve that is first to understand why it is not happening now. I would be interested to hear from the Minister why she thinks that is. I suspect it is down to a number of issues, including demographic issues, the attractiveness of our markets versus others, regulation, taxation—Gordon Brown’s dividend stealth tax has a lot to answer for—and, I am sure, others. The better solution, surely, is to identify and deal with the barriers that exist to make UK productive assets a more attractive investment prospect, not to take the frankly lazy and inefficient route of mandating without addressing the underlying reasons. Neither Canada nor Australia mandates. Rather, they promote domestic investment in infrastructure and projects through collaboration, not by forcing specific allocations. We should learn from those examples.

The Minister has been clear that the Government do not expect to use this mandation power. This raises a wider point of principle, one that the Minister and I have debated in other contexts in the past, which is that the Government should not give themselves powers that they do not intend to use. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, there is a tendency to use them regardless at some point, even if it is another Government who use them. This is becoming a bit of a trend, and one that I feel should be strongly resisted. There are two potential solutions to this part of the Bill. Either we need to clarify the whole fiduciary duty principle and improve safeguards, or we should remove the power altogether, and I must say that I favour the latter.

With that, I look forward to working with Members from all around the House, as ever, and the Minister on the Bill. In the meantime, I wish everyone a very happy Christmas.

UK pension funds have stopped supporting British companies, large and small. I believe that the future of British business can be successful and I believe in Britain, but it seems like our own pension funds do not. Even the parliamentary pension scheme has about 2.8% of its equity exposure in the UK. The Bill does not address that, as the Government are focusing on DC and local government schemes. One of the proposals that I would like to put to the Government is to see whether there are ways in which, instead of mandating specific areas that the Government want pension funds to invest in—which happen to be, in my view, some of the riskiest areas that they could support—the Government should require, let us say, at least 25% of all new contributions into pension schemes to be put into UK assets, listed or unlisted.

The UK listed markets have become exceptionally undervalued in a global context because our pension funds no longer support our markets. We used to have a reliable source of long-term domestic investment capital. If schemes want taxpayers to put huge sums into their pension funds each year, and if managers and providers wish to continue to receive such sums, is it so unreasonable to ask that they put, as I say, maybe just one-quarter of those contributions into the UK? That could include unlisted assets, listed assets or infrastructure—that would be up to trustees to decide—and if they wanted to put more than 75% overseas, they could go ahead, but should not expect taxpayers to give them money to do so. That seems to me to be not mandation but a proper incentivisation, using the incentive mechanism that we already have of tax relief, which does not have to support Britain at all.

We find ourselves in constrained fiscal circumstances. New Financial recently showed that each bit of the UK pension system has lower allocations to domestic equities as a percentage of assets, as a percentage of their equity allocation and relative to the size of the local market than other countries. What is wrong with Britain? I believe in Britain, and there are reasons to expect that pension schemes—after all, 25% of the pension is tax free—should do far more now to protect and boost our growth. This would not have to wait until 2030, either; it could happen immediately.

If I may, I want to cover the question of relying on consolidation as the answer to driving better returns, and what that might do to the marketplace. Defined contribution workplace schemes and the LGPS are supposed to somehow automatically generate better long-term returns by being bigger. Well, there is a case for that, and some studies would support it, but the figure of £25 billion that must be reached by default funds, and the £10 billion by 2030 that is required, are totally arbitrary. There is no rationale that says that is the right number, yet we are putting it in primary legislation. That is most unwise. What if there is a market crash between now and 2030, for example? What is magic about that number?

Can the Minister say what evidence there is that scale is a reliable future predictor of returns? What consideration have the Government given to the damage to new entrants by favouring these large-scale incumbent funds? The risk of schemes herding and all doing the same thing with such large pools of capital, especially in global passive funds, could distort markets. What consideration has been given to that? What level of confidence is attached to the predictions that the Government have made for improvements in outcomes?

I have heard from new entrants to the market, such as Penfold, which say they are now unable to get new business because they are growing fast but may not reach the £10 billion by 2030—and of course people cannot recommend that employers now invest in them. That company has innovative financial methodologies and is offering a new way of reaching out to pension scheme members, as are Cushon and Smart Pension, which may be further down the line in reaching the target. I have concerns that the Bill will stop new competition and new entrants coming in. An oligopoly is not normally the best way for a market to succeed.

I am particularly puzzled by the explicit exclusion of closed-ended listed companies within the Bill. Part 2 says that none of those investment trusts that have invested in precisely the types of investment that we need, and that the Government want to encourage to boost the UK economy, are excluded from the Bill. I do not understand why the Government would be doing this. I know that they want to encourage long-term asset funds, which are open-ended structures, but there are enormous reasons for and benefits from having closed-ended structures when holding such illiquid assets and long-term growth assets. These are proven companies that have produced very good returns in net asset value yet have shrunk to discounts, due partly to macro factors but also to regulatory overkill, which needs urgently to be reviewed.

Investment in just UK infrastructure and renewables by this investment company sector has exceeded £18 billion. Overall, in the kind of assets that the Government want to encourage—funding solar and wind projects, energy efficiency initiatives, social housing, biotech, property and private equity—these companies have put more than £60 billion to work. But they are now struggling to survive and having to buy back their shares, rather than invest in the kind of growth assets that they could otherwise be selling and managing for pension funds in this country.

I hope that the Minister will help us understand whether the Government are going to reverse this particular exclusion and recognise the benefits of this long-standing, world-leading investment sector. Unquestionably, it can be part of the answer in this scenario. I also urge the Government to clarify what fiduciary duty means. I know that there have been many calls for that to be put into statutory guidance, and I would support this.

Finally, as regards the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme, I welcome the flexibility that is being put in to allow the levy to be changed. I welcome the change in the terminal benefits. I welcome the acknowledgment of the injustice of the pre-1997 frozen payments, with the oldest people both in the Pension Protection Fund and particularly in the Financial Assistance Scheme, suffering most. I also welcome the flexibility that will mean that, where a scheme is unsure whether the previous rules would have granted increases on the pre-1997 benefits, it will be assumed that they will. The terminal illness increase, from six to 12 months, is again very welcome. But I would urge the Government to look carefully at how we can recognise the injustice to the pre-1997 members, such as Terry Monk, Alan Marnes, Richard Nicholl and John Benson, who gave years of their lives to achieve better outcomes in the Financial Assistance Scheme, and promote the PPF, which has been such a success. I have also heard from Carillion workers who were in the Civil Service pension scheme and have ended up in the PPF, losing their pre-1997 benefits. This injustice hurts, especially in light of the Government’s generosity to mineworkers and the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme, which has been given a 30% to 40% increase to pensions that is effectively publicly funded. I hope that the Government will think again about potentially one-off increases, or some other way of helping the pre-1997 members who lost their benefits.

We did some work on this at the Resolution Foundation back in 2023. I cannot remember what has happened to the chief executive at the time, but perhaps I can quote some figures from our intergenerational audit in 2023. We estimated that millennials born in the early 1980s will reach the age of 60 with, on average, £45,000 less in pension assets than boomers born 20 years earlier. That is the challenge of boosting the pensions savings of the younger generation, which I hope is the cross-party basis for this legislation.

A particularly acute example of how this generational unfairness can work is that some of those defined benefit schemes closed to new members were in deficit. The company plugged the deficit gap by using revenues generated by all of its workers, including the younger workers, which it put into the defined benefit scheme available only to some of the workers. We now have some very interesting examples of what happens when these schemes find themselves now, thank heavens, in surplus. The recent Stagecoach deal is a very interesting example; it has been widely welcomed in the media, and in many ways it is good news. However, the Stagecoach pensions scheme closed to new members in 2017. After that, the younger workers had no opportunity to join it. There will now be a distribution of the surplus. I hope the Minister might comment on the feasibility of some of the uses for that surplus, which are not in the current provisions. We heard from my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott about the importance of pension adequacy. Would it be acceptable for one use of the surplus to be to pay increased auto-enrolled employer contributions into the pension schemes of employees of Stagecoach who joined post 2017 and were therefore not in the earlier scheme? Some of their work will have generated the revenues that created the surplus. Would helping them through the successful auto-enrolment model not be one way forward? Another use, which is being talked about, is funding a collective DC pension arrangement to help get those schemes going. I very much hope we will move beyond the single CDC we have at the moment with Royal Mail. Pensions UK has an interesting proposal for some tax waivers for extra contributions going into CDC, especially out of pension surpluses. Again, I hope the Minister might be able to give that a welcome.

The closure of DB schemes and the creation of pure DC was the background to some of the big shifts we have been talking about. There has been a massive shift from equities into bonds and away from UK assets into assets held abroad. We are talking about this as if it is just rational capitalism working and trustees exercising their discretion, but I have a lot of sympathy with the points that my noble friend Lady Altmann made, because the British model is a very unusual model. I believe it is largely to be explained, not by some higher economic rationality, but by the strange features of the closure of DB and moving to pure DC. It means that the percentage invested in UK equity fell from 50% 20 years ago to 5% now. That makes us a complete outlier across the OECD for the willingness of our pension funds to invest in UK assets.

This is not what the pension fund members and contributors expect. As we know from recent polling published by the London Stock Exchange, when you do a survey of 1,000 current members of workplace pension schemes and ask them how much of their pension contributions they think are going into British business, their estimate is 41%—nearly 10 times larger than what is actually happening. If you ask them whether they think their pension scheme should invest more in British industry, even if this would involve some sacrifice in their future pensions, 61% say yes.

Most funded pension schemes in other advanced western countries are much more deeply rooted in their own national economy and realise that part of what they are trying to do is create the environment in which their national pensioners thrive in a healthy economy in a generation’s time. It is absolutely right to have this debate now in Britain and, for me, having been involved—and still being involved, in different ways—in the science base and research, it is deeply frustrating that we have one of the world’s great research bases and one of its great financial centres but we have totally failed to link the research base with the commercial investors in the City. That needs to change.

Successive Chancellors have been trying to do this, and of course we have had the Mansion House compact and now have the Mansion House Accord. There is now a fraught debate about mandation, and I realise all the delicacies about it. I personally think that the recent proposal from the London Stock Exchange is a very interesting way forward: not specifying the asset allocation by type of asset but saying that, whatever asset allocation has been decided upon, 25% should go into UK assets—absolutely not with full mandation but expecting this as a provision for UK DC default funds. So I hope the Minister will say that the Government are considering this proposal from the London Stock Exchange, now backed by 250 founders and chief executives of UK companies. I hope she will assure the House that, if that proposal were to go forward, this Bill would provide the necessary legislative framework, which I am assured is not an ambitious set of changes. There are things that can be done to secure a far greater understanding of the value of investing in British industry and other British assets than we have seen over the last few years.

I will briefly raise one other issue involving the other Pensions Commission: the investigation of pension age. I hope the Minister may be able to say something about this, because the clock is ticking. There was a half-hearted partial announcement of the decision that the pension age should go up further under the previous Government, which has not been followed up. My view is that that debate has got totally trapped in a preoccupation with life expectancy and using projected life expectancy as the only metric—what I call RIP minus X—or formula that has to be used. What pension age you set is not simply a mechanical calculation around life expectancy but an important fiscal decision. As in all other decisions, there are other factors, including long-term public expenditure costs and the likely income of pensioners from other sources.

I hope therefore that we will not find that we look back on this debate and ask why we missed another opportunity to prepare the ground and properly consider whether, given the fiscal constraints that any Government face, we should also be considering increases in the pension age.

The pension sector’s role as a major allocator of capital will come increasingly from defined contribution schemes. There is momentum behind the need to focus on the DC pension sector’s ability to deliver good value for pension savers. In addressing these twin challenges of improving the outcomes for pension savers and achieving sustainable economic growth, there is general agreement that we need market consolidation, to see fewer pension providers operating at scale, and to deliver higher returns to savers and greater investment in UK productive assets. The Bill introduces the enabling powers to achieve that structural reform and greater consolidation in the market. But that raises major issues in respect of regulation and the governance standards required in both the management and administration of those schemes and the oversight of them by those with the fiduciary duty to protect the scheme members.

The case for consolidation is compelling, but will the Government give further consideration to the governance and regulatory requirements that need to be placed on those fewer scale pension providers managing billions, even trillions of assets over time so that downside risks are controlled and the desired outcome is achieved?

On the specific issue of trustees in these consolidated schemes, in another place, Liam Byrne MP called out the risk that in creating scale through fewer and bigger pension funds, there would still be a failure to deliver desired levels of investment in the UK. He called for greater legal clarity on trustees’ fiduciary duties, their ability to consider systemic factors and their impact on members pension savings when taking investment decisions. The Minister, Torsten Bell, advised that the Government will bring forward legislation to clarify that trustees can take systemic factors into account. Can the Minister advise the House as to the timescale for bringing forward that legislation?

The Bill aims to improve the returns workers receive on their retirement savings. We know that the DWP, the regulator and the FCA are working together to create a disclosure framework for assessing value for money that is to apply across the whole DC market, enabling consistent and comparable assessments of workplace pension schemes. To fully implement that framework, however, will require primary legislation in addition to the provisions in this Bill. When do the Government anticipate fully rolling out a new framework for assessing value for money?

I turn to the issue of accessing pension savings on retirement. In a DC world, UK savers are not well supported at retirement in making the complex decisions they face. They must manage their own longevity, inflation, and investment risk, and many struggle. Which? rightly points out that these decisions may have severe consequences and can mean that an individual outlives their savings. So it is good news that the Bill requires trustees of pension schemes to provide their scheme members with default retirement solutions that are relevant to their needs, and to help them manage the risks they face when they move into retirement. But we have to ensure that those solutions are fit for purpose. Are the Government actively considering additional guidance and regulation on the assessment of the value and benefit for members of the default retirement solutions to be provided by the schemes?

There are now many millions of small pension pots, as workers move from employer to employer, and the numbers are increasing. It is a major inefficiency in the pension system, as the Minister herself pointed out. The welcome advent of the pensions dashboard will help savers to take action to consolidate their pension pots. Characteristically, however, inertia means that many will not. The Bill provides for very small pots to be automatically transferred into qualifying consolidator schemes, which should reduce administration costs and deliver better returns for consumers through lower costs and charges. Can the Minister say what the Government’s current thinking is on the timetable for implementing the necessary regulation to allow this to happen?

There are several other important changes in the Bill which other noble Lords have already raised, but I finish by highlighting one of the changes to the PPF—the Pension Protection Fund—compensation. The decision to introduce legislation to enable prospective annual increases on pre-1997 compensation to PPF and FAS members is welcome. It could benefit more than a quarter of a million PPF and FAS members, but I am concerned that it will leave an unfairness, because no retrospective increases are applied to pre-1997 accrued pensions. The prospective increases will not apply to those members whose schemes did not provide increases to pre-1997 pensions prior to entering the PPF, and there is no recognition in any form of the major past loss of pension value, particularly given the incidence of high inflation and the acute financial impact on those affected. In its foreword, a recent PPF levy policy document concludes:

“The likelihood of the PPF encountering significant funding problems in the future … is low and is expected to continue to reduce over time … if funding problems did arise, these could be resolved over a multi-year period with our investment returns likely to be the most significant contributor”.

I go back to the points made by my noble friend Lady Drake on 23 April, when she raised this issue. Taking into account the considerable confidence in the funding level and investment returns, that £32.2 billion of assets, £19 billion in liabilities and reserves of £13.2 billion are held by the PPF, and the reduction in the levy to zero, the level of fairness set in the striking of the balance between levy payer and PPF/FAS member does not appear right. As my noble friend said:

“Not only has the levy in quantum declined hugely; the levy has also declined as a proportion of the PPF’s funding mix. Roughly one-third of the funding comes from the assets transferred to the PPF from those members’ pension schemes. Similarly, another third comes from the investment returned on assets, and 11% comes from assets recovered by the PPF on behalf of those schemes. Less than a quarter—23%—of the funding comes from the levy, and that is going to fall”.—[Official Report, 23/4/25; col. GC 32.]

Can the Minister take back to the Government consideration of an ad hoc payment to those members of the PPF with pre-1997 service, in recognition of the considerable real loss of pension that they have experienced? Such a payment should be well within the funding levels of the PPF. Payment of the prospective increases to pre-1997 pensions accrued to those whose original scheme may not have made provision for such increases.

There has been quite a lot of talk about trustees, and I know that a number of bodies have been trying to see if we can move to having solely professional trustees. That would be a mistake. I appreciate that is not what the Bill is calling for, but one of the challenges is that trustees, driven by a certain type of asset adviser, have been attracted to low-cost and low-risk pension schemes, but too often that has led to low return. So many of the gradual changes we have seen and that will start to come through in response to some of this legislation will be able to address that. That is vital and I will support measures to achieve it.

However, there is an underlying issue here about the mandation clause. From my experience in government, I remember a meeting in Downing Street with a bunch of pension providers, which was mainly driven by insurers. People had been told that they could not raise the issue of Solvency II being a problem. One or two were brave and did so, and were later chastised by Treasury officials. Nevertheless, it was important that they did. I understand the frustration of Government Ministers at the very top of government. People saying “We need investment” is all well and good, but why do they not put some of their money into it? I include the Local Government Pension Scheme in that. Ultimately, our traditional approach is one of state pensions not being particularly generous and trying to incentivise people to put into the private pension market, as well as what has happened historically with the defined benefit industry. That is why we have the system that we do, which has grown to the extent that it has so far—so much so that, as has been recognised, trillions of pounds in assets could be deployed to greater use, but it still must be for the benefit of current, future and, indeed, deferred pensioners.

Further, there is a missed opportunity in this Bill. Having two different regulators for pensions is a wasted opportunity. I know that the two bodies, the FCA and the Pensions Regulator, have been working on joint strategies, but fundamentally we still have significantly different rules on what can or cannot happen with pension funds, depending on how they are regulated. That just does not make sense.

This is the moment to try to change that. Frankly, the FCA has enough to do. Under their different rules, TPR allows a particular investment but the FCA does not, although it may seem to be a very similar product. We should not leave that element of complexity to be solved via delegated powers but take the opportunity to fix it in this Bill. That will need primary legislation and I hope that, although she may not welcome it—and, as I am trying to get it all out of the Treasury and the FCA, they certainly will not welcome it—the Minister will try to get it into one regulator to make a difference for the prosperity of our pensioners.

I am conscious that this is a missed opportunity in how pensions can help our planet. I strongly promoted the concept of planet, prosperity and people. These are mutually beneficial and there is no doubt that investment by the industry can play a part. That is why we put in place world-leading, pioneering regulations making the link to the TCFD and net zero. However, crucially, they did not mandate how investments were to be made or the drawing from a variety of assets but, basically, put a much greater duty of transparency on what was happening in the long term. The same needs to happen with nature and the TNFD. I will explore that in Committee.

In terms of what we want to achieve from this, I think your Lordships will share with the Government the outcome of having a good, robust and fully functioning pensions industry that generates prosperity, but let us not go down this tricky route of mandation. In particular, the DPRRC singles out that Ministers keep saying, “We don’t intend to use it”. In that case, let us not legislate for it. Let us make sure that we keep that blunt instrument away and continue to have a productive pensions industry. Nest, which was originally provided for in legislation prior to 2010 and came into effect within the last decade or so, has been a fantastic source to drive and make sure that we have private asset allocations. Let us celebrate that, work out why it worked so well and, as I have already suggested, make sure that we get rid of the stuff that is massively underperforming when prospective pensioners do not realise it.

It is going to be an interesting time in Grand Committee. I am afraid there will be a lot of amendments—this is not the only Bill I will be tabling amendments to—but I hope the Government will think again on the themes we will get into. If a lot of this is just about getting investment in Britain, the Government will need to answer why they scrapped the British ISA, which was a ready-made model. It is almost because it was not invented here. Fortunately, on the pensions journey, there is normally good cross-party consensus, but I fear that mandation has blown that out of the water. Nevertheless, let us see if we can try to fix it.

We also have to acknowledge that 2.8 million pensioners are now living in households below the minimum income standard. I note that the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee said in July:

“No older person should be unable to have a minimum, dignified, socially acceptable standard of living”.

The Green Party concurs with that. I know the Minister will be interested that women make up 67% of those pensioners in poverty. There has been some improvement in the situation with the new state pension but, as the committee noted in July, there are “blind spots” in policy-making. The reality of women’s lives is still insufficiently recognised. I cannot see anything in this Bill that deals with that, but I would be interested if the Minister could contribute anything on it.

Staying with the context, because it is important that we think about where we are before we get to the detail, according to ONS data we now have 44% of adults aged 16 and over actively contributing to a pension pot. This compares to 34% a decade earlier. Obviously, auto-enrolment is a really important factor, but according to the recent Scottish Widows 2025 Retirement Report, 39% of working-age adults are not on track to achieve what the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association deems a minimum lifestyle in retirement, and that is a 1% increase since 2024, so we are headed in the wrong direction.

The Minister said this is all about security and dignity in retirement. Before we start talking about private pensions, we have to acknowledge that the financial sector’s private pensions are not going to meet everybody’s needs. There are great risks with the financial sector in this age of shocks, and we have to acknowledge that the state pension must be the anchor of security, certainty and freedom from fear for everybody in our society.

Picking up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, there are a couple of extra facts from that report that I think are telling and concerning. At 149 pages, the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum is nearly as long as the Bill itself, which is 161 pages. The number of delegated powers in the Bill—119—nearly exceeds the number of clauses, which is 123.

I have spent quite a bit of time on context because I think it is important, but I turn now to a couple of points that I expect to raise in Committee and possibly later. One of those is the term “fiduciary duty”. Lots of people have been asking me, “What are you doing in the last week before Christmas?” and I have said, “I am going to be talking about fiduciary duty for pension schemes”. I have then got lots of blank looks.

But this is something I have actually long been familiar with as a Green, as we have been struggling over many years to ensure that local pension schemes in particular are able to avoid investing, say, in the merchants of death, big tobacco, because that is bad for pensioners in a broader context, or able to avoid investing in fossil fuels because of their health and environmental impacts, and also because of the financial risks of the carbon bubble. So things like “fiduciary duties” roll off my tongue so easily.

Noble Lords will know that this was debated very strongly in the Commons. They have started the work in some ways but have left us with an unfinished piece of work. In response to the amendment in the Commons supported by 34 MPs, including all four Green MPs, the Pensions Minister has now committed to legislate to bring forward statutory guidance—again—on fiduciary duty. However, as I understand it—I am happy to be corrected by the Minister—the statutory guidance provided by the Government would not apply to the whole range of pension schemes and would not provide the legal clarity that schemes would need to wish to act on these issues. Any statutory guidance of course need not be followed and is at risk from potential future Governments.

Although this sounds technical, it is of course terribly important. I note that Liam Byrne in the other place said that there is currently confusion—and what the Government are proposing does not seem to deal with that confusion. With confusion comes caution. Then, we see trustees understandably following the safe path, rather than the one they can actually see is the right path.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has covered a lot of what I was going to say about nature, so I will not repeat that. But it is worth looking at this from my perspective of six years in this place. I am delighted to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in her place, because she has been a leader in finally getting successive Governments to put climate and nature into Bills. To get the climate and nature bit in because the Government initially left it out has become almost the standard part of the role of your Lordships’ House. That is something I am sure we will return to.

I have one final point to make on the Bill. The Financial Conduct Authority has, to be charitable, a chequered regulatory history. The Minister said that the FCA would have this extra responsibility and that extra responsibility, which is deeply concerning. I am interested in the suggestions from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on how we might look at that regulation. I do not have a view on that yet, but I would be interested in the debate.

I note that, a year ago, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services—I declare I am a Member—published a report on the effectiveness, or not, of the FCA, and blamed it for doing too little, too late, and doing nothing to prevent or punish alleged wrongdoing, with errors being all too common. That is really important, given that we are giving it oversight over some significantly increased powers for trustees, where trustees will not be referring back to members of the scheme.

Finally, I come to the fun bit. Given that this is the last contribution from a Member of the Green group for this session before Christmas, I sincerely thank all the staff—the doorkeepers, clerks, Library, catering, security and cleaning staff—for the many hours they have laboured for us, all too often hours very late in the evening. To offer a wish for all of them and all of us, my hope for 2026 is that we might see more sensible working hours for your Lordships’ House and for all our staff.