Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Committee (2nd Day)

My Lords, the Hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering, except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.

A list of participants for today’s proceedings has been published by the Government Whips Office, as have lists of Members who have put their names to the amendments, or expressed an interest in speaking, on each group. I will call Members to speak in the order listed. Members are not permitted to intervene spontaneously; the Chair calls each speaker. Interventions during speeches or “before the noble Lord sits down” are not permitted. During the debate on each group I will invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request and will call the Minister to reply each time. The groupings are binding and it will not be possible to de-group an amendment for separate debate. A Member intending to move formally an amendment already debated should have given notice in the debate.

Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content”, an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content”, a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely intends to oppose an amendment expected to be agreed to, they should make this clear when speaking on the group. We will now begin.

It is currently intended that we will take a break at 5 pm for 15 minutes. There has been some suggestion that not all Members are happy with this. I suggest, therefore, that the three Whips get together at some point to decide whether they wish to have this break. It being a Thursday, I can understand that people might have different feelings about it.

Amendment 12

12: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause— “The Boundary Commissions: constitution (1) Schedule 1 to the 1986 Act (the Boundary Commissions) is amended as follows.(2) At the end of paragraph 2 insert “in accordance with paragraph 3A below”.(3) In paragraph 3(a), for “Lord Chancellor” substitute “Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales”.(4) In paragraph 3(c), for “Lord Chancellor” substitute “Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales”.(5) After paragraph 3 insert—“3A The two members of each Commission appointed by the Secretary of State shall each be appointed in accordance with the following process—(a) a selection panel shall be convened by the Secretary of State to select the members of the Commission, which shall comprise—(i) the deputy chairman of the Commission, and(ii) two persons appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons;(b) the selection panel shall determine the selection process to be applied and apply that process;(c) the selection panel shall select only one person for recommendation for each appointment as a member of the Commission;(d) the selection panel shall submit to the Secretary of State a report stating who has been selected and any other information required by the Secretary of State;(e) the Secretary of State shall on receipt of the report do one of the following—(i) accept the selection,(ii) reject the selection, or(iii) require the panel to reconsider the selection;(f) the power of the Secretary of State to require the selection panel to reconsider a selection is exercisable only on the ground that, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, there is not enough evidence that the person selected is suitable for appointment as a member of the Commission;(g) the power of the Secretary of State to reject a selection is exercisable only on the ground that, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, the person selected is not suitable for appointment as a member of the Commission;(h) the Secretary of State shall give the selection panel reasons in writing for requiring the reconsideration of, or rejecting, any selection.”(6) In paragraph 4, at end insert “, but the term for which each member (other than the chairman) is appointed shall be a non-renewable term.””Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would ensure that the appointment of members of the Boundary Commissions is made and is seen to be made independently and without the influence or appearance of influence of the Executive, to remove the possibility of political interference in the process of setting the boundaries of Parliamentary constituencies.

The background to Amendment 12 is the effect of automaticity in moving the focus to the Boundary Commissions, which will now make the final decisions. This means that any risk of interference or perception of a lack of partiality or other matters will move to the commission and the process of appointing it. The Constitution Committee suggested we should consider what needed to be done to ensure the independence and impartiality of the commission. I am sure that there is complete agreement that the process must be wholly independent and free from the possibility of political inference or, more importantly, any perception of political interference or influence. Decisions must be independent and be seen to be independent and we must safeguard the process from the US problems of gerrymandering.

The amendment seeks to address this issue in three ways, so that the commission is not only independent and impartial but seems to be so. The first way is the appointment of the deputy chairman. Commissions are chaired by deputy chairmen. In each of our four nations the deputy chairman has to be a High Court judge. In Scotland, the deputy chairman is appointed by the head of the judiciary, the Lord President, and in Northern Ireland by the head of judiciary there, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.

However, that is not the position in England and Wales. The appointment is not by the head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice, but by the Lord Chancellor, a government Minister. For England and Wales this anomaly predates the change to the position of the Lord Chancellor in 2005. Until then, he was the head of the judiciary in England and Wales and a judge. Now, not only is he not head of the judiciary, he is no longer a judge but a political Minister.

The Act should therefore now be changed so that the deputy chairman is no longer appointed by a government Minister but, as in Scotland and Northern Ireland, by the head of the judiciary. Although the Lord Chancellor consults the Lord Chief Justice, that is insufficient in the light of the proposed change brought about by the Bill. That is because it is necessary to ensure that the independence of the judiciary is not undermined by any perception of partisanship in the appointment. It must be seen to be wholly independent of the political Minister which the Lord Chancellor now is. That is a small and, I hope, uncontroversial change.

I will speak briefly in support of the amendment introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. As was discussed on Tuesday, the Bill introduces automaticity into the implementation of new constituency boundaries following a boundary review. This is a move which I support. This amendment is a further step to ensure that the review process is, and is seen to be, totally impartial. Its aim is to strengthen the independence of the Boundary Commissions themselves by setting out how the appointments of their members can be made independently and without the possibility of political interference. The importance of this was underlined by the Constitution Committee and the arguments in favour of this additional clause have just been well set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas.

I simply add that I hope there will be no temptation to argue that this amendment is unnecessary. If the Minister does take that line when he replies, he would be saying in effect that we can trust the present appointments system. I ask him to reflect on this in the context of the level of public trust in politics today, which was touched on in our debate on Tuesday. When winding up the Second Reading debate earlier this year, the Minister said that the Boundary Commissions

“are independent and neutral; they must and will remain so”.—[Official Report, 27/7/20; col. 96.]

This amendment will surely assist the Government in meeting this worthy pledge.

Lord Liddle. No? We will move on to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon.

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. As Welsh Secretary, I ran a mile whenever I thought there was a conflict of interest. It is for others to judge whether I succeeded. It goes without saying that I did the same as Attorney-General. The spirit and meaning of this amendment is that the office of Lord Chancellor has been changed. It certainly gives the appearance of being a more political office. I will make no comment on his statutory duty to maintain the rule of law in the present circumstances, but it is important to distance the appointment of the Boundary Commission from a perception of closeness to party interests. The machinery—the bread and butter—of general elections is the make-up of constituencies. This is what the Bill does, with disastrous consequences for the representation of Welsh electors. A judicial method of appointment removes the semblance of political interests.

As Welsh Secretary, I had experience of a parallel matter. In what I would call my vice-regal role, it was my duty to appoint the chairman of the Local Government Boundary Commission and, I believe, its members. I presume that this duty went, on devolution, to the Assembly and it is too late to amend it, but it is important so far as England is concerned. The same argument—the need to distance decision-making from a politician—applies to this kind of appointment and the Boundary Commission itself. On assuming office, I inherited the proposed appointment of the Local Government Boundary Commission chairman from my Conservative predecessor. I was not satisfied with the proposed appointment.

The make-up of local government constituencies can have a considerable effect on subsequent parliamentary constituencies. I decided not to implement my predecessor’s proposal; I wanted a judicial figure as chairman. I appointed Mr Ronald Waterhouse QC, who later became a distinguished judge in the High Court and Court of Appeal. His first recommendation involved St Dogmaels, a village between Cardiganshire and Pembrokeshire which, given the history of those two constituencies, was of fundamental importance. My predecessor may have been right; I may have been right. We were both political Secretaries of State and neither of us should have had this duty. It can become a political bone of contention. It can give the impression that the appointor—the Secretary of State—has a conflict of interest.

I therefore not only support this amendment but hope that the same issue will be borne in mind in the field of local government, certainly so far as England is concerned. I hope that that will remove the impression of political interference. Local government boundaries are one of the building blocks that the parliamentary commissioner takes into account in resolving what the constituencies should be. It is, therefore, of equal importance. The spirit of the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is to ensure fairness and remoteness from any political decision-making; I strongly support it.

My Lords, I begin by apologising for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling this important amendment. As the Committee heard in debates on other amendments on Tuesday, the Bill removes the present power of Parliament to approve the Boundary Commission’s proposals at the end of the process of reviewing boundaries in the UK. As it stands, the process allows MPs only to ratify or block the commission’s proposals, not to amend them. Even this can still be viewed as politicians being able to influence the final decision, as happened in, for example, 1969 and 2001. However much we deplore these situations and others like them, that is what current legislation allows. However, the removal of this power from parliamentarians and, therefore, the introduction of automatic review implementations, has been described by MPs as a “power grab” by the Executive from the legislature and a constitutional outrage. It is seen by many as another attempt to silence or sideline Parliament.

The UK’s four Boundary Commissions pride themselves on the impartiality of their reviews, as they work within the parameters set by various Acts of Parliament. However, up to now that impartiality has ended when the review arrives in Parliament for approval, as history has shown. It is therefore probably right that the UK follow in the footsteps of countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand in removing politicians from the process. After all, during the process of a review, politicians and political parties have the ability to express their views in the submissions they make to the commissions, and those submissions are given due regard.

However, this is the most unequal of changes. The Bill takes away the rights of parliamentarians, but the right of the Executive to appoint members to the Boundary Commission remains intact, leaving the impartiality balance skewed in favour of the Government. This is a situation I do not wish to see in Wales—a future Welsh Boundary Commission, influenced by the UK Executive, could hardly claim to be impartial. If the system is to be seen as fair and impartial, all political influence must be avoided. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment achieves just that. If the Government are reluctant to accept it, the accusations of a power grab by the Executive over the legislature will be seen to have substance. On these Benches, we support measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commission.

Diolch yn fawr. It is very nice to have so many Welsh people speaking in this debate. I think it would be a brave Minister who rejected the advice contained in this amendment from a former and very eminent Lord Chief Justice—and one, I might add, whose term of office coincided, I think, with that of Chris Grayling as the Secretary of State for Justice, although why I should make that particular point I cannot think at the moment.

It is clear that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, knows a thing or two about the relationship between a Secretary of State and our independent judiciary and legal system. He has no doubt seen at close quarters how decisions are made or influenced and is able to draw on this experience in his advice to the Committee and in the amendment that he has moved today.

The amendment covers two points. First, and crucially, it effectively takes the appointment of commission members out of the hands of an elected politician—indeed, a member of the Cabinet—and places oversight in the hands of the Speaker and the Lord Chief Justice. Secondly, it makes the appointments non-renewable to ensure that Boundary Commission members can carry out their function with absolutely no glance over their shoulder at the possible renewal of their mandate. As the noble and learned Lord says, this fits in well with the Constitution Committee’s view that if we are to move to automatic implementation of Boundary Commission recommendations, this will protect against undue political influence only if the commissioners themselves are genuinely impartial and completely independent of political influence, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, also said.

In particular, the Constitution Committee recommended that commissioners should be appointed for a single, non-renewable term; the Secretary of State should appoint only from names recommended by the selection panel; and the deputy chair of each commission should sit on the selection panel.

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for the detailed thought that he has put into drafting his amendment and to the fact that he has drawn the Committee’s attention to this very important topic. I am also grateful to him for the time that he gave to have a private conversation on this matter. I am certainly open to have further conversations with him in the days and weeks ahead. I am grateful to all those who have spoken on this topic today.

I must in preface take up what I thought was a very strikingly polemical political utterance from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in which she purported to impugn the overall integrity of the public appointments system—an implication which was also left in a much more acceptable but similar fashion by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin. I will come back to that, because I believe that the integrity of the public appointments system is absolutely fundamental and I am concerned that these kinds of generalised political charges should surface in the manner that we heard from the noble Baroness. I will not trade time in your Lordships’ Committee or at a later stage on Report by listing the names of other people of other parties who have taken up political and public appointments.

For my own part, I do not believe that the desire to give public service as a Member of Parliament or as a humble leaflet deliverer for any political party which is represented in Parliament means that that person should be automatically excluded or regarded as suspect if they are appointed to a public body. I believe that the course of politics—the vocation of politics—and public service through politics are honourable vocations, and that ought to be borne in mind as we address this subject.

Equally, I do not accept the characterisation by the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, that the Bill represents a “power grab”. We have had this discussion before. We had it at Second Reading and we have heard it again. This legislation takes power away from the Executive and invests it by automaticity in the Boundary Commission, which brings us—setting aside the political chatter—to the gravamen of the serious, non-political argument which has been put forward.

There is no doubt, and the Government accept, that the introduction of automaticity to the boundary review process—a change the Government regard as critical to achieving regular and effective boundary reviews—shines a light on the Boundary Commissions themselves. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, that point was indeed made by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, which said:

“The House may wish to consider what safeguards are required to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commissions and their recommendations.”