Online Scams

I am obviously not against measures to raise public awareness of scams, and some very good work is being done. The Pension Wise guidance has had a real impact on people’s awareness of pension scams. Many organisations, including regulators, charities and advice agencies, have helpful advice about how to avoid scams, but scammers are extremely agile and good at what they do, and it is not enough to prevent serious fraud.

We need a strong regulatory framework. Online platforms should be given the responsibility for preventing scam content from appearing on their sites and more responsibility for removing it when it is reported. That would perhaps bring them a bit more into line with consumers’ expectations.

The online harms Bill seems the perfect opportunity to deliver that. By including financial harms, there is a greater responsibility on the search engines and social media platforms to identify and remove harmful content. I understand why the White Paper is limited in scope. Platforms and sites will be required to take reasonable steps to identify and prevent user-generated child sexual exploitation and abuse, and terrorist content. However, the tools that the scammers use to target their victims—social engineering and grooming—are similar to those used by criminals in financial fraud. The same requirement should be extended to cover the scam content defrauding people of their money and causing immense mental anguish and harm, let alone financial anguish.

There is also a strong case for ensuring that the Bill covers both paid-for advertising and user-generated content, because the scammers use both. As Which? points out, if we do not tackle the user-generated scam content, scammers will adapt. They will use that loophole and move from posting scam ads to organic user-generated scam content. There is support for that approach from Which?, UK Finance and the FCA.

I hope the Minister will commit to widening the scope of the online harms Bill. If he will not, will he introduce proposals for further legislative action to protect people from online scams effectively? The Government have said that their objective is for the UK to be the safest place in the world to go online. We have a chance now to make that a reality.

Turning to the current situation and what is already being done, authorised push payment scams—APP scams—have become a major problem in recent years. Fraudsters use sophisticated techniques to trick people, often, as the hon. Lady said, by forming phony relationships and defrauding people into authorising payments to criminal-controlled accounts. According to UK Finance, £456 million was lost to these scams in 2019, up from £354 million the year before.

Last week, I met with the managing director of the Payment Systems Regulator and raised concerns like those we have heard today. We agreed that more needs to be done to ensure victims are protected. To that end, the Payment Systems Regulator and industry are working together to improve the level of protection provided to consumers through the existing voluntary code, known as the contingent reimbursement model code, which the hon. Lady referenced.

Banks that have signed up to that code have agreed to reimburse victims of APP scams, so long as they took a reasonable level of care when making the relevant payment. As the hon. Lady will know, the code has been operating since May 2019, and its effectiveness is currently being reviewed by the lending standards board, the body responsible for governing it. I look forward to the conclusions of that review. The hon. Lady cited statistics, which I recognise require thorough examination.

When it comes to fraud, prevention is just as important as any cure. That is why the authorities are taking steps to ensure that fewer people fall foul of the scams in the first place, notwithstanding the sophisticated nature of the interactions that lead to them. At the request of the Payment Systems Regulator, the six biggest UK banking groups have introduced a process known as confirmation of payee. Under that process, the bank account and sort code numbers are checked against account names, to ensure that payments are going to the intended recipients. It is early days, but we are confident that this innovation is an important step forward in preventing scams from succeeding in the first place.

The challenge is that for a number of those measures—we are probably all familiar with them from doing payments ourselves—it comes down to where culpability lies. The hon. Lady made observations about the sophisticated relationship and the conditioning that has sometimes taken place. That is what we are dealing with and what we have to get to grips with.

The financial services sector is just one part of the equation in combatting fraud. Other industries, including online platforms, which have been mentioned, have a role to play. The National Cyber Security Centre has been leading the way in ensuring that online scams are taken down as quickly as possible, and this year it launched a new suspicious email reporting service, making it easier for the public to highlight suspicious emails and websites. The service has already led to more than 3.6 million reports and more than 18,000 scams being removed, but I recognise that more needs to be done.

The Financial Conduct Authority’s ScamSmart website, which is not limited to online scams, also aims to help consumers protect themselves against investment scams. It does that by allowing users to search a warning list to check an investment opportunity and report scams or unauthorised firms. Anybody who falls victim to such scams should contact Action Fraud UK to help us catch the criminals. As the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart) mentioned in her contribution, this is a universal problem, and I recognise her anxiety about the sufficiency of the measures. As I say, I am happy to continue the discussion about what more can be done.

The private sector has its own responsibility to protect customers online. We have been working with online platforms and industry to take down fraudulent materials and websites. The specialist Dedicated Card and Payment Crime Unit is a great example of that partnership at work: it is a proactive police unit and involves UK Finance, the City of London police, the Metropolitan police and the Home Office. It continues to develop new partnerships with social media companies to take down accounts being used for various fraudulent ends and to stop the recruitment of people as money mules.

As well as working to prevent scams, we need to look after those who fall victim to them. We need to consider the emotional, as well as financial, harm that victims experience. That is why we are working with national and local policing, including police and crime commissioners, to support the victims of these terrible crimes. Even where it is not possible to investigate a case further, the Action Fraud economic crime victim care unit supports victims by helping them to recover and better protect themselves in future. What about the next steps? A lot of good work is being done, but we cannot rest on our laurels. This is a sophisticated problem: just as the wider banking, online and commercial landscapes continue to evolve, so the methods used by criminals to defraud customers evolve. In June 2019, the Treasury announced a review of the payments landscape, and we recently held a call for evidence as the first stage. That call for evidence reflected on the success of the Faster Payments Service as a 24/7 real-time payments system, but it also noted that Faster Payments currently lacks scheme rules to resolve disputes and assign liability when payments go wrong, including—crucially—in the case of APP scams. The Government have concluded that a set of comprehensive rules in the Faster Payments Service could make a real difference to tackling that problem. We have sought views on the issue and will outline our next steps in due course.