My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 155 in my name, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Strathcarron. Some of my remarks in Committee last week did not go down terribly well with Members and, in retrospect, I realise that that was because I was the only Member of the Committee that day who did not take the opportunity to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on her birthday. So at this very late stage—a week later —I make good that deficiency and hope that, in doing so, I will get a more jocular and welcoming hearing than I did last week. I will speak in a similar vein, though on a different topic and part of the Bill.
This amendment relates to Clause 65, which has 12 subsections. I regard the first subsection as relatively uncontroversial; it imposes a duty on all service providers. The effect of this amendment would be to remove all the remaining subsections, which fall particularly on category 1 providers. What Clause 65 does, in brief, is to make it a statutory obligation for category 1 providers to live up to their terms of service. Although it does not seek to specify what the terms of service must be, it does, in some ways, specify how they should be operated once they have been written—I regard that as very odd, and will come back to the reason why.
I say at the outset that I understand the motivation behind this section of the Bill. It addresses the understandable feeling that if a service provider of any sort says that they have terms of service which mean that, should there be complaints, they will be dealt with in a certain way and to a certain timetable and that you will get a response by a certain time, or if they say that they will remove certain material, that they should do what they say they will do in the terms of service. I understand what the clause is trying to do —to oblige service providers to live up to their terms of service—but this is a very dangerous approach.
First of all, while terms of service are a civil contract between the provider and the user, they are not an equal contract, as we all know. They are written for the commercial benefit and advantage of the companies that write them—not just in the internet world; this is generally true—and they are written on a take it or leave it basis. Of course, they cannot be egregiously disadvantageous to the customer or else the customer would not sign up to them; none the less, they are drafted with the commercial and legal advantage of the companies in question. Terms of service can be extreme. Noble Lords may be aware that, if you have a bank account, the terms of service that your bank has, in effect, imposed on you almost certainly include a right for the bank to close your account at any time it wishes and to give no reason for doing so. I regard that as an extreme terms of service provision, but it is common. They are not written as equal contracts between consumers and service providers.
Why, therefore, would we want to set terms of service in statute? That is what this clause does: to make them enforceable by a regulator under statute. Moreover, why would we want to do it when the providers we are discussing will have, in practice, almost certainly drafted their terms of service under the provisions of a foreign legal system, which we are then asking our regulator to ensure is enforced? My objection is not to try to find a way of requiring providers to live up to the terms of service they publish—indeed, the normal process for doing so would be through a civil claim; instead, I object to the method of doing so set out in this section of the Bill.
We do not use this method with other terms of service features. For example, we do not have a regulator who enforces terms of service on data protection; we have a law that says what companies must do to protect data, and then we expect them to draft terms of service, and to conduct themselves in other ways, that are compatible with that law. We do not make the terms of services themselves enforceable through statute and regulation, yet that is what this Bill does.
When we look at the terms of service of the big providers on the internet—the sorts of people we have in mind for the scope of the Bill—we find that they give themselves, in their terms of service, vast powers to remove a wide range of material. Much of that would fall—I say this without wanting to be controversial —into the category of “legal but harmful”, which in some ways this clause is reviving through the back door.
Of course, what could be “harmful” is extremely wide, because it will have no statutory bounds: it will be whatever Twitter or Google say they will remove in their terms of service. We have no control over what they say in their terms of service; we do not purport to seek such control in the Bill or in this clause. Twitter policy, for example, is to take down material that offends protected characteristics such as “gender” and “gender identity”. Now, those are not protected characteristics in the UK; the relevant protected characteristics in the Equality Act are “sex” and “gender reassignment”. So this is not enforcing our law; our regulator will be enforcing a foreign law, even though it is not the law we have chosen to adopt here.
3:45 pm
YouTube policy during the pandemic prohibited material that contradicted the views of health authorities. Even my right honourable friend David Davis was removed for opposing Covid passes, but that was a legitimate political position to take and contribution to make. There is no obligation on the platforms to protect free speech or to have respect to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. They are not in any sense bound by the European convention; most of them are not in any sense European. I think very strongly that this whole section is very dangerous.
I posit an extreme case that requires a slight exercise of the imagination. Imagine if a Russian platform were to gain a significant presence in the UK. It is not impossible: nobody would have predicted TikTok emerging from China so quickly not very long ago. Imagine the terms of service said, quite in compliance with Russian law, that it would remove any material that included the words “war” and “Ukraine” together; “special military operation” would be all right, but “war” and “Ukraine” would not. Imagine that it was relatively inefficient at doing this and left such material up. Are we not in a position, as a result of this section of the Bill, of obliging Ofcom to seek to enforce that term of its service contract on a Russian platform? How absurd that would be in an extreme case, but the parallel exists with the American and other platforms.
I very much hope that my noble friend will say what I want to say, which is that, yes, there is an issue and we would like to do something. We understand the motivation here, but this is very much the wrong way of going about it. It is inimical to free speech and it leads to absurd conclusions.
I support Amendment 44. I am pleased that, as part of the new triple shield, the Government have introduced Clause 12 on “User empowerment duties”, which allow users to protect themselves, not just from abusive posts from other users but from whole areas of content. In the Communications and Digital Committee’s inquiry, we had plenty of evidence from organisations representing minorities and people with special characteristics who are unable adequately to protect themselves from the hate they receive online. I am glad that subsections (10) to (12) recognise specific content and users with special characteristics who are targets of abuse and need to be able to protect themselves, but subsection (3) requests that these features should be
“designed to effectively … reduce the likelihood of the user encountering content”
they want to avoid. I am concerned that “effectively” will be interpreted subjectively by platforms in scope and that each will interpret it differently.
At the moment, it will not be possible for Ofcom to assess how thoroughly the platforms have been providing these empowerment tools of protection for users. If the features are to work, there must be an overview of how effective they are being and how well they are working. When the former Secretary of State, Michelle Donelan, was asked about this, she said that there was nothing in this clause to pin an assessment on. It seems to me that the lists in Clause 12 create plenty of criteria on which to hang an assessment.
The new duties in Clause 12 provide for control tools for users against very specific content that is abusive or incites hatred on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, disability, sex, gender reassignment or sexual orientation. However, this list is not exhaustive. There will inevitably be areas of content for which users have not been given blocking tools, including pornography, violent material and other material that is subject to control in the offline world.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his words—I thought I was experiencing time travel there—and am sympathetic to many of the issues that he has raised, although I think that some of the other amendments in the group tackle those issues in a slightly different way.
I support Amendments 44 and 158 in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. Requiring a post-rollout assessment to ensure that the triple shield acts as we are told it will seems to be a classic part of any regulatory regime that is fit for purpose: it needs to assess whether the system is indeed working. The triple shield is an entirely new concept, and none of the burgeoning regulatory systems around the world is taking this approach, so I hope that both the Government and Ofcom welcome this very targeted and important addition to the Bill.
I will also say a few words about Amendments 154 and 218. It seems to me that, in moving away from legal but harmful—which as a member of the pre-legislative committee I supported, under certain conditionality that has not been met, but none the less I did support it—not enough time and thought have been given to the implications of that. I do not understand, and would be grateful to the Minister if he could help me understand, how Ofcom is to determine whether a company has met its own terms and conditions—and by any means, not only by the means of a risk assessment.
I want to make a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Healy, made the other day—but I want to make it again. Taking legal but harmful out and having no assessment of whether a company has met its general safety duties leaves the child safety duties as an island. They used to be something that was added on to a general system of safety; now they are the first and only port of call. Again, because of the way that legal but harmful fell out of the Bill, I am not sure whether we have totally understood how the child risk assessments sit without a generally cleaned up or risk-assessed digital environment.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 44 and 158 in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. I also note my support for the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, to ensure the minimum standard for a platform’s terms of service. My noble friend Lord Moylan has just given an excellent speech on the reasons why these amendments should be considered.
I am aware that the next group of amendments relates to the so-called user empowerment tools, so it seems slightly bizarre to be speaking to Amendment 44, which seeks to ensure that these user empowerment tools actually work as the Government hope they will, and Amendment 158, which seeks to risk assess whether providers’ terms of service duties do what they say and report this to Ofcom. Now that the Government have watered down the clauses that deal with protection for adults, like other noble Lords, I am not necessarily against the Government’s replacement—the triple shield—but I believe that it needs a little tightening up to ensure that it works properly. These amendments seem a reasonable way of doing just that. They would ensure greater protection for adults without impinging on others’ freedom of expression.
The triple shield relies heavily on companies’ enforcement of terms of service and other vaguely worded duties, as the noble Viscount mentioned, that user empowerment tools need to be “easily accessible” and “effective”—whatever that means. Unlike with other duties in the Bill, such as those on illegal content and children’s duties, there is no mechanism to assess whether these new measures are working; whether the way companies are carrying out these duties is in accordance with the criteria set out; and whether they are indeed infringing freedom of expression. Risk assessments are vital to doing just that, because they are vital to understanding the environment in which services operate. They can reduce bureaucracy by allowing companies to rule out risks which are not relevant to them, and they can increase user safety by revealing new risks, thereby enabling the future-proofing of a regime. Can the Minister give us an answer today as to why risk assessment duties on these two strands of the triple shield—terms of service and user empowerment tools—were removed? If freedom of speech played a part in this, perhaps he could elaborate why he thinks undertaking a risk assessment is in any way a threat.
My Lords, this group of amendments looks at the treatment of legal content accessed by adults. The very fact that Parliament feels that legislation has a place in policing access to legal material is itself worrying. This door was opened by the Government in the initial draft Bill, but, as we have already heard, after a widespread civil liberties backlash against the legal but harmful clauses, we are left with Clause 65. As has been mentioned, I am worried that this clause, and some of the amendments, might well bring back legal but harmful for adults by the back door. One of the weasel words here is “harmful”. As I have indicated before, it is difficult to work out from the groupings when to raise which bit, so I am keeping that for your Lordships until later and will just note that I am rather nervous about the weasel word “harmful”.
Like many of us, I cheered at the removal of the legal but harmful provisions, but I have serious reservations about their replacement with further duties via terms of service, which imposes a duty on category 1 services to have systems and processes in place to take down or restrict access to content, and to ban or suspend users in accordance with terms of service, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, explained. It is one of the reasons I support his amendment. It seems to me to be the state outsourcing the grubby job of censorship to private multinational companies with little regard for UK law.
I put my name to Amendment 155 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, because I wanted to probe the Government’s attitude to companies’ terms of service. Platforms have no obligation to align their terms of service with freedom of expression under UK law. It is up to them. I am not trying to impose on them what they do with their service users. If a particular platform wishes to say, “We don’t want these types of views on our platform”, fine, that is its choice. But when major platforms’ terms of service, which are extensive, become the basis on which UK law enforces speech, I get nervous. State regulators are to be given the role of ensuring that all types of lawful speech are suppressed online, because the duty applies to all terms of service, whatever they are, regarding the platforms’ policies on speech suppression, censorship, user suspension, bans and so on. This duty is not restricted to so-called harmful content; it is whatever content the platform wishes to censor.
My Lords, it has been interesting to hear so many noble Lords singing from the same hymn sheet—especially after this weekend. My noble friend Lord McNally opened this group by giving us his wise perspective on the regulation of new technology. Back in 2003, as he mentioned, the internet was not even mentioned in the Communications Act. He explained how regulation struggles to keep up and how quantum leaps come with a potential social cost; all that describes the importance of risk assessment of these novel technologies.
As we have heard from many noble Lords today, on Report in the Commons the Government decided to remove the adult safety duties—the so-called “legal but harmful” aspect of the Bill. I agree with the many noble Lords who have said that this has significantly weakened the protection for adults under the Bill, and I share the scepticism many expressed about the triple shield.
Right across the board, this group of amendments, with one or two exceptions, rightly aims to strengthen the terms of service and user empowerment duties in the Bill in order to provide a greater baseline of protection for adults, without impinging on others’ freedom of speech, and to reintroduce some risk-assessment requirement on companies. The new duties will clearly make the largest and riskiest companies expend more effort on enforcing their terms of service for UK users. However, the Government have not yet presented any modelling on what effect this will have on companies’ terms of service. I have some sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said: the new duties could mean that terms of service become much longer and lawyered. This might have an adverse effect on freedom of expression, leading to the use of excessive takedown measures rather than looking at other more systemic interventions to control content such as service design. We heard much the same argument from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. They both made a very good case for some of the amendments I will be speaking to this afternoon.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords from all sides of the House for their contributions and for shining a light on the point the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made near the end of his remarks about the need to equip adults with the tools to protect themselves.
It is helpful to have these amendments, because they give the Minister the opportunity to accept—as I hope he will—a number of the points raised. It seems a long time since the noble Lord, Lord McNally, introduced this group, but clearly it has given us all much time to reflect. I am sure we will see the benefits of that in the response from the Minister. Much of the debate on the Bill has focused on child safety and general practicalities, but this group helpfully allows us to focus on adults and the operation of the Government’s replacement for the legal but harmful section of the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, rightly said, perhaps some tightening up of the legislation before us would be helpful. These amendments give us that chance.
4:15 pm
My noble friend Lord Lipsey has put forward a number of amendments, which helpfully focus on the whole area of adult risk assessments, which were required under the previous iteration of the Bill but have since been drastically watered down. I would be grateful if the Minister could give some explanation as to why we find ourselves in that situation, and perhaps take the opportunity to pick up a number of the points raised in the amendments.
Quite a lot of the debate has focused around the amendments put forward in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. These amendments take a somewhat different approach, because they require service providers to assess the extent to which their user empowerment tools are meeting the obligations laid out in Clause 12. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, in his helpful remarks, said that it was right to keep up to date with the trends in abuse. This is a point that has come up repeatedly in our discussion: the need to make sure that this legislation is entirely fit for purpose and is able to move with the kind of changes that he referred to.
20 of 131 shown
Not only will the present list for such tools need to be assessed for its thoroughness in allowing users to protect themselves from specific harms, but surely the types of harm from which they need to protect themselves will change over time. Ofcom will need regularly to assess where these harms are and make sure that service providers regularly update their content-blocking tools. Without such an assessment, it will be hard for Ofcom and civil society to understand what the upcoming concerns are with the tools.
The amendment would provide a transparency obligation, which would demand that service providers inform users of the risks present on the platform. Surely this is crucial when users are deciding what to protect themselves from.
The assessment should also look for unintended restrictions on freedom of expression created by the new tools. If the tools are overprotective, they could surely create a bubble and limit users’ access to information that they might find useful. For example, the user might want to block material about eating disorders, but the algorithm might interpret that to mean limiting the user’s access to content on healthy lifestyles or nutrition content. We are also told that the algorithms do not understand irony and humour. When the filters are used to stop content that is abusive or incites hatred on the basis of users’ particular characteristics, they might also remove artistic, humorous or satirical content.
Repeatedly, we are told that the internet creates echo chambers, where users read only like-minded opinions. These bubbles can create an atmosphere where freedom of expression is severely limited and democracy suffers. A freedom of expression element to the assessment would also, in these circumstances, be critical. We are told that the tech platforms often do not know what their algorithms do and, not surprisingly, they often evolve beyond their original intentions. Assessments on the tools demanded by Clause 12 need to be carefully investigated to ensure that they are keeping up to date with the trends of abuse on the internet but also for the unintended consequences they might create, curbing freedom of expression.
Throughout the Bill, there is a balancing act between freedom of expression and protection from abuse. The user empowerment tools are potentially very powerful, and neither the service providers, the regulators nor the Government know what their effects will be. It is beholden upon the Government to introduce an assessment to check regularly how the user empowerment duties are working; otherwise, how can they be updated, and how can Ofcom discover what content is being unintentionally controlled? I urge the Minister, in the name of common sense, to ensure that these powerful tools unleashed by the Bill will not be misused or become outdated in a fast-changing digital world.
Finally, I will speak in support of Amendment 160, which would have Ofcom say what “adequate and appropriate” terms are. To a large degree, that is my approach to the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, spoke about: let Parliament and the regulator determine what we want to see—as was said on the data protection system, that is how it is—and let us have minimum standards that we can rightly expect, based on UK law, as the noble Lord suggested.
I am not against the triple shield per se, but it radically replaced an entire regime of assessment, enforcement and review. I think that some of the provisions in this group really beg the Government’s attention, in order to make sure that there are no gaping holes in the regime.
Without these amendments, the Bill cannot be said to be a complete risk management regime. Companies will, in effect, be marking their own homework when designing their terms of service and putting their finger in the air when it comes to user empowerment tools. There will be no requirement for them to explain either to Ofcom or indeed to service users the true nature of the harms that occur on their service, nor the rationale behind any decisions they might make in these two fundamental parts of their service.
Since the Government are relying so heavily on their triple shield to ensure protection for adults, to me, not reviewing two of the three strands that make up the triple shield seems like fashioning a three-legged stool with completely uneven legs: a stool that will not stand up to the slightest pressure when used. Therefore, I urge the Minister to look again and consider reinstating these protections in the Bill.
What is more, Clause 65 asks Ofcom to ensure that individuals who express lawful speech are suspended or banned from platforms if in breach of the platforms’ Ts & Cs, and that means limiting those individuals from expressing themselves more widely, beyond the specific speech in question. That is a huge green light to interfere in UK citizens’ freedom of expression, in my opinion.
I stress that I am not interested in interfering in the terms and conditions of private companies, although your Lordships will see later that I have an amendment demanding that they introduce free-speech clauses. That is because of the way we seem to be enacting the law via the terms of service of private companies. They should of course be free to dictate their own terms of service, and it is reasonable that members of the public should know what they are and expect them to be upheld. But that does not justify the transformation of these private agreements into statutory duties—that is my concern.
So, why are we allowing this Bill to ask companies to enforce censorship policies in the virtual public square that do not exist in UK law? When companies’ terms of service permit the suppression of speech, that is up to them, but when they supress speech far beyond the limitations of speech in UK law and are forced to do so by a government regulator such as Ofcom, are we not in trouble? It means that corporate terms of service, which are designed to protect platforms’ business interests, are trumping case law on free speech that has evolved over many years.
Those terms of service are also frequently in flux, according to fashion or ownership; one only has to look at the endless arguments, which I have yet to understand, about Twitter’s changing terms of service after the Elon Musk takeover. Is Ofcom’s job to follow Elon Musk’s ever-changing terms of service and enforce them on the British public as if they are law?
The terms and conditions are therefore no longer simply a contract between a company and the user; their being brought under statute means that big tech will be exercising public law functions, with Ofcom as the enforcer, ensuring that lawful speech is suppressed constantly, in line with private companies’ terms of service. This is an utter mess and not in any way adequate to protect free speech. It is a fudge by the Government: they were unpopular on “lawful but harmful”, so they have outsourced it to someone else to do the dirty work.
On the other hand, companies that choose to do nothing will have an easier life under this regime. Faced with stringent application of the duties, companies might make their terms of service shorter, cutting out harms that are hard to deal with because of the risk of being hit with enforcement measures if they do not. Therefore, far from strengthening protections via this component of the triple shield, the Bill risks weakening them, with particular risks for vulnerable adults. As a result, I strongly support Amendments 33B and 43ZA, which my noble friend Lord McNally spoke to last week at the beginning of the debate on this group.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, I strongly support Amendments 154, 218 and 160, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which would require regulated services to maintain “adequate and appropriate” terms of service, including provisions covering the matters listed in Clause 12. Amendment 44, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and me, inserts a requirement that services to which the user empowerment duties apply
“must make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the extent to which they have carried out the duties in this section including in each assessment material changes from the previous assessment such as new or removed user empowerment features”.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, spoke very well to that amendment, as did the noble Baronesses, Lady Fraser and Lady Kidron.
Amendment 158, also tabled by me and the right reverend Prelate, inserts a requirement that services
“must carry out a suitable and sufficient assessment of the extent to which they have carried out the duties under sections 64 and 65 ensuring that assessment reflects any material changes to terms of service”.
That is a very good way of meeting some of the objections that we have heard to Clause 65 today.
These two amendments focus on risk assessment because the new duties do not have an assessment regime to work out whether they work, unlike the illegal content and children’s duties, as we have heard. Risk assessments are vital to understanding the environment in which the services are operating. A risk assessment can reduce bureaucracy by allowing companies to rule out risks which are not relevant to them, and it can increase user safety by revealing new risks and future-proofing a regime.
The Government have not yet provided, in the Commons or in meetings with Ministers, any proper explanation of why risk assessment duties have been removed along with the previous adult safety duties, and they have not explained in detail why undertaking a risk assessment is in any way a threat to free speech. They are currently expecting adults to manage their own risks, without giving them the information they need to do so. Depriving users of basic information about the nature of harms on a service prevents them taking informed decisions as to whether they want to be on it at all.
Without these amendments, the Bill cannot be said to be a complete risk management regime. There will be no requirement to explain to Ofcom or to users of a company’s service the true nature of the harms that occur on its service, nor the rationale behind the decisions made in these two fundamental parts of the service. This is a real weakness in the Bill, and I very much hope that the Minister will listen to the arguments being made this afternoon.