Before I call the Minister, I wish to make a brief statement. I found out only this morning that the charges against the two individuals relating to espionage for the Chinese authorities were to be dropped. I do not think that is good. Of course, we do not discuss the detail of security matters relating to Parliament on the Floor of the House, but given the very important issues raised by this case, I ask officials to consider whether any further steps should be taken—operational, strategic or legal—to ensure that all those who work in this Parliament are able to undertake their activities securely and without interference. I am a very unhappy Speaker with what has happened. The fact that it has taken two years, until today, for somebody to withdraw this case is not good enough.
This morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial.
The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China.
The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining
“any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information”
that
“might be…useful to an enemy”.
Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity.
Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.
Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.
The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.
Let me seek to address the shadow Home Secretary’s points. He raised the question of whether China constitutes a threat or not. I think I was very clear in the language that I used. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, and as the Government set out in the strategic defence review, China presents a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”. The reality is that, in government, there is an absolute requirement to co-operate with nations all around the world. When there are areas in which we need to challenge China, of course we will do so. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members will completely understand that when there are areas, in terms of economic co-operation, in which we need to work closely with China, of course we will do so, because it is absolutely in our national interest.
I referenced the comments of the previous Foreign Secretary, and the shadow Home Secretary might want to look back at what was said following the China audit. The previous Foreign Secretary was absolutely crystal clear: we will take a long-term, strategic approach to China that is rooted in the UK’s national interest. I understand why the shadow Home Secretary wants to boil down such a complex bilateral relationship into a single word, but the reality is that it is neither helpful nor sensible to do so.
The shadow Home Secretary will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with his characterisations of what he described as the “signals” that this Government have sent to China. In truth, I will not take any lessons from him on that, not least because—I have said this to him previously—it was not so long ago that a Conservative Prime Minister took the leader of China to the pub. When it comes to signals, I am not sure that the shadow Home Secretary speaks with a huge amount of authority.
The shadow Home Secretary spoke about FIRS. He knows that the Government’s position is that no decision has been taken with regard to the enhanced tier and China, and any decision taken by the Government will be announced in the normal way. FIRS is a crucial tool, and I am proud that this Government have got on and implemented it as of 1 July.
I hope that the Intelligence and Security Committee will get a good chance to dig into what has happened in this place, because we are hampered in the Chamber by not being able to look at sensitive issues. I also hope that the Minister will lend his weight to the approval of many senior Members of this House, prior to the last election—it got as far as the last Prime Minister—to create a Committee to look at sensitive spending, but also sensitive issues. In the summer, this Government chose to reintroduce extradition arrangements with Hong Kong, despite the application of the Chinese security Act. Given what the Minister has said today, how can we square both of those positions?
I hope that my hon. Friend knows that this Government hugely appreciate and respect the relationship we have with Hongkongers. Through the processes in place, we will absolutely ensure that nobody, be they a Hongkonger or any other nationality, is extradited for reasons of political expediency. I can also point her to the important work, which we take incredibly seriously, on transnational repression. I previously made a statement to this House, and I hope that she and others understand the seriousness with which we take these activities. We are working closely with our international allies, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the UK is a hard target for these threats, wherever they might originate.
As always, I am very grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement.
For years, the Chinese Communist party has worked to undermine the democratic institutions and values that underpin our society. This House is all too aware of the warnings, not least from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s excoriating report on China. That report made it clear that the previous Government lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Chinese state and that insufficient resources had been committed to meet that challenge. We expect to see better from this Government.
We are faced with a case in which two men, one of them a parliamentary researcher with close links to senior MPs, were accused of serious offences under the Official Secrets Act, only for the Crown Prosecution Service to drop those charges due to insufficient evidence. In this context, the decision is deeply worrying. It raises serious questions about the UK’s capacity to detect and prosecute espionage linked to hostile states, particularly China. So what specific issues with the evidence led the CPS to conclude that the threshold for prosecution was no longer met?
More broadly, what does this outcome say about our preparedness to respond to threats from foreign intelligence services operating on our soil, and even within the corridors of this Parliament? The Government must make protecting our democracy a national security priority. That means implementing the recommendations of the ISC’s China report in full, and ensuring that we are not left exposed to foreign interference simply because our systems are not equipped to respond.
Finally, the Minister again today committed to introduce legislation for a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies as soon as parliamentary time allows. Could he update us on the timeline for bringing this forward and what its scope will be?
I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I aways am, for the very sensible and reasonable way in which she has made her comments. She raises a number of important observations, many of which I agree with. I do have to say to her what I said to the shadow Home Secretary, which is that it would be completely inappropriate for me to speculate about the reasons why the CPS sought to make this decision. I completely understand why right hon. and hon. Members would ask me about it, but I hope they also understand that I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision. That is very much a matter for it, not for the Government.
On the other points the hon. Member raised, let me give her an assurance that the Government do everything we possibly can to ensure that the UK is a hard target to guard against those malign forces, wherever they may come from, that seek to infiltrate or interfere with our democratic processes. We will ensure that our security and intelligence services and agencies and law enforcement have the necessary tools and resources they need to do the difficult job of guarding against the threats we face. Obviously, as she understands very well, there is also a legislative framework for that, and that is why, I understand, she asked the question about Jonathan Hall KC and the recommendations that she has made recently. As she knows, we have made an absolute commitment that we will legislate as soon as we can, and I give her an assurance that that work continues at pace.
I thank the Minister for his statement. I think we have a duty—all democracies have a duty—to protect democracy from its enemies. I do not doubt that our allies face exactly the same challenges, so I would be interested to know what discussions we have had with our allies about this very challenge. The Minister mentioned that MPs and their offices would get new guidance. Can he commit to a date for that being issued?
My hon. Friend raises an important point about our allies. Many of the threats and challenges we face are shared ones, which is precisely why the UK Government convened the five countries ministerial conference last week. We were proud to host our allies from the Five Eyes nations, with which we work very closely, along with other important international co-operation arrangements. We do work very closely with our allies to ensure that, collaboratively and collectively, we are best able to guard against the threat we face.
I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will seek to ensure that the new guidance is in place as soon possible. I also point to the fact that I wrote to all Members of this House just before the recess with advice on protective security and other matters. However, should any Member feel that they need additional support, we will work very closely with you, Mr Speaker, and the Parliamentary Security Department to ensure that they get it.
The Minister made the point that the charges brought were under the old legislation, the Official Secrets Act, which has now been superseded. Has he made an assessment of whether the charges would have proceeded had the new offences been in place at the time the charges were brought? Will he be working with ministerial colleagues, law enforcement and others to look at whether new offences are needed in this case and in others?
If I may say so, that is a very clever question from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee. I hope that the right hon. Lady will understand that, given that the decision was communicated this morning, the Department and the Government will be looking at it very closely. I am confident that the new National Security Act gives the Government—I genuinely pay tribute to the previous Government for their work in introducing that groundbreaking legislation—the tools we need, but I know she will understand that we will look very closely at the decision communicated this morning and satisfy ourselves that we have all the necessary powers and tools to guard against the nature of the threat we face.
I thank the Minister for his statement. The first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and I know that he has a track record of doing just that. He also rightly recognises that politics is not just about MPs or Members of the other place; it is also about political staff, the Clerks, everybody who works in this place, and everybody in local government. What reassurances can he give my constituents and the greater population that he will ensure that we stop foreign influence over our democratic processes for everybody?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises an important point. I can give him and his constituents the assurances he seeks. The Government take these threats incredibly seriously and we will do everything we need to do to keep the public safe. On behalf of the Prime Minister, I chair the Defending Democracy taskforce. The Prime Minister recently renewed the mandate of that cross-departmental mechanism, which ensures that we are able to provide a whole-of-Government approach to the threats we face. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. These are not party political issues. I have always believed that these are matters that should be a shared endeavour. I will want to work with him and Members right across the House to ensure that, collectively, we keep ourselves safe.
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For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about.
The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act.
This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience.
In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats.
As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary.
As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information.
The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests.
I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.
I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?
May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.
The shadow Home Secretary specifically raised the issue of the embassy in London, as I am sure other hon. Members will. He will know that China’s application to build a new embassy in London is going through an independent planning process. A final decision on planning permission will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, but I can be absolutely clear, in relation to FIRS, the nature of the threat and the embassy, that national security has been, and will continue to be, a core priority for this Government throughout the process.
The shadow Home Secretary asked about the CPS decision. I know that he understands that he is asking me about decisions made by the CPS that are entirely independent of Government. This was an independent decision made by the CPS, and it is not for any Government Minister to speculate on the reasons behind it. As I have said—I have been crystal clear—the Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, and we remain extremely concerned about the espionage threat posed to the United Kingdom.