That this House regrets that the Official Controls (Plant Health) and Phytosanitary Conditions (Amendment) Regulations 2025, laid before the House on 8 January (SI 2025/13), provide for further constitutional separation between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.
Relevant document: 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
My Lords, the regret Motion standing in my name tonight is on a very technical piece of legislation, but one that raises huge matters of principle for this country. That is why I thought it right to ensure, however belatedly, that the issues are debated and are not lost from public or parliamentary view. In speaking tonight, I want to do three things. The first is to set out my concerns about this specific legislation. The second is to set it in the context of the wider Windsor Framework arrangements. Finally, I want to speculate and to ask the Minister a few questions about the implications for the Windsor Framework of the SPS agreement reached, at least in principle, with the EU on 19 May.
First of all, in brief, the legislation updates in various ways the controls that apply to the import of plants into Great Britain to protect against certain high-risk plant pests. I will not go into the detail. I thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for highlighting it as legislation of interest; the committee did so on the back of a memorandum from the honourable Member Jim Allister in the Commons and a response from Defra. Mr Allister’s memorandum, the concerns of which I entirely share, and the Defra response, which seems to largely miss the point, together set out the core problem.
These regulations, as I say, provide for new controls on the import of plants from other countries, including the EU, which for these purposes includes Northern Ireland. In other words, Northern Ireland is in a separate SPS zone from Great Britain. The implications of this are significant. The legislation says that there is a new list of pests from which HMG want to protect Great Britain. Yet, Northern Ireland is part of the UK as well. Why do the Government not wish to protect Northern Ireland, too? The answer, of course, is that they cannot do so; they must, in fact, rely on the EU’s own biosecurity controls, which are the only controls in force in Northern Ireland. The British Government have no legislative or legal control over biosecurity in Northern Ireland.
In any world, biosecurity is an essential state function of any country, for it must be performed by the state. Article 1(2) of the Northern Ireland protocol says that it
“respects the essential State functions”.
In this case, however, that state function is outsourced to another state. Many might argue that itself is not compatible with the operating of the protocol. The Government attempt to deal with this problem by arguing that the EU’s controls are just as good as ours and therefore we have no reason to be concerned by the situation. Indeed, when we were last debating this, on 29 January, the Minister said:
“I want to stress that the EU takes its biosecurity responsibilities for something like foot and mouth extremely seriously”.—[Official Report, 29/1/25; col. 360.]
My Lords, I will address principally the arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Frost, used in the third part of his speech—the ones that relate more generally to the SPS agreement that on 19 May our Government and the European Union agreed to negotiate.
When I listened to the noble Lord introducing his regret Motion, I hardly noticed any recognition of the fact that we would not be discussing this tonight were it not for his dereliction as a negotiator, when the negotiations were being carried out, to find any protection for the extremely valuable agri-food exports that we make to the other countries of Europe. Nothing was done about that when he was a Minister in the Johnson Government, and no attempt was made to negotiate provisions in the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU aimed at protecting those valuable exports and the people who produce them.
It seems to me that he was also, apparently, unaware of the fact that the SPS agreement, if negotiated successfully—which the Government agreed to attempt to do on 19 May, as did the European Union—would have many additional aspects that could be of great value. Those, of course, are the ones that relate to Northern Ireland, because it is rather clear that if there were an SPS agreement, quite a lot of the problems that have arisen in the operation of the Windsor Framework and the arrangements for trade between Northern Ireland, the rest of the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe would simply fall away. They would not be necessary. That in itself is surely a major prize to reach for.
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The SPS controls—which have prevented our agri-food industries gaining the benefits that they used to gain when we were a member of the European Union and that they could have gained if there had been an SPS agreement—are very substantial, and I wonder whether the noble Lord who is moving this Motion took, at the time, the views and interests of those industries. Did he ask them whether they wanted an SPS agreement? I rather doubt it. Did he pay any attention to the fact that many of those industries are now extremely enthusiastic about the idea of an SPS agreement with the European Union? I think that is pretty clear. Did he at the time conduct any kind of impact assessment as to the effect his dereliction would have? I doubt that too.
In ending, I simply say that I hope this House will not regret these regulations because of the considerations that I have mentioned and because the benefits from an SPS agreement would, I believe, be very considerable. I trust that the House will therefore not approve this regret Motion if it is put to a vote. It can then be consigned to that increasing heap of the benefits of Brexit.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Frost, on praying against this. It is really good to see someone from the Conservative Party actually praying against these regulations. In his wide-ranging contribution, he highlighted some of the real issues that we should be discussing. Perhaps it might be helpful if sometimes we were not discussing these issues so late at night. I also congratulate him on his patience, because I think he prayed against this some months ago and, of course, the regulations are already in place.
These regulations are hugely controversial because they undermine the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, giving effect to the division of the UK into two parts. Although it is correct that, for epidemiological purposes, Northern Ireland has been treated on the same basis as the rest of the island of Ireland since before the imposition of the Irish Sea border, the idea that this somehow neutralises the problem associated with the border and these regulations is just unsustainable. There is all the difference in the world between the effects of being treated as part of the same epidemiological unit as the rest of the island of Ireland, while remaining within the international SPS borders of the United Kingdom, and being treated as part of the same epidemiologist unit as the rest of the island of Ireland, while being moved from within the international SPS borders of the UK into the international SPS borders of the EU.
What makes these regulations really toxic to me and to others is the fact that they have been given effect through the SPS border enforcement framework provided by the Official Controls (Amendment) Regulations 2024. As such, not only do they divide the UK by means of an international SPS border but they do so on the basis of a justification that their enforcement mechanism sweeps away, pulling the rug from beneath the feet of the entire Irish Sea border project.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. I agree with virtually every word that she has said. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Frost, on bringing this regret Motion before your Lordships’ House this evening. It is extremely important, as I have said on numerous occasions during these types of debates. I welcome that, while it is not a great turnout, it is a much better turnout than we normally have for these statutory instrument debates. We are privileged to have so many people taking an interest. We guarantee that there will be such opportunities in the future, as we examine European legislation.
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It is important that these matters are properly debated somewhere in Parliament, because they are certainly not debated in Stormont or in the House of Commons. Our legislatures here and in Stormont have no control, power or say in developing any of these laws. It is very important that we take this time, on behalf of the people in the part of the United Kingdom who are affected by foreign laws being imposed upon them without their say and without any role in developing them, so that they have the opportunity to hear some people at least explore what these regulations mean and the importance of them.
I want to say a few words on the generality of some of the issues that have been raised so far and then come on to the details of this set of regulations. As the noble Lord, Lord Frost, said, we have now this reset and the announcement by the Government of plans for future negotiations, an SPS agreement and so on. While this may bring temporary change or relief in the operation of some of the workings of the Windsor Framework/protocol, the fact is that none of the reset will change one word or one letter of the Windsor Framework/protocol. It will not deal with the areas that are left outside SPS—the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has asked for clarification on what areas are covered. I look forward to hearing what the Minister says on that because, again, this is extremely important for the people of Northern Ireland.
In the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, on which I have the honour of serving under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, this issue has come up many times. The people of Northern Ireland do not now know what the law is and they cannot find out what it is because of the changes that take place on a dynamic alignment basis. Clear evidence of this has been given, so it is very important that we get these facts out and on the record.
My worry about the reset is that, while it is being talked up by some, it is restricted in the areas that are covered. It does not change the Windsor Framework/protocol. As a result, the reset could be changed again, leaving Northern Ireland back in the position that it currently finds itself in. Fundamentally, it does not deal with the major point of contention here—the constitutional and democratic one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. The fact is that in 300 areas of law—not 300 laws but 300 areas—covering vast swathes of our economy, the laws for Northern Ireland are set by a foreign political body in its interests and not in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland. We are left to accept it. They are imposed upon us on a dynamic alignment basis.
There was a recent debate on the Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products and Energy Information (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2025—if you ever want to know what a technical regulation is, that is certainly one of them. During that debate, there was a bit of discussion on whether or not we were being dynamically aligned with the EU. Just after that, we received evidence in our Select Committee from Dr Lisa Claire Whitten of Queen’s University in which she explained how we were affected by the dynamic regulatory alignment of Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework. I hope that nobody will dispute that issue. It is very insidious situation, where laws are being changed without even coming to the attention of the Democratic Scrutiny Committee of the Assembly in Northern Ireland. Many of them are delegated acts or implementing legislation that is not covered by the so-called Stormont brake, the applicability Motion or any such like.
This is extremely important business that we are about this evening. These specific regulations relate to biosecurity. Article 1(2) of the Windsor Framework/protocol states that:
“This Protocol respects the essential State functions and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom”.
The most essential state function is the provision of security for citizens, and a critical dimension of the security of citizens is their biosecurity. These regulations are another illustration of the abandonment of the United Kingdom Government of this function in respect of part of the United Kingdom. These regulations apply only to England, Scotland and Wales. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, at paragraph 4.1, the instrument
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She was effectively admitting then that those responsibilities are not ours but the EU’s.
I do not know whether it is true or not that the EU takes its responsibilities seriously. In one sense, it does not matter; there is nothing we can do about it. We can try to persuade the EU through the joint committee process to put similar rules in place in Northern Ireland, if it has not done so in the whole of the European Union, but it is only persuasion; we have no power and we are supplicants to the EU in this and many other areas. In short, we can legislate for GB but not for Northern Ireland. That remains the situation, and it is a very unhappy one.
This brings me to the second area I want to discuss, which is the broader picture into which this legislation fits. Tonight’s SI is a specific case of the general problem, which is the Windsor Framework. Under this arrangement—which, regrettably, the previous Government agreed to—a process is under way which is contributing to the separation between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is what is happening, and that is at the root of the political problem.
To look back a little, the Windsor Framework ultimately stems from the 2017 joint report between this country and the European Union, and the commitment that was made in that report to align Northern Ireland with the EU single market and customs in default of any other solution. Once that commitment had been made, it then became inevitable that the EU would never try to find any other solution. That is why the original Northern Ireland protocol had to be agreed in 2019, effectively under duress, as the only way of delivering the referendum result, once the option of leaving the EU without a deal had been closed off by Members of this Parliament.
Two directions of travel were then possible. The first was that the protocol arrangements would be seen to be difficult to work in practice, would come under pressure, would not last and the protocol itself would end up being removed or overridden. The Johnson Government, both when I was responsible for this issue and under my successors, sought to achieve this, first by negotiation and then by the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. As we know, that Bill fell and with it fell any effort—for the time being anyway—to deal with the legal situation created by the protocol.
The other possible direction of travel was the one that has been taken since that point, whereby British Governments have reconciled themselves to the protocol arrangements and actively supported them. That is what the Windsor Framework represents. The British Government are now actively committed to defending these arrangements—a situation in which another entity decrees what must happen in part of our own country.
Not only is that intolerable in itself on that basis; it has two consequences. First, this new reality, in which our Government actively support these arrangements, leads to a different future because other actors start adjusting to it. For example, on trade, between 2020 and 2023 the value of goods purchased by Northern Ireland from Ireland went up twice as fast as the value of goods purchased by Northern Ireland from Great Britain. There is persistent evidence that companies in Great Britain are less inclined to supply Northern Ireland because of the complexity of the rules. The Northern Irish companies are finding suppliers in Ireland instead, and therefore trade diversion is taking place. I note that trade diversion is an explicitly specified reason in the protocol for the use of the safeguards in Article 16.
The second consequence is that it leads to a situation that is well known but needs to be dwelt on: British Governments are inhibited from legislating differently from the EU in areas covered by the Windsor Framework for fear of opening further the gap between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. There is plenty of evidence that this is happening. It was part of the reason why the previous Government were so reluctant to remove, fully and completely, retained EU law from the statute book and it was part of the inspiration behind the product regulation Bill, currently going through the Commons, which will allow Ministers to align us further with the EU by legislative fiat.
This is the heart of the political and legal problem, and all attempts to mitigate it—including, I am sure, in the important work of the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and his review of the protocol—will come up against this central fact: the willing agreement of the Windsor Framework was a serious mistake. I am afraid that it has caused profound damage to our national interests and will continue to do so.
I know that some noble Lords with an interest in Northern Ireland—and others with a broader interest in Northern Ireland politics—regard this view as intolerably simplistic. They say that the only way to make things work in Northern Ireland is to live with complexity, to accept ambiguity and to be resolute for equivocation. They say that the only way to keep viable the political arrangements created by the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is to pretend to believe they can do two things at the same time: be simultaneously a route to Irish unity for some and a guarantee of Britishness for others under unionism. Maybe you can do that in words, but you cannot do it in real life. Every political, economic and legal development affecting Northern Ireland tilts the balance one way or the other between—to use the jargon—east-west and north-south. But I am afraid that nothing has tilted it more than our acceptance, in the Windsor Framework, of the fact that laws in Northern Ireland are not made by people in Northern Ireland or anywhere else in the UK.
I feel that, in the long run, these arrangements will have to go. One day, a different route will have to be taken and something like the proposed mutual enforcement arrangements will have to be put in place. The Windsor Framework will have to be ditched, and UK laws will have to apply in Northern Ireland as they do anywhere else. I do not think that the current arrangements can stand.
I turn to the third area I want to discuss. I have previously made points like the ones I have just made, as have many others. But since I last made them, one important new element has been added to the situation: the 19 May reset deal and the proposed SPS agreement between us and the EU. I will speculate a little about what this might be and what implications it might have for the legislation we are discussing tonight and other such legislation in the same series. I ask the Minister to respond to some questions.
It is said in the communiqué that the putative agreement
“would result in the vast majority of movements of animals, animal products, plants, and plant products between Great Britain and the European Union being undertaken without the certificates or controls that are currently required by the rules … These same benefits would be extended to the movements between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, through the interplay of the Windsor Framework and the SPS Agreement, so long as the SPS Agreement is fully implemented”.
It goes on to be quite clear about the legal basis for this dynamic alignment: that the UK must accept EU legislation in the SPS area without any formal say in the matter. In other words, the arrangements that are so unacceptable democratically and legally in Northern Ireland are to be extended to the rest of the United Kingdom as well. That is a huge price to pay in national sovereignty and control.
The phraseology of the declaration is important. What the UK has to do is clear; what the effect will be is less so. The Government have at times given the impression that there will be unfettered agri-food trade once the agreement is in place, but that is not what the words say. Agri-food is not all food: it does not include certain processed animal or plant products and many drinks—for example, Scotch, our biggest food and drink export. The Windsor Framework’s arrangements themselves cover more than just SPS movements.
I ask a few questions to conclude my remarks. First, the reset text says that “the vast majority” of movements of SPS goods will be covered by the agreement. Can the Minister say which goods are not covered and will therefore be covered by the existing Windsor Framework arrangements?
Secondly, for goods that are covered by the new arrangements, will the other non-SPS aspects of the Windsor Framework process remain in place for movements from GB to Northern Ireland? Specifically, can the Minister confirm, either now or later in writing, that the customs arrangements required under the Windsor Framework will remain in place, as surely they must unless we are joining some sort of customs arrangement as well. SPS movements will remain secondary customs movements as now, and therefore even when this new arrangement is in place for SPS goods, there will still remain a process and customs barrier between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Finally, can she confirm—to help us understand the difference between now and the future—whether the specific piece of legislation we are discussing tonight would be needed in future when the SPS agreement is in place? If not, is that because in future the biosecurity not just of Northern Ireland but of the whole of this country will be protected under EU legislation rather than our own?
I conclude that the Windsor Framework is leading this Government and this country into deeper, more dangerous waters with every day that passes. It must one day be removed, and one day I hope it will be. I beg to move.
The Government’s justification for moving both the customs and the international SPS border from the international border was that the only way we could have such a border was as a hard border and they did not want a hard border on the international border and therefore agreed to the movement of the border to the Irish Sea.
However, the enforcement mechanism for the regulations before us today demonstrates that the border can be enforced without SPS infrastructure on the border, so the Government’s justification for moving the border disappears, making the constitutional ramifications of the regulations before us today very toxic and controversial.
When I raised this problem on 29 January in the debate on the Official Controls (Amendment) Regulations that provide the framework for the enforcement of the regulations before us today, the Minister stated:
“I was also asked why SPS checks and controls take place away from the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. This was obviously part of the Windsor Framework and was approved at the time by Parliament. We cannot unpick that through this SI, but, again, these things can be looked at by the work that the noble Lord will be carrying out if the committee is interested in doing so”.—[Official Report, 29/1/25; col. 359.]
But that is incorrect.
Although the movement of the SPS border from the international border to the Irish Sea was obviously part of the Windsor Framework, the removal of the central justification for moving the border, by means of the way in which the regulations before us today will be enforced, was not in the protocol, nor in the amendments that resulted in it being renamed the Windsor Framework. That is the whole point.
It is with the demonstration that the border can be enforced through an SPS infrastructure away from the border, through the enforcement regime for the regulations before us today, which has become apparent only this year, that the whole justification for moving the border has been removed.
On 4 March, the honourable Member for North Antrim raised the very same point in another place. Interestingly, on that occasion the Secretary of State said:
“The answer is this: as a sovereign country, it falls to us to decide how we check goods that arrive in our territory … It is for sovereign countries to determine what checks they apply. The same truth applies to the European Union; it has a single market”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/25; cols. 253-54.]
What the Secretary of State was saying simply has the effect of saying that the problem highlighted is indeed a reality, but seeks to validate this on the basis that the way the border works is the decision of the UK Government for goods moving from Northern Ireland to GB and of the EU Government for goods moving from GB to NI. As such, it simply acknowledges the current situation but does not engage with the problem that it presents.
The point is that doing this completely removes the justification always given for taking the extraordinary step of agreeing to move the customs and SPS border from the international border to the Irish Sea, namely that this was the only way to avoid having a hard border, when our Irish Sea border arrangements demonstrate that this is not true. So I ask the noble Baroness again: who is right, she or the Secretary of State in the other place?
This is a huge issue, because of the costs associated with moving the SPS border away from the international border, even, as we know, as that border serves as the border for tax and excise purposes, for purposes of currency, for many other legal purposes and indeed more recently for immigration purposes, because the Republic now carries out immigration checks along the border. So it constitutes the most extraordinary reversal of democracy.
We are aware of countries that are not democratic and we want them to become fully democratic. But what has happened in Northern Ireland, by contrast, because of the needless movement of the customs and SPS border, is really extraordinary. We have seen the disenfranchisement of 1.9 million people in 300 areas of law—not just bits of law but areas. This makes the Government’s position completely unsustainable. They cannot say, as the Secretary of State said, that it is fine to agree to move the border when the operation of the Irish Sea border, GB to NI, demonstrates that the only justification for doing so does not exist.
In truth, no self-respecting country should agree to any arrangement that involves the disfranchisement of all its citizens in 300 areas of law, for any reason. However, to do so in a context where one’s own arrangements demonstrate that this is completely unnecessary suggests that the United Kingdom has become the first country in the world that is prepared to prioritise acquiescing to the requests of other countries that its own arrangements demonstrate are needless when the price is trading the citizenship of its own people.
I have to say that the Secretary of State himself bears a unique responsibility, because he brought before Parliament what became the Benn Act, the effect of which was to greatly weaken the negotiating position of the then Government. Had he not tied their hands, it is highly unlikely that we would have ended up with the protocol, because there is no doubt that the European Union would have feared the implications of a no-deal Brexit and might not have been quite so unreasonable.
Nevertheless, as the noble Lord Frost said, many of us thought at the time when all of this went through that it would only be temporary. I am very sad that the incoming Government have not seized on the opportunity with this so-called reset to actually try to get the European Union to see sense. The Secretary of State’s intervention ensured that there had to be a deal, without the risk of no deal, and the price of that, which he and others certainly wanted, was that the people of Northern Ireland have become a commodity, traded to give the people of Great Britain the assurance of the trade and co-operation agreement.
The regulation before us today puts in focus once again the abandonment of 1.9 million people of the United Kingdom. I am not going to go over it again, but last time I read out the letter from young people from Northern Ireland who talked about the Government lecturing young people about the importance of active citizenship, only to argue that they did not actually have active citizenship in that part of the United Kingdom. I would also say that they are very grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, has now agreed to meet them, and they are looking forward to that.
All of what is being said now and will be said by others has huge implications for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, which is required by paragraph 7 of the unilateral declaration of 2019 to consider both the operation of the Windsor Framework and the implications of moving away from it, which is possible only if we all consider the alternatives to the current arrangement. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, must consider the alternatives in detail, including, as the noble Lord, Lord Frost, said, mutual enforcement, which was originally what the EU favoured back in 2019, but things have moved on since then.
We have had to come to terms with the very destructive impact of the operation of the Windsor Framework on democracy, trade and the diversion of trade—why has Article 16 not been invoked?—the effect of those wishing to buy goods from GB businesses and, most importantly, driving a wedge between one part of our country and another. As the noble Lord, Lord Frost, said, this cannot continue. It cannot be sustainable. Mutual enforcement can be a solution to address the UK/Republic of Ireland land border challenge. While it may have been passed over in 2019 because some people felt that it was not the solution, now that we have seen what was the solution, mutual enforcement most certainly represents the best available option in 2025, and discussing these kinds of regulations and the effect on people in Northern Ireland really should make noble Lords sit up and think that something has to change.