Offensive Weapons Bill

Committee (3rd Day)

My Lords, we have started a little late for the obvious reason that people cannot be in two places at once. I must make the normal announcement that if there is a Division in the House, the Committee will immediately adjourn for 10 minutes.

Clause 26: Surrender of prohibited offensive weapons

Amendment 70A had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Clause 26 agreed.

Clause 27 agreed.

Clause 28: Offence of threatening with offensive weapon etc in a public place etc

Debate on whether Clause 28 should stand part of the Bill.

Member’s explanatory statement

This, along with amendments to Clause 29, would retain the current definition of risk for the existing offences in section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and for the new offence in Clause 29.

My Lords, I have given notice of our intention to oppose the question that this clause should stand part of the Bill. I will also speak to Amendments 71 and 72. Clause 28 would change current legislation in terms of the risk that must be present for an offence of threatening someone with an offensive weapon to be proved. Currently, the person threatening must do so in such a way that there is an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The Bill changes this level of risk to what a reasonable person would think was an immediate threat of physical harm, not serious physical harm—it is only a perceived threat and not an actual threat.

In their joint briefing, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust point out that the new definition is a much lower threshold for conviction. The person being threatened does not have to be present or at actual risk of harm. Previously, there had to be an immediate threat of occasioning grievous bodily harm; now, it is an undefined level of physical harm, and the “reasonable person” test is vague.

Clause 28 relates to offences in public places and Clause 29 to offences on further education premises. I question why these offences are needed at all. Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 states that a person is guilty of an offence,

“if he uses or threatens … violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.

An affray may be committed in private as well as in public, and a person guilty of affray is liable to a maximum sentence of three years in prison or a fine, or both. Can the Minister explain which parts of these new offences are not covered by the offence under Section 3 of the 1986 Act?

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for affording the Committee the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill updating the offences of threatening with an offensive weapon. It may assist the Committee if I briefly explain the provisions in Section 1A of the Protection of Crime Act 1953 and Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and then explain why we have brought forward changes to these provisions. I will also cover Section 3.

Section 1A of the 1953 Act provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of the weapon threatens another person with the weapon in a public place. Section 139AA of the 1988 Act similarly provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of an article with a blade or point threatens another person with the article in a public place or on school premises.

Unlike the offences in Section 1 of the 1953 Act and Section 139 of the 1988 Act, which are simple possession offences, where a person is convicted of an offence under Section 1A of the 1953 Act or Section 139AA of the 1988 Act, the court must, in the case of an adult, impose a custodial sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment, unless it would be unjust to do so. The power to make a community order is not available in circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence condition is met.

It is an essential element of these aggravated offences that the defendant threatened the victim with the weapon,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to the victim”,

as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained. However, the view of the Crown Prosecution Service is that the requirement that the defendant threatens with the weapon or article,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”,

My Lords, can my noble friend say how many offences are committed annually on further education premises, which are the subject of Clause 29? Further education premises are a place where perhaps a majority of the people have an offensive weapon, as defined in the Bill, as part of what they need to do their training. If someone is spending their day with a screwdriver because they are on an electronics course and someone comes up and kicks them in the butt, and they turn round with the screwdriver in their hand, under the amended provision, they will be in chokey for it. We do not seem to have incorporated in it any defence which says that the person had the weapon for perfectly good reasons and was using it for perfectly good reasons when somebody else did something which caused the threatening situation. In public, one does not come across this often, but in an FE college it is a routine occurrence. I cannot see that we should criminalise arguments in FE colleges without there being some reasonable defence.

I thank my noble friend for his question. As we are including FE colleges for the first time in the legislation, we do not have the data as yet, but that will be captured in future. We have the data on schools and public places, which I am happy to share with my noble friend. On his last comment, there is no intention of criminalising arguments. We are talking about people in possession of an offensive weapon and threatening someone else with it in such a way that any one of us—assuming that we are all reasonable people—would assume that there was a risk of physical harm.

My Lords, if you are waving a screwdriver about, there is a risk of physical harm, which is the point of the old wording of “serious physical harm”: to rule out such a random occurrence. In public places, in schools, by and large people do not handle physical, offensive weapons openly. In a further education college, a lot of people will be, because it will be part of what they are required to do. Nobody doing anything serious with a knife uses a blade that does not lock. Anybody using a screwdriver or other pointed implement will be using something that will be classified, or is capable of being classified, as an offensive weapon. We should make sure that somebody reasonably having in their hands an offensive weapon because they are using it at the moment when the flash of an argument starts does not become the cause for a mandatory prison sentence. There has to be the scope for a court to take a sensible view of what is going on. It is not like a school; it is an environment where offensive weapons are routine and where a lot effort goes into making sure that people use them safely. Common sense needs to be applied when considering whether it is an offence with a bladed weapon or just an argument taking place when one or both of the parties happen to be holding an offensive weapon, because that is what they were supposed to be doing at the time the argument started.

I hope that I can reassure my noble friend on two points: first, the spirit of the legislation is not to criminalise people in the way that he has described; secondly, the sentencing guidelines were updated relatively recently, in June last year, and give multiple scenarios for the courts to consider in sentencing—which I think would allay my noble friend’s fears.

I would be grateful if my noble friend could share that.

My Lords, can the Minister remind us of the youngest age to which these provisions apply? I remind her that it is the effect of the legislation, not the intention, that matters.

The youngest age to which the provisions apply is 10—the standard age of criminal responsibility.