My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall repeat a Statement on the OBR forecasting process made in the other place earlier today by my right honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. The Statement is as follows:
“Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement to the House on two separate but related matters. The first is regarding communication with the public in the lead-up to the Budget. I understand that this is a topic that has held much interest and speculation over the weekend and I would like to take this opportunity to give a formal Statement to the House on the Government’s position. However, the Government have also today received the results of the OBR’s investigation into the early release of the Economic and Fiscal Outlook at the Budget last week. I know that the House will be concerned to understand those findings, so the majority of my Statement will be concerned with this latter point.
On the former point, the Chancellor has been entirely consistent and honest with the public about her considerations in the lead-up to the Budget last week. First, she was clear on her priorities for the Budget on 4 November: cutting NHS waiting lists, cutting the cost of living, and cutting our debt and borrowing. The Budget she delivered last week delivered on all three of those priorities. Secondly, she was clear on 4 November that a lower productivity forecast would mean lower tax receipts. The OBR confirmed at the Budget that tax receipts are £16 billion lower as a result of its reduced productivity forecast.
Thirdly, the Chancellor was clear on 4 November that she intended to build more headroom. She has done that, with headroom against the stability rule of £21.7 billion. Fourthly, she was clear in the summer that the policy decisions we took on welfare would need to be paid for at the Budget, and the Budget document shows those decisions costing £6.9 billion in 2029-30. Finally, the OBR has now confirmed that the Chancellor knew on 4 November that she had only £4.2 billion of headroom against her fiscal rules, meaning that once the cost of those policy decisions was accounted for, there would be a deficit of £2.7 billion against the stability rule.
The combined effect of this information is this: on 4 November, the Chancellor knew that the Government would be in deficit against the stability rule before any of this Government’s priorities for the Budget had been delivered or any additional headroom had been built. In the light of this information, and in the knowledge of the OBR’s productivity downgrade, the Chancellor knew on 4 November that challenging decisions would be required on tax and spend. The subsequent decision to freeze personal tax thresholds for a further three years shows that this was completely correct.
The Chancellor took the unique step of delivering that scene-setter speech before the Budget, precisely so that she could be honest about the circumstances that she was facing and the decisions she would need to take. The Chancellor has been completely honest and consistent with the public in everything that she has said.
I turn now to my second topic. Last Wednesday, before the Chancellor had begun to give her Budget speech, the Office for Budget Responsibility published its entire Economic and Fiscal Outlook November 2025 online. Let me be clear: this is a very serious breach of highly sensitive information. It is a fundamental breach of the OBR’s responsibility, it is a discourtesy to this House, and it should never have happened. The OBR rightly took full responsibility and issued an apology to the Chancellor later that day. It has now conducted an investigation into how the report was published prematurely, and it sent its report, including its findings, to the Treasury and the Treasury Select Committee today at 12.30 pm.
The report states:
‘We are in no doubt that this failure to protect information prior to publication has inflicted heavy damage on the OBR’s reputation. It is the worst failure in the 15-year history of the OBR’.
It adds:
‘The ultimate responsibility for the circumstances in which this vulnerability occurred and was then exposed rests, over the years, with the leadership of the OBR’.
The report notes that this has
‘inflicted heavy damage on the OBR’s reputation’,
and caused significant disruption on Budget Day ‘to the Chancellor’s disadvantage’. I can confirm to the House that the report goes on to make it clear that this is a significant and long-standing issue that has allowed external users to gain early access to the OBR’s publication, which contains full details of its forecasts and the Chancellor’s Budget.
In the days since the Budget, there has been speculation about the kind of error that led to the Economic and Fiscal Outlook November 2025 being published early. The report today confirms that the cause was not
‘simply a matter of pressing the publication button on a locally managed website too early’.
The report concludes that the cause of the OBR’s error was ‘systemic issues’, and that the investigation has made it clear that
‘the problem exposed last week was not a new one’.
Indeed, I can confirm to the House that the report reveals that the OBR’s EFO in March was accessed before the Chancellor delivered the Spring Statement to the House. That underlines just how serious a situation this is. Let me underline just how seriously we as a Government take it to ensure the OBR never allows this to happen again.
The report notes that common and fairly basic protections to prevent early access, including passwords and random character URLs, were not used. It further notes that two configuration errors, which were not understood by the OBR’s online publishing function, prevented the safeguards in its online publishing software being effective.
However, I am very concerned to share that the report also notes that
‘it is very likely that the weaknesses that caused the premature accessing of the November 2025 EFO were pre-existing. Indeed, it appears that the March 2025 EFO was accessed prematurely’.
These findings are very serious indeed. That market-sensitive information was prematurely accessible to a small group of market participants is extremely concerning; that it might have been the case on more than one occasion is even more severe. We do not at this stage know the extent to which market behaviour may have been affected on this or other occasions as a result of information being available early.
I want to share one further piece of information from the report with the House today. On the morning of the Budget, the first IP address to successfully access the economic and fiscal outlook had made 32 prior attempts on the day, starting around 5 am. Such a volume of requests implies that the person attempting to access the document had every confidence that persistence would lead to success at some point. This unfortunately leads us to consider whether the reason they tried so persistently to access the economic and fiscal outlook is because they had been successful at a previous fiscal event. At this time, we do not have answers to all these questions, but I can confirm that the Treasury will make contact with previous Chancellors to make them aware of developments that relate to previous fiscal events. The OBR has rightly conducted its initial investigation as quickly as possible, and it is right that both the Government and the Treasury Select Committee now take time to consider the report and its findings. The Treasury Committee will have the opportunity to carefully question the OBR tomorrow at its post-Budget hearing.
Furthermore, in response to the recommendation in paragraph 3.4 that the problem exposed last week was not a new one, I can confirm to the House that the Government will work in conjunction with the National Cyber Security Centre to take forward the recommendation that a forensic examination of other fiscal events is carried out, although let me specifically note to the House that the report finds no evidence of hostile cyber activity. In addition, the report says that the OBR
‘could not, in the time available, carry out deeper forensic examination of other recent EFO events and we recommend that such an exercise is, with expert support, now urgently carried out’.
We will make sure that work is carried out urgently. We will look at wider questions of the systemic risk that this incident has uncovered, including the report’s conclusion that the OBR’s information security arrangements
‘should have been regularly re-examined and assured by the management of the OBR’.
This Government are committed to the independence of the Office for Budget Responsibility and its role at the heart of economic and fiscal policy-making. The strength of that institution is a vital pillar in the Government’s economic and fiscal policy-making, and we will respond to this matter with the seriousness it demands”.