Nuclear Test Veterans Report

As we approach the 75th anniversary of the UK becoming a nuclear power, the contribution of over 22,000 UK service personnel, as well as scientists and civilians, in developing our nuclear deterrent must never be forgotten. I would like to place on record how grateful this Government are to those individuals for the critical role they played in the security of our nation.

Today I am updating the House on the findings of a major records exercise undertaken by the Ministry of Defence. This work has sought to address concerns raised by some in the nuclear test veteran community on gaps in their medical records.

I would first like to thank the community for their patience while this records exercise has been undertaken. The publication of its findings reflects this Government’s clear commitment to transparency and follows regular ministerial engagement with nuclear test veterans and the organisations that represent them. We have been keen to ensure that the exercise was conducted with thoroughness and care, and that its findings are as comprehensive as possible. This has required considerable work and therefore taken time to complete.

Records have been reviewed across the Department, including those held by the single services historical branches and AWE Nuclear Security Technologies. This has been a complex undertaking, noting the passage of time and cohering information, from a myriad of different departments and departmental reorganisations, since nuclear testing took place. The modern Ministry of Defence was established in 1964, some 12 years after testing began, which I appreciate has caused issues of trust in historical information storage. I know that we have lost veterans since its commissioning, and I would like to take this opportunity to pay my respects to them.

This significant exercise examined: the policy of blood and urine testing between 1952 and 1967; information captured about the blood and urine testing; and if the records did exist, to determine what happened to them.

Evidence indicates medical examinations or blood testing were required for the majority, if not all, of the nuclear testing period and applied to all three services. I refer to both, as when medical examinations are mentioned, it is not always explicit whether this included blood testing, or more specifically blood counts, but for the most part blood tests or blood counts are mentioned when the details of medical examinations are outlined. Evidence indicates blood testing was used pre-deployment to assess fitness to work and to establish a baseline for future comparison in the event of suspected radiation exposure. No evidence was found to suggest an overall policy for urine testing.

Compliance with policies on blood testing is evident in some surviving documentation in veterans’ records. However, the exercise confirmed that some blood testing records are indeed absent. This is likely to be due to historical policy and practices and is consistent with the condition of other personnel and medical records from the time of those not involved in nuclear tests.

It is important to state that the exercise identified some cases where testing should have taken place but did not, or where records were destroyed through administrative error. I acknowledge that, for veterans and their descendants seeking and viewing medical records, the picture therefore appears complex and inconsistent and that the content of their records will vary depending on the individual, their service and their deployment history. The exercise found no evidence of intentional concealment of medical records.

I am placing a copy of the following documents in the Library of the House and publishing them on www.gov.uk:

Records exercise into blood and urine testing of UK service personnel during the UK’s nuclear testing programme,1952 to-1967;

Army historical branch report on nuclear testing medical policy;

Navy historical branch report on nuclear testing medical policy;

Air historical branch report on nuclear testing medical policy;

AWE Nuclear Security Technologies report on nuclear testing medical policy.

My predecessor promised on 25 March 2026 to update the House in response to questions raised about a draft document released under an environmental information regulations request, entitled “Review of environmental monitoring data for Christmas Island (Cl) 1957-1958 (AWE 1)”.

Officials were asked to investigate the circumstances of the drafting of AWE 1 and the actions that were taken at the time. An extensive search of systems was undertaken. This work has established the facts around the document. It has been identified that AWE 1 was self-initiated by two AWE employees. They discovered some additional contemporaneous data that did not appear to have been included in the 1993 Clare report, which summarised the environmental monitoring programme for the nuclear tests on Christmas Island. AWE 1 was never finalised and remains a draft document.

Within Government, the release of draft documents will always create a challenge. We strive to maintain rigorous standards in the work which the Department publishes and acknowledge that the release of incomplete or draft documents without appropriate context, as in this case, may cause unnecessary confusion in relation to an already complex topic. We will learn from this.

AWE 1 was developed in isolation and without the rigorous checking required for a scientific report. It suggested that the data recordings on the island showed a minor increase in levels of radiation, but that it could not be determined at the time whether the increase was due to a natural anomaly or the result of the nuclear tests. The Clare report had already found there had been

“very localised and just measurable, but radiologically insignificant, fall-out activity”

and the authors of AWE 1 acknowledged that the fallout they identified was still too low to have caused health impacts.

AWE 1 was developed without the knowledge of MOD officials, who became aware of it in late 2014. We have found no evidence of Ministers being made aware of AWE 1 until December 2025. In January 2015, MOD officials requested to see the document and the Treasury Solicitor’s Department commissioned an expert technical review—peer review 1—which was received on 2 March 2015. It identified shortcomings with the analysis of the evidence, and completely rejected the contention and conclusions in AWE 1 that there had been material fallout on Christmas Island as a result of Grapple X. Separately, it came to light that AWE 1 had been reviewed by another AWE employee in early 2015, at the request of a local manager; that document is referred to as AWE 2.

In the 2016 final war pension litigation, new evidence—MOD report 1—was submitted that negated the exclusive reliance on measurements-based reports, such as the Clare report, and the relevance of AWE 1 and AWE 2. The tribunal considered the new evidence which took into account the nature of the war pension scheme’s standard of proof, and which assumed that, for the sake of argument, fallout had occurred at Christmas Island after every detonation. The MOD report 1 data modelled hypothetical individualised dose assessments calculated for each claimant on this basis. It is important to note that the tribunal also considered expert medical evidence and concluded in all but one case that either the level of radiation exposure was not sufficient to have caused the claimed condition, or that they were not caused by radiation at all. After the hearings before the 2016 tribunal, the author of MOD report 1 updated the report’s findings in MOD report 2 and submitted this report to the tribunal, which it took into account before coming to its final decision.

Today in the spirit of transparency, I am placing in the Library of the House a copy of AWE 1 and the five additional documents that were identified during the recent programme of work, which provide context around AWE 1. I am also placing in the Library of the House a copy of a narrative report on these documents, which provides further context.

AWE 1 document—Ionising Radiation Appeals—Review of environmental Review of environmental monitoring data for Christmas Island (Cl) 1957-1958.

AWE 2 document—Review of SDTN No. 16/93: Environmental Monitoring Data for Christmas Island 1957-58.

Peer review 1—Ionising Radiation Appeals: Review of environmental monitoring data for Christmas Island 1957-58 —Undated and un-reference draft AWE report. Review and Comments by K. Johnston.

Peer review 2—Review of SDTN No 16/93—Note by K Johnston.

MOD report 1—Reconstruction of doses received by Veterans of the UK Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests at Kiritimati—Christmas Island.

MOD report 2—Supplementary Report: Revision of Estimates of Dose to Include Additional Nuclides, Uranium 240, Neptunium 240 and Plutonium 240.

Narrative report on documents relating to environmental monitoring data at Christmas Island during the UK nuclear testing programme.

I once again offer my personal gratitude to nuclear test veterans, their families and the organisations that represent them for their patience and engagement throughout this work. I hope that the documents released today provide the clarity they have been seeking for so long, and I am committed to continuing to operate under the principle of transparency in the future.

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