Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Third Reading

That the Bill be now read a third time.

My Lords, before we begin Third Reading, I will make a statement on legislative consent.

The Government remain committed to delivering better outcomes for those most affected by the Troubles by providing more information in a more timely manner to more people than is possible under current mechanisms. We have, however, been unable to secure legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly, which is of course not sitting currently. It is important to note that the Government are working tirelessly to see the return of effective, locally elected and accountable devolved government, which is the best way for Northern Ireland to be governed. However, I also acknowledge the possibility —if I can put it that way—that, even if an Assembly were sitting, it may have chosen not to provide legislative consent in this case.

The Government have also not secured legislative consent from the Scottish Government. We are therefore, regrettably, proceeding without consent, as this legislation requires a UK-wide approach. As the Government, we must make difficult and realistic decisions about how we can best deliver for families in Northern Ireland. I reassure noble Lords across the House that the Government will continue to engage with all Northern Ireland parties and the Scottish Government on this matter.

Clause 42: Tort, delict and fatal accident actions

Amendment 1

1: Clause 42, page 36, line 4, at end insert— “(8A) This section does not apply to a relevant Troubles-related civil action if, or to the extent that, section (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation)(1) applies to the action (prohibition of civil claims alleging invalidity of interim custody orders).”Member’s explanatory statement This provides that Clause 42 does not apply to proceedings to which subsection (1) of Clause (Interim custody orders: prohibition of proceedings and compensation) applies.

My Lords, I committed to tabling an amendment at Third Reading in response to widespread concerns raised by the House over the 2020 Supreme Court ruling concerning the validity of interim custody orders made under Troubles-era internment legislation. We debated these issues at length during the amending stages, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Godson for raising these matters and for the constructive manner in which they engaged on the amendments that I tabled late last week.

To be clear, it has always been the Government’s understanding that interim custody orders, made by Ministers of the Crown under powers conferred on the Secretary of State, were perfectly valid. To restore clarity around the legal position and ensure that no one is inappropriately advantaged by a different interpretation of the law on a technicality, I have tabled amendments that retrospectively validate all interim custody orders made under Article 4 of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, as well as paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. This has the effect of confirming that a person’s detention under an interim custody order was not unlawful simply because it had been made by a junior Minister rather than by the Secretary of State personally, as was always the understanding of successive Governments.

The amendments would also prohibit certain types of legal proceedings, including civil cases, applications for compensation as a result of miscarriages of justice, and appeals against conviction which rely on the 2020 ruling from being brought or continued. To align with other prohibitions in the Bill, the continuation of pending claims and appeals in scope would be prohibited immediately from commencement.

There is a specific exemption in the Bill for certain types of ongoing criminal appeals, where leave to appeal has already been granted or where there has been a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission by the time of the Bill’s commencement. Importantly, this exception would not allow for the payment of compensation flowing from the reversal of such convictions. I make it clear that this amendment would not lead to convictions already reversed being reinstated. I hope the House will join me in welcoming the legal clarity that these amendments bring. I beg to move.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for tabling these amendments in response to amendments tabled by me and the noble Lord, Lord Godson, which were supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. I thank the Minister and his officials very much for the constructive way in which they engaged with us to produce this complex amendment in response to our simpler but plainly inadequate amendment. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who is not in his place. He supported the amendment on the basis of the well-understood Carltona doctrine.

I have also been asked to mention the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who is in the interesting position of being the only living Minister who was in Northern Ireland at the time and directly involved with this and a number of other ICOs. I thank him and many other noble Lords for their help with these amendments. They will do a great deal to restore the Carltona principle to its proper place and it will put right a decision of the Supreme Court which was no doubt reached in good faith but which was, in retrospect, wrongly decided.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister, of which I have given him notice. The first is in relation to the commencement date for the two new clauses. They are described as coming into force two months after Royal Assent. I understand what he says about those extant criminal appeals. It seems that delaying this for two months risks there being some further appeals which will go forward on the rather unfortunate premise that the relevant ICOs were unlawfully entered into. Can he clarify that?

Secondly, the second proposed new clause contains an order-making power, for regulations under Section 55(2), which is consequential on the section and allows a Minister to amend this Act. They are subject to the affirmative procedure, but I am concerned, as the House always is, by powers of this scale. I seek an assurance from the Minister: although I know that the current Secretary of State will not be amending the Act to, in any way, take away with the left hand what it has given with the right, it would be useful to have on record the assurance that the Bill does not intend to amend its provisions in any substantial way, particularly those that are the subject of these amendments.

My Lords, I support the amendments, but mention has been made of the Supreme Court judgment in R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19, which caused the difficulties that these amendments are designed to address.

On 26 June, on Report, my noble friend Lord Faulks referred to Policy Exchange as having

“consistently and cogently argued that the decision flew in the face of the well-established Carltona doctrine”.

That has been explained as the doctrine that the powers of the Secretary of State may be exercised on their behalf by junior Ministers or officials. My noble friend Lord Butler of Brockwell expressed concern that the Carltona judgment

“has been thrown into doubt by this judgment”,

which he described as “this very extraordinary ruling”. The noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, said that he was

“astonished, frankly, that such a legal error could have been made”.—[Official Report, 26/6/23; cols. 502-6.]

The judgment of the five judges of the Supreme Court was given by the late Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, a distinguished and much-respected jurist. In his judgment, Lord Kerr recognised the role and importance of the Carltona principle. His reasoning was that the principle did not apply in the Gerry Adams case, because of the specific wording of the relevant statutory provision, which expressly distinguished between the making of the detention order and the signing of the order. The statutory provision said that the order could be signed by the Secretary of State, a Minister of State or an Under-Secretary of State. Lord Kerr’s conclusion was that the distinction expressly drawn in the statutory provision between the making and the signing of the order necessarily meant that only the Secretary of State could make the order.

My point is that it is simply wrong to accuse Lord Kerr of ignoring the Carltona principle or throwing it into doubt. The judgment, whether or not you agree with it—different views are, of course, permissible—was based on an analysis of the express terms of the relevant statutory provision. I am concerned that this House should not unfairly impugn the reputation—the well-deserved, high reputation—of the late Lord Kerr.

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in welcoming the amendment put forward by my noble friend the Minister that reverses the effects of R v Adams, thus restoring the Carltona principle and stopping compensation wrongly being paid for what was an entirely lawful action by my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford. I also join in the tributes paid earlier to Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who retired from this House a fortnight ago and was one of the most formidable critics of the Supreme Court’s judgment in that case, thus showing his own remarkable independence of mind, which was characteristic of his career here and on the Bench.

There has been much objection in this House to the Bill’s immunity provisions, as if they were somehow unique and unprecedented. However, immunity has already been widely granted to terrorists, such as the early release for prisoners, which was a key element of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, implemented by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. There were also 187 comfort letters issued to those on-the-runs between 2000 and 2014. The issuing of these letters was further pressed on Tony Blair as Prime Minister by Bertie Ahern as Taoiseach in December 1999, along with the cessation of extradition requests.

There has also been widespread use of royal pardons: 418 were issued in Northern Ireland between 1979 and 2002, including many for convicted terrorists. The Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill of November 2005 further sought to fulfil commitments made by the British and Irish Governments in 2003, with its offer of judicially based immunity for offences committed before 10 April 1998—that is, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

These are all extraordinary departures from the normal rules of law. Privately, Tony Blair admitted to Members of this House that they had ripped up the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. This was not just for terrorists but for security force personnel as well, which is why the investigation into Bloody Sunday was an inquiry led by a judge, not a criminal investigation led by the police.

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s amendments and I will confine my remarks to them. First, I observe that this shows how quickly the Government can move when they decide to legislate in respect of Northern Ireland to remedy an obvious injustice. Therefore, I hope that, on future occasions when we raise issues of concern that have support in Northern Ireland, the Government will be loath to use the argument that parliamentary time does not permit.

Secondly, people from right across all communities and all parties in Northern Ireland—except Sinn Féin, of course—will breathe a sigh of relief at the prospect that the godfather of terrorism over many decades, Gerry Adams, will not, on a technicality, be able to benefit from the largesse of the British taxpayer, when so many widows and the thousands of families that he and his organisation caused such suffering to, have struggled with very little compensation or recompense for many years. That injustice will be put right in this House and this Parliament. That will be warmly welcomed by those who really believe in true justice.

My Lords, Clause 42, to which this amendment applies, deprives those who suffered loss or damage as a consequence of the Troubles of the ability to bring or continue any civil action after 17 May 2022—some 14 months ago. A relatively small group of UK citizens from every part of these islands is to be deprived of their rights not only to bring a civil action but to inquests and to full human rights-compliant criminal investigations by virtue of the restrictions still placed on the investigative powers of the ICRIR by this Bill.

The long title of the Bill is amended by one of the amendments. It describes the purposes of the Bill as being to

“promote reconciliation by establishing an Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery, limiting criminal investigations, legal proceedings, inquests and police complaints”.

The purpose of the Bill is clearly stated, but at no stage has the Minister explained how it is expected that limiting criminal investigations, legal proceedings, inquests and the investigation of police complaints will promote reconciliation. I am unaware of anyone who thinks it will.

The real purpose of the Bill is to protect the Government from having to pay damages for those occasions on which investigation reveals that the state acted in breach of its duties to protect life. At its simplest, if somebody was murdered, and the state had prior knowledge and did not intervene or prevented proper investigation—and we know that these things happened right across our communities—a cause of action is disclosed. Now, in addition to the provisions of these amendments, there will be no right of action for bereaved and grieving families. That is the first purpose: to stop civil actions. The second purpose is to control access to information so that some people will never be able to prove what happened in cases involving state actors. The third purpose is to protect those veterans—they are few—both police and military, who may have committed the greatest crime, that of murder, from being subjected to due process. This Bill, as everyone has said, has been roundly and consistently condemned in the UK, by the Council of Europe, by the European High Commissioner for Human Rights, by the UN and by many others. It is a terrible breach of our international legal obligations.

My Lords, I broadly welcome these government amendments. This is a complex matter, as the interventions this afternoon have illustrated, but I am glad that the Minister has managed to find a solution that is, broadly speaking, acceptable to all, subject to the comments made for the record by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

I have only one question for the Minister regarding these Third Reading amendments. I assume that the Northern Ireland Department of Justice was also consulted and that it is happy with these proposals. Could the Minister perhaps confirm that that is the case?

My Lords, this is the third occasion on which your Lordships have had the opportunity to discuss what has become an increasingly complex issue. I am delighted that it is probably the last as, should there be any more, it would get even more complicated.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Lord Kerr was a very eminent judge. Many of us remember him and the great work that he did. However, there has clearly been a problem with this particular judgment, and the principle of junior Ministers signing orders on behalf of the Secretary of State, even if it applied all those years ago, must be sustained. So I very much look forward to what the Minister has to say in response to this short debate. We will not be opposing this amendment.

My Lords, I am as always very grateful to those who have contributed. In direct response to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, I can assure her that the DoJ in Northern Ireland was consulted on these amendments.

I am grateful again to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the very constructive way in which he has engaged on these matters. With respect to commencement, it is the Government’s intention that this should commence at the same time as the Clause 42 prohibition in the Bill relating to the ending of civil proceedings: that is, two months after Royal Assent, which is the normal commencement date. We believe that a consistent approach is important, particularly when bringing forward an amendment that is about ensuring legal clarity.

The Government believe that there is little or no prospect of compensation claims being hurried through in the two months between Royal Assent and commencement. To give an illustrative example of the pace of such claims, there has to date, to our knowledge, been no payment of compensation to anyone bringing a claim as a direct result of the Supreme Court judgment in 2020; nor are the Government aware of any of these cases being close to awarding compensation. This includes the significant cohort of civil claims in this area, which remain at a relatively early stage.

On the issue of consequential powers raised by the noble Lord and by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in her remarks, the power exists for the new provisions. I assure the House that this is solely for the purpose of consequential amendments and not to be used to alter fundamentally the policy intent of the provisions within the amendments, or their scope in bringing relevant proceedings to an end. It is intended to be very limited indeed.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his contribution. He raised a number of points but did not direct any questions. I am quite relieved at that, given his great legal experience and expertise, whereas I am a humble history graduate standing at the Dispatch Box. His comments brought out that there is a need for greater clarity in the law in this area, and that is indeed what the Government are seeking to provide with these amendments.