Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

[1st Allocated Day]

[Dame Rosie Winterton in the Chair]

Clause 1

Overview of main provisions

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—

“(za) comes into effect only in accordance with section 26(2A) to (2D);”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 26, page 1, line 3, at end insert—

“(za) requires Ministers of the Crown to set out a legal justification for altering the effect of the Northern Ireland Protocol in domestic law”

Amendment 31, page 1, line 4, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b).

Amendment 32, page 1, line 14, leave out from “Protocol” to end of line 15.

Amendment 5, page 1, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) provides powers to Ministers of the Crown that may be exercised only after good faith negotiations with the EU (through the mechanisms provided for in the Northern Ireland Protocol) have been exhausted and only with the approval of both Houses of Parliament and, where relevant, the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

Clause stand part.

Amendment 25, in clause 2, page 1, line 17, at end insert—

“(A1) This section is subject to section (Limitation of general implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol: approval of Northern Ireland Assembly).”

Clause 2 stand part.

Clause 3 stand part.

Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 8, line 47, at end insert—

Amendments 1 and 2, the latter of which amends clause 26, relate to the commencement and operationalisation of the provisions in the Bill. I have drafted them in this way because of the nature of the Bill itself. We will come to amendment 2 on day three, but amendment 1 paves the way for it, so it may be convenient if I set out the thinking behind both amendments.

As was debated at some length on Second Reading—I will not repeat everything that was said—this is an unusual and rather exceptional Bill, and not necessarily in a good way. If fully brought into effect, the Bill would lead to the United Kingdom departing unilaterally from an international agreement and therefore breaking its obligations under both customary international law and the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which is a grave and profound step for any Government to take.

I recognise that there are circumstances in which that step can be taken, and the Government asserted on Second Reading that the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol gives rise, or potentially gives rise, to those circumstances. The essence of it, though, depends on applying a factual evidence base to a legal test. The legal test in this case is essentially the international customary law convention of necessity, which is now enshrined in article 25 of the articles on state responsibility, which were adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 and are recognised by the UN General Assembly, by our Government and by the international community as an authoritative statement of the law. Article 25 sets out that necessity may be invoked if certain tests are met. The point of these amendments is to say that if the Government, or any Government, were to take that step, they should do so upon the most compelling grounds, so that the factual basis for their actions met the legal test. The reputational consequences, politically, internationally and legally, are very significant, so this should be done only when that is thoroughly tested and set before this House to be tested.

My hon. Friend is referring to certain tests of a reputational character, so I would be grateful if he would tell the Committee what those tests are right now.

I will be happy to talk about the essential tests of necessity, which are well recognised and well set out, as my hon. Friend knows. But the principle behind the amendment, which I will then go into the detail of, is precisely to say, “If you are invoking that doctrine, a most unusual thing to do, you ought to come to the House and set out the basis upon which you seek to do so.” The House would then have the chance to say whether or not we were prepared, on the basis of what the Government had put before us, to take the very exceptional step of putting ourselves in breach of a treaty obligation. That is the point.

I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman first.

On the question of necessity, does the hon. Gentleman accept, first, that we have dysfunctional government in Northern Ireland, and that the terms of the Belfast agreement have totally broken down and some have been removed? Secondly, does he accept that that has been brought about as a result not of actions by this Government, but by the protocol, the actions of the EU and the way in which it has insisted that it be applied? Thirdly, does he accept that the EU has not even tried to remedy this, because it has refused to negotiate, so necessity has been proved?

Let me return to that once I have set out the tests, because that is one issue that, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman—I do have much respect for him—the House ought to consider on the factual basis that is set before it. The first test is that departing from the treaty is the only means available to the state party

“to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”.

I quote from the case law and the text of the convention. Let us just break that down. On “an essential interest”, it might be that the Government could, at some point, make a case to say that the disruption in Northern Ireland, be it economic, societal or political, gets to a stage where it could threaten an essential interest of the UK. I concede that, but I have not, as yet, seen the evidence to justify that.

Forgive me, but my hon. Friend asked me to set out the tests and I am doing so. The second test is the necessity to safeguard an essential interest against a “grave and imminent peril”. The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has helpfully provided a briefing, setting out that that imports something that very grave indeed—it is a high test—with a degree of urgency to the matter. A possible, contingent or proximate risk does not come within the test of being a “grave and imminent peril”, and that is a risk with the way in which the Bill is drafted at the moment. Again, evidence might be produced to show that it does apply, and the Government might be able to make their case—they ought to do so.