Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill

That document was, of course, arrived at in the weeks immediately following the decisive general election result of December 2019, in which voters in Northern Ireland made very clear their desire to see Stormont return. The document was instrumental in securing the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland. Yet the document itself was the product of almost three years of painstaking negotiations under three successive Secretaries of State following the resignation of Martin McGuinness in January 2017 and the subsequent collapse of the institutions. They were three years in which Northern Ireland was effectively left in a state of political limbo, with no functioning Executive or Assembly and with civil servants able to take only limited decisions.

I know from personal experience just how deeply frustrating a period it was, including many late nights, long hours and false starts. Many of the measures in New Decade, New Approach, and subsequently in this Bill, are designed to avoid a repeat of this. As a result, the Bill is fairly narrow in scope, though I appreciate that noble Lords in this House with a vast wealth of experience in Northern Ireland might want to make some broader points that go beyond the confines of the legislation before us.

I turn to the clauses of this short Bill. Clause 1 amends Sections 16A and 16B of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 by extending the time available to appoint a First or Deputy First Minister following the resignation of either, or after the first meeting of the Assembly following an election. Currently, the period for ministerial appointments is only seven days after the First or Deputy First Minister ceases to hold office, or 14 days after an Assembly election, after which the Secretary of State is by law bound to set a date for another election within a reasonable timeframe.

The Bill extends the period for filling ministerial offices to a six-week period that is automatically renewed, unless the Assembly resolves otherwise on a cross-community vote, for a maximum of three times up to a total of 24 weeks. This is designed to allow more time for discussions between the parties and to facilitate a resolution of issues and avoid the need to rush headlong into another election. It will also give some parties the opportunity to reflect on whether they wish to be in the Executive at all or, alternatively, to go into opposition.

Clause 2 will enable existing Ministers to remain in post following an election until the end of the 24-week period for appointing new Ministers, rather than ceasing to hold office automatically on polling day as at present, or for a maximum of 48 weeks since a functioning Executive was in place. This is designed to provide for greater stability and sustainability of the devolved institutions and for continuity in decision-making, thus avoiding the scenario I have described following the effective collapse of the institutions in January 2017, when Northern Ireland was left with little or no governance.

Clause 3 amends Section 32 of the 1998 Act which currently requires the Secretary of State to propose a date for an Assembly election in two scenarios: first, where the Assembly resolves to dissolve itself by a two-thirds majority, and, secondly, where the existing period for appointing all Executive Ministers, including the First and Deputy First Ministers, expires without those offices being filled. This Bill places the Secretary of State under a duty to propose an election date as soon as is reasonably practical and within 12 weeks of either scenario having taken place. This provides greater legal certainty over the date of an election than at present. Clause 3 also allows the Secretary of State to certify or call an Assembly election at any point after the end of the first six-week period for appointing new Ministers if he considers that there is not sufficient representation among Ministers to secure cross-community confidence in the Assembly.

Clause 4 substitutes a revised ministerial code of conduct which sets out expectations for the behaviour of Ministers, including provisions around the treatment of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, public appointments, the use of resources and information management. This is an excepted matter and, as such, exclusively for Parliament, and follows a request from the former First Minister and Deputy First Minister, with Executive approval.

Clause 5 reforms the petition of concern in the Assembly to reduce its use and restore it to its original intention in the 1998 agreement. The Bill keeps the existing threshold for triggering the petition at 30 Assembly Members but introduces a requirement that they must be from two or more parties. Once lodged, any petition will have to be confirmed after a period of 14 days’ reflection. The Bill limits the matters in which a petition can be lodged and prevents the Speaker and deputies from signing.

Finally, Clauses 6 to 9 deal with repeals, extent and commencement.

Nobody claims that the Bill will be a panacea should we again be in the unfortunate situation in which the devolved institutions come under severe political strain. It does, however, contain important safeguards against a situation arising in which one party can simply crash the institutions and leave Northern Ireland effectively with limited or no governance at all.

The Bill faithfully implements the commitments of the UK Government as set out in New Decade, New Approach to make the devolved institutions more resilient and more sustainable, so that they can continue to focus on delivering for the benefit of the whole community in Northern Ireland.

Successive surveys and the 2019 general election demonstrate—I think conclusively—that inclusive, power-sharing devolution within the United Kingdom is the preferred form of governance for most people in Northern Ireland. That is also the Government’s preference, and we are determined to do whatever we can to make devolution work in order to build a brighter, stronger and more prosperous Northern Ireland—a Northern Ireland where politics works, the economy grows and society is more united. This short Bill takes a number of steps to help us on that course and, in that spirit, I commend it to the House.

We welcome the objectives of the legislation, which I think reflect commitments made in the New Decade, New Approach agreement—as the noble Lord said—to improve sustainability and to increase transparency and accountability. But following the debates in the other place, I was struck that even those supporting the legislation were disappointed. There was frustration over missed opportunities in the Bill to make progress on commitments which have been allowed to stall. There was frustration over a lack of progress on parts of the New Decade, New Approach agreement. There was also frustration, which I am sure he will understand, that it has taken so long to bring a Bill forward, when the New Decade, New Approach agreement was signed off in January 2020.

This is where I hope and think that there is an opportunity for the Minister to be a real asset to the Government, because—I am sure I am not alone in thinking this—too often it has appeared that Northern Ireland has been pretty low on the Government’s list of priorities, and that decisions have been taken without recognising their full implications. I find it extraordinary that the Northern Ireland protocol was agreed, and continues to be discussed, without representatives from Northern Ireland being part of those discussions. I thought the Prime Minister was far too casual and, not unusually but unforgivably, uninformed about how Brexit and the protocol would impact Northern Ireland trade and Northern Ireland politics. So there is a direct read across from the Prime Minister’s and the Government’s casual approach to Northern Ireland—I am not implicating the Minister in this; I hope he can do something about it—and the instability we see in the institutions. Those cannot be separated, and the connections cannot be ignored.

The Government need a broader commitment that goes beyond the legislation. If we genuinely and deeply support stability, that commitment has to run through all actions and all policy-making, and it has to be total. Northern Ireland cannot be considered as an afterthought to policy-making or as a means just of holding on to government.

Turning to the provisions of the Bill, as my colleagues, the shadow Secretary of State Louise Haigh and Alex Davies-Jones, were clear during debates in the other place, there is room for improvement. I appreciate that, while taking on board suggestions, the Government resisted any changes for improving the legislation in the other place. However, this is where I am an optimist in life, as I always remain hopeful that Ministers—particularly a new Minister who has real knowledge of the situation in Northern Ireland, as the noble Lord, Lord Caine, does—may have reflected further on this.

One of our concerns about the cause of instability is when agreements are made but full implementation remains elusive. In the other place, we raised the issue of ensuring the full implementation of the NDNA agreement. We also raised parts of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement which have not been, or are currently not being, fulfilled, including the Bill of Rights and the Civic Forum. I do not know whether the Minister is able to give the House an update today on the Government’s plans to legislate on the Irish language protections and cultural package which are part of that agreement. If not, I hope he will be able to do so during the course of the Bill’s passage, or indeed write to noble Lords. The Government have previously made commitments to bring legislation forward if agreement or legislation was not achieved in Stormont by the end of September, but we have not had an update on next steps to date.

The Minister will be only too aware of the concerns raised over the delayed timing of the Bill. MPs were concerned that, after an already long delay, the Bill would not be out of Parliament before Christmas, and here we are, almost in December and just starting the Second Reading this evening.

I am sure the Minister is aware that, in the other place, there were helpful conversations about whether the two-month commencement period provided for in the Bill could be truncated or removed. It will be helpful if we can return to those discussions and conversations as the Bill progresses—and there are other issues we will want to seek clarification on or explore further with Ministers.

As the Minister outlined, the Bill provides that Ministers will no longer cease to hold office after the election of a new Assembly for two specified time periods, which certainly makes sense in terms of the stability and continuity of decision-making, and confidence in the institutions. We are all aware that, at times, civil servants have faced an almost impossible situation of having to operate without political direction or ministerial cover. There is nothing in the legislation about the extent of or limitations on the authority of so-called caretaker Ministers. Could it be the case that a Minister remains in office having not stood for election or, indeed, having lost their seat? Can the Minister say more about the limitations, guidance or instructions that will be in place?

My understanding from the answers given in the other place on this issue was that Ministers understood that this would be an unsatisfactory position but better than the alternative that currently exists. I would like to see greater clarity on that and, indeed, on whether we can do better. As a former direct rule Minister who was not elected by anybody in Northern Ireland, I understand and fully appreciate the difficulties here and support the principle of the Government’s approach, but we need to probe and seek a bit more information about how this is intended to work in practice.

On Clause 4, can the Minister confirm where responsibility lies in enforcing the Ministerial Code? He will know that in the UK Government it lies with the Prime Minister, and yet, when an independent investigation reported that a Minister had broken the code, the Prime Minister’s judgment was that they had not, and it was the commissioner who left office, not the Minister. I do not advocate that any breach of the Ministerial Code should result in a ministerial resignation or sacking, and I have suggested changes to the code here to change that, but I am seeking information from the Minister as to where responsibility lies for the enforcement and implementation of the code. Also, does the Minister consider that Clause 4 can play an important role in the management of caretaker Ministers? Again, we will want to probe the operation and extent of the code on that.

On petitions of concern, the Government have been clear about the intention of the clause and it has our full support. It is a limited reform that seeks to return the mechanism to what was originally intended. However, the Minister will be aware of the other vetoes that have been used to block agenda items from even reaching the Executive or have prevented discussion on issues of cross-community concern. Is there any more he can say about this, even if he is not proposing to include anything in the Bill at this stage?

Finally, this is a very modest Bill, but it is significant. The Government could have been bolder, and there are issues that we will want to probe further in Committee, but we welcome the proposals that have been made and look forward to deliberating further and in detail.

In that context, it would be remiss not to raise the commitment that was given by the UK Government in annexe A, paragraph 10, on the integrity of the UK internal market, which, as we know, has been breached by the Northern Ireland protocol. It is important that, as we see progress on aspects of NDNA, we also see progress on that commitment, and that the Northern Ireland protocol is addressed in a way which brings stability to the institutions in Northern Ireland; we have yet to see that happen. Of course, discussions are continuing and we are aware of those negotiations. People said that there could not be any renegotiation; effectively, that is what is happening. People said the original form of the protocol had to be rigorously implemented; we have seen that bypassed. That is all good—it is progress—but the current discussions cannot be strung out much longer. We know the time has almost run out for those discussions, and by the end of the year it will have run out completely.

Action will have to be taken, either in the form of an agreement between the European Union and the Government, addressing the issues that are outstanding in all aspects—both constitutional and economic—or in the form of UK action to fully restore Northern Ireland’s position in the internal market and its constitutional integrity. The invocation of Article 16 may or may not be part of that, but it can be only part of it, because it is not a solution in itself.

If neither of those happens, unionists in the Executive will of course be in a completely untenable position, where the political processes and the political balance will not exist in terms of the institutions. That will have the inevitable consequence of making the institutions which we are debating here tonight inoperable. One thing is certain: it cannot be dragged out to the next election, or even to a time when this Bill may be a matter of law, because things will come to a head before that, and certainly by the end of the year.

I want to come on to another general point about the Bill and the context in which we find ourselves. The Government have said that they are legislating here for those parts that cannot be legislated for in the Northern Ireland Assembly. These are matters that are excepted, but the Government must be consistent in their approach, and it appears to many people in Northern Ireland that there has not been a consistent approach in terms of when and in what circumstances government here legislates in the devolved space. We see it in terms of the cultural package, for instance, where there is no agreement on the timing of its introduction for the reasons that I have mentioned—the protocol and so on—and yet the Government are proceeding without that cross-community agreement in an area which is exclusively devolved.

I gently ask the Minister to address the point about the inconsistency of the Government’s à la carte attitude to legislating in the devolved area, where there does not appear to be a lot of logic and where talk about ensuring the stability of institutions can be at variance with some of the actions that are being taken in that regard.

Coming on to some aspects of the clauses in the Bill, the Minister has outlined the provisions in Clauses 1, 2 and 3, in relation to the appointment of Ministers in circumstances where Ministers can remain in post after an election and so on. In the other place, there was a lengthy discussion about the powers and competences of temporary Ministers who would be in place after an election or if the Executive had collapsed. I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in more detail how we will ensure that Ministers do not overstep the mark or that we do not end up in a situation where civil servants are effectively running the show again. It is a tricky balance—it is a difficult balance—but Northern Ireland went through a very difficult period over three years when the institutions were collapsed as a result of the resignation of Sinn Féin from the Executive, and we do not want to see a similar situation.

The Minister recalled the provisions where the Secretary of State can call an election after the first six-week period to give effect to the purpose of paragraph 3.15 of Annexe C of NDNA, as mentioned in the Explanatory Notes. Can he expand further on the precise circumstances in which that power would be used? The Secretary of State can call an election if two-thirds of the Assembly vote for one, or if the time limits have run out to form a Government. However, there is also this power, which is where they think that paragraph 3.15 of Annexe C of NDNA justifies it. I would be grateful for more explanation of that point.

The Ministerial Code had widespread agreement among the parties in Northern Ireland, but I would be grateful if the Minister could outline how it compares to the situation here in London in terms of the provisions and where it differs from the provisions governing Ministers’ activities and behaviours here in Whitehall and the statutory basis that exists here for any enforcement or measures taken against a Minister for breach of the Ministerial Code.

On the petition of concern, again there was protracted debate among the parties about this. Of course, there has already been a change to the operation of the petition of concern because, when the numbers in the Assembly reduced from 108 to 90, the threshold for activating the petition of concern remained at 30, so that change has already made it more difficult to have a petition of concern by default. In recent years, people have ramped up the attacks on the petition of concern—notably, those parties who agreed, in the Belfast agreement and the original 1998 Act, to this whole structure of the petition of concern—and criticised its use, although it has been used by all parties, particularly in the welfare reform debate, where the SDLP and Sinn Féin used it quite a bit. Interestingly, this has only become a major theme as a result of the unionists in the Assembly having lost the majority due to the reduction in the number of seats per constituency. It is important that there are those safeguards.

The Minister referred to the original purposes of the petition of concern, but can he—or, indeed, other Members who will speak in this debate—point to a specific reference in the Good Friday agreement or the Northern Ireland Act to the actual purpose of the petition of concern? There is none. This is continually stated as a matter of fact, but there is no reference in the Good Friday agreement or the Northern Ireland Act to the specific purposes that have sometimes been ascribed to it by people who speak about the subject.

The reason why the petition of concern was brought in is because it was genuinely felt, on both sides of the community and among the political representatives at the time, that there should be some safeguard mechanism. Actually, when you think about it, when the withdrawal agreement and the agreement on the protocol were made, the first thing the Government did was strip away that safeguard. Instead, the vote on whether the protocol should continue to be implemented became a straight-majority vote in case it might have been defeated. The single vote of any real significance—possibly the only vote—that can happen in the Northern Ireland Assembly by a majority vote is one on the Northern Ireland protocol. Everything else is a cross-community vote or susceptible to being turned into one. That is not lost on the unionist community, I tell you, with them having been told for decades that majoritarianism and majority rule were unacceptable. So when we come to the petition of concern, we recognise that there is room for improvement, but there have been reforms and we need to bear in mind its original purpose.

This Bill is not all that controversial in itself and will, no doubt, be subject to changes, criticism and debate in Committee. However, it comes at a time when there are massive stresses and strains on the institutions in Northern Ireland as a result of the protocol; as I said earlier, they will have to be resolved before we go much further. No amount of legislation, whether it is this Bill or any other, will piece together things if they unravel. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, rightly said, things are much harder to put together again after they unravel than they are to keep together as we try to work our way through all these problems. Time is short, and I hope that the Government will soon be able to bring forward proposals to deal with the issues with the protocol that underlie all our problems at the moment.

There would also have been a contesting voice from the unionist community the following month, when the EU stated its position on the UK Government’s paper and on the provisions of the Belfast agreement. It was notable that this imbalance and asymmetry would not have taken place had the institutions been up and running and this legislation been in place at the time. That would have been a welcome development and we would have had greater balance in all that. In concluding, I note the words of the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, who spotted this at the time of the withdrawal agreement of 2018. He said

“had the Assembly been up and running and had the Executive been working, the nationalists and unionists would have had to come together to resolve the issues that currently”—[Official Report, 6/12/18; col. 1122.]

bedevil them. There is no better statement than that. It would also have been the case that the principle of equal citizenship across these islands would have had a greater level of surety had the legislation proposed tonight been in place then.

I welcome the legislation, but there are certain areas for improvement, and I have already spoken to the Minister about them. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and others that the commencement date needs to be foreshortened and that the sense of urgency needs to be fed into this legislation to ensure that it is on the statute book fairly quickly—because in Northern Ireland we need that political stability.

Parties such as Sinn Féin and the DUP have talked about taking nuclear action to provide political stability. We had examples of that back in June, with Sinn Féin declaring that it might not nominate a deputy if it did not agree with the DUP’s nominee first. We then had the DUP threatening—shall we say—institutions over the protocol. But, by trying to create political stability, they are in fact creating political instability. So I tell them: in the good interests of all the people of Northern Ireland, that is not the way forward.

The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, referred to the protocol. I support the protocol, but there is a need for mitigations—I am in no doubt about that—and the European Union has provided them in its papers to the UK Government. There is also a need to promote the benefits of the protocol: for example, in the survey that the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry carried out some days ago and that was published at the end of last week, 70% supported that. Queen’s University Belfast takes this view in its recent poll, as does the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool. That is part of the political context, so could the Minister provide us with an update on those negotiations between the UK and the EU? He—in his former state—and the noble Lords, Lord Empey, Lord Dodds and Lord Hain, were all members of the protocol sub-committee, and we agreed our first report and achieved consensus. But the important thing is that we arrive at a position that provides the very best for the people of Northern Ireland in trade, jobs and opportunity.

Other issues provide that political context. All the parties in Northern Ireland fundamentally disagree on the Government’s proposals on legacy issues because we all believe that they need to be victim centred. Will the Government respect the wishes of the parties and remove the amnesty proposal? The Minister may disagree with the use of the word “amnesty”, but, to us, that is the way it can be best characterised.

Other areas from NDNA are outstanding, and the Minister will be aware of them: the whole area of rights, language and identity proposals. I thought that, whenever the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive had not brought forward those proposals, the UK Government were to do so by October, but we still have not had any legislation in relation to that issue. There is information about the progress on the civic advisory panel and, of course, the Bill of Rights, which we have been talking about. On Friday, I met Amnesty International in Downpatrick, and it is active in this respect but anxious that there has not been a Bill of Rights. In Northern Ireland, all that we can do on many issues is talk about them—we are not good on the doing—so, if the Minister could pursue the Northern Ireland Executive in relation to those outstanding issues, that would be useful.

Generally, I support the Bill, but I felt that several areas could be built on. There is now an opportunity to move forward on the following areas and return to that vision in 1998 that created the infrastructure and architecture to manage differences and be able to realise a better shared future, based on partnership in Northern Ireland.

I go back to the position in 1998 about the appointment of Ministers and the purpose and intention of the GFA on the equalisation of titles: the joint election of First Ministers. I believe that there is some divergence from the concepts of the Good Friday agreement, on restoring the joint nature of the First Minister’s office, which was changed by St Andrews and was a centrepiece of strand one. That is what parallel consent was about. I understand why things did not happen at St Andrews, such as the Assembly collectively nominating the First Ministers who would then be accountable to it. There is a three-Minister provision that is causing a logjam in the Executive office and prevents Ministers bringing forward productive and progressive legislation because it is thwarted by one of the bigger parties. That issue needs to be addressed as well.

The Good Friday agreement and the 1998 Act were destined to build reconciliation, partnership, equality and parity of esteem, but that was thwarted at the next stage at St Andrews. I feel that we need to revert to the original principles and purpose, and I hope, with colleagues, to bring forward amendments in Committee about the equalisation of titles and the joint election of the First Minister.

Political, economic and social stability and sustainability will ultimately not come from rules and procedures. Yes, they are required but, finally, they will come from people in Northern Ireland believing, understanding, having confidence in and accepting that sharing power with their neighbours is the right thing to do and does not negate or diminish their identity. We knew that as far back as 1973, with the first power-sharing Executive arrangement. I was 15 years of age at that stage, and I remember feeling a sense of excitement and hope. Sadly, that did not last all that long. I hope that the matters related to the protocol can be resolved and, while I accept the main provisions in the Bill, I would like to think that the Minister can look at the outstanding areas and work with the Northern Ireland Executive to bring about a resolution.

I return to what a political commentator said—this is my final comment—on journal.ie in February 2020. He said that NDNA was not short on political ambition. Many of us thought it was a document of aspiration, but then it comes back to the willingness of parties to implement it and to underpin the power-sharing parity of esteem to fulfil the needs of a modern, progressive society that has been hit by the outworkings of a hard Brexit and Covid. The people of Northern Ireland have been hit by Brexit, long waiting lists, Covid and the need to recover from the pandemic. When you meet people and talk to them, they want access to a hospital bed, surgery and investigations that lead to diagnosis. Those are the issues that matter to them most, but they want respect for political differences. I accept the provisions in the Bill. I believe that they can be built on by going back to the 1998 agreement to look at the principles of duality of collective responsibility in the election of joint Ministers.

We cannot discuss the real-time realities of Northern Ireland at this time without acknowledging the threats presented economically and constitutionally by the Northern Ireland protocol. Northern Ireland’s representatives and the rights of the people they represent are being undermined by the protocol and the imposition of its Irish Sea border. With the latest comments from the CEO of Marks & Spencer, and previous comments from other leading supermarkets regarding trade in Northern Ireland, the negative effect on the import of goods from mainland Britain to Northern Ireland is there for all to see. Regrettably, policymakers in Brussels and elsewhere are either blind to or ignorant of this.

I hope for practical solutions, which would see the removal of the Irish Sea border and the integrity of the UK’s internal market fully restored. However, inaction cannot be allowed to cripple businesses in Northern Ireland. Many small and medium-sized businesses rely on the supply chain from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, and the present uncertainty is destroying livelihoods in many instances. Those who support the protocol are not only calling for the long-term integrity of the UK internal market to be put into serious question but prioritising the 23% of Northern Ireland’s trade that is with the EU over the 77% of the trade that is with the rest of the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The volume of domestic trade between all parts of the UK highlights the importance of finding a workable, long-term solution that protects everyone. What we have at present is unsustainable. The uncertainty caused by the protocol breeds instability, which in turn can unfortunately lead to hostility. The people of Northern Ireland have suffered enough.

When we discuss the institutions of government, we look at the agreements on which they are built. The most fundamental pillar of the Belfast agreement and subsequent peace agreements is the principle of consent; Northern Ireland’s devolved settlement is based on that. However, the protocol has set that principle aside and undermined the very institutions that we are seeking to improve.

Many people in Northern Ireland feel that these regulations, which have been imposed upon them, run contrary to everything that they understand about democracy and the democratic principles that underpin Northern Ireland’s society. The people of Northern Ireland did not consent to spending more for goods, waiting longer for medicines or becoming second-class citizens within this United Kingdom.

It is regrettable that after so much progress in our society, in our politics and in Northern Ireland’s economic attractiveness on the global stage, this protocol risks taking us backwards. Does the Minister agree that we need to see a workable solution to this issue soon, and can he confirm whether it is the Government’s intention to set a deadline for the end of these negotiations with the EU?

It is quite clear that invoking Article 16 is rapidly becoming a necessary response. I support the Bill and I trust that it will go some way towards achieving stability in Northern Ireland.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne, talked about the people being better consulted. The Library briefing on the Bill notes that the New Decade, New Approach deal was agreed by the five main Northern Ireland political parties. It does not talk about consultation with the people. None the less, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, said, we seem to have some progress here —not sufficient issues are being dealt with, but at least some are.

However, there are many things that the Bill cannot deal with. The Minister talked in his introduction about the need for the economy to meet the needs of society. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, talked about the hit from Brexit, as many other noble Lords have, along with NHS waiting lists and the level of NHS services.

I want to add to that a report out today: a truly, deeply, shocking report from Action for Children, which found that more than a quarter of working parents in Northern Ireland expect to take on extra work or forgo time off to pay for Christmas, and that most of them will miss at least one key family event in that process. This comes after last year’s Christmas was cancelled by Covid.

Another report a week or so back showed that among the families hit by the £20 cut to universal credit in October, two-fifths are likely to cut back on heating and one-third are likely to skip meals, while 20% said that they expected to go to a food bank. I note that eight out of 18 parliamentary constituencies in Northern Ireland rank in the bottom third of the UK for children living in low-income households, and that the two-child limit for universal credit is felt particularly acutely in Northern Ireland.

We are tackling some constitutional issues here. But, as the Minister himself acknowledged, there are many other ways in which Westminster needs to provide more support to Northern Ireland to tackle the issues it faces, including constitutional ones.

There are other aspects of the New Decade, New Approach agreement, which the noble Lord, Lord Caine, helped to negotiate, that are yet to be implemented—one of which, we are told, will imminently be legislated for—which cause me great concern. The NDNA agreement promised that within 100 days from 9 January 2020 the Stormont House agreement of December 2014, which set out the structures to deal with the legacy of Northern Ireland’s violent past, would be implemented.

Although noble Lords will have their views on the efficacy of the Stormont House agreement, it is an agreement not least between the UK and Irish Governments. On 18 March 2020, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced in a two-page Written Ministerial Statement that the Government were unilaterally repudiating the agreement. There was no consultation with the victims and survivors sector in Northern Ireland, who are most directly affected, no consultation with the political parties in Northern Ireland, and no consultation with the Irish Government.

Fast-forward to July of this year, and the Government produced a Command Paper which in so many ways is the most shocking document I have come across in my 50 years in politics and in government. It proposes what is, in effect, a blanket amnesty which would include those who carried out some of the most unspeakable atrocities imaginable during what is still euphemistically called the Troubles. It would halt all court proceedings on crimes related to the Troubles, both criminal and civil. It would halt all inquests, even those currently listed for hearing. It would say to traumatised and still-grieving victims that what happened to their loved ones is no longer of any interest to the state, and it says to the perpetrators that what they did to those victims is no longer of any interest to the state—and this from a Government who purport to respect and uphold the rule of law. These proposals are legally dubious, constitutionally dangerous and morally corrupt, in my view. I am raising it here in an effort to get the Government to think again before the Bill is brought to Parliament.

On 24 October 1990, Patsy Gillespie, who worked as a civilian cook in an army base, was chained to the steering column of his van, which had a 1,200 lb bomb placed in it. While his wife and young family were held at gunpoint, he was made to drive the van to an army post. He shouted a warning but, while he was still in the driver’s seat, the bomb was detonated, killing Patsy and five soldiers. No one has been made accountable for this horrendous crime and, if the Government have their way, no one ever will be. The police in Northern Ireland are convinced that one of those responsible is today part of an active dissident republican group in Derry/Londonderry. If the legislation as currently proposed is enacted, who do you think will sleep easier in their beds: Patsy’s wife, Kathleen, or the people who turned her husband into a human bomb? Could any of us look Kathleen in the eye and say: “I voted for a law that will offer succour and protection to the men who robbed you and your children of the love of your life”? I could not, and I urge the Government to think again before their Bill is presented to Parliament.

In our joint letter in September 2018, a cross-party group of Peers, each with direct ministerial or parliamentary experience in Northern Ireland, suggested another way forward. So does Operation Kenova, so ably headed by former Chief Constable Jon Boutcher; having observed how Kenova is working, my thinking on dealing with legacy issues has evolved. In essence, Kenova prioritises an information-recovery process rather than a prosecutorial process, but—and this is crucial—it leaves open prosecutions if the evidence uncovered sustains those.

Victims and survivors will be properly served only through a criminal justice process that is compliant with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I urge the Secretary of State, through the Minister, to change his proposals and follow a Kenova-type model, or I predict his amnesty for some of the most terrible crimes will face certain defeat in your Lordships’ House.