Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill

I inform the House that Mr Speaker has not certified the Bill for the purposes of the Standing Orders relating to territorial application and devolved legislative competence.

I beg to move that the Bill be now read a Second time.

As the House will be aware, at the end of April, following the appalling killing of Lyra McKee, the Government announced a new set of political talks to restore all the political institutions established by the 1998 Belfast agreement. With the support of the Irish Government, and in accordance with the well-established three-strand approach, we established five working groups involving all five main Northern Ireland parties. Each of the groups has been led by independent facilitators who are all respected current and former senior Northern Ireland civil servants. Over the past nine weeks, over 150 meetings in a range of formats, including roundtable meetings with all five main parties, as well as the UK Government and the Irish Government, and bilateral meetings, have taken place. I want, in particular, to thank the five working group leads for their efforts in supporting this process and the parties for their constructive engagement to date.

There have been signs of an emerging consensus between parties on the programme for Government; the use of the petition of concern; and transparency. On the issues of identity and languages, and on the sustainability of the institutions, the parties have engaged actively. Here, too, there has been some agreement, but no overall consensus on these issues has yet been found. The two largest parties have, over recent days, been considering how an accommodation can be reached on the remaining and contentious issues. From the outset, the Northern Ireland parties have been clear that they want to see the institutions restored, but after nearly 10 weeks the people of Northern Ireland expect to see results. No one should be in any doubt that the fact that this has not yet happened is a huge disappointment.

While I continue to believe that an agreement is achievable, I also have a responsibility to prepare for all scenarios. Provisions allowing limited decision making to ensure the effective delivery of public services to continue in the absence of an Executive expire on 25 August. After that, the Northern Ireland civil service will revert to the restrictions applied to decision making by civil servants following the Buick High Court judgment, leaving Northern Ireland without sufficient powers to ensure good governance from 26 August, continuing indefinitely.

In a few weeks, Parliament will rise for the summer recess and there will be no further opportunity to legislate before the existing provisions expire. The Bill will extend the period for devolved government to be restored by two months, from 26 August to 21 October, with provisions that allow for a further extension of the Bill from 21 October to 13 January next year. A new deadline of 21 October creates the time and space that parties need to reach an agreement, and there is provision for a short extension with the consent of both Houses.

I absolutely echo the Secretary of State’s sentiment that we would like to see the Executive restored now, but if we are going to put this right and ensure that we do not have a repeat in future of what we have had over the past two years and more, that requires reform and a commitment to ensure that never again can one single party hold the entire population of Northern Ireland to ransom and leave them without a Government for such a lengthy period. We need to put that right.

I want to make sure that we not only restore the institutions, but do so in a sustainable way, because the people of Northern Ireland deserve to see government. Not only is it 18 months since I took this job, but tomorrow, it will be two and a half years since the Executive collapsed. We can never again be allowed to go for that period of time without government in Northern Ireland. I know the commitment that the right hon. Gentleman’s party has made to this, and the commitment of other parties, but let us be clear: the issues that caused the Executive to collapse and which have meant that we have not had an Executive for two and a half years remain, and we need to find a way to bridge that gap. I am bringing this Bill in with the utmost reluctance, but I am doing it to ensure that we have continuity of good governance arrangements in Northern Ireland. However, this is not and can never be a replacement for effective, devolved power-sharing, where locally elected politicians make decisions on behalf of the people who elected them. I know that the right hon. Gentleman agrees with that point—we have discussed it on a number of occasions—as does everyone in this House.

That is why it is clear that ultimately, agreement cannot be imposed by the UK Government, the Irish Government or anyone else. It requires the consent of Northern Ireland’s elected representatives. Twenty-one years after the Belfast/Good Friday agreement was reached, the need for all the institutions that it established to be fully functioning is there for all to see today in Northern Ireland.

We need to see the same spirit from Northern Ireland’s political leaders today that drove those who made that historic agreement 21 years ago, but while the parties continue to work towards securing an accommodation, the people of Northern Ireland should not have their services put at risk. Responsible government is about making provision for all scenarios, just in case those contingency plans are needed. I hope therefore that the House will support the Bill and will join me in urging all parties to come together.

How does the Secretary of State assess her duty to propose a date for an election? In the absence of these measures, would she have had to call an election in the very near future, or would she have had the power to name a date at some point in the future, rather than perhaps six or seven weeks after the existing powers had lapsed?

The role and duty of the Secretary of State to call an election is as set out in the St Andrews agreement and legislated for in this House. It is very clear that the Secretary of State has a duty to call an election, and there are timeframes set out for that. The Bill removes that duty, but it does not remove the discretion to call an election, if it is felt that it is the right thing to do.

I hope the Bill does not receive Royal Assent. That is a slightly odd thing for a Secretary of State to say, but I hope that the Executive will be restored before Royal Assent so that we have government in Northern Ireland and there is no need for the Bill. The Bill will ensure that all contingencies are covered. It does not preclude the Secretary of State from calling an election should they wish to, but it does mean we have the flexibility and discretion to give the talks the best chance of success. Ultimately, that is what the people of Northern Ireland want, and that is why we want an accommodation reached as soon as possible that restores the Executive immediately. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.

I am also bound to remind the Secretary of State that it is 909 days today since Northern Ireland had proper governance. When the Secretary of State brought the original Bill before the House, 652 days had elapsed. I need to remind the House that this is not simply an absence of institutions; there is a vacuum of both politics and decision making that is unprecedented since the signing of the Good Friday agreement. It is unprecedented and very dangerous. It is dangerous for the credibility of the democratic institutions established under the Good Friday agreement.

The Secretary of State referred quite rightly to the brutal murder of Lyra McKee as one of the triggers that brought the parties back to the talks process, but it should not take the brutal murder of a young woman to impel people—be they the Secretary of State or parties in the Northern Ireland—to do their duty. The absence of power sharing is also directly dangerous. For individuals and communities, the absence of those decision-making processes has meant things not being done, and as a result conditions are deteriorating for people across Northern Ireland.

The precedent in the past was very clear. The law is very clear. Where talks and elections have been unable to resolve a situation, succeeding Secretaries of State have brought in direct rule. This Secretary of State and her predecessor were not prepared to do that. I say to the Secretary of State, as she is entitled to say herself, that there has been a failure by the five parties—perhaps, more fairly, of the two parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin —to get round the table and make power sharing work over those 909 days, but she cannot absolve herself from her own responsibilities. Until the law was changed last October, there had been 651 days of drift, during which time decisions were not being made and there was simply no ambition to bring through that decision-making process. Serious decisions were not made because the Secretary of State and others shied away from the controversial decision-making process it involved.

Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the only party in Northern Ireland that is out of step and, indeed, tips the balance in these circumstances is Sinn Féin, which has consistently refused to go back into Stormont although all the other parties would have gone back yesterday?

I am afraid not. Inevitably, it takes different parties to come together to form an agreement. While I understand the political imperative of the finger-pointing that takes place between the DUP and Sinn Féin, the reality is that neither party, in the end, was prepared to reach a position in which matters could be brought to a conclusion—although I should remind the right hon. Gentleman that in the spring of last year Northern Ireland was very close to an agreement, which was then frustrated. We can look back in the history books—and I shall read the right hon. Gentleman’s autobiography with great interest—to see how the blame is allocated, but what is certainly true is that people were very close to a deal at that time. So it does take more than one party to reach an agreement.

Let me now make a point about the adequacy of the Bill. What it certainly does is protect the Secretary of State from being subject to judicial review for being in breach of the duty to call an election if there is no legislative change or no Stormont Assembly, which was a real threat at one time, but I must disagree with the right hon. Lady’s observation that the Bill is about good governance. It is not about good governance; it is about a very marginal protection for Northern Ireland civil servants so that they can make decisions for the people of Northern Ireland. However, most of the decisions that really matter are not being made by the Northern Ireland civil service, and not simply because of Buick. It was the case long before Buick that they did not have the capacity to make those decisions without political cover. The Bill is not about good governance; it is about a very partial way of keeping things ticking over.

One of the odd aspects of this situation is the fact that the backdrop to the absence of a Northern Ireland Executive has been a period in which Brexit has been the biggest issue in United Kingdom politics, not simply in terms of the relationship between the UK and the European Union but, in particular, in terms of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Ireland. During that period of the Brexit conversation, there has been no voice for the Northern Ireland Executive, no voice for the non-Westminster parties in Northern Ireland, and no voice for the people of Northern Ireland, who voted overwhelmingly—let me rephrase that; they voted significantly—in favour of remain. There has been no voice for the business community, no voice for agriculture, and no voice for the many people who have spoken to me, and to the Secretary of State, about the need for a Brexit settlement that will not be damaging and dangerous for the people and the economy of Northern Ireland.

The Secretary of State has spoken about an extension until 21 October, and the hon. Gentleman has been talking about Brexit. During that period, the House might well be very preoccupied with the dangers of a no-deal Brexit, and debating the possibility of our crashing off the cliff. Is this timetable sensible for the consideration of complex issues in Northern Ireland?

The hon. Gentleman—my hon. Friend—has raised a very interesting point, and it is exactly the point that I was about to make myself. The two candidates for the leadership of the Conservative party—one of whom will, we assume, be the next Prime Minister of this country—are currently vying with each other to be the most no-deal Brexit candidate. That is very dangerous for Northern Ireland, and we know it would be disastrous for the whole United Kingdom economy. Those who read the article by Carolyn Fairbairn, the director general of the CBI, this morning will have seen a very well argued case for why the whole United Kingdom would suffer, but because she knows Northern Ireland she also makes the point that a no-deal Brexit would be massively dangerous for Northern Ireland.

The simple reality is that we know the following from many different sources. As the outgoing Chief Constable of the PSNI warned, the hard border across the island of Ireland which would inevitably follow a no-deal Brexit would become a potential target for the terrorists. A hard border, by making a target for terrorists, would lead certainly to members of the PSNI being put at risk and also potentially people more generally across Northern Ireland. Those are a serious warnings that we ought to take very seriously.

The Prime Minister said in an answer earlier this year that technical solutions effectively involving moving the border would still mean there is a border. Some involve equipment that could come under attack and some involve a degree of state surveillance that, frankly, I think would not be acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland. We have a very real situation here: a crash-out Brexit is massively threatening to the people of Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland more generally.

The hon. Gentleman has expressed the view today and on many other occasions that a crash-out Brexit would be against the terms of the Belfast or Good Friday agreement and this would cause many problems for the people of Northern Ireland. Does he equally believe that any attempt to legislate individually or separately for matters that should be within the ambit only of the Northern Ireland Assembly would also be outside the spirit of the Good Friday agreement?

I do not accept that. In the end, Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. In the absence of governance for Northern Ireland, it is inevitable that there will be consideration here in Westminster of what that means for the people and the institutions of Northern Ireland.

If that is what the shadow Secretary of State really does believe and he is not just being selective for his own interests, would he not then agree that, in the absence of devolved government in Northern Ireland and given that there are important decisions to be made about infrastructure, schools and hospitals, he should be calling on the Secretary of State to introduce direct rule?

I shall come on to exactly that point, but let me continue with this question of a hard border across the island of Ireland and the question of crashing out. The reality is that we know as well that there is not simply a threat around terrorism with that hard border, but there is also a massive threat to the economy of Northern Ireland and the movement of goods, including agricultural goods and manufactured goods, which is why the business community and the farmers union in Northern Ireland are both absolutely consistent in their view that that would be massively damaging to the Northern Ireland economy.

But there is a separate issue that the Good Friday agreement involves, and it is very different in the Northern Ireland context from anywhere else in the United Kingdom: the whole question of identity. Identity matters in the Northern Irish context: identity and respect for people’s different identities is the heart and soul of the Good Friday agreement, and we simply cannot allow that to be damaged by crashing out of the European Union—a crash-out Brexit.

We have heard so often in this House about a hard border; who is going to implement a hard border?

That is not a difficult question to answer. The European Union would insist on a border across the island of Ireland. There is no doubt about that. There can be no question of Northern Ireland acting as some kind of back door for smugglers. I am old enough to remember the days when gates were left open on the border and cattle would wander across, by morning and night. Those days have not entirely gone, and we know that smuggling still takes place between Ireland and Northern Ireland, but the European Union would not allow the institutionalisation of any facility that made the smugglers’ lives easier.