North Atlantic Submarine Activity

With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I wish to make a statement on north Atlantic activity. Let me begin by thanking the many members of our armed forces who are currently deployed in over 30 operations across the globe. Their efforts are often unseen by the British people, but they are always appreciated. They defend the very freedoms that we enjoy.

Last week, my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary revealed details of one such operation. While the focus of many has been drawn to the middle east, UK armed forces, in partnership with our allies, have been deployed to deter the increased Russian activity that we have witnessed in the Atlantic. The specific operation involved a Russian Akula-class submarine and a concurrent deployment of two specialist submarines from GUGI—Russia’s main directorate of deep-sea research.

Last November, the Defence Secretary outlined to the House how GUGI vessels, including the spy ship Yantar, are directed by President Putin to engage in hybrid warfare activities against the UK and its allies, specifically around critical undersea infrastructure. Their mission is to survey pipelines and cables during peacetime and then potentially, if required, sabotage them in conflict.

In response to the Russian subsurface activity, the Defence Secretary deployed a Royal Navy warship and a Royal Air Force P8 aircraft alongside allies and partners to ensure that the Russian vessel was monitored during every phase of the operation. The Akula subsequently retreated home, having been closely tracked throughout, and we continued to monitor the two GUGI submarines when they were in and around UK waters and, of course, beyond. Our armed forces left them in no doubt that they were being monitored, that their movements were not covert as planned, and that their attempted secret operation had been exposed. The two GUGI submarines have now left UK waters and headed back north, and this operation, which lasted more than a month, has now concluded.

In often treacherous conditions, our pilots racked up over 450 flying hours and our frigates sailed several thousand nautical miles. Some 500 British personnel were involved in the response. I know that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to every single person involved.

We exposed this military operation undertaken by Russia for three key reasons: first, to send a message to Putin that he failed to remain covert, and that any attempt to damage critical undersea infrastructure will not be tolerated and cannot be denied; secondly, to demonstrate that even with significant capabilities and personnel deployed in the middle east, we will always do what is necessary to protect our homeland; and thirdly, to highlight a significant operation carried out by our armed forces, who met this challenge with the characteristic determination and professionalism that we all know too well.

This operation reminds us why the seabed matters, especially for the island nation of Britain: it connects us to everything, and that connection is sustained beneath our waters without interruption through a vast network of cables and pipelines on which much of our way of life relies—much of the gas that heats our homes, 99% of international telecoms and data traffic, and trillions of pounds of global trade each day. Because the seabed matters to us, it is a prime target for our adversaries.

The UK’s undersea network is highly resilient, but the threats are increasing, so we are stepping up our action to defend it, including by providing an extra £100 million for our vital P8 submarine-hunting aircraft; launching our Atlantic Bastion programme to combine the latest autonomous technologies with the best warships and aircraft to create a British-built hybrid naval force; and making the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, after years of hollowing-out and underfunding by various Governments. The threat is clear, and our resolve to confront it is absolute. That is why this year we are deploying our carrier group where it is most needed—the north Atlantic and the High North—and supporting NATO’s new mission, Arctic Sentry.

I want to put on the record our thanks to our allies, with whom we have co-operated closely throughout this operation, including Norway. Our shared commitment to confront Russian aggression in the north Atlantic is at the heart of our Lunna House agreement, and together we are now building a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and new uncrewed systems.

Let me say a few words on Ukraine, from where I returned just last week. Today, two wars on two continents are being fought at the very same time. Putin wants us distracted while he steps up strikes on Ukraine relentlessly, and indeed at enormous scale, with around 7,000 attacks a day on the front line and 55,000 drone and missile strikes last year alone. We must always remember our duty to Ukraine and recognise that Russian aggression is growing across Europe once again.

Let me finish where I began, with praise for our people. We have the very finest armed forces that a nation could hope for. They are second to none. As I speak, we have personnel deployed across every domain, every moment of the day, in every part of the world. They are in constant confrontation with our adversaries, from the depths of the seabed to the reaches of space. When a crisis erupts, as it has done in the middle east, I understand people questioning why all UK military assets and personnel have not been sent to deal with it. But as demands on defence rise, we must deploy our resources to best effect across multiple priorities.

Because of our increase in defence investment, we will be able to call on more and more resources in the coming years. As we defend our interests and partners in the middle east, we will tackle increasing threats in the High North. We will stand with Ukraine. We will meet our NATO obligations. Above all, we will always fulfil the first duty of government: to protect our homeland and keep the British people safe. I commend this statement to the House.

I call the shadow Minister.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. With all eyes on the middle east, let us not forget that Russia remains the most acute, persistent and active threat to the United Kingdom. Putin’s goal of conquering Ukraine is unchanged, and that continues to place our entire European continent in jeopardy. His ongoing nefarious activity, most notably in our own territorial waters, should be a stark wake-up call. We must start acting on the threats that are visible and right in front of us.

We may be critical of the Government’s tortoise-like approach to giving defence what it needs—slow and steady does not win this race, and it certainly does not keep us safe—but what does unite us is the full-throated support for the men and women of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, who keep the wolf at bay in these dangerous times. I pay particular tribute to all those who are serving in the middle east at the moment, those who served in recent Atlantic operations, and especially those who crew our continuous at-sea deterrent patrols, 24/7, 365 days a year, every year.

When the Secretary of State came to this House last year to highlight the actions of the Russian spy vessel Yantar, he told Putin:

“we see you, we know what you are doing, and we will not shy away from robust action”—[Official Report, 22 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 1016.]

That was the right message, but at some point simply saying “We see you” is not enough. Words must be backed by action.

This is not just a question of traditional defence. There is a growing and under-appreciated threat to our national resilience and our way of life. Just 65 undersea cables carry 99% of global communication, and a far smaller number of pipelines and interconnectors link our gas and electricity supplies to others. Can the Minister guarantee that there are no hostile devices, kinetic or otherwise, on, near or underneath any of those cables, pipelines or interconnectors? The reality is that he cannot. The Secretary of State said with confidence that there was no sabotage on this occasion, but what of the many other incidents in UK waters—in the Baltic, in the cables running to North America, west of the British Isles, where monitoring capacity is limited at best?

We can agree that no sabotage took place this time from the Russian sub-surface activity off the coast of the UK. We have backed our words with action when it comes to deterring Russia, with £4.5 billion in UK military support to Ukraine last year and a total of £21.8 billion. The Ukraine defence contact group just raised an astonishing $45 billion to buy weapons, munitions and capability for the Ukrainians. The Ministry of Defence stands ready to board any vessels that meet the criteria—there is a lot of misinformation out there. Having very expensive frigates escorting every vessel at such range is putting significant demands on the Russian fleet and degrading its capabilities. Let me add that we have spent £5 billion extra this year alone on the defence budget, and by 2028-29 we will spend around £73 billion on it.

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

I thank the Minister for his statement and the Defence Secretary for his public statement, which have increased public awareness about the growing threats that our nation faces. On behalf of the Defence Committee, I pay tribute to all our armed forces personnel involved in disrupting the Russian activity around our critical undersea infrastructure. This incident underscores the growing threat that Russia poses, and the need to increase defence investment now and finally to publish the defence investment plan.

Turning to the incident itself, I take on board the Minister’s words, but it has been widely reported, including publicly at the London defence conference, that Putin had explosives planted on our undersea cables. For the record, can he confirm whether Russians were involved in either sabotage or precursors to sabotage on or around our undersea cables?

The reality is that Russia failed on this occasion, and it failed because we exposed its activity, which meant that there was no way, shape or form that it could deny its activity in the first place. I was at the London defence conference and I heard certain discussions about undersea cables. I can confirm that no sabotage took place this time, but the Russians put a lot of effort into mapping and understanding our undersea critical national infrastructure, and we will do everything to map, track and expose it, should it take place.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and I associate my party with his thanks and appreciation for the dedicated service of our armed forces personnel around the world.

While the world’s attention was on Trump and Netanyahu’s catastrophic war in Iran, Vladimir Putin was collecting vital information about our critical infrastructure. In response, the Defence Secretary told Putin, for the second time: “We see you.” But we need much greater confidence that the Government have the plan and resolve not just to observe Russia’s activities, but to meet and resist them, should that be required.

As Putin plans for future conflict, our Government appear frozen. Delay and inaction is sapping the confidence of industry and our allies, while enabling Putin’s war machine in Ukraine. The Government must remedy these failings as a matter of urgency. Our national security and the sovereignty of our Ukrainian allies demand it. Will the Minister commit to publishing the defence investment plan before Parliament is prorogued, and will he publish a plan to raise £20 billion in defence bonds to be spent on urgent projects, including rebuilding our naval capabilities, which are critical for protecting our undersea infrastructure?

The Minister rightly highlighted Russia’s continued assault on Ukraine. Péter Magyar’s spectacular victory in yesterday’s Hungarian elections should unlock European financial support to Ukraine. At just the same time, Donald Trump authorised a suspension of sanctions on Russian energy assets. The Government cannot allow this opportunity to slip, so will the Minister work with EU partners so that the UK’s £30 billion share of the frozen Russian assets in Europe can be sent to Ukraine’s defence alongside the promised €90 billion from the EU, and will he work with colleagues across Government finally to put an end to the scandal of UK companies providing maritime services for the export of Russian oil, gas and coal?

I am glad that the Government took a defensive stance on Iran. We were clear that we did not have a legal mandate, there was not a plan and there was no clear end state, and if we are going to put people in harm’s way, we need those three things before we can do so.

While the defence investment plan not has not arrived yet, five classes of ship or submarine are on order or being built, including 13 frigates on order—eight Type 26s and five Type 31s—which is a collaborative effort to ensure that our maritime capability is fit for purpose as threats diversify and increase, in particular in the High North. We are learning the lessons from Ukraine and ensuring that we have the best autonomous capability, and our Atlantic Bastion platform is moving in the right direction. We have worked exceptionally hard, and the Foreign Office is pushing as well, to sanction thousands of Russian individuals, companies and, of course, vessels, to reduce the illegal flow of resource back into Russia, which is funding the illegal and brutal war waged by Putin on Ukraine.

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his statement. GUGI has been at work since the 1960s, as I understand it; it has been doing extensive mapping for quite some time. In our report on subsea cables, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came up with a great many recommendations, with which he will be more than familiar. When it comes to the defence investment plan, may I draw his focus to our recommendation on a sovereign capability in repair ships? Will he promise to look at that or agree to meet me to discuss it?

I thank my hon. Friend for his really focused question. We have been watching the underwater research programme for years now. We understand exactly what they are up to and why they are up to it. They understand some of the vulnerabilities—I would not say weaknesses—in the west, and they are trying to identify and, indeed, threaten them at a point in time of their choosing. I recognise the report’s recommendation on a sovereign capability to fix cables. We are working with industry and partners, and of course we have a multitude of capabilities within defence that can support the types of operations that may need to take place should anything happen to our undersea cables.

I am delighted that the Minister has made this statement, because I have raised this issue a number of times in this place. My constituency looks directly at the High North, and it is off the coast of my constituency that this Russian activity took place—let us make no mistake about it. My constituents find it deeply worrying.

As the Minister himself has admitted, we have only so many surface ships. They are based mostly in Devonport and Portsmouth. The sailing time from the south of England to Orkney, Shetland or my constituency is a matter of days, and we have to move very fast in this situation with Russia. Let us remember history: before the first world war, Winston Churchill and others took the decision to relocate part of the fleet to Invergordon and to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. Are we quite certain that we are basing the surface ships that we have—we hope we will have more—in the position where they need to be to keep a close eye on the High North and protect our vital strategic interests?

I thank the hon. Member for a really focused question. Part of this problem set is about looking at early warning when systems appear, either in our waters or close to our waters, or indeed close to any critical national infrastructure. That is a multi-domain operation, ranging from space all the way down to other intelligence assets, which gives us very early warning of what is happening, where, when and why, and allows us to pre-position capabilities to meet them, or to ensure that we can understand exactly what they are up to and therefore put in an operation to deter that if required.

I was in Latvia at the weekend, where they very much know what the threat is from Putin and the Russians. I thank the Minister for his statement and the helpful way in which this has been described in public. It is clear that we need to do a lot more to explain to the British public what the threat is from the Russians and how it is getting worse—not least if we are to increase defence expenditure, as I have been advocating in this place for some time, and tough decisions have to be made. We need to have a better programme of education and information to demonstrate how serious a threat Putin and the Russians are to the security of this country.