National Security Strategy, Political Finance and Foreign Influence

Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy

We now come to the Select Committee statement on behalf of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Matt Western will speak for up to 10 minutes, during which no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of his statement, I will call Members to ask questions on the subject of the statement. Those should be questions, not speeches. I emphasise that questions should be directed to the Select Committee Chair and not the relevant Minister, but Front Benchers may take part in questioning.

I am pleased to present the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s third report of this Parliament, on political finance and foreign influence, and I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this.

Let me outline why this issue matters. First, the UK’s political finance system was designed for a more innocent age when state threats were lower and the “good chaps” theory of politics resonated more strongly, both at home and abroad. The scale of loopholes facilitating the flow of foreign money into UK politics is now recognised, and Transparency International UK estimates that it runs to tens of millions of pounds. Furthermore, US intelligence has estimated that Russia spent over $300 million to influence politicians in 24 countries between 2014 and 2022. Here, we have seen a British politician jailed for taking Russian bribes, alongside MI5 interference alerts about Christine Lee, who made around half a million pounds in political donations. This is all deeply concerning. The Government deserve credit for addressing the basic failures through the new Representation of the People Bill, alongside other work, but our Committee established that they need to go further.

We have not yet seen a collapse in the integrity of our democratic processes, but we worry that a moment of reckoning may be coming. Indications suggest that foreign state threats are growing, and the possibility of an acute crisis can no longer be ruled out. Efforts to influence UK political positions on critical issues will likely increase between now and the next general election. Democracies around the world are under threat, and as democratic norms erode, so will corporate behaviour. That will only be made easier by new technologies that enable firms to evade due diligence checks.

There is also deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of the current United States Administration, who have ambitions to shape the political direction of their allies. Wealthy individuals are a concern too: Elon Musk, for example, has reportedly considered a £75 million donation to a UK political party. As our political landscape becomes more fragmented, the likelihood of tight and unpredictable electoral races is growing. Adversaries could try to create the impression of having influenced a few races, even if they do not actually change outcomes, simply to make the losers doubt the legitimacy of the process.

I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent statement. I fully welcome the report and its recommendations, which I will read very carefully. I share his concerns about cryptocurrencies. The first recommendation is about the need for a single centralised unit. Does he agree that the Government might consider the new National Police Service, announced as part of the policing reforms, a suitable vehicle to deal with the issues of electoral crime?

The Committee very much hopes that a new service will be able to accommodate that recommendation. We hope that there can be a centralised service, using whichever is the most appropriate vehicle; whether that be within the National Crime Agency or separately within the police service is for others to decide. The most crucial thing is that we do not have a disparate mix of agencies working in the same arena. The critical thing that we uncovered was how the Electoral Commission—which much of the investigation was about and where so much of the concern originates—often cannot access data and information from other agencies for GDPR reasons, and therefore it is frustrated in its work and many opportunities to prosecute or bring cases are not enabled.