My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.
State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.
In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.
My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are.
We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable— I will come to those in a moment.
We must be frank about the threat we face. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a distinct threat. It is an organisation that has been active on British soil, targeting British citizens and funding terrorism across the world. In October 2024, Ken McCallum, the director-general of the Security Service, said that MI5 and the police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving
My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support the principles of the Bill. We have been clear that we also want this legislation on the statute book and we will not seek to hold it up. We fully recognise the unprecedented security challenges that we face, confronting more serious and less predictable threats than at any time since the Cold War. In 2025 alone, MI5 reported a 35% increase in state threat activity on the previous year, including more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. We are in accord with the Government. This activity must be stopped.
However, while we will not obstruct the Bill, our support is not a blank cheque for lawmaking. The Bill was introduced just 13 days ago and was rushed through the other place in less than six hours. That begs the question: why did it take 14 months to act on recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC, which were accepted in full in May 2025? To ask this House to deliver a watertight defence in a single afternoon is a tall order and risks the Bill being seen as a rapid answer rather than a complete answer. Such accelerated progress risks important areas not being properly covered or provisions having unintended consequences.
Good legislation also involves scrutiny and input from outside Parliament. The media and experts from a wide range of professional fields are normally critical in improving a Bill. However, the speed of this Bill’s passage runs a real risk that much-needed external scrutiny will be missed.
The Bill addresses a critical gap. Looking to existing terrorism laws to deal with state organs was, in the words of the independent reviewer,
“shopping in the wrong department”.
By creating a power to designate bodies involved in “foreign power threat activity”, the Bill creates the right tool to penalise the proxies and hired guns that foreign powers use to carry out sabotage on UK soil.
My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken.
My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, it exemplifies: the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity—endeavours in which this country excels—in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved.
I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even impossible, for western Governments to speak.
I am also grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the various peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations, from Conciliation Resources to Save the Children and the Halo Trust, that have approached me with their concerns in relation to this issue. I thank the Minister and his Bill team for our discussions on this issue since the Bill was published two weeks ago.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee.
Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome.
There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum—it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments.
However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the law is outpaced almost as soon as it is enacted. We cannot afford, once again, to legislate in arrears.
The reality is that modern state threats are often indirect. They are mediated through networks, proxies, front organisations and aligned movements that provide distance and deniability. Influence is rarely crude; it is incremental, sustained and frequently embedded within legitimate structures. That presents a challenge which the Bill does not fully meet. In particular, it requires us to take seriously the role of transnational ideological networks that may intersect with state interests, whether formally or informally.
I welcome the Bill. The fact that we need it less than three years after the passing of the National Security Act demonstrates the evolving threat that this country faces.
In 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I chair, published its ground-breaking Russia report. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it took three years for the then Government to implement most of the recommendations in that report, including the FIRS. Since then, we have produced in 2023 our report on China and in 2025 our report on Iran, and all pose a threat to UK security. The playbook they use is very similar: sabotage, cyber attacks, intimidation of the diaspora, misinformation, kidnapping, assassination in some cases—all carried out not just in this country but across Europe. Many examples can be found in open source material. Their strategy is not only well thought out but well funded. It is to undermine the trust in government, increase social division, weaken the rules-based order and, in Russia’s case, try to limit our support for Ukraine.
After the attack in Salisbury, thanks to the efforts of our security services and our international partners, we have made the operating environment in the UK and across Europe far more difficult for these actors. That is why they have gone to using proxies. Again, it is not just about acts of sabotage. There have been good examples across Europe, such as shopping centres in Poland being attacked. Earlier this year I was in Latvia, where the railway system is attacked on a daily basis—not because it is breaking down but because people are being paid to disrupt the network. We have seen Iran using organised crime networks across Europe to assassinate those who oppose the regime. We have also seen, closer to home, the example of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, Nathan Gill, who was paid by the Russians to put out a positive image of Russia and to undermine the West’s support for Ukraine.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. We have had many conversations about national security over the years and have not always agreed, but he knows what he is talking about, and I agree with him on this Bill. This is a necessary Bill, and the sense of urgency is necessary too. As others have said, the National Security Act 2023 was a big step forward. I welcome the cross-party approach that we had to that and have to national security matters generally. It is a huge help, including for those to whom we have already paid tribute in our services, our operating partners and the police.
However, threats change, our enemies adapt, and we must respond; as others have said, we must do so at pace and not get left behind. There has already been reference to Sir Ken McCallum’s comment that he saw a 35% increase in the number of individuals being investigated for involvement in state threat activity. I remember once being told off by a Prime Minister for “beguilingly precise” statistics, but the picture is what I recognise, including from my time as National Security Adviser and my time reading all the intelligence. We need to respond.
As I am sure those who know him would agree, Sir Ken is the sort of person who would tell you, in the same calm, professional tone, that you had won the lottery or that your house had burned down. We must not let that professionalism mask the day in, day out reality of what we are facing in terms of the threat to this country. That is why I support the Bill. I also support those who talk about the need for a national conversation about that threat; we need that in order to have the basis for taking our legislation forward. We need to respond to this evolving and increasing threat from state actors and their proxies.
I commend Jonathan Hall KC. We should remind ourselves that he is our independent reviewer. All across the House there is respect and support for what he has said. He has shown us a way forward and I commend him, not least because this is really difficult, as we have already heard. We cannot simply cut and paste from terrorism to state actors. I also commend the fact that operational partners have been involved in framing the Bill. In my view, the Bill will bring real and direct operational benefits. That is what it is about, and that is what we should support.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barrow. I agree with his comments. Like him, I welcome the Bill, and, like him, I think we have been waiting a long time for it. It is not just that it seems to have taken the Government a long time to get going on the issue; it is that real life affects those who are at risk, not only the Jewish community but certainly and definitely that community, so we need to get on with this legislation, and I am therefore among those who do not support further delay.
The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—for me, they introduce a new element, but one that quite clearly has real force—require us to try to get a balance between, on the one hand, contact with organisations of which we deeply disapprove and whose activities are malign, but for purposes that serve our interests and which are for the general good, and, on the other, not creating loopholes by inventing, if I can put it that way, motives that would lead to the courts excusing their conduct. It is not difficult to see that a defence could make it quite difficult for the prosecution to land its point if there is an argument in court about motivation and it has to prove that it was for a prohibited purpose. One thing that we need to concentrate on in the short time we have is getting some careful drafting into the legislation to get the balance right.
The Minister said, and I see his point, that he could not guarantee that this legislation would actually lead to the proscription of the IRGC. All I can say is that, in the real world, if it does not lead to that, there is something very wrong. I would expect to see that happen. We do live, I think, in the real world, not in one that is composed of nicer situations than actually prevail.
On the prohibited purpose requirement, as I say, it is obvious that we need careful drafting, but that applies also to the provision on prosecution regarding the risk of people planning activities in this country for malign activity abroad. Again, it is not difficult to see that, unless it is possible to land the point, the defence will have quite a good time arguing about motive. When this legislation is passed, we must not get into a situation where it turns out to be a great deal less effective than it should have been because we put into it clauses that enabled the defence of these individuals to make a monkey, if I can put it that way, of the legislation that we put in place.
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The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.
The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.
In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.
The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.
I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.
Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.
The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.
Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.
New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.
There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.
I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.
We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.
In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.
I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.
There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.
In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counterterrorism investigation, and prosecutors said that one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in Britain. In March this year, we saw the horrific arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, responsibility for which was claimed by an Iran-aligned group.
The IRGC funnels billions of dollars to terrorist proxies worldwide. It gifts rockets and advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. It manages thousands of fighters operating across multiple continents. It co-ordinates assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations, including here in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely right that the law should treat association with, and support for, the IRGC as a criminal matter. That is what this Bill sets out to do and why we support its intentions.
However, good intentions poorly executed create only the illusion of security. I must be candid with the House: as drafted, the Bill contains at least four significant vulnerabilities that we believe must be addressed before it leaves this place. The first is the “prohibited purpose” requirement. The provisions in Clause 2 are modelled on Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the provision that makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation. However, the Government have introduced an additional element that does not appear in the Terrorism Act: a requirement that the support be given for a “prohibited purpose”, which is defined as conduct that is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
I ask the Minister a simple question that I hope he will answer directly: what form of support for the IRGC do the Government consider to be beneficial to the United Kingdom? What type of assistance to the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism could possibly be regarded as in our national interests? If the answer is none—as it self-evidently must be—then why does this additional evidential standard exist at all?
What this provision creates in practice is a perverse hierarchy of culpability. Under the Bill, a prosecution against an individual for supporting the IRGC would require proof that their support was prejudicial to the United Kingdom. However, if that same individual were supporting one of the IRGC’s terrorist proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—they would face a lower bar to prosecution under existing terrorism legislation. The organisation responsible for inspiring, organising, arming and financing those groups would receive greater legal protection than the groups themselves. That cannot be the Government’s intention. I hope that the Minister will listen and bring his own amendment to this effect; if not, I most certainly will.
The second concern relates to an omission of provisions on uniforms and insignia. Under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, it is an offence to display in a public place
“an item of clothing, or … any other article, in such a way … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.
It is also an offence to publish an “image” of such an article or item of clothing. That is the provision used to remove Hamas flags from our streets and to seize Hezbollah insignia. The Bill contains no equivalent provision whatever. If the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its symbols, insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. There is a gap in the legislation that is so obvious and damaging to public confidence that its presence in the Bill is difficult to explain.
I believe that the Government are of the view that this would somehow be inappropriate for this legislation. I wholly disagree. The Bill applies only to a UK person. We are not trying to ban Iranians displaying such insignia in Iran—of course we cannot do that—but why should anyone in the United Kingdom be permitted to wave the flag or wear the uniform of an organisation that we have deemed to be a threat worthy of designation under this legislation?
The third gap relates to the dissemination of publications and materials. Since 2006, it has been an offence under the Terrorism Act to disseminate terrorist publications. These are publications that encourage, glorify or provide practical assistance for acts of terrorism. That standard has been part of our counterterrorism framework for nearly two decades. This Bill makes no equivalent provision for designated hostile state bodies. Materials promoting, glorifying or facilitating the activities of designated groups could be distributed without triggering criminal liability. This is not a minor technical omission; it is a failure to apply a basic and well-established standard of counterterrorism law to a new category of threat.
The fourth and final concern is the absence of a preparatory conduct offence. The Bill as drafted captures those who assist, support or receive money from a designated group; it does not capture those who are in the process of planning to do so. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 addresses this gap in the terrorism context, making it clear that preparation for terrorist action is itself an offence. By the time someone has completed an act of support for a terrorist organisation, the damage may already be done. Catching people in the preparatory stages is operationally essential for our security services. As the Bill stands, an individual who has taken concrete steps towards assisting the IRGC cannot be prosecuted unless and until the act itself is complete. They cannot be prosecuted for those acts because preparatory acts are not covered by any of offences in the Bill. That is a vulnerability that we do not have in our terrorism legislation. It is a vulnerability we should not introduce here.
I will make one final point. I have read Hansard and looked at the response from the new Security Minister to my honourable friend Alicia Kearns in the other place, and I must say that I found it wanting. The Security Minister said:
“There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 922.]
This argument does not stand. Proscription does not abolish a terrorist group. Hamas is a proscribed group of the United Kingdom, yet we all know it still exists in the Middle East. Daesh was not defeated because the British Government had proscribed it. Would anyone argue that Palestine Action does not exist now that it has been proscribed?
The purpose of proscription is not to abolish a group but to degrade its ability to operate in the United Kingdom by prohibiting all forms of association with and support for it. That is precisely what the Government say they intend to do with designation under this Bill. Therefore, the reality is that proscription and designation are not really as different as the Minister would have us believe. Given that was the Government’s main justification for rejecting my honourable friend’s amendments last week, I hope they will rethink their objections.
The rushed nature of the Bill’s drafting is, I regret to say, visible in the legislation. When a Government spend months resisting legislation, then reverse course under political pressure and move quickly to announce a Bill, the risk of corners being cut is very real. We see the evidence of that here. None of our concerns is insurmountable. In each case, the amendments would bring this legislation into conformity with the counter- terrorism framework it is explicitly based on.
As I have just outlined, there is no reason why this should not happen. The threat from the IRGC—and, indeed, other state-linked groups—is present, documented and ongoing. The House has an obligation to ensure that when legislation is passed in response to that threat, it is legislation that works, is watertight and enforceable, and does not permit those who support one of the world’s most dangerous organisations to slip through its gaps. We support the Bill. We want to see it on our statute book, but we will not allow the urgency of the cause to excuse the inadequacy of the drafting. We will table amendments in Committee and we look forward to constructive engagement with Ministers.
The litmus test for the Bill will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. My noble friend Lord Marks has constantly argued that if the IRGC was not in power in Tehran, it would be universally recognised as a terrorist organisation. Yet, as drafted, this Bill is gentler on the IRGC than our laws are on the terrorists it funds.
We must also ensure that these powers have teeth in the global financial system. My noble friend Lord Purvis noted on 11 June that these groups operate through complex commercial, financial and now digital trade routes. We must use this Bill to trigger robust investigations by Companies House and the Financial Reporting Council to unmask front companies and starve designated organisations of UK-origin funds. However, I remain a bit concerned by the Minister’s comment that a UK connection of some sort is required for designation. In an era of digital interference, when state-backed proxies can target our citizens and sabotage our interests from behind a screen thousands of miles away, we must ensure that this requirement does not become a loophole. We need an assurance that this Bill is equipped for the era of digital interference, ensuring that hostile actors cannot evade designation simply by operating entirely from abroad via digital means.
We must also listen to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Development Committee. They warn that new Section 17B is so broad that it could unintentionally criminalise impartial humanitarian aid. Ministerial “intent” is not a legal safeguard. We need an express exemption on the face of the Bill for impartial humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anything less leaves our aid workers at the mercy of a 14-year prison sentence for simply delivering life-saving medicine.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified another trap. Clause 1 currently allows for designation without even establishing a link to a foreign power for certain acts, such as those under Section 4 of the 2023 Act. That is both too weak against our enemies and too broad for a free society.
On future-proofing, the director-general of MI5 has rightly warned of the next frontier: autonomous AI systems that may evade effective human control. The Government’s own AI Scenarios 2030 report admits that such systems could cause “existential harms” without intervention. I will be moving a specific amendment in committee to ensure that “foreign power threat activity” captures the development of super-intelligent AI capabilities by a foreign power.
Finally, because this is a fast-track Bill, we must have a 12-month statutory review of its adequacy. We also need the safeguard that any removal of a designation must be approved by votes in both Houses. Parliamentary oversight must exist at the end of a designation, not just the beginning.
As I said, we will not hold this Bill up, but we will seek to amend it. We are talking about individuals who actively assist hostile states in sabotaging our nation. We owe the citizens and residents who are being specifically targeted by these lethal plots more than just sincere intentions; we owe them a law that holds up in the courtroom and at the border. We look forward to a rigorous, if brief, Committee stage.
What do I mean by the “unintended consequences” of the Bill? Take proposed new Section 17C, which is about obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining material benefits from a designated body. That is an offence punishable by 14 years in prison—quite right, too, in the cases highlighted in the Explanatory Notes: a business assisting a hostile state with new military technology or a contract criminal who knew, or should have known, where his fee was coming from.
However, “material benefits” are defined in proposed new Section 17C(3) with remarkable breadth. They include
“financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information”.
Taking that definition at face value, the likes of Inter Mediate could contravene criminal law by accepting information from a designated body as to that body’s objectives or negotiating stance. The defence of reasonable excuse in proposed new subsection (7) applies only to the retention of information; there is no such defence for agreeing to accept information or accepting it. There is a protection for public servants in proposed new subsection (8)(b), but not for charities or churches, which often have reach that Governments do not. One thinks of a charity such as the Halo Trust. Wishing to clear a minefield, it asks the IRGC, once designated, where the mines were laid. That, too, on a plain reading of proposed new Section 17C, would constitute the criminal offence of agreeing to accept information—although only 10 years in prison for that one.
Section 17B, as the noble Baroness has said, presents similar problems. Humanitarian organisations are not usually exempt from paying taxes, duties and fees to establish and maintain their operations in a country or territory—for example, tax on staff salaries, import duties on aid items and visa fees. It is at least arguable that anything which swells the coffers of a designated organisation will be of material assistance to the activities of that organisation locally or, by subsection (4)(a), in the United Kingdom. Bluntly, it helps to pay for them. That legally prudent interpretation risks blunting the aid effort where it is most needed and criminalising those who would seek to provide it.
The Minister will remind us that the CPS prosecutes only in cases where that is in the public interest and that for these offences, the additional consent of the Attorney-General will be required. In other words, “Don’t worry: it may never happen”. However, with respect, and as anybody familiar with these sectors well knows, reliance on the wise exercise of such discretions, though important, is not a sufficient answer.
Charitable trustees, of whom I suspect that there are quite a few in the Chamber, are properly cautious about signing off on activity which could expose us or our staff to the criminal law. So, to a still greater extent, are bank compliance departments, insurers and suppliers of humanitarian aid—all essential to the activities of those operating in these fields. The experience of NGOs in conflict zones is that banks and others are highly risk-averse. Why would they take the reputational risk of getting involved with potential criminality, even if only on paper? That is precisely why Parliament has expressly excluded those engaged in humanitarian activity from at least one comparable criminal offence—the designated area offence in Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000.
We have a week to sort this out. The Explanatory Notes, as they stand, are not sufficient, for reasons that I do not have time to get into. A clear statement from the Minister that Sections 17B and 17C are not intended to operate as I have suggested would be a start. An explicit reference to Pepper v Hart could be a useful signal to prosecutors and judges. Also helpful at a more general level would be an undertaking to co-operate through the established tri-sector group dialogue in amending the applicable guidance and a clear and unqualified statement that the new offences are not intended to apply to bona fide organisations engaged in conflict prevention, conflict resolution or, in the words of the Explanatory Notes,
“humanitarian assistance or other activities that support basic human needs”.
These are sticking plasters, but it will take amendment to remove the chilling effect and place the matter beyond doubt. Though I shall listen with great care, as I always do, to what the Minister has to say, I fear that this is an issue to which we shall have to come back in Committee.
The arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Godson in his recent article in the Spectator are both relevant and necessary to engage with. He draws attention to the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood operates less as a single organisation and more as a diffuse and adaptive network: a movement with affiliated bodies, overlapping structures and a capacity to project influence across civic, educational and political space. This strength lies not in overt confrontation but in persistence, organisation and reach over time. The point is not to collapse this into a simplistic category of state threat but to recognise that boundaries between state and non-state activity are often porous, and that serious actors are adept at operating across these boundaries.
Other countries have begun to engage with this reality. France and Austria, among them, have examined how such movements function, how they influence institutions and what risks they may pose to democratic resilience over the longer term. In the United Kingdom, our approach has been more cautious—arguably, too cautious—and the Bill reflects this caution. It is anchored firmly in the concept of state attribution which, while understandable, has created a limitation. If influence is exercised through networks that fall just outside that definition, a framework confined to it risks overlooking a significant part of the threat.
To be clear, this is not part of an argument for indiscriminate measures or broad-brush conclusions. It is an argument for clarity and completeness, to ensure that our understanding of modern threats is sufficiently wide, and that our response is capable of addressing them. At present, the alignment is not yet fully achieved. This is why the next stages of the Bill are so important.
As has already been demonstrated in another place, there is real scope to strengthen and redefine the framework. In particular, it is reasonable to apply three basic tests. First, flexibility: can the Bill adapt to new forms of threat without the need to repeat primary legislation? Secondly, scope: does it adequately capture indirect as well as direct forms of hostile influence? And, thirdly, clarity: are the definitions and mechanisms sufficiently precise to be both effective and enforceable?
If the Bill falls short against these tests, amendment is not an obstruction; it is responsible lawmaking. Those who seek to undermine open societies are neither static nor unsophisticated. They study our systems, identify ambiguities and exploit gaps with consistency and patience. If our legislative response is too narrow or too cautious, it will not be enough. The Bill is an important step forward, but it must also be a durable one. I believe that the Bill can be improved and that we can future-proof it, widen its scope where necessary and ensure that it addresses not only direct state action but the broader ecosystem in which influence is exercised. In conclusion, our task is simple: not to follow threat but to get ahead of threat and to stay there.
This is a very difficult environment for law enforcement and security services to act in. For example, it might not be evident straightaway that acts of sabotage are being supported by foreign actors. We saw the case last year of the attack on a warehouse in east London that was being used to store supplies for Ukraine.
Will this threat increase and is it going away? No, it is not going away. I argue that it will increase. Certainly, in Russia, as Putin comes under more pressure, this is a low-risk element in trying to undermine the West. We do not know what is going to happen next in Iran in terms of the fallout from the war, but again this is a low-risk strategy for Iran because it can deny involvement in many of these attacks or misinformation campaigns, whether they are attacking warehouses in east London and synagogues or posting antisemitic rhetoric online. We also have increasing activity by the Chinese, who are targeting universities and looking for trade secrets, something that the Bill will take on. Will this Bill be the end of it? Will that be it? No, it will not. I think we will be coming back. As our adversaries react and adapt, we will have to come back for more.
There is an issue that the previous Government ignored, even though they gave a commitment on it: the review of the Official Secrets Act 1989. The problem I have with this legislation is that there is now going to be a huge disparity between 14 years for an offence under this legislation and two years for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. The review was promised in 2019 but shelved, and I urge the Government to revisit it.
It is often said that democracy is fragile. It is. It has to be nurtured. We have to ensure that in any legislation such as this we get the balance right between protecting our nation and its citizens and the rights of individuals. As chair of the ISC and a member of the ISC for nearly 10 years, I see the regular reporting on what is happening: the attacks not just in this country but across Europe. I think we need to have an honest public conversation about the threats. In his report, the reviewer said that statistics should be published. I think we need to publish them, whether in his annual report or in the ISC’s annual report.
I come to the issues around designation. Reference has been made to the IRGC. This was covered in our Iran report. Yes, the current legislation is not fit for purpose and I think this is a way forward, but I stress to individuals who are calling to put the IRGC in the Bill that that is not the way we operate because proscription is done independent of politics on a threat-based assessment. I think it will meet that threshold, and I hope we can see a movement forward.
I will just touch on some of the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I agree with him that there are concerns. We need to alleviate them; it is about getting the right balance between protecting our nation from harm and making sure that those who are doing good in the world are protected as well. There are instances where Governments, NGOs and others have to deal with some very nasty people. That is a fact of life. I have to say—it might not be very popular in this debate—that on occasion NGOs and Governments have to be involved even with individuals linked to the IRGC.
This is a movement forward. Will it be the final say on this situation? No, it will not. This is going to be an ever-increasing issue that we will have to come back to, and the Government will have to be agile to react to it. Finally, like my noble friend I say thank you to the members of our security services and the police who keep us safe 365 days of the year.
I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lord Anderson. Like others, I have been contacted by NGOs concerned about the effect of this legislation. I thank them for raising those concerns and I pay tribute to them for their extraordinary, brave work in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Clearly, they have to engage with actors who do not have our best interests at heart; that is what it takes to operate in those places.
I thank the Minister and his team for the briefings that have allowed some of us to raise these concerns. It is clear to me that the Bill is designed to meet that challenge through the concept that the offence is committed only by conduct
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
There is an intent element to this as well. Legitimate humanitarian assistance would not fall foul of this test.
There are other safeguards too, but I encourage the Government to continue discussions with the NGOs to see whether anything more could be done through guidance, including for the CPS. I agree with my noble friend Lord Anderson about the use of a tri-sector approach as well. I see the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, listening, so I await further legal analysis in this respect, but I would not support an amendment creating an exemption. Surely that would be a loophole that our opponents would seek to use. I think it would put the NGOs in a place of greater danger. But let us continue the conversation and see what we can do.
I also understand the motivation of those who have called for putting a particular actor on the face of the Bill, but I do not agree. In my experience, national security legislation should be as actor-agnostic as possible. It should create the framework through which the Government can act with the best intelligence, advice, involvement and engagement with the operating partners as possible. I do say to the Minister that, if the Government should get their way, as I hope they will, and fast-track this legislation successfully, there will be an expectation in this House, and more generally, of rapid action in exercising these powers with the same sense of urgency and purpose as in pursuing the Bill itself.
I have one question for the Minister, and this goes to a point that the noble Baroness made about a 12-month review. Since this is a Bill amending Part 1 of the National Security Act, as I read it, I understand that the independent reviewer will be required to carry out an annual review of these provisions. Can the Minister confirm that? That would allow for us to respond quickly if there are deficiencies—and they could be on either side of the debate. Indeed, it may not be that we have got this wrong but that our opponents will move and react, so we need to know quickly whether there is more that we should do in this area and take it upon ourselves to respond accordingly. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister on that.
In conclusion, we all know that we cannot legislate away the threats to our country, but we should do what we can as quickly as possible to try to keep pace with evolving threats. I therefore support getting the Bill passed by the Summer Recess. I would welcome any improvements, but not at the cost of delay. Let us do what we can now. We will do the best that we can in the time that we have available to us, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, and others have said, we will for sure be coming back to this issue in the future because the threats will not go away. They will continue to evolve.
Finally, I think it was my noble friend Lord Pickles who made an important point about future-proofing. We should try to include in this legislation individuals who are not directed by or acting under the influence of an organisation but who are themselves motivated to support state organisations, so that we can also convict them. If one looks at current terrorist activity, it is very clear that the self-motivated individual is a feature of the threat scene. It is important that we should try to include people acting on their own authority in this legislation. It is an important Bill. I support getting it through but I hope we will not do this at the expense of getting the provisions and the balance of the legislation right.