National Security: State Threat Designations

In 2022, the National Cyber Security Centre issued an advisory alongside international partners exposing malicious activity. The advisory highlighted the threat from cyber proxy actors affiliated with the IRGC targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian and UK organisations.

Between March and May 2026 there were a series of attacks and attempted attacks targeting Jewish communities, journalists and Israeli interests in the United Kingdom and across Europe. These incidents including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and have had a profound impact on those communities affected.

The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, otherwise known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah, has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities, and Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March.

Sitting behind IMCR were members of Iran’s IRGC Qods Force, which almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe.

While the IRGC has already been sanctioned in its entirety by the UK, designation of both IMCR and IRGC under this framework will strengthen our ability to disrupt and take enforcement action against those supporting or facilitating this type of activity, and reinforces the UK’s position that these malign actions are unacceptable.

The Government assess that the GRU Volunteer Corps forms part of a network of volunteer and proxy formations that are controlled, co-ordinated and overseen by the main directorate of the general staff of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), Russia’s military intelligence service. The GRU has a long-standing record of state threats activity directed against the United Kingdom and its allies, including the 2018 Salisbury nerve agent attack, and wider sabotage and intelligence activity across Europe.

In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence introduced reforms that mandated that volunteer formations fighting in Ukraine should be brought under formal contractual arrangements with the GRU and the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since these reforms, the GRU has directly supervised and funded these volunteer formations, using them as recruitment and deployment mechanisms in support of Russian military and intelligence objectives. This includes elements of the former Wagner Group, which has conducted sabotage activity in the UK, and which now receive direct GRU tasking and supervision.

These arrangements are part of a broader model by which the Russian state combines conventional military capabilities with irregular and deniable forces, intended to project Russian power abroad and undermine European and NATO security.

As such, the Government assess that the GRU Volunteer Corps is involved in foreign power threat activity, including sabotage and other activity directed against the UK and Europe. This designation will strengthen the United Kingdom’s ability to disrupt activity linked to these formations and protect UK national security.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has concluded that there is sufficient basis to reasonably believe that each of these bodies is engaged in foreign power threat activity, and that each designation is necessary to protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.

[HCWS218]