National Security Bill

New Clause 9

Use of Reasonable Force

“(1) A power conferred on a constable by virtue of this Part—

(a) is additional to powers which the constable has at common law or by virtue of any other enactment, and

(b) is not to be taken as affecting those powers.

(2) A constable may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power conferred on the constable by virtue of this Part.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 1—Offence of failing to declare participation in arrangement required to be registered.—

“(1) A person who carries out an activity, or arranges for an activity to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to—

(a) a foreign activity arrangement required to be registered under section 61(1), or

(b) a foreign influence arrangement required to be registered under section 64(1)

must declare that they are party to the arrangement, when making a communication to those in section 65(2)(a)(i) to (vi).

(2) A person who breaches the requirement in subsection (1) commits an offence.”

New clause 2—ffence of carrying out activities under a foreign activity arrangements: Disqualification from Parliament—

“(1) A person who is a Member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords commits an offence if—

(a) the person carries out an activity, or arranges for an activity to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement, and

(b) the persons knows, or ought reasonably to know, that they are acting under the direction of a specified person.

(2) A person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (1), and is a Member of the House of Commons, is disqualified from membership of the House of Commons.

(3) A person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (1), and is a Member of the House of Lords, is disqualified from sitting or voting in the House of Lords, and sitting or voting in a committee of the House of Lords or a joint committee of both Houses.

It is a pleasure to stand before the House today to introduce not just new clause 9, but many other new clauses that I and many others in this House have argued for at different times and in different places.

Plus a few others.

Plus a few others. So it is a great pleasure to be here today.

May I also place on record my enormous thanks to two right hon. Members—the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) will smile as I say this—who have done so much to get us to this position today? I refer to my right hon. Friends the Members for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who have been extremely generous with their time and thoughts, including in private with me as well, in making sure that I am able to answer as many of her questions as I can, although somehow she has exceeded even their magisterial intellect. I am grateful that they have got us to this place, because this Bill is essential for the future defence of our nation.

The reason for that is because, of course, the world has changed. The reality is that national security in this country has changed and evolved in recent years, and the Darwinian challenge between the hunter and the hunted has led us to a position where we need to update not just our techniques, which can be done in private, but sadly our laws, which rightly must be debated in public.

I think we all agree with the core aims of the Bill. The first is to give our law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to tackle harmful activities in the United Kingdom carried out by, or on behalf of, foreign powers. However, to do that we also need to increase the transparency around those who seek to influence the politics and institutions of the United Kingdom through the foreign influence registration scheme. That is a very welcome addition. I know that many Members here, including those who have been on the Foreign Affairs Committee for the past five years, have called for it at various different points. The Bill has, at its heart, the protection of the national security of this great country that we all serve.

On that, I will give way—not for the last time, I am sure—to the right hon. Member.

The Minister talks about Darwinian change, but evolution takes a long time. Many things in the Bill have been kicking around for at least six or seven years, and that includes the issue around the foreign influence registration scheme, which was only put in the Bill at Committee stage after it was omitted on Second Reading; even now, there are amendments to it. Is the Minister satisfied that the Bill—in terms of the major changes that it will achieve—will fulfil its purpose and that it has been properly scrutinised in this House?

What I am so pleased about with this Bill is that it introduces so many ideas that the right hon. Gentleman and I have discussed in private over many years when I was in a similar position to him—scrutinising a Government. The Bill introduces some of those ideas that, yes, he is right to say, seem to have been introduced quickly, but the reality, as he knows very well, is that they have been discussed slowly. Many aspects of the Bill not only date six or seven years into the past, but update aspects that date a lot further back. Sadly, some of our national security legislation is better placed to hunt those who would send secret notes on pigeons back to Germany than to hunt those sending secret messages through the internet. This is updating quite a lot of laws that date all the way back to the first world war. I am very glad that we are doing it, and I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman’s scrutiny in the Bill Committee has been so rigorous and so onerous.

My right hon. Friend is right that this is an important step. In particular, he is right about the foreign influence registration scheme, which has long been called for, including by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am a member. He will also know that, because we have yet to discuss that in any detail, there may be confusion about the primary and secondary tiers—in other words, those things that are designated as being of more profound importance than these other things. Would it be helpful if he were to write to the ISC, setting out how he thinks they would work in practice, given that we understand that the secondary tier will be introduced by secondary legislation?

My right hon. Friend is right. I would be very happy to write to him. I can summarise it now by saying that the primary tier is that connected to political activity. Anybody from any foreign country who wishes to influence this House, this Parliament, any Members here, or indeed any political outcome, would be looking at the primary tier. That is the basic level, and it involves a registration on a website so that we can all know who has taken payment for what—which piper has been paid and by whom.

The enhanced registration is different and requires registration for a wider range of activities, but those depend on the specific foreign power and, indeed, the entity or operation within it. That is a different matter, and that will be down to the Secretary of State looking at what is reasonably necessary in order to protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom—that is the enhanced tier, as we are calling it. That is the summary, but I will be happy to write to the ISC.

The Minister said that once somebody has registered on a website, we will all be able to see it. That may be true if we knew that that was where we had to look to check whether somebody coming in through the door, sending us a letter or inviting us to dinner as an MP was actually somebody who was working for a foreign power. Would it not be far more sensible, once somebody has registered, to require them to declare to any Minister, MP or Member of the House of Lords that that is what they were doing, so that there is a degree of protection for this House?

The hon. Member makes a very good point: there are many areas in which the individual concerned should certainly be doing the responsible thing and advertising it. The basis of this has to be a balance, so requiring people to register is, I think, a very good start. We need to take forward some of the recommendations that the hon. Member has made and the thoughts he has expressed, because he is absolutely right that transparency in all things is important.

The Minister has accurately described what the two different tiers of the FIRS scheme will do, but it is difficult to understand why the registration of harmful activity outside of political influencing, such as covertly acting as an intelligence officer, only applies to a foreign power that is set out in secondary legislation. Surely, if that activity is wrong, it is wrong whether the country is on an as-yet-undefined list or not.

I think the right hon. Member will find that espionage is illegal in the United Kingdom, whoever is carrying it out.

Will the Minister give way?

I will.

The Minister is very forbearing, and I am glad of the opportunity to warmly congratulate him on his appointment and thank him for the positive way in which he has been reaching out to the ISC.

On the question of the second tier, there appears to be some sort of discrimination between countries that are friendly and those that are hostile, and—unless I misunderstand the Bill—only the hostile ones are going to appear in the secondary designation. If that is the case, could it not lead to some anomalous situations when diplomatic relations improve with a country, so we take it off the second tier, or they worsen and we put it on? There is bound to be a time lag in that sort of thing, so how practical is the second tier scheme as it is currently constituted?

My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. The challenge that we have, as he knows very well, is how we balance the responsibility to inform and how wide we go. I have spoken about this issue with my right hon. Friend in the past, and his judgment on this is something I have always valued, so it has always been very important to me that we share a view on it. However, I think we all agree that where a foreign power is seeking to influence our political life in the broadest sense, we should know about it, whoever is exercising that influence.

I take my right hon. Friend’s point about enhanced registration. Sadly, there is inherently a delay between the way that life changes and the response of Government —that is the reality of existence—but it is important for us to recognise that some countries and entities do require enhanced awareness. That is why it is important for us to have an extra tier.

Will the Minister give way on that point?

This will be the last time I give way for now.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has talked about the challenges and the enhanced part of the scheme. Will it not be a challenge to use the scheme in practice, because he has to put the country concerned into secondary legislation? Is that not going to be diplomatically very difficult to do? Is the reality not that the complex way in which the Government have set out the scheme, with little scrutiny possible from either this Chamber or Committees, means that in practice it is not going to be used at all?

I think the hon. Lady knows me well enough to know that, having been sanctioned by three countries now, it is unlikely that I will be reticent in identifying those that I think are threats to the United Kingdom.

The right hon. Gentleman might not be in the job.

I am very confident that others will also be bold on His Majesty’s behalf. Whoever is fortunate enough to be representing His Majesty in the Home Office will be able to conduct those offices in the good fashion that people expect. [Interruption.] I will move on.

The core of the Bill is, of course, national security and our intelligence services, building on the work they have done to enable us to grow in confidence and prosperity. They have provided the security apparatus that allows freedom beneath and around it. That is an extraordinary luxury and a blessing that this country has been able to enjoy for many years and generations because of the courage and intellect of so many people. They require tools to conduct those tasks, and I am delighted that the Bill will sharpen some of those tools.

I am very glad that the twofold nature of the foreign influence registration scheme has now been set out—we are introducing something that other countries introduced a number of years ago—and that we are ensuring that we keep our politics and those who influence our country open and transparent, not silenced, so that we know who is actually conducting influence operations in our country and trying to shape our public debate. It is important that we support those measures. I am very glad that members of the Bill Committee, many of whom are here on both sides of the House, spoke out in favour of many aspects of the measures, and have supported the Government with new ideas and different ways of thinking, so that we have been able to listen and adapt.

As Members will know, I have listened to every view that has been raised across the House, and I am very pleased to say that we have come, I think, to a Bill that works. We have a Bill that can be sent and introduced to the other place, ready to then deliver for our agencies and those who keep us safe.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, we had four Ministers in the Bill Committee. Yes, the Minister has listened, but nothing in the Bill has changed. It is still a mess, and that goes back to the fundamental point about not including the Security Service Act 1989 in the reform that is needed. Let me tell the Minister now: the lack of scrutiny in this House means that the Bill will be absolutely torn to shreds in the other place.

The right hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that we disagree on that element, but it has been a great pleasure to work on the Bill with him and with many others in the Chamber, and to hear their comments and criticisms. There are many other supplementary areas that I would like to work on in different places at different times, but the Bill answers the essential need that we have now, which is to update our national security legislation to keep the country safe and defend our people, and to ensure that those who have the courage, integrity and wisdom to keep us all safe have the tools at their disposal to do so.

Order. We have already had four points of order, and we have limited time, so I ask Members to please be mindful of the length of their contributions so that we can get as many people in as we possibly can.

It is a pleasure to be back in the Chamber at the Report stage of this hugely important piece of legislation. Bill Committee colleagues will join me in saying that it was not straightforward, for all the reasons that were highlighted in the multiple points of order. The Committee had no less than four Ministers and three Government Whips, and was forced to adjourn twice. Since Second Reading, the Bill has been the responsibility of three different Home Secretaries in—remarkably—the Governments of three different Prime Ministers.

We got off to a shaky start on the first day of the Bill Committee when the Whip, the hon. Member for North Cornwall (Scott Mann), who I am pleased has joined us this afternoon, was asked to act up as a Minister only minutes before the start. On one day, the Committee had to be adjourned because the second Minister was missing in action—the circumstances are still a mystery to this day. It was something of a relief, then, when the current Minister took office and we could turn to the serious detail of scrutinising and delivering long overdue and incredibly necessary national security legislation.

As we have said before, many of the new measures in the Bill have been born out of recommendations in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report and in the Law Commission’s “Protection of Official Data” report. With those solid foundations, we have been keen to work with Government to move the legislation forward and close the gaps in our defences. That could not be more timely in the light of stark warnings given by the director general of MI5 today, including about the fact that there have been at least 10 attempts to kidnap or even kill UK-based critics of the Iranian regime since January of this year.

That is not to say that we do not have some outstanding concerns about the detail of the provisions. In speaking to all the amendments grouped with new clause 9, I turn first to amendment 14, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). I will spend some time discussing the detail of this amendment, because it is so important.

Efficacy and proportionality are the twin guarantees that underpin all security legislation and activity, as the hon. Lady is aware, but if anything, clause 13, for example, should go further than it currently does. She will know that that clause is built on the idea of intention—that people must intend to do harm—but people should know that they are likely to do harm if they act recklessly, and the Bill could be expanded in that direction. There is an unholy trinity of anarchists, liberals and Bolsheviks who oppose all legislation of this kind, but if anything, this legislation should be warmly welcomed and go further than it does.

I am grateful for the intervention. The points that I am about to make about the value and role of an independent reviewer of this legislation relate to how, if some of the thresholds are not in the right place, such a reviewer can not only be both a check and a balance on the powers but make recommendations for going further in the legislation if we find that there is an operational case for doing so. That is the sensible and constructive point that the right hon. Gentleman knows I am making.

Clause 53 recognises the need for evaluation but deems only part 2 of the Bill to be necessary for review by an independent reviewer and fails to be explicit about who that independent reviewer will be. The Minister has been unable to confirm who will perform this oversight function, which we believe is integral to finding the appropriate balance of powers and freedoms. The scrutiny of terrorism legislation provided by Jonathan Hall KC has been invaluable. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation function has identified weaknesses in terrorism legislation and highlighted areas where stronger safeguards are needed, as well as providing crucial and checks and balances on the powers.

When he gave evidence to the Bill Committee, I asked Jonathan Hall whether there is a logic to his office taking on the additional responsibilities and whether he had the capacity to undertake that work. He said:

“My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 6, Q4.].

With the highest regard for Jonathan Hall, we recognise the merit in adding to his remit the responsibilities created by clause 53. We can see the benefit of a coherent, joined-up approach to assessing both counter-terrorism and state threat legislation.

That said, were the Minister to make a case for the creation of a brand-new position, exclusively for the independent review of laws concerning state threats, we would certainly be open to that. We are, though, now reaching the Bill’s final Commons stages, and we are very much overdue an agreement that the role will begin immediately once the Bill is enacted, clarity on who will undertake the work, and a commitment that all the new provisions in the Bill will be considered in an annual review. Successive Ministers have understood the point and committed to sorting the situation out, but here we are with no progress and nothing to show for it on the face of the Bill, so we are keen to push new clause 3 to a vote.

My hon. Friend is right that we discussed the issue in detail in Committee. Clearly, the only reason is seen to be that someone has been involved in terrorism. Does she agree, however, that there are many other people, such as rapists, paedophiles and murderers, of whom we also have a low opinion? The logical conclusion is surely that, if we restrict it in one area, we should restrict it for everyone.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for making that powerful point. He is absolutely right that there is a distinct lack of consistency. If we are singling out specific criminal offences that we do not like, there is more that we could do to ensure that there is some consistency in that approach. There will be vulnerable people here who we want to check are not falling through the gaps, which would make the situation worse for us all.

What if a woman’s abuser is a terrorist? As I said, the nature of terrorist offenders means that that is often the case. For some of the lower-level offences covered by clauses 84 to 85—for example, that someone made a phone call on behalf of an abuser—it is easy for somebody to say, “I wouldn’t do that, because I’m not a terrorist,” but we all might if we were living in a household where we were terrorised. The danger is that more women in such cases will end up stuck with a terrorist making them be a terrorist, rather than being able to escape them. That is why we feel strongly that the Government should adopt amendment 6.

On some other changes that we would like to see, we have tabled new clauses 5 and 6. They were drafted in the wake of the revelations that the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), when he was the Foreign Secretary, met former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev without officials or security at the height of the Salisbury poisoning case in 2018. That was immediately after the then Foreign Secretary had attended a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss the collective response to Russia’s use of Novichok on UK soil. We still have a series of questions about that encounter, not least who his guest was at that party and why we have not taken steps to sanction Alexander Lebedev, given the assessment of our Five Eyes partner Canada, which has sanctioned him.

Having made the case in Committee for new clauses 5 and 6, which both seek to put safeguards in place to prevent that type of security breach ever happening again, the Minister was keen to stress that he was not going to seek to defend the Administration of the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip, as if that time had passed and there was no need for any further changes to the law in this regard. When that exchange happened on the Tuesday, little did the Minister or I know that by the Thursday, remarkably, the right hon. Gentleman would be launching his campaign to come back as Prime Minister. None of us could have foreseen that, which is one more reason why I stress that the clauses would complement the Bill.

I welcome the Minister to his post. He is very much a round peg in a round hole—despite my historic critique of the Home Office, that is meant as a compliment. I thank him for seeing me and my colleague, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), on the amendment the other day. He will be unsurprised that he did not persuade me, but I thank him for the time in any event. In view of the short time, I will focus mostly on amendment 14, which I hope we will press to a vote. It is in my name and that of the hon. and gallant Member for Bromley—not Bromley, but Barnsley Central; not quite Bromley. That amendment strikes out clause 27.

A decade and a half ago, the British public were shocked to hear stories of British complicity in American and other countries’ acts of kidnap, rendition, torture and assassination, typically but not always by drone strikes, with the collateral damage that that entailed. Collateral damage in this context is a euphemism for the deaths of innocent women and children who happen to be standing near the original target. I use this stark language to make plain the potential consequences of what might seem like bland legalistic language in the Bill.

The legal basis of those actions—I almost said atrocities, but of those actions—was the Intelligence Services Act 1994, when we first recognised the operation of the Secret Intelligence Service. Most notably, it inserted the melodramatically named “007 clause”—section 7—which empowered Ministers to authorise criminal behaviour overseas. I was one of the Ministers who took that Bill through the House. We Ministers were briefed very firmly that, in practice, that section would authorise bugging, burglary and blackmail—the normal behaviour of intelligence agencies seeking to penetrate enemy states and organisations—not kidnap, not torture and most certainly not a licence to kill.

We the Ministers on that Bill gave our word to the House that that was what it was for, but a decade later section 7 was used to authorise the enabling of rendition, torture and quite possibly assassination as well. We know the names of several victims of UK complicity: Binyam Mohamed, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, Fatima Boudchar, his wife, and Rangzieb Ahmed, to name just a few.

It is worth reflecting and placing back on the record that we know the names of Belhaj and Boudchar only because somebody happened to find the papers unattended after the fall of Gaddafi. That was the only way that the truth about their cases came into the public domain.

The right hon. Gentleman is right, and it is also true that we found out about Binyam Mohamed only because of extended legal cases in the courts, which were resisted by the agencies at every turn. We know about Rangzieb Ahmed only because I got access to the in-camera papers. So this is a general problem and I will come back to that. A most recent example is Jagtar Singh Johal, who alleges that he was tortured by Indian authorities and was detained, we believe, as a result of British intelligence. Again, we know about that only because we could spot the case inside one of the commissioner’s reports. Accordingly, exactly because of that, this is literally the tip of the iceberg.

The Intelligence and Security Committee report on detainee mistreatment found 232 cases where UK personnel

“continued to supply questions or intelligence”

to other intelligence services, after they

“knew or suspected that the detainee had been or was being mistreated.”

As I said, I have seen in-camera evidence that showed quite how deliberate some of those decisions were—absolutely in the knowledge that they would be used in the process of torture. That was done rather more broadly, even when the intelligence services did not know at all where the detainee was being held, or even whether they were being held legally or not. Those are the consequences of vague legislation that awarded too much power to the authorities.

We might therefore expect clause 27 to tighten up over-loose legislation to make Ministers, officials and agents more conscious of their responsibilities, not less. Instead, it does the exact opposite. Clause 27 would provide an exemption to schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Schedule 4 sets out the circumstances in which assisting and encouraging a crime that occurs overseas is still a criminal offence. Clause 27 means that it would no longer be an offence to assist a crime overseas where someone’s behaviour is necessary for

The powers given by the so-called “007 clause” are already too loose. Further loosening of the powers of the security and intelligence services could lead to further mistakes of execution and policy. Even slight carve-outs could lead to major problems. Under clause 27, the intelligence services or armed forces would be exempted if they are carrying out their proper function, but it is not clear what that will mean in practice. I have probably been one of the major critics in this House of torture and rendition, but I never believed that our officials were motivated by anything other than patriotic duty. I knew a large number of them, including the Ministers and senior officials involved, and they were not psychopaths. They thought that they were protecting our country and our national security. They thought that they were carrying out their proper function. However, intending to do good does not make evil right, and that is what happened. It has undermined both the liberty and the honour of our nation. In the week after Remembrance Sunday, we should remember that.

In the law, there is already a defence of acting reasonably. There is no obvious reason to go further than that. The dangers of doing so are stark; I hope that I have exemplified them. Instead, clause 27 creates an unnecessary carve-out for officials and Ministers. How can we reasonably criticise Saudi Arabia or Russia when they carry out foreign assassinations if they can point to our creating a law that allows us to do the same? For that reason, and that reason alone, I stress that I want the House to strike down the clause.

We are short on time, so I will talk only to amendment 12, which would take out clause 83. That clause will allow the courts to reduce damages paid to people who have suffered as a result of a crime—maybe torture—carried out by us. Again, it is, along with all the reductions of damages proposals, unnecessary. I will give not my view but that of the Government’s own independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. First, he said that, given the existing legislation, why do we need anything else? Secondly, he said that the new provisions

“introduce a lower threshold than under the 2001 Act”

and that the lower threshold for final deprivation of property is “novel”—by that, he means that it is dangerous. Finally, he said that the courts will already give “appropriate respect” to the views of the Government, so why do we need to go further?

Much of the Bill is important and necessary, but it is incredibly important that we learn from our own history, and in the last 20 years that history has been tragic. We should learn not to repeat that tragedy.

Order. I will now announce the results of the ballot held today for the election of the Chairs of the Education Committee and the Transport Committee. Due to the compressed time in this Report stage, I will not take any points of order until just before the Adjournment at the end of business today. I hope everybody will be happy with that.

In the Education Committee Chair election, 452 votes were cast, one of which was invalid. The counting went to two rounds. There were 436 active votes in the second round, excluding those ballot papers whose preferences had been exhausted. The quota to be reached was therefore 219 votes. Mr Robin Walker was elected Chair with 228 votes.

In the Transport Committee Chair election, 448 votes were cast, none of which were invalid. The counting went to five rounds. There were 369 active votes in the final round, excluding those ballot papers whose preferences had been exhausted. The quota to be reached was therefore 185 votes. Iain Stewart was elected Chair with 192 votes.

Both Chairs will take up their posts immediately. I congratulate Mr Robin Walker and Iain Stewart on their election. The results of both counts under the alternative vote system will be made available as soon as possible in the Vote Office and published on the internet. Congratulations once again.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). He has our full support, both in relation to amendment 14 and to what he said about clause 83.

A Bill of this nature is absolutely necessary and overdue, but I share the concerns of colleagues about the amount of time provided for debate and scrutiny. So short of time do we appear to be that the Minister, much as I respect and like him, did not actually even seem to speak about any of the amendments he has tabled today, including Government amendment 60, which is, frankly, absolutely outrageous, but I will come on to that shortly. It is essential, yes, that we update our espionage laws, but it is also essential that we update them correctly. If we do not do it correctly then: first, we risk severely criminalising behaviour that was not intended to be criminalised; secondly, we leave loopholes to be exploited by those who mean us harm; and thirdly, we confer powers way beyond what is reasonable or required. Our amendments seek to address all three dangers.

First, we have concerns about behaviour that should not be caught in the provisions. We have concerns about the impact of the legislation on protesters, journalists, non-governmental organisations, whistleblowers, those acting in the public interest and, now, victims of trafficking. In some cases, that is because of how some of the specific offences have been framed. For example, by catching someone who might

“approach or be in the vicinity of”

a prohibited place, clause 4 risks seriously criminalising protesters at Faslane for example, assuming the Government still consider nuclear weapons as essential to the

“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Similarly, the National Union of Journalists is concerned that clause 5 risks a chilling effect on its photographers by criminalising any photo of a prohibited place as “inspecting” it. We tabled amendment 120 to protect protesters who are simply in the vicinity of a prohibited place, and amendment 133 to ensure that taking a photograph of a prohibited place is not automatically considered an inspection of it and therefore an offence.

The powers to retain samples obtained after arrest under clause 25 indefinitely, rather than within the usual three-year limit, are too wide. If someone has had even a youth caution for something totally unrelated, their samples can be kept on file forever, unlike most other people’s. Amendment 123 would restrict indefinite retention to those who have previous convictions under the Bill.

In conclusion, we need some of the Bill’s provisions, but in too many ways it goes too far, and it certainly goes too fast. Our amendments seek to remedy that.

Order. As hon. Members can see, there is quite a bit of interest in the debate. I am introducing an initial six-minute speaking limit, which I am sure will be reduced to accommodate everybody.

I am grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker. I will not take that long.

Before I speak to the amendments in my name and those of other hon. Members, which are quite narrow, I want to address Government amendment 60, which I am quite surprised to find in the Bill. Peculiarly, it sets out a series of offences to which it is no longer a defence to claim modern slavery. I am surprised that many of them are not already captured elsewhere. Some of them are very general, such as “entering a prohibited place” and “foreign interference: general”. I always get worried when I see the Government tabling amendments that say things like “in general”, because it really means that they want to do something else that we do not know about. I accept that the amendment will make it into the Bill today, but I want to see what comes back from the other place once the Lords have managed to probe it and find out about it. I would be grateful if the Minister explained why the Government suddenly needed to put it in the Bill.

My amendments would strike out subsections (1)(b) and (2)(b) of clause 68. The Government seem almost to have cut and pasted some of the US legislation and possibly the Australian legislation. I know that the exemption for legal services appears in that legislation, but I am concerned. My amendment is a tightening-up exercise. I really wonder why we think it necessary to provide such a general exemption for legal services. I am sorry if there are practising lawyers present in the House, but if I know anything at all about how lawyers work, they will find ways to exercise the process of lobbying on behalf of organisations and individuals with no right to be here. They will not call it lobbying; they will find some term that is covered by “legal services” and then get on with it. That will also be a way of getting around the Crown prerogative.

I would be grateful if the Minister looks at the issue carefully and understands that there is a problem. I have talked to a lot of lawyers, and most of them believe that the exemption for legal services is not necessary. There is no reason why they should be exempted; the rules should apply directly to them. Either the definition of what constitutes legal services needs to be tightened up very carefully, or the exemptions should be struck out as the amendments require. I would like some indication from the Minister at the Dispatch Box that the Government will look seriously at the matter in the Lords and act on it. An exemption for legal services is unnecessary and will lead to lobbying by the back door; I am sure that all sorts of terms will be found that are covered by “legal services”.

Order. After the next speaker, the speaking time limit will be five minutes. I call Dan Jarvis.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and everyone else who has spoken, and a particular pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). I agreed with all the points that he made. He has done the House a great service in explaining the context of the amendment that we tabled, and I am very grateful for it.

I say that mindful of the fact that we live in a world that continues to create new threats to our safety and way of life from a wide range of hostile states and actors. While their methods and origins vary, their intent is clear: to undermine our national security. Like others—like everyone who is in the Chamber at the moment, I am sure—I personally take these issues very seriously, and I also appreciate the complexities of the issues that we are debating today. None of this is easy, and I know very well the challenges that our security and intelligence services face every single day. I also know very well that our response to terrorism must always be unequivocal, but must always be legal.

I do not doubt the intentions that underpin the Bill. I have known the Minister for a long time, and I absolutely believe that he wants to do the right thing. This is the prism through which I view the Bill: I view it as someone who cares deeply for our country and wants to scrutinise the Bill in order to make it better, and to make our country both stronger and safer. It was in precisely that spirit that I tabled amendment 14, along with the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, with whom I have worked for some time on these issues.

I acknowledge that the Government’s intent in tabling clause 27—as I understand it—is to protect UK personnel in the intelligence services and the armed forces if they are found, in the course of their duties, to have committed a crime. However, I consider that the scope of the clause is too wide, and I fear that it would instead end up protecting Ministers and senior officials. As we heard earlier from the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act already allows Ministers and senior officials to authorise some potentially unlawful activities, carried out by UK personnel overseas in the course of their duties. Clause 27, however, would provide protection for Ministers and senior officials who “encourage or assist crimes overseas”, such as giving a tip-off that leads to someone’s torture, as opposed to the direct commission of the crime itself. In that sense, it is, as drafted, unlikely to help UK personnel overseas who receive separate legal protections under the Intelligence Services Act. To that end, it is only right for the decision to prosecute, or not, to rest with the Director of Public Prosecutions, and not to be legislated away.

Order. I have miscalculated—this is one of the reasons I was never made a Treasury Minister—and I want to give the Minister an opportunity to respond at the end. Sir Robert Buckland, you can have five minutes, but then we will go to four minutes.

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I will not be able to emulate the admirable record of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Sir Charles Walker), but I will do my best to be as succinct as possible. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who is right when he says that we have to strike a balance here: we need to protect our way of life but not protect ourselves out of the very values that we seek to defend—or, in other words, diminish the very rights that we want to protect. That is at the heart of all the national security legislation that I and others in this House have dealt with over the years. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security for our conversations about these issues.

I cannot conceal my disappointment at the non-selection of new clause 8, in the name of the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), which was signed by me and others. It is inevitable that this issue will be revisited in the other place. There are two issues that arise from it that are of general application to the Bill and to the future reform of the Official Secrets Act, which has to come. The first is the potential creation of a public interest defence, which in my view is an essential substitute to the rather random guessing game that we have at the moment, with jury trials—however well directed the juries might be—ending up with verdicts that, to many of us, seem perverse.

The second relates to the recommendation to create a statutory commission to allow people to raise their concerns—to whistleblow, if you like—through an approved process. The Law Commission’s report of September 2020 made those very clear and cogent recommendations and I commend them strongly to my right hon. Friend the Minister. I think they go hand in hand. The time is here for the Government to start addressing these issues and to adopt those recommendations. To quote my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne in another context: if not now, when?

There are many things in the Bill that I support, but I think it is a missed opportunity. It has been a messy process in Committee, as has been said, as a result of the number of Ministers we have had dealing with it, the late inclusion of things like the foreign agents registration scheme and the completely missed opportunity to reform the Official Secrets Act 1989. The new Minister is very good, but he is a bit like a friendly old bank manager: he listens to you, he agrees with you and he is sympathetic, but you do not get the loan at the end of the day. The point is, however, that this Bill will be changed radically in the other place, because we have not had the proper amount of time to do it.

I want to refer to clause 27, which has been spoken to by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). I was on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we were discussing detention and rendition, and some of the things that went on then did not make for pretty reading. We do not want to go back to those days. Things were changed in the consolidated guidance and the principles were brought forward. One of the sops for the Committee—a phrase that everyone kept using—was that there could be a chilling effect on the security services. Everyone kept asking what the chilling effect would be.

A commitment was given to allow the ISC to have classified information on this, and the Chairman of the ISC wanted that before today because it would have given us an opportunity to say whether we were satisfied. Unfortunately, that was turned down, but we have had the initial information and I and other members of the Committee are not yet satisfied that there is justification for this. We have asked for more information, which we are going to receive, but it would have been handy to have it before today. Unless there is good cause, frankly I think it will be interesting to see how this can be justified.

Referring to something that the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) said, I am disappointed that my new clause 8 was not selected. This is one of those things in the Bill that will come back. The equivalent new clause was selected in Committee only because the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali) in the Chair agreed to it, so I was not surprised that the Clerks knocked it out of selection, but it will not go away. My fear is that a great opportunity to modernise our national security landscape is being completely missed. I do not think we will see a Bill on public interest or reforming the 1989 Act, but it desperately needs to be done.

The way in which the foreign agents registration scheme was introduced in Committee was completely unacceptable. Not only are the Government trying to reinvent the wheel; they are trying to invent a new device. Part 2 will never be used, in my opinion, because it would create so much diplomatic fallout.

Finally, we need transparency on the public register. I have had representations from universities, including the Russell Group, that are concerned about how this provision fits with other Bills currently going through the House, such as the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill. This is a minefield. It is overcomplicated, and it could be a lot simpler and a lot more belt and braces. Although I welcome what is happening, this Bill will be very different when it comes out of the Lords. We have missed an opportunity, and it is the Government’s fault. When this Bill is enacted, we must not think that things cannot change any more, because there are other things that need to happen.

In view of the time, I will only briefly say something about three areas of the Bill. First, amendment 14, in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) seeks to remove clause 27, which excludes liability for assisting an offence overseas if the relevant behaviour is necessary for the proper function of the intelligence agencies or the armed forces. The key question being: how is that materially different from the defence to encouraging or assisting crime in section 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 of acting reasonably?

I am a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, as is the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). As he said, we are due to receive further evidence on clause 27 and we are, therefore, not yet in a position to provide a view on it. It is probably right that I reserve my final judgment until I have considered that further evidence but, speaking personally, I am not persuaded that, within the parameters of the reassurance and protection it is reasonable to offer those acting on behalf of the intelligence agencies or the armed forces, clause 27 achieves anything that the current section 50 defence does not. The Minister will have to explain the difference between acting reasonably and acting in the proper exercise of a function, as this clause requires.

My right hon. and learned Friend will remember that, when the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 was first brought before the House, the International Criminal Court told the Government, “If you go too far with this and nobody can be prosecuted, we will prosecute.” Is there not the same risk with clause 27?

I hope my right hon. Friend is wrong, but the Government have to consider it for exactly those reasons. It would be not only wrong but profoundly embarrassing if the United Kingdom were to find itself in that position.

I hope the Minister can clearly explain the difference I outlined, because the only difference I can see is that it could be argued that “acting reasonably” may be applicable to more circumstances and, therefore, offer arguably broader protection than “acting in the proper exercise of a function.” We have heard it argued that the current defence is not sufficiently legally certain but, from experience, legal certainty is an elusive quarry. The concept of reasonableness is very familiar to the courts in a variety of contexts. Anyone looking for absolute certainty in every case will not find it, because all cases are different and must be considered on their merits.

The second area I want to mention is amendments 8 to 12, in my right hon. Friend’s name, dealing with the potential reduction of damages in national security proceedings where a successful claimant has committed wrongdoing related to terrorism. It is worth noting in passing that such wrongdoing is not limited to convictions for criminal offences, and we need to understand from the Minister what level of wrongdoing in this context would suffice to put someone’s damages in jeopardy.

The operative measure is clause 58(3), which says

“the court must decide whether, in light of its consideration of the national security factors, it is appropriate for it to reduce the amount of damages”.

So we need to know what “appropriate” means—or should mean. Surely it should mean appropriate in all the circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice overall—it would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that—and that there is no presumption in favour of reduction, nor is there an instruction to reduce damages where the factors set out are present. That is how I understand the clause, but I would be grateful if he could confirm it.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who did the House a great service in bringing to us in four minutes what could have been the subject matter of a whole afternoon’s debate in itself, thus highlighting the total inadequacy of today’s proceedings for proper scrutiny of this Bill. I fear it will be filleted when it goes to the other place, and it deserves to be.

I added my name to new clause 8, but it is not available to debate and discuss. So much of what is in the Bill risks offering protection to people who do the wrong thing in the service of our country, while those who seek to expose that wrongdoing are to be left completely unprotected. Others have said it before, and I say it again now: this was the perfect opportunity to provide protection of that sort. If not now, when are going to see it?

It is a matter of significant regret that in an area of public policy where there is a substantial and natural consensus across the political parties, we have come to this stage in the proceedings of the Bill with so much division and disagreement, albeit a disagreement between those on the Treasury Bench and the Government Back Benches, not just between the parties. I do not think anybody in this House would not want to promote the security of our nation, and we all understand the complex and difficult situations in which pursuing that work often places people.

We also know, because it is human nature as much as anything else, that in these difficult and complex situations it is often possible to persuade oneself of just about anything. When that happens, it is necessary that somebody, somewhere, can be held accountable for it, because we are a country that believes, still, in the rule of law, and these things matter. That is why my colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches and I are so concerned about the content of clause 27 and clauses 79 to 83.

As I mentioned in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the cases about which we know and are rightly shocked, we know about only because these matters came into the public domain by mere happenstance. It is eminently possible that the circumstances of Belhaj and Boudchar would not be known to us today but for the fact somebody who happened to be walking around Gaddafi’s palace during the fall of his Government found the papers that revealed the extent to which rights had been deliberately traduced. It is surely wrong that there should be protection for people who behave far outside British standards, notwithstanding Government policy and indeed the law.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and to see so many members of the Bill Committee in the House on Report. It was a very constructive Committee, and I am pleased that we are all still vaguely getting on.

As the Minister said in his opening remarks, a number of clauses in the Bill update espionage legislation that goes back to world war one. Obviously we do not have time to go through all of them, but after putting the Bill into context, I will spend some time talking about clauses 13, 14, 20 and 21. The context is important. In my lifetime, and since the end of the cold war, we have lived through an era of what could be considered unprecedented global peace. In many ways, in the ‘90s, we took our eye off the ball. Once the Berlin wall came down, we took our eye off the ball on state-based threats. When things got hot in 2001, after 9/11, our national security legislation and our activity were focused much more on counter-terrorism, so now is the time to update our espionage legislation to counter state-based threats as well as counter-terrorist threats.

It is clear that state-based threats have not gone away. There are more Russian spies in London now than there ever were at the height of the cold war.

How do you know that?

Because I have read it. [Interruption.] I will give sources to the House of Commons Library if I have to.

Those hostile threats are a real and present danger. Russia in particular is a danger. We know that the Skripal poisonings were the work of the GRU. We know that Russia continues to implement a range of hybrid techniques that undermine what it sees as its adversaries—to make it clear, that includes us. The use of disinformation, particularly through bot accounts on Twitter, has been used to foster division and political instability in countries.

The head of MI5 has declared that China, not Russia, is the biggest long-term threat to Britain’s national security. It is said that if Russia is a tropical storm, then China is climate change. This new threat requires new measures to protect us. We need to create new offences to tackle state-based sabotage. I refer to clause 13, in particular. I would argue to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), who is not in his place, that we do go far enough.

Part 2 of the Bill covers prevention and investigation measures, which update our legislation to mirror the counter-terrorism legislation that we learned so hard in the noughties. In many ways, that reflects the new foreign intelligence threat that we face, which is much more like the threat of terrorism from the past 20 years. Espionage has never been the gentleman’s game that is portrayed in books and films, but now, in particular, we face some pretty gruesome threats. Clause 21, on arrest and detention, is also incredibly necessary in this day and age.

In summary, I support the Bill. We must bring our espionage laws up to date and into the 21st century.

I, too, support the Bill, but I think part 3 is a complete mess. I do not think it will survive long in the House of Lords—I hope they do a proper job of scrutinising it, because we are certainly not able to do a proper job of scrutiny this afternoon. The Minister is a lovely chap, but if he were on the Back Benches, he would be saying exactly what I am saying now. We know that Ministers do that, because only days ago, the right hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice), the former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, told the whole House that the one thing he had been proclaiming to the world—that the UK deals with Australia and New Zealand were wonderful—was not what he really believed.

Of course, we need to tackle political interference by hostile states in the United Kingdom. Some of us have been arguing that point for a very long time, which is one of the reasons why I would like to see the tier 1 visa report published—I see the Minister nodding, so let us hope that he will have produced it by the end of the week. Secondly, I would like us to have the full Russia report, so that we know exactly what the Government knew about interference in British politics.

Some interference is overt, but much of it is covert, as the hon. Member for Milton Keynes North (Ben Everitt) has just referred to. Some of it comes not from embassies, but from all sorts of different people who approach MPs and Ministers and seek to influence the British political system. Some of it is online targeting through bots and trolls, which may be done from St Petersburg, Tehran or wherever, but some of it happens on our own streets. Sometimes, it happens in Parliament through all-party parliamentary groups that receive support, whether secretariat or financial, that comes directly or indirectly from a foreign power. We need to be careful about that. We on the Standards Committee have had direct advice from Parliament’s director of security that this is the Achilles heel of the British political system at the moment.

MPs and peers, of course, do not have the resources to be able to personally check whether the person who is coming through the door has legitimate bona fides; we simply do not have that intelligence resource. That is why one of the amendments I have tabled seeks to establish that, once somebody has registered that they are working for a foreign power, they should declare that when they come to see a Member of Parliament or Government Minister. In Parliament, we do not just register: we declare. That is a simple thing and I am bewildered that the Government are not prepared to accept it.

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). I agree with everything that my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North (Ben Everitt) has said. I am incredibly supportive of the Bill overall, but I do have questions that it would be helpful to get clarity on in this debate, or—what I think is more likely—when the Bill goes to the other place. I say that because the questions and issues we want clarity on are so substantial that we cannot do them justice in the limited time we have today.

For me, those issues revolve around the foreign influence registration scheme and the exemptions to that scheme. I am mindful that the scheme was introduced into the legislation after we had taken evidence in Committee, so we did not get the chance to question some of the experts on what it would look like. I will address my remarks to clause 68 and Government new schedule 2, and to amendments 15 and 16, which stand in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I am particularly concerned about the legal services exemption. I do not understand why such a broad exemption is required. As my right hon. Friend said, it might be that we are just copying the US legislation, but we need a level of explanation. Removing the legal exemption is not about restricting access to legal services—we still fundamentally believe in natural justice and the rule of law—but we need transparency to prevent exactly the kind of lobbying that we have spoken about. I know that we are unlikely to vote on the amendments today, but we need that kind of transparency.

If we are trying to copy or mirror some of what the US has done, I would question the lack of any kind of exemption for academia, which the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) spoke about. I have spoken to Universities UK, which is concerned about the enhanced tier proposed in FIRS and the impact it could have on UK R&D and on our competitiveness. The US registration scheme clearly has an exemption for

“religious, scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits”

provided that no political activities are included.

I am saying not that there should be an exemption for academic services but that we in this House need to debate properly what exemptions, if any, should apply to the scheme. Should there be an exemption for legal services? Should there be an exemption for academic work? I do not think we have the opportunity to consider that properly today, but I look forward to following the debate in the other place. I ask the Minister to think about some of those exemptions and, if we are to proceed with them, to give a proper explanation to the House about why they might be necessary.

The Minister said in relation to the foreign influence registration scheme that other countries have had similar provisions for some years, and of course, that is absolutely true. It is also true that the ISC is very much in favour of introducing a foreign influence registration scheme. We are concerned, however, that the scheme as proposed is more complex than the ones in the US and Australia but that it simultaneously does not go far enough, which is a problem.

Unlike the US and Australian schemes, the proposal is for the one here to be two-tiered. I welcome Government amendments 63 to 94 to restructure clauses 61 and 64, which at least makes some of this a little more comprehensible. However, that still leaves us with a primary tier that will capture all arrangements and activity undertaken on behalf of any foreign power for the purpose of influencing a political event or decision—that is welcome at face value—and a secondary tier designed to capture all other activity beyond political influence, including, for example, acting as a foreign intelligence officer. For arrangements or activity to require registration, however, they have to be undertaken on behalf of a country set out in secondary legislation, so the provision does not necessarily apply automatically to every country.

As I said earlier, it is difficult to understand why acting covertly as an intelligence officer outwith the political influencing sphere, for example, applies only where the foreign power is set out in secondary legislation. It is perfectly possible that intelligence operations will be undertaken by countries that are not named in the regulations and so will not require registration. That is self-evidently an omission and a weakness. Requiring all countries to register such activity would be a stronger deterrent.

As the scheme does not yet name a particular country that may be registered under the second tier, it is not clear which countries the Government intend to name when the Bill becomes law. It is also not clear what criteria will be used when deciding which countries to add to the list. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, these things can take some time. I do not know how swiftly the Government might react to add a new country threat, and I am certainly not at all convinced that when that threat is lifted, the Government will act swiftly to remove a country from the list in the secondary tier.

This is a bit of a dog’s dinner. The real risk is that the secondary tier, which could be valuable tool and which I want to see work, might end up not being used. As the Security Minister recognised in Committee, use of the enhanced registration requirement will be “limited”. We do not want this to be limited; we want it to be comprehensive, to be able to capture the majority of the risks. It would surely be far more effective to have one tier which applies to all countries and a broad range of covert activity.

For the record and as a message to the other House, I wish to say that I believe that the Government forcing through such a serious Bill in so limited a period of time today is a matter of contempt of this House and the parliamentary process.

I rise to speak because over a decade ago I gave an undertaking to one of my constituents that I would seek to ensure that no other person would go through what he had gone through. It worries me that sometimes this House’s collective memory is lost, so it is worth reminding people of what was happening in that period. There was a culture of unaccountability—almost of impunity—among some of our services, and the way they liaised with other nation states and their intelligence services resulted in the torture of our constituents.

My constituent was a young Asian doctor, who had just finished his training. He went on an altruistic, charitable expedition to Pakistan to work in hospitals there. He was picked up and for six weeks he was tortured. At the end of each torture session, which consisted of thorough beatings, he was interrogated by what could only be MI6. It was clear to us. I saw Ministers; alongside the Ministers were civil servants, and alongside them were, I believe, intelligence officers. I got the same response as has been given today, with the same phrasing: “We do not condone or support or participate in torture.” Well, they did on that occasion, and scarred my constituent for life. Even though he is now a successful consultant, he lives in fear still.

What was happening is that decisions were taken here about the arrest of my constituent and the questions that would be put to him at the end of the torture, as though at the end of the exercise we could have clean hands. It was unacceptable. I support amendment 14 because I fear that, if we try to lift some of the protections that our constituents have, we will recreate that culture of unaccountability and impunity and others will suffer like my constituent suffered. That is why it is important not to lessen the accountability of decision makers at every level, whether they are on the frontline or in ministerial offices here.

I was here to speak to new clause 7 and amendments 17 to 28 and 30 to 39, but there is not enough time for me to do so. That is most regrettable, given the importance of the Bill.

I am here not in my personal capacity but as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our duty is to scrutinise legislation to check its human rights compliance, and we have done that. I remind Members that the Joint Committee is a cross-party Committee with half its members from the House of Commons and half from the House of Lords. That is just as well, because it will be in the House of Lords that our amendments get the attention that I believe they deserve. Although I am not really a fan of the House of Lords as an unelected Chamber, I am very much a fan of second Chambers. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that such a small amount of time has been afforded to us today to debate this important Bill, which we believe has significant human rights implications. Given the short time available to me, I shall make some general comments; as I say, I hope that our detailed amendments will get the attention they deserve in the House of Lords.

We broadly welcome the attempt to modernise espionage offences, but we have some concerns about the Bill’s provisions. The Bill is a step forward and many of its provisions are broadly in line with the recommendations of the Law Commission’s recent review, but there are risks that some of the provisions are drawn far too widely and could criminalise behaviour that does not constitute a threat to national security. We think that other provisions would interfere unnecessarily and disproportionately with rights to freedom of expression and association and the right to protest, and that they may regrettably have a disproportionate impact on certain communities in the United Kingdom, particularly if new police powers are not exercised with restraint.

The provisions on prevention and investigation measures, which were not included in the Law Commission’s review, also engage the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security and the right to a private and family life in a way that gives the Joint Committee cause for concern. We are also very concerned about the restrictions on the grant of legal aid and on the awarding of damages to those who have been involved in terrorism. They risk impeding access to basic rights and legal protections, as other Members have elaborated on. We have therefore suggested that the Bill be amended in a number of ways but, as I say, there is not sufficient time for me to address any of the amendments in any meaningful way.

This has been a very full discussion involving many people. Although I sympathise with those who have quite rightly made the point that we could always have more time for these debates, the truth is that we had a lot of time in the Bill Committee and we are going to have to do much more work on this subject as its various elements evolve with the technology and the challenge. The truth is that if we had had this debate five, 10 or 15 years ago, we would have been debating different subjects, different nations and different elements of technology that have evolved into the threat that we sadly face today. Although I recognise that many hon. Members have understandably raised the number of hours and days that we have had today and in the past few weeks, the Government have listened and adapted the Bill to many aspects that have been raised in different ways.

One thing that the Government have certainly had plenty of time to get ready is the tier 1 visa report, as promised by five Home Secretaries. When will the Minister publish it?

It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know that one of the first things I did on arrival at the Home Office was to ask for it to be prepared for publication. I will come back to him with it, I hope, urgently—I will let him know.

Many different points have been raised. I pay enormous tribute to my many right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken and to those who have approached the Bill with the diligence and seriousness that the subject demands, particularly the hon. Members for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), who have been extremely supportive critics and have been challenging in the right spirit. I am glad to say that those discussions have resulted in most of the Bill going through in the way that was intended, and that those challenges and changes have improved it.

I accept that there are some differences of opinion. On areas such as the Serious Crime Act and the changes to statutory requirements, I believe that the Government are right because the exercise of the functions of an officer of the state are exactly what should be the limiting functions of their powers. That is why this reform makes sense, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) raised some important points and challenges that we will have to look at.

My right hon. and learned Friend also asked about damages and whether they followed in the way that he described, and I agree that they do. The point is that we should neither make it harder or more applicable to have damages, nor prevent it where judges seek the discretion to do so. Where they have that discretion, they may continue to do it, but we are asking them to look and consider the situation in which those damages arose to make sure that they are truly applicable. It is merely a review policy, rather than a block. That is an important element of the Bill; judges may already have that power but this measure merely puts it on the statute book.

Much of the debate has focused on whistleblowers and the public interest defence, and the way in which various people could argue that they are acting in the interests of the wider polity in raising different objections. This is a hugely important area and I understand that many hon. Members have raised different points. The head of MI5, the heads of various agencies and many others who have engaged on it have been absolutely clear on this point, however, because we need to make sure that we are not introducing any defence that forces the Government to reveal the damage that has been done in order to provide a defence.

With the greatest respect, that is a weak argument, because there can always be closed hearings on national security grounds. I say to the Minister that this issue will not go away—the courts are deciding it anyway. I would sooner state a protection in law than leave it to the whims of a jury, which is what we have now.

I have a great trust in our jury system, and I know the right hon. Member does, too.

I haven’t actually.

Oh, he does not. I do have trust in our jury system and I do have trust in the Great British people to make decisions appropriately. One of the decisions sometimes made by juries is to strike out a case because they disagree with it. I am afraid that is simply one of those—

The public interest defence has been mentioned on several occasions throughout this debate. Notwithstanding the strictures of national security and of this Bill, it is important that people have a reliable route that they can take when they want to expose wrongdoing. Does my right hon. Friend consider that an office of the whistleblower might be such a route? I know the public interest defence is very likely to come forward again.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that. It is not specific to this Bill, but it is something that many of us have been considering for a while. I certainly agree that wider consideration is important in ensuring that those who have legitimate grievances and objections to what they may have been asked to do have a valid route for raising such questions.

I will go through a few of the other points very quickly. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Antony Higginbotham) raised the point about legal services, and they were absolutely right to do so. Let me be quite clear that this is about privileged legal co-operation. Therefore, that privilege should be exempt—it should absolutely be exempt—so that those who have access to legal rights should be able to exercise them without the state’s intervention. That is essential to the rule of law and, indeed, to the protection of human rights in our country.

I should also make it quite clear that the Government have heard very clearly the points made about civil legal aid. These will be receiving very serious consideration in the coming days, and I look forward to updating the House in due course on where that goes to.

I briefly thank for their insights my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North (Ben Everitt) on the Government side, and of course my very dear friend, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). Although we disagree, again, he remains a very close friend, and I look forward to discussing more of these issues with him in the future. I shall leave it at that.

New clause 3

Reviews of Parts 1, 4 and 5

‘(1) The operation of Parts 1, 4 and 5 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.

89|17:57|211|283|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 2

Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets

Amendment made: 40, page 3, line 1, at end insert—

“(aa) an individual who lives in the United Kingdom;”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 3

Assisting a foreign intelligence service

Amendments made: 41, page 3, line 24, leave out “of a kind”.

Amendment 42, page 3, line 27, leave out

“the conduct is of that kind”

and insert

“it is reasonably possible their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities”.

Amendment 43, page 4, line 7, at end insert

“which is not a legal obligation under private law”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 7

Meaning of “prohibited place”

Amendments made: 44, page 7, line 10, leave out “place” and insert “land or building”.

Amendment 45, page 7, line 41, leave out second “land” and insert “any land or building”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 13

Foreign interference: general

Amendment made: 46, page 12, line 3, leave out “England and Wales” and insert

“any part of the United Kingdom”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 15

Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service

Amendment made: 47, page 14, line 30, at end insert

“which is not a legal obligation under private law”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 27

Offences under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007

Amendment proposed: 14, page 20, line 35, leave out clause 27.—(Mr Davis.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

90|18:11|212|283|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 28

The foreign power condition

Amendments made: 48, page 21, line 20, leave out

“the financial or other assistance of”

and insert

“financial or other assistance provided by”.

Amendment 49, page 21, line 21, after “power” insert “for that purpose”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 30

Foreign power threat activity and involvement in that activity

Amendment made: 50, page 23, line 12, at end insert—

“(vii) section 15(1) (obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service);”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 61

Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements

Amendments made: 61, page 43, line 15, leave out from beginning to “must” and insert

“Where P makes a foreign activity arrangement, P”.

Amendment 62, page 43, line 18, leave out “with” and insert

“between a person (“P”) and”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

That subsection (2) of Clause 61 be transferred to the end of line 14 on page 43.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Amendments made: 63, page 43, line 30, leave out subsections (5) and (6) and insert—

“(5) Schedule (Control of a person by a foreign power) makes provision about when a person is controlled by a foreign power.”

Amendment 64, page 44, line 16, leave out subsection (8).

Amendment 65, page 44, line 18, leave out “subsection (1)” and insert “section 61(1)”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

That Clause 61 be divided into two clauses, the first (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) consisting of subsections (1), (2), and (10) and the second (Meaning of “specified person”) consisting of subsections (3) to (5), (7) and (9).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 62

Offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement

Amendments made: 66, page 44, line 28, after “person” insert

“(whether P or another person)”.

Amendment 67, page 44, line 34, at end insert—

“(1A) “P” has the same meaning as in section 61.”

Amendment 68, page 44, line 35, leave out subsection (2). —(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 63

Requirement to register activities of specified persons

Amendments made: 69, page 44, line 37, after “person” insert

“who is not a foreign power”.

Amendment 70, page 44, line 38, leave out “activities are registered” and insert

“specified person has registered the activities”.

Amendment 71, page 44, line 39, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—

“(2) A person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, a specified person who is not a foreign power, must not carry out activities in the United Kingdom in that capacity unless the specified person has registered the activities with the Secretary of State.

(3) A person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, a specified person who is a foreign power must not carry out activities in the United Kingdom in that capacity if or to the extent that—

(a) the person makes a misrepresentation about their activities or the capacity in which they act (whether generally or to a particular person), and

(b) the specified person has not registered the person’s activities with the Secretary of State.

(4) A misrepresentation is a representation that a reasonable person would consider to be false or misleading in a material way.

(5) A misrepresentation may be made by making a statement or by any other kind of conduct (including an omission), and may be express or implied.

(6) A misrepresentation may in particular include—

(a) a misrepresentation as to the person’s identity or purpose;

(b) presenting information in a way which amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true.

(7) A person who breaches a prohibition in subsection (1) or (2) commits an offence if the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the activities in question are not registered with the Secretary of State.

(8) A person who breaches a prohibition in subsection (3) commits an offence if the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection applies.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 64

Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements

Amendments made: 72, page 45, line 8, leave out

“A person who makes a foreign influence arrangement”

and insert

“Where P makes a foreign influence arrangement, P”

Amendment 73, page 45, line 10, leave out “the person” and insert “P”.

Amendment 74, page 45, line 11, leave out “with” and insert

“between a person (“P”) and”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

That subsection (2) of clause 64 be transferred to the end of line 7 on page 45.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Amendments made: 75, page 45, line 12, leave out “the person” and insert “P”.

Amendment 76, page 45, line 21, leave out

“is a United Kingdom national”

and insert

“qualifies as an overseas elector under section 1A of the Representation of the People Act 1985”.

Amendment 77, page 45, line 29, leave out subsection (5).

Amendment 78, page 45, line 30, leave out subsection (6).

Amendment 79, page 46, line 7, leave out paragraph (a).

Amendment 80, page 46, line 9, after “countries” insert

“and is governed by international law”.

Amendment 81, page 46, leave out lines 13 to 17.

Amendment 82, page 46, leave out line 18.

Amendment 83, page 46, line 20, at end insert—

“(11) At any time before section 14 of the Elections Act 2022 comes into force, the reference in subsection (3)(c) to section 1A of the Representation of the People Act 1985 is to be read as a reference to section 1(2) of that Act.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

That clause 64 be divided into two clauses, the first (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements) consisting of subsections (1), (2), (7) and (8) and the second (Meaning of “foreign principal”) consisting of subsections (3), (4) and (9) to (11).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 65

Meaning of “political influence activity”

Amendments made: 84, page 47, line 22, at end insert “and a junior Minister”.

Amendment 85, page 47, line 25, after “Service” insert

“or of the Northern Ireland Senior Civil Service”.

Amendment 86, page 47, line 31, at end insert “, or

(b) a person appointed to a position in the Northern Ireland Civil Service by a Northern Ireland Minister and whose appointment to that position meets the conditions set out in section 1(3) and (4) of the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 8 (N.I.)).”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 66

Offence of carrying out political influence activities pursuant to unregistered foreign influence arrangement

Amendments made: 87, page 47, line 39, after “person” insert

“(whether P or another person)”.

Amendment 88, page 47, line 40, after “activity” insert

“, or arranges for a political influence activity to be carried out,”.

Amendment 89, page 48, line 1, at end insert—

“(1A) “P” has the same meaning as in section 64.”

Amendment 90, page 48, line 2, leave out subsection (2). —(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 67

Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals

Amendments made: 91, page 48, line 7, after “principal” insert

“who is not a foreign power”.

Amendment 92, page 48, line 8, leave out “activities are registered” and insert

“foreign principal has registered the activities”.

Amendment 93, page 48, line 10, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—

“(2) A person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, a foreign principal who is not a foreign power must not carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom in that capacity unless the foreign principal has registered the activities with the Secretary of State.

(3) A person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, a foreign principal who is a foreign power must not carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom in that capacity if or to the extent that—

(a) the person makes a misrepresentation about their activities or the capacity in which they act (whether generally or to a particular person), and

(b) the foreign principal has not registered the person’s activities with the Secretary of State.

(4) A misrepresentation is a representation that a reasonable person would consider to be false or misleading in a material way.

(5) A misrepresentation may be made by making a statement or by any other kind of conduct (including an omission), and may be express or implied.

(6) A misrepresentation may in particular include—

(a) a misrepresentation as to the person’s identity or purpose;

(b) presenting information in a way which amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true.

(7) A person who breaches a prohibition in subsection (1) or (2) commits an offence if the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the activities in question are not registered with the Secretary of State.

(8) A person who breaches a prohibition in subsection (3) commits an offence if the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection applies.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 68

General exemptions

Amendment made: 94, page 48, line 18, leave out subsections (1) to (10) and insert—

“(1) Schedule (Exemptions) makes provision in relation to exemptions.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 69

Registration information

Amendment made: 95, page 50, line 29, leave out “misleading, false or deceptive” and insert “false, inaccurate or misleading”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 70

Information notices

Amendments made: 96, page 50, line 35, leave out “who is” and insert

“the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be”.

Amendment 97, page 50, line 37, at end insert—

“(ca) a person the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be carrying out activities registered under that section;”.

Amendment 98, page 50, line 39, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

Amendment 99, page 51, line 4, leave out “who is” and insert

“the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be”.

Amendment 100, page 51, line 6, at end insert—

“(ca) a person the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be carrying out activities registered under that section;”.

Amendment 101, page 51, line 8, leave out “the” and insert “a”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 73

Offence of carrying out activities under arrangements tainted by false information

Amendments made: 102, page 52, line 27, after “activity” insert

“, or arranges for an activity to be carried out,”.

Amendment 103, page 52, line 37, after “activity” insert

“, or arranges for a political influence activity to be carried out”.

Amendment 104, page 52, line 38, leave out “political” and insert “foreign”.

Amendment 105, page 53, line 3, leave out subsections (3) and (4).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 74

Publication and copying of information

Amendments made: 106, page 53, line 10, leave out “this Part” and insert “section 69 or 70”.

Amendment 107, page 53, line 11, leave out “this Part” and insert “either of those sections”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 75

Offences: penalties

Amendments made: 108, page 53, line 32, leave out “63(3)” and insert “63(7)” or (8)”.

Amendment 109, page 54, line 16, leave out “67(3)” and insert “67(7) or (8)”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 78

Interpretation

Amendments made: 110, page 55, leave out line 28.

Amendment 111, page 55, line 35, at end insert—

“(2A) For the purposes of this Part references to an “arrangement” do not include an arrangement between a person (“P”) and—

(a) a person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity), or

(b) a person the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising functions on behalf of P as if the person were within paragraph (a).”

Amendment 112, page 55, line 36, leave out subsection (3). —(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 80

Duty to consider reduction in damages payable by the Crown

Amendments made: 51, page 56, line 37, after “consider” insert “the national security factors.

(2A) The national security factors are—

(a) whether the claimant has committed wrongdoing involving—

(i) the commission of a terrorism offence, or

(ii) other involvement in terrorism-related activity,

(“terrorist wrongdoing”), and

(b) if the claimant has committed terrorist wrongdoing—

(i) the extent of that wrongdoing, and

(ii) the matters mentioned in subsection (2B).

(2B) The matters are”.

Amendment 52, page 56, line 39, leave out paragraph (a).

Amendment 53, page 57, line 2, leave out “conduct of the claimant” and insert “the claimant’s terrorist wrongdoing”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Clause 89

Regulations

Amendment made: 113, page 64, line 5, at end insert—

“(g) regulations under paragraph 15 of Schedule (Control of a person by a foreign power).”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

New Schedule 1

Control of a person by a foreign power

Conditions for control

1(1) A person is controlled by a foreign power if one or more of the following conditions are met.

(2) Condition 1 is that the foreign power has the right to direct or control, or actually directs or controls, the person’s activities (in whole or in part).

(3) Condition 2 is that the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares in the person.

(4) Condition 3 is that the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting rights in the person.

(5) Condition 4 is that the foreign power holds the right, directly or indirectly, to appoint or remove an officer of the person.

(6) Condition 5 is that—

(a) the trustees of a trust, or the members of a partnership, unincorporated association or other entity, that is not a legal person under the law by which it is governed meet one or more of conditions 1 to 4 (in their capacity as such) in relation to the person, and

(b) the foreign power has the right to direct or control, or actually directs or controls, the activities of that trust or entity (in whole or in part).

2 In this Schedule “officer”—

(a) in relation to a body corporate, means a director, member of the committee of management, chief executive, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body, or a person purporting to act in any such capacity;

(b) in relation to a partnership, means a partner or person purporting to act as a partner;

(c) in relation to an unincorporated association other than a partnership, means a person who is concerned in the management or control of the association or purports to act in the capacity of a person so concerned.

3 This Part makes provision about the interpretation of Part 1.

4 If a foreign power holds a share or right jointly with another person (whether or not a foreign power), each of those persons is to be taken to hold that share or right.

5(1) If shares or rights held by a foreign power and shares or rights held by another person (whether or not a foreign power) are the subject of a joint arrangement between those persons, each of those persons is to be taken to hold the combined shares or rights of both persons.

(2) A “joint arrangement” is an arrangement between the holders of shares (or rights) that they will exercise all or substantially all the rights conferred by their respective shares (or rights) jointly in a way that is pre-determined by the arrangement.

(3) For the meaning of “arrangement”, see paragraph 12.

6(1) In relation to a person that has a share capital, a reference to holding more than 25% of the shares in that person is to holding shares comprised in the issued share capital of that person of a nominal value exceeding (in aggregate) 25% of that share capital.

(2) In relation to a person that does not have a share capital—

(a) a reference to holding shares in that person is to holding a right to share in the capital or, as the case may be, profits of that person;

(b) a reference to holding more than 25% of the shares in that person is to holding a right or rights to share in more than 25% of the capital or, as the case may be, profits of that person.

7(1) A reference to the voting rights in a person is to the rights conferred on shareholders in respect of their shares (or, in the case of a person not having a share capital, on members) to vote at general meetings of the person on all or substantially all matters.

(2) In relation to a person that does not have general meetings at which matters are decided by the exercise of voting rights—

(a) a reference to exercising voting rights in the person is to be read as a reference to exercising rights in relation to the person that are equivalent to those of a person entitled to exercise voting rights in a company;

(b) a reference to exercising more than 25% of the voting rights in the person is to be read as a reference to exercising the rights under the constitution of the person to block changes to the overall policy of the person or to the terms of its constitution.

8 In applying this Schedule, the voting rights in a person are to be reduced by any rights held by that person.

9(1) A foreign power holds a share “indirectly” if the foreign power has a majority stake in a person and that person—

(a) holds the share in question, or

(b) is part of a chain of persons—

(i) each of which (other than the last) has a majority stake in the person immediately below it in the chain, and

(ii) the last of which holds the share.

(2) A foreign power holds a right “indirectly” if the foreign power has a majority stake in a person and that person—

(a) holds that right, or

(b) is part of a chain of persons—

(i) each of which (other than the last) has a majority stake in the person immediately below it in the chain, and

(ii) the last of which holds that right.

(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), a foreign power has a “majority stake” in a person if—

(a) the foreign power holds a majority of the voting rights in the person,

(b) the foreign power is a member of the person and has the right to appoint or remove an officer of the person,

(c) the foreign power is a member of the person and controls alone, or pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders or members, a majority of the voting rights in the person, or

(d) the foreign power has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, dominant influence or control over the person.

10 A share held by a person as a nominee for another is to be treated as held by the other (and not by the nominee).

11(1) Where a person controls a right, the right is to be treated as held by that person (and not by the person who in fact holds the right, unless that person also controls it).

(2) A person “controls” a right if, by virtue of any arrangement between that person and others, the right is exercisable only—

(a) by that person,

(b) in accordance with that person’s directions or instructions, or

(c) with that person’s consent or concurrence.

12(1) For the purposes of this Schedule, “arrangement” includes—

(a) any scheme, agreement or understanding, whether or not it is legally enforceable, and

(b) any convention, custom or practice of any kind.

(2) But something does not count as an arrangement unless there is at least some degree of stability about it (whether by its nature or terms, the time it has been in existence or otherwise).

13(1) Rights that are exercisable only in certain circumstances are to be taken into account only—

(a) where the circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue to obtain, or

(b) when the circumstances are within the control of the person having the rights.

(2) But rights that are exercisable by an administrator or by creditors while a person is in relevant insolvency proceedings are not to be taken into account even while the person is in those proceedings.

(3) “Relevant insolvency proceedings” means—

(a) administration within the meaning of the Insolvency Act 1986,

(b) administration within the meaning of the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/2405 (N.I. 19)), or

(c) proceedings under the insolvency law of another country or territory during which a person’s assets and affairs are subject to the control or supervision of a third party or creditor.

(4) Rights that are normally exercisable but are temporarily incapable of exercise are to continue to be taken into account.

14 Rights attached to shares held by way of security provided by a person are to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as held by that person—

(a) where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in accordance with that person’s instructions, and

(b) where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part of normal business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in that person’s interests.

Power to amend thresholds etc

15(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this Schedule for a permitted purpose.

(2) The permitted purposes are—

(a) to replace any or all references in this Schedule to a percentage figure with references to some other (larger or smaller) percentage figure;

(b) to change or supplement Part 1 of this Schedule so as to include circumstances (for example, circumstances involving more complex structures) that give a foreign power a level of control over a person broadly similar to the level of control given by the conditions in paragraph 1;

(c) in consequence of any provision made by virtue of paragraph (b), to change or supplement Part 2 of this Schedule so that circumstances specified in that Part in which a person is to be regarded as holding an interest in another person correspond to any of the conditions in paragraph 1, or would do so but for the extent of the interest.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

New Schedule 2

Exemptions

1(1) Sections 61(1) and 64(1) (requirements to register foreign activity arrangements and foreign influence arrangements) do not apply to arrangements that are UK arrangements.

(2) The following provisions do not apply to activities carried out in accordance with a UK arrangement or a UK agreement—

(a) section 63(1) to (3) (specified persons etc must not carry out unregistered activities);

(b) section 67(1) to (3) (foreign principals etc must not carry out unregistered political influence activities).

(3) A “UK arrangement” or “UK agreement” is an arrangement or agreement to which—

(a) the United Kingdom is a party, or

(b) any person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown is (in that capacity) a party.

2 The following provisions do not apply to a foreign power—

(a) section 61(1) (requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

(b) section 62(1) (offence of carrying out activities under unregistered foreign activity arrangement);

(c) section 64(1) (requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

(d) section 66(1) (offence of carrying out activities under unregistered foreign influence arrangement);

(e) section 73(1) and (2) (offences of carrying out activities tainted by false information).

3(1) Section 61(1) (requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) does not apply to the extent that the foreign activity arrangement relates to the provision of goods or services which are reasonably necessary to support the efficient functioning of—

(a) a diplomatic mission,

(b) a consular post, or

(c) the permanent mission to a UK-based international organisation of a country which is a member of the organisation,

(for example, the provision of catering or maintenance services).

(2) Sections 61(1) and 64(1) (requirements to register foreign activity arrangements and foreign influence arrangements) do not apply where P (within the meaning of those sections)—

(a) is a member of the family of a principal person forming part of the principal person’s household, and

(b) makes the arrangement pursuant to an activity carried out by the principal person in that capacity.

(3) “Principal person” means a person who is a member of staff of—

(a) a diplomatic mission,

(b) a consular post, or

(c) the permanent mission to a UK-based international organisation of a country which is a member of the organisation.

(4) The members of the family of a principal person forming part of the principal person’s household include a person who is living with the principal person as their partner in an enduring family relationship.

(5) “Member of staff”—

(a) in the case of a diplomatic mission, means a member of the mission within the meaning given by Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (set out in Schedule 1 to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964);

(b) in the case of a consular post, means a member of the consular post within the meaning given by Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (set out in Schedule 1 to the Consular Relations Act 1968).

(6) In this paragraph—

“consular post” has the meaning given by Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (set out in Schedule 1 to the Consular Relations Act 1968);

“diplomatic mission” is to be read in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations done at Vienna on 18 April 1961;

“UK-based international organisation” means an international organisation which has its headquarters in the United Kingdom and on which privileges and immunities have been conferred under section 1 of the International Organisations Act 1968.

4 (1) The following provisions do not apply to a recognised news publisher—

(a) section 64(1) (requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

(b) section 66(1) (offence of carrying out activities under unregistered foreign influence arrangement);

(c) section 67(1) (foreign principal must not carry out unregistered activities);

(d) section 73(2) (offence of carrying out political influence activities tainted by false information).

(2) Section 67(2) (employees etc of foreign principal must not carry out unregistered activities) does not apply to a person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, a recognised news publisher (acting in that capacity).

(3) The following provisions do not apply to a person who is not a recognised news publisher, where the arrangement in question is a news-related foreign influence arrangement—

(a) section 64(1) (requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

(b) section 66(1) (offence of carrying out activities under unregistered foreign influence arrangement);

(c) section 73(2) (offence of carrying out political influence activities tainted by false information).

(4) A news-related foreign influence arrangement is a foreign influence arrangement made between a person and a foreign principal who is a recognised news publisher where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the arrangement is the publication of news-related material.

(5) In this paragraph—

“news-related material” and “publish” have the meaning given by section 50(5) of the Online Safety Act 2022;

“recognised news publisher” has the meaning given by section 50 of the Online Safety Act 2022 but as if, in subsection (2)(e) of that section, “in the United Kingdom” were omitted.

5(1) Sections 61(1) and 64(1) (requirements to register foreign activity arrangements and foreign influence arrangements) do not apply in relation to a foreign activity arrangement or a foreign influence arrangement to the extent that the arrangement relates to the carrying on of a legal activity by a lawyer.

(2) The following provisions do not apply to the carrying on of a legal activity by a lawyer—

(a) section 63(1) to (3) (specified persons etc must not carry out unregistered activities);

(b) section 67(1) to (3) (foreign principals etc must not carry out unregistered political influence activities).

(3) “Lawyer” means—

(a) a person who for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007 is an authorised person in relation to an activity that constitutes a reserved legal activity (within the meaning of that Act),

(b) a solicitor or barrister in Northern Ireland,

(c) a solicitor or advocate in Scotland, or

(d) a person who is a member, and entitled to practise as such, of a legal profession regulated in a jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom.

(4) “Legal activity” means—

(a) in England and Wales, a legal activity within the meaning of section 12 of the Legal Services Act 2007,

(b) in Northern Ireland, a legal activity within the meaning of that section, but reading the reference to an activity which is a reserved legal activity as a reference to an activity corresponding to a reserved legal activity,

(c) in Scotland, the provision of legal services within the meaning of section 3 of the Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 16), or

(d) acting as an arbitrator or mediator.

6(1) Where an exemption is conferred on a person (“P”) by this Schedule, the following are also exempt (subject to sub-paragraph (2))—

(a) a person who holds office in or under, or is an employee or other member of staff of, P (acting in that capacity), or

(b) a person the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising functions on behalf of P as if the person were within paragraph (a).

(2) Where P is a foreign power, the exemption does not apply to persons within sub-paragraph (1)(a) if or to the extent that the person makes a misrepresentation about their activities or the capacity in which they act (whether generally or to a particular person).

(3) A misrepresentation is a representation that a reasonable person would consider to be false or misleading in a material way.

(4) A misrepresentation may be made by making a statement or by any other kind of conduct (including an omission), and may be express or implied.

(5) A misrepresentation may in particular include—

(a) a misrepresentation as to the person’s identity or purpose;

(b) presenting information in a way which amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true.

7 The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for further cases to which any provision of this Part does not apply.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Schedule 6

Detention under section 25

Amendments made: 54, page 100, line 19, at end insert—

“(1A) The power in sub-paragraph (1) may be exercised only in relation to land or a building in the United Kingdom which is owned or controlled by a police force.”

Amendment 55, page 100, line 30, at end insert—

“(5) In this paragraph—

“building” includes any part of a building;

“police force” has the same meaning as in paragraph 28.”

Amendment 56, page 123, line 18, at end insert—

“(ba) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable who is a National Crime Agency officer, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;”.

Amendment 57, page 124, line 9, leave out “police officer” and insert “constable”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Schedule 12

Fingerprints and samples

Amendments made: 58, page 173, line 40, at end insert—

“(ga) the National Crime Agency;”.

Amendment 59, page 174, line 21, at end insert—

“(ba) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable who is a National Crime Agency officer, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Schedule 13

Damages at risk of being used for the purposes of terrorism

Amendment proposed: 132, page 176, line 29, leave out

“there is a real risk that”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

91|18:27|56|282|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Schedule 14

Minor and Consequential Amendments

Amendment proposed: 60, page 181, line 6, at end insert—

9 In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), after paragraph 36B insert—

36C An offence under any of the following provisions of the National Security Act 2022—

section 1 (obtaining or disclosing protected information);

section 2 (obtaining or disclosing trade secrets);

section 3 (assisting a foreign intelligence service);

section 4 (entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK);

section 12 (sabotage);

section 13 (foreign interference: general);

section 15 (obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service);

section 16 (preparatory conduct).’”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

92|18:39|275|209|The House divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

It remains for me to thank enormously my right hon. Friends the Members for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who did so much to get the Bill to the right place; my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has very graciously left me to get on with this; and all the Members who have been so helpful.

My great thanks go to the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in particular. Their extraordinary courage and skill have earned more than my admiration, respect and gratitude for many, many years, but never more so than in the last few weeks, in which I have been privileged to serve them.

It is worth pointing out very quickly one or two elements of the Bill that I have not yet had the chance to touch on. Let me make it absolutely clear that there is no possibility—no way, no desire, no intent—that any area in this Bill, or in any other that this Government would pass, would in any way diminish the unqualified right not to be tortured. That is an absolute right that this Government and, I know, other Governments, would all hold to. I should be absolutely clear that not only is there is no desire in this House for that to change, but there is no such desire in any of the services and agencies with which I have had the privilege of discussing it.

What our Government, our agencies and those who hold office in our name all know very well is that they are defending our rights and freedoms when they defend the rule of law. They are absolutely championing the values and liberties that matter to us. In the Bill, we are evolving from trying to stop spectaculars such as the tragedies that hit on 9/11 to employing spectrometers—finer points of detection—to try to ensure that we eliminate risks that come in different ways. That is why I am so grateful to them all for the advice and help they have offered to ensure that the Bill is structured as it is.

I should make it quite clear that the Bill has opened up an area in which we will need to go further and in which I am glad the Prime Minister has asked me to go further: the defence of democracy. Our democracy in this country has sadly been under attack for too long. We are not alone; we know that our friends in other parts of the country and other parts of the world have faced similar attacks and similar areas of influence. I am delighted that the taskforce that the Prime Minister has asked me to lead will get on with its work very shortly, updating the integrated review and helping to ensure that this country is ready for the changes in the threats that we face so that the ultimate sovereignty of our people—the right to choose—is guaranteed and defended long into the future. That means that we have to set up not just powers to empower those agents who work in our name, but the guardrails to defend that right.

I rise to confirm that the Labour party supports the Third Reading of this Bill.

It is the first job of every Government to defend our national security from hostile states that wish to do our country harm, and from malign actors and extremists who want to undermine our democracy and everything we stand for. That is not a principle that divides us along party lines; it unites every Member of this House. It is why throughout the Bill’s passage we have worked with the Government to get the detail right and to defend our shared interests, and why we will continue to do so.

Our world-leading intelligence and security agencies do incredible and unseen work, day in, day out, to keep us safe. We pay tribute to them and thank our brave officers and staff for their service. I also thank those in policing, the Home Office and the intelligence community for the way they have engaged with me and other hon. and right hon. Members involved in scrutiny of the Bill.

The threat posed by hostile states is on the rise. The annual threat update given today by Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, was a daunting assessment of the breadth and nature of the threats facing the UK. However, we remain concerned about clause 27 in particular and some of the details of the Bill, and we will continue to work with the Government and all those in the other place to find resolutions to those outstanding issues.

Labour supports the Bill because we could not take national security more seriously. We know that our democracy can be defended only when our agencies are equipped with the powers and tools they need, and when we can all have confidence in the procedures and oversight that accompany them.

I, too, thank all colleagues for their involvement and engagement in the Bill, even if we could have done with a little more time for that today. I also thank all the officers and staff of the Home Office and the agencies for their engagement. They have persuaded us of the merits of large parts of the Bill, if not quite all of it. I want personally to thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) for keeping me right on lots of these issues, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) for her detailed work with the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

We do need a Bill of this nature—in fact, a Bill of this nature is long overdue. There are still dangers—as I said on Report, we have to make sure that we do not criminalise people the Bill is not intended to criminalise or leave loopholes for people who should be criminalised, and that we rein in some of the more excessive powers—but the Government have listened to some of our concerns and responded positively to some of the amendments. I just encourage them to listen more as the Bill proceeds.

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Further to the announcement from the Chair on the result of the Education Committee elections, I would like to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks who organised today’s elections and to all colleagues who voted in them. I recognise that a number of excellent candidates ran for the post of Chair of the Committee, and I pay tribute to all of them for the respectful and constructive tone of their campaigns.

Nothing can be more important for the future of our country than how we educate and support our children. I pay tribute to the excellent work of my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon), in holding Ministers to account for that. I am grateful for the support of esteemed colleagues in all parts of the House in allowing me to follow in his footsteps.

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I also put on the record my grateful thanks to the staff of the House for the conduct of the Transport Select Committee election earlier today? I am very grateful to have won the support of colleagues throughout the House. I pay tribute to the other candidates. I think the election somewhat taxed the arithmetical skills of the counters a little more than the election for the Education Select Committee, as it went through all the rounds of the contest. We had a good-natured and humorous campaign. I should mention in passing my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Karl MᶜCartney) and his innovative and tuneful campaigning style.

I very much look forward to chairing the Committee. Transport affects all our lives and all our constituents. I look forward to digging deep into the many issues and challenges that are coming forward. In the two hours or so since the result was announced, I think I have received about 20 different requests for the Committee that I look forward to fielding. Again, I offer my grateful thanks to all colleagues.

I thank the new Chairs of the Education Committee and Transport Committee for their points of order. I am sure that everyone in the House will have appreciated their kind words, not least those about the other candidates in the elections. I congratulate both hon. Gentlemen. I am sure they will have an enjoyable and interesting time carrying out the very important job of scrutinising the Departments, which I know everyone in the House appreciates—Ministers particularly appreciate that work. Many congratulations, and thank you also for your kind words about the staff of the House and their facilitation of the elections.

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wonder whether you might be able to advise me on a slightly more sombre subject. In a question earlier today, the Immigration Minister responded to a concern raised by the hon. Member for Buckingham (Greg Smith)—I have been trying to find him to say that I was going to raise this issue—regarding the absconsion of a gentleman who it subsequently transpires from press reports has been accused of a very serious assault of a young refugee child in my constituency. The Minister said he would investigate the matter and come back to the hon. Member. Can you advise me, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how I can ensure that, given that the matter took place in my constituency—we were not aware at the time—I get an update on the issue as well?

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The reports of the case are very serious and raise some questions about how the Home Office has handled this case. We do not know the full circumstances at the moment, but could you use your good offices to ensure that the Immigration Minister updates us and fully investigates this case?

I thank the hon. Lady and the right hon. Lady for their points of order. Obviously I do not know the background to this case, but I can see that it is a very serious issue. Government Ministers are present and I think the Minister for Security may wish to intervene.

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am sure that I speak for the Immigration Minister and the Policing Minister when I say that they will both look into it very carefully. I am sure they will return to answer these questions.

I thank the Minister; that is extremely helpful. I know that it will be fed back that this has been raised, that it is a serious issue and that the House would like some further information about what has happened since.