National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026

Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-government advice. A decision to designate is taken only after great care and consideration, and, as noble Lords will know, it must be approved by both Houses. It was approved by the House of Commons yesterday evening.

For the benefit of noble Lords I will give some explanation of the bodies in question. First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a group that has been commented on significantly in this House over many months, before the gracious Speech and since. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is no secret. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have established a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, as well as Jewish and Israeli communities globally.

The IRGC Quds Force and IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors and influence operations designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has included threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC supports militant actors overseas and has been associated with cyber and other state threats activity aligned with Iranian state objectives. I know that noble Lords across all parts of this House have great concerns about that body.

The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, otherwise known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah, has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media, including an antisemitic attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March, a well-known arson attack that Members will be aware of. Sitting behind the IMCR were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress and have had a profound impact on those communities. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.

The GRU Volunteer Corps is Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom in a form that extends far beyond conventional military action to include state threats. Moreover, the Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force, nor a loose collection of volunteers; it is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.

These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU and are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. What we are seeing is a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture. It reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and that has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom.

In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London. They acted on behalf of the Wagner Group—another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have also been absorbed into this so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the United Kingdom by this group.

With noble Lords’ consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her to reasonably believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy that the United Kingdom will not allow harm to ourselves or our interests, and that we will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil.

In conclusion, these bodies operate in different ways but are united in their role of endangering the safety and interests of the United Kingdom through violence, intimidation and destabilisation. I know this House has called for designation. It is a proportionate and necessary response, and this Government will continue to use every available tool to confront state threats wherever they arise. I commend this instrument to the House.

This designation of the IRGC by the United Kingdom follows the designation of the IRGC by the European Union in February this year in the aftermath of the violent repression of unarmed protesters in Iran over the turn of the year, which saw mass arrests, executions, internet shutdowns and the open use of lethal force against many thousands of demonstrators, as well as more international activity.

The designation of the Russian Federation Volunteer Corps directorate recognises the threat that the Government have concluded is posed to the United Kingdom’s national security by the Russian state and security apparatus, of which this body is part, as the Minister has explained.

We are entirely clear that the Government are rightly satisfied that these three bodies have met the requirements set out in the Act for designation and, for that reason, we fully support these designations.

These are the threats that we were trying to tackle in our amendments to the state threats Bill. Although it is welcome that the Government have at least tried to tackle the threat from the IRGC, the GRU Volunteer Corps and the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, I still worry that they have not created legislation with the teeth to tackle these threats. I would be grateful, in conclusion, if the Minister can reconfirm, as he said during the passage of the Bill, that the issues that I have outlined today will be addressed in a future national security Bill.

In the gracious Speech, we promised a state security Bill later in the parliamentary Session. It will cover a number of issues, which the House will not expect me to go into because the Bill has not yet been published, but we discussed issues such as passports in Committee on the state threats Bill, and I gave indications that we wanted to take action on that. On the display of a Palestinian flag but not an IRGC flag, and the illegality of that, if a person expresses support in any way, and if their reasons for doing so are prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom, they will commit an offence. I hope that gives the noble Baroness some reassurance. That is different from the provisions in the Terrorism Act and reflects the reality of dealing with bodies that benefit from protection under international law. Individual decisions to arrest or charge will be for the police and prosecutors, but people who glorify terrorism will potentially face action in future.

The noble Baroness asked me about not criminalising the specific offence of the display or wearing of certain articles of clothing. I said during debates on amendments to the state threats Bill that we consider that the supporting of a designated body offence is wide enough to capture the display or wearing of articles when this is done for a prohibited purpose. It was therefore, in our view, unnecessary to create a specific offence, while also avoiding potential enforceability challenges by foreign state officials who are protected by international law. Whether we like that or not, that is the situation. I gave that explanation to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, and I give it now to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. I hope that she will recognise that there will be further action downstream. As a former Minister in the Home Office, she will know that I cannot say what, I cannot say when, and I cannot give detail, but, if she remembers, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will concur with this, I could not say when or what or give detail about the regulations that I have brought forward today, but those regulations are here.

For the reasons I have mentioned and with gratitude for the support of both Opposition Front Benches, I condemn—no, not condemn; it has been a long day waiting for the debate—I commend these regulations to the House and hope Hansard will treat me kindly.