My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to open this debate. Let me start by thanking everyone who has come in on this lovely sunny day, and, in particular, the members of the committee for their hard work and commitment over the years in which I was chair. Sadly, I no longer chair the committee, but I have passed the baton to the very capable hands of the noble Lord, Lord Wood, who we look forward to hearing from later. Before I move on, I thank the committee’s clerks, both past and present, our policy adviser and our specialist adviser, Isabel Stockton, and all those who gave evidence to this report. This report showed this House, as I think of it, at its best. It was a great cross-party effort—a team effort—and I thank everyone for all that they did.
The sustainability of our national debt is, in my mind, a central issue of our time. How we manage it and ensure that it remains sustainable touches on almost every aspect of our economy and our way of life. Between the turn of the century and March last year, public sector net debt, excluding the Bank of England, trebled to just under 100% of GDP. This rise was turbocharged by successive Governments’ responses to the financial crisis, to Covid and then to the energy shock. In the past, such a sustained increase happened only during wartime. This time, as our debt grew, so did the conspiracy of silence about it. None of the major parties wanted to confront head-on the economic and social consequences of this rising tide of red ink. Therefore, at the start of last year, the Economic Affairs Committee decided to give this issue the attention it truly deserved by asking a very basic question: how sustainable is our national debt?
Before I go any further, let me define what the committee meant by sustainability. Debt sustainability depends on tax and spending policies which credibly align with expectations for economic growth and the cost of borrowing. It is the trajectory, rather than the level of debt, and our ability to service our debt which should be the principal considerations when assessing debt sustainability. A debt level risks becoming unsustainable if there is an insufficient buffer to absorb future economic shocks, or if a Government’s approach to fiscal policy creates a long-term trajectory of increasing debt service costs.
Looking at our nation’s debt through this prism, our findings paint a very dark picture of our nation’s finances. Our core conclusion was that, without an appropriate fiscal policy that addresses the challenges the UK faces, there is a risk of the debt becoming unsustainable. We stated that if we wish to maintain the level and quality of public services and benefits that we have come to expect, we face a choice: taxes will need to rise, or the state will need to do less. Addressing this will demand clarity as to the responsibilities and role of the individual versus that of the state. Muddling through is not an option. If this choice is ducked in this Parliament, the UK risks being on a path to unsustainable debt.
My Lords, I start by saying what an excellent and challenging report this is. It is exactly the kind of thing that the House of Lords exists to do and which political parties find very difficult to address. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, whom I have always seen as one of the stars of the Benches opposite, on his excellent introduction to this debate. I did not agree with some of it, but it was challenging, and he asked a lot of the right questions.
I suppose that the side of the argument that we should not be as worried about this question of debt, as the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, lays out, is that we are in the middle of the international pack. That is some reassurance. However, we live in a very unstable world—goodness knows what is going to happen in the United States. As the noble Lord pointed out, we have very particular vulnerabilities. We are dependent on the kindness of foreigners to fund our borrowing. We do not have the high domestic savings levels that countries such as Italy and Japan have. I do not want to get back into the European arguments that I have always made, but it is worth pointing out to the House that Greece now pays a lower interest rate on its debt than we do, because it has the power of the European Central Bank behind it. That is my view.
I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, that really big challenges are coming down the track. My worry is that we must not set a debt rule that rules out investment in growth. If the interest rate is higher than the growth rate, we are in deep trouble, so we have to find a way of raising the growth rate, which requires a very strong policy of public investment, which the Government are doing. Things such as the Oxford-Cambridge link and the developments around it are very important. My own favourite development would be a massive transformation of urban connectivity in the north of England, which would have a very beneficial effect on productivity.
My Lords, in the light of recent events, the last report from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, as the brilliant chair of our Economic Affairs Committee, could not have been more opportune. As he indicated, the growth of government borrowing in the last 20 years tells us why we have a problem. In Gordon Brown’s last Budget as Chancellor, public sector net debt was 35.1% of gross domestic product. When Covid struck five years ago, debt rose to almost 100% of GDP. Record borrowing of £314 billion the following year pushed public sector net debt up to £2.8 trillion pounds in cash terms, which is £1 trillion greater than before the pandemic and more than five times the £535 billion when Gordon Brown presented his 2007 Budget.
Historically, we have funded our deficit by the Government issuing a high proportion of long-dated gilts. This has meant that annual refinancing needs are lower than in other G7 countries and changes in interest rates take longer to have effect. Nevertheless, quantitative easing increased the sensitivity of government borrowing costs to short-term movements in interest rates. The unwinding of quantitative easing will take until 2028, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility, before the effective maturity of our debt returns to the pre-QE level of seven years.
There can be no doubt that the market requires the Chancellor to stay within her fiscal rules. As the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, indicated, it is never going to take much for the targets to be missed, even before the reduction in our growth forecast and Trump’s tariff wars. The Chancellor will already be hearing siren voices urging her to ignore her fiscal rules and increase borrowing, but as Sir John Kingman—now chair of Legal & General and Barclays, and formerly a Treasury mandarin—put it so well the other day, those who believe additional borrowing to be the answer should
“glance at the significant rise in the premium the UK is already having to pay in world markets to borrow very large sums each year … That is a clear warning sign. Of course no fiscal rule can be perfect. But the UK … is already treading a very delicate path, along a cliff-edge in deep fog. The protective fence may or may not be in quite the optimal place. But removing it seems unlikely to be a good idea”.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, for his time as chair of the Economic Affairs Committee and for securing this debate. He played a crucial role in ensuring that the committee’s work was relevant, timely and newsworthy. We can see that in the reports that were published during his time as chair. He summarised very well this report, which was completed last September. It remains pertinent—even more so considering many recent developments.
As has been said, the main emphasis of the report is on the need for a fiscal framework for delivering long-term financial sustainability. However, it also addresses some of the challenges that we face and presents some of the inevitable choices. As the report emphasises, two fundamental issues cast a shadow over future fiscal policies. The first is the persistent poor growth performance since the 2008 financial crisis. The second is the consequence of the succession of crises in recent years that have been addressed through substantial government spending and borrowing.
First, on growth, in conjunction with other high-income European countries, we have experienced a protracted economic slowdown since the financial crisis. The decline has been accompanied by a decline in the share of investment in the economy. The reasons for this are debatable—I do not think that there is any simple, compelling explanation. However, personally, I am persuaded that one contributing factor is that the European countries, including the UK, overreacted to the financial crisis by imposing excessive regulation on the banking system and the regulations that followed reduced the available finance for many small and medium-sized businesses.
In contrast, the US has managed to avoid the extent of the slowdown in growth that Europe has experienced. However, both the US and Europe are grappling with the consequences of deindustrialisation of traditional industries, and we are now witnessing the unfortunate resort of the United States to extraordinary tariff levels. I do not think anybody can be confident about growth rates over the medium term, which is going to have a significant impact on our own debt arithmetic.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Burns, not for the first time in my life. It is also a pleasure to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, on his incisive speech today and his excellent chairmanship of the committee that produced this report.
Despite the time lag, this debate is timely in another sense because of the IMF’s warning this week that global debt—that of all Governments in the world—is likely on track to exceed 100% of GDP. It said that is a risk to the financial system, so this debate is perhaps not just about the UK; it could be about many countries, including the United States of America. Nevertheless, I think many people were surprised in 2024 when the OBR came out with the projection, on certain assumptions, that debt to GDP in this country could rise to 270% in the 2070s. That seems an astonishing increase and would plainly pose a threat to sustainability. How could this be?
The reason, as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, is that in 2020 we saw one of the largest surges in debt since the Second World War. The UK debt-to-GDP ratio was below the G7 average in 2001; it then grew faster and is now forecast by the IMF to be above the G7 average in 2029. The problem is not just the ratio but the structure and the maturity of our debt, and it has also been, as the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said, that this Government and previous Governments have tended to react to shocks by spending more money. Public expenditure and borrowing have increased, then public spending comes down but not to the pre-crisis level. That is the story of Covid and the response to the financial crisis.
Why is it that we have this threat to our sustainability? One reason is interest rates. Interest rates are unlikely in the future, many people think, to be as low as they have been in the recent past. It was the very low nature of interest rates, particularly with quantitative easing, that got us into this situation in the first place. Nobody knows whether interest rates are going to be higher in the long run, but many people think that is the case—they are higher today than they were. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, if the interest rate on government debt is higher than the growth of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio will increase in the absence of a primary surplus. I do not think the Government’s fiscal rules—perhaps the Minister will comment on this—provide for a primary surplus.
My Lords, it is a pleasure, if somewhat daunting, to follow the former Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to be shortly followed by the former Governor of the Bank of England. However, as a member of the Economic Affairs Committee, I first acknowledge and salute the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, for his astute and incisive chairmanship of the committee and his spot-on introductory comments.
It is indeed time for tough decisions, but I have to admit to growing increasingly cynical about our appetite to face up to them, let alone to take them. We have ducked those decisions for the majority of the last 20 years, and I fear we will go on doing so for the next 20. This highly topical report was published last September, just weeks before Rachel Reeves’s first Budget, which saw another rewriting of the fiscal rules as we ushered in another £30 billion of borrowing. Yes, taxes were raised by £40 billion, but at the cost of future growth.
Our public sector net debt has grown by almost 10 times over the last 25 years, from £300 billion in 2001 to approaching £3 trillion next year. We have had the financial crisis, the pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and this ensuing energy crisis. Each event led to exceptional, “one-off” increases in government spending financed entirely by borrowing. But I argue that those shocks explain less than half of this £3 trillion debt pile and obscure the real malaise: low growth and poor productivity.
Not only is there no peace dividend or surplus in stable years, but we routinely borrow at least £100 billion a year to fund our budget deficits. In fact, it was £130 billion last year and, as we have learned this week, in the year to March it has grown to £152 billion—rather worryingly, £15 billion more than the OBR predicted; more on that in a moment.
The resulting interest bill of more than £100 billion a year cannot be paid by tax revenues. We meet those interest payments only through additional borrowing. It is a vicious cycle and it is, of course, unsustainable. I am afraid that business is usual is that R, representing interest rate on debt, exceeds G, our GDP growth rate, even in non-crisis years. So we are caught in a cycle of low growth and productivity accompanied by high borrowing and, crucially, that borrowing has not led to productivity gains.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate. I add to the congratulations to my noble friend Lord Bridges, as chairman of the committee, and its members for producing this—I was going to say “timely” report, but this debate is some seven months after the report was published and quite a lot has changed in that time.
Short of national security, it addresses the biggest issue facing the country. That we have an advisory speaking time of four minutes tells you everything about the way in which Parliament is increasingly becoming the decorative part of the constitution. We now, apparently, take on huge, unlimited, unknown debt in nationalising industries over a weekend and give powers to civil servants to force people in private companies to do things on pain of being sent to prison if they do not—and Parliament has no say. It is clearly important that we address this issue not just in Parliament but in the country.
The lesson of this report is that our people—the constituents of the Members at the other end of this building, our families—have no idea of the crisis that is facing our country and the threat that it presents to our ability to deliver pensions and important public services.
Even this week we learn that borrowing has turned out to be £15 billion more than expected. In the year to March, as the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, said, we spent £151.9 billion more than we had in income, and we are relying on growth, which we have not seen since 2008, to rescue us from that situation. As the report points out, there are fundamental strategic reasons why we need to tackle this now, and the longer we wait to bite the bullet the bigger the problem will be.
These reasons include the fact that, in the 1980s, we thought we had a peace dividend, but now we realise that we should not have spent that money, but we had committed that expenditure to welfare and other matters. The baby boomers were creating wealth and now they, like me, are a burden on the state in one form or another. The notion that we can finance the triple lock on pensions, however popular it may be, is ridiculous in these circumstances. We need to get the country to understand that and to lower its expectations for the future.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, is taking part remotely. I invite the noble Lord to speak.
In the noble Lord’s absence, I suggest we move on to the next speaker in the Chamber.
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Why did we come to this conclusion? First, the trends that helped us manage and bring down our debts in the past have been thrown into reverse. We now face what I call the Ds: higher defence spending; the pressure of demographic change; decarbonisation and the green transition; dependency, especially around labour market inactivity and welfare costs; and, of course, the cost of servicing debt itself.
Another reason for our concern was growth. If real interest rates exceed the growth of national income, there must be a primary surplus. In other words, government expenditure, net of interest payments, must be less than government revenue to prevent the debt ratio rising. With growth anaemic, we heard evidence of how the UK risks being sucked into a debt trap. Furthermore, we pointed out that while high net migration has boosted GDP growth, it cannot be the solution to debt sustainability, for it has made little impression on GDP per head.
The third reason for our concern was the structure of our debt. Successive rounds of quantitative easing have seen long-term debt exchanged for short-term debt, and a greater proportion of debt is index-linked and held by overseas investors. This has made the cost of servicing the UK’s debt more sensitive to rises in interest rates and inflation, as well as to sudden changes in investor sentiment. Given today’s geopolitical risks, the Government need a larger fiscal buffer if they are to weather future economic shocks.
Finally, we were concerned about the fiscal rules. We said that rules should hold Ministers accountable for reducing debt steadily, as a proportion of GDP, over time. The concept of a rolling target for debt creates a misleading impression as to the true state of the public finances and hides the need to take difficult decisions to secure debt sustainability in the medium to long term.
Since the report’s publication, we have had a Budget, we have had a Spring Statement, we have seen the impact of other challenges created by another D—this time Donald Trump—and we have received the Government’s written response to our report.
In that response, for which I am most grateful, the following passage stuck out. Let me quote it:
“The government agrees with the … Report that difficult decisions are required to avoid the UK’s debt being on an unsustainable path. The Budget took the necessary difficult decisions to put the public finances on a sustainable path—setting realistic plans for public spending while raising revenue—to create the conditions for growth. This will be supported by the government’s new fiscal rules”.
Let us dissect this passage. First, on the difficult decisions, tax as a share of GDP is going to rise to an historic high in 2027 and remain at that level for the rest of this Parliament. I do not think any of us would dispute that raising taxes to an historic high counts as a difficult decision, but has it put our public finances on a sustainable path and is this course of action creating growth, as the Chancellor’s letter stated?
Let us start with debt sustainability. On Wednesday, the latest figures showed that net debt as a percentage of GDP remains at levels last seen in the 1960s. Looking ahead, the OBR shows that, from 2025-26 to the end of the decade, debt will rise by an average of almost £11 billion more every year. Although public sector net debt is forecast to fall a fraction next year, it will then rise back to 96.1% in 2029-30. Obviously, the Government have changed the definition of debt that they use for their fiscal rules, but, as the OBR states, whichever of the four definitions of debt one uses, all four show debt remaining at historically high levels within the forecast period and show debt to be higher in 2029-30 than in 2024-25.
Next, are the Government creating the conditions for growth, as the Chancellor states? Growth largely stagnated over the second half of 2024 and is now forecast to be 1% this year—half of the October forecast—and that forecast could itself easily be blown off course. I make one point: were bank rates and yields on gilts issued across the forecast both 0.6% higher—this is less than the 1% volatility in 10-year gilts since early October—that alone would be enough to eliminate the minuscule headroom that the Government have to meet their fiscal mandate.
On tax and spending, the OBR assumes that the fuel duty indexation and the reversal of the 5p cut will take place and that unprotected departments’ budgets will be cut. It flags that the proposed welfare reforms are “very uncertain” and that previous reforms have saved much less than previously expected. Given all these uncertainties, the probability of meeting the fiscal target is 54% and the probability of meeting the debt target is 51%.
That brings me to the fiscal rules. The debt target is pinned to the third year in the forecast—a year that continuously moves forward. The Chancellor’s letter states that this
“avoids the need to make sharp policy adjustments in response to small changes in the forecast or economic shocks”.
I do not buy this argument for rejecting our proposal, which was for debt to hit a fixed target in a given year
“unless there are exceptional reasons”.
In other words, economic shocks would be catered for. If small changes in the forecast mean that the Government cannot meet their rule, this suggests that their plan failed to build in a fiscal buffer.
I highlight this key point: the committee proposed that the fiscal framework should show whether the Government have a sufficient fiscal buffer to withstand an economic shock. The Government’s plans show why this is so badly needed. Look at the buffer for meeting the debt rule—it has a margin of just 0.4% of GDP, or £15 billion, in 2029-30. This is not a fiscal buffer; it is a fiscal wafer, so thin and fragile that it will snap at the slightest tap, let alone an economic shock.
The central question in my mind is not whether the Government have taken tough decisions on our public finances but whether the Government have taken the right tough decisions. Yes, the world has changed since we wrote the report, but, back in September, we knew that defence spending was going to have to rise; we knew the pressures that our public services were under; we absolutely knew that, in a volatile world, we had to build up a fiscal buffer to protect us from unforeseen shocks. We knew this, and the committee said so in the report.
I would like to hear from the Minister some answers to some very basic questions about the Government’s approach. First, given that the Chancellor wrote to me on 15 November, saying that her Budget had put our finances on a sustainable path, why did she then have to rewrite her plans in the Spring Statement, just 131 days later? Next, given that the Chancellor wrote in her letter that her Budget had created the conditions for growth, why has the growth forecast been halved? Thirdly, given that the Chancellor has assured us that her Budget has taken the tough decisions to put our finances on a sustainable path and that she is not going to change her fiscal rules, will the Minister repeat the Chancellor’s assertion that she is
“not coming back with more borrowing or more taxes”?
I have a sneaking suspicion that we will not get clear answers to these questions, confirming my fears that, as our report said, we will continue muddling through and not being honest about the scale of the challenges that we face and the impact that they will have on our tax and spending policies, and therefore the risk of our debt becoming unsustainable will continue to grow.
On spending, we must be really tough. We have to attack bureaucracy, as we are now doing in the National Health Service. We have to take on vested public interests. This is very difficult for people on our side of the House who have a lot of friends in the public sector trade unions, but we must be prepared to have a policy of reform. In addition to that, and to being tough on things such as PIP and SEND, which have got ridiculous in terms of their growth, we must be fair. I end on one this point. Being fiscally tough does not rule out fairness. One thing that I would like to see in future is a redistributive package which addresses child and pensioner poverty.
Perhaps in more political terms the Chancellor should remember what happened to Liz Truss when she ignored the debt market. However, it was James Carville, President Clinton’s adviser, who put it best. He was the man who coined the election phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid”. In this context, I think his better bon mot was, when asked who he would like to be reincarnated as, he replied, “The bond market”. I suspect the Chancellor feels the same.
The second core issue that has been mentioned is the consequence of the series of crises in recent years: the bank bailouts, the Covid pandemic support and the energy crisis. In each case they were funded by increased public spending and borrowing, and that is really the cause of this extraordinary rise in the debt ratio. There was a similar outcome in many other countries, as has been said. However, this is not too much of a comfort to thank, as it still leaves us, as the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, mentioned, with an inadequate fiscal buffer for the possibility of future economic shocks.
The report outlines some of the challenges to debt sustainability. These include continuing high debt interest payments by government; adapting to an ageing population, which is the subject of our current inquiry; transitioning to net zero; and, of course, future defence commitments. We should also consider the decline in the number of people available for work since Covid as another challenge—it was discussed in the committee’s most recent inquiry—and what we now see today: the extraordinary threat of serious trade wars.
The report discusses the case for a fiscal framework that will bring down the debt ratio over time. In general terms, this is consistent with the framework established by the Government in the last Budget—at least in spirit, if possibly not in detail. However, experience suggests that attempting to fine-tune fiscal outcomes on a year-by-year basis is nearly impossible and can lead to poor decisions, especially when the margin for error is wafer thin. What matters most is the direction of travel and the need for the debt trajectory to be downward.
Finally, the report highlights the difficulties we could face in delivering public services without further increases in the tax burden. This all points to the necessity of a long-term approach and a willingness to take some very difficult decisions.
The funding of the existing stock of debt is a substantially greater burden today than it has been in the past. In the 2010s, debt could be stabilised while running a government deficit of over 2% of GDP. Today, because of higher interest rates in money and real terms, you need a primary surplus greater than 1% of GDP in order to stabilise the debt ratio. The Government will say they are aiming to achieve growth—that is their “get out of jail” card—but can they actually get a rate of growth that is higher than the interest rate? They may increase the growth rate but find that interest rates have increased further, and so they are not able to escape from the challenge that confronts them.
Then there is the significant risk of an ageing society. We are living through a period that is unique in world history. By 2070, one person in work will be equalled by one person in retirement. This poses huge problems fiscally. The dependency ratio will go up. The Prime Minister of Japan, a country further along this road of an ageing society than we are, said the other day:
“Japan is standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society”.
These words are chilling, and we should reflect on them. The fiscal challenge of an ageing society is massive. There are no easy answers. As the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said, we need to make some tough decisions. Nothing is inevitably going to happen, but if something looks unsustainable, the chances are that it will prove unsustainable, and that is the risk we face.
This raises the uncomfortable question: how much of this £3 trillion debt has been channelled into truly productive areas that will accelerate growth, as opposed to simply financing budget deficits? I suggest to the Minister that we produce an asset register on our borrowing worthy of its name, with a proper impact assessment focusing on ROI—return on investment—to answer this very question.
My final point is on the rolling fiscal rule that foresees a budget surplus in five years’ time. It is a recipe for deferring tough decisions, as we have already heard, and it is aided and abetted by the OBR’s record of optimistic forecasting. Since its inception, the OBR has predicted budget surpluses five years out in 20 of its 28 forecasts when, in fact, the UK achieved such a surplus just once in the last 20 years. Let us have some economic realism.
We had growth in world trade. Now we have an—I hesitate to use an adjective—Administration in the United States who are determined to destroy world trade. I assume that we should forgive them, for they know not what they do, but the impact on growth will be enormous. As my noble friend Lord Bridges pointed out, life expectancy is increasing; this and the success of the National Health Service point to further pressures that will be difficult to sustain.
Whenever there is a consensus on anything, one ought to worry. There was a consensus on quantitative easing and on lockdown, and now we are paying the price for that quantitative easing—for printing money on a vast scale. It has left the country more vulnerable to rises in interest rates and more dependent on the kindness of strangers and foreign investors, at a time when the world as a whole is under severe pressure. The latest estimate is that QE will cost us some £150 billion. The decline in the workforce to support all of this is such that, by 2070, there will be one person in work for every person in retirement. That is a huge burden to place on the next generation.
Therefore, this report should be taken seriously by the Government and by the Opposition. We need a consensus in our country, to explain to our people the crisis that we are facing, in the context of the world crisis, and to cut our cloth according to our ability to pay.
National Debt: It’s Time for Tough Decisions… · Order Paper · Order Paper