That this House has considered miscarriage of justice compensation.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I wager that the majority of citizens are unfamiliar with the workings of the criminal justice system, and still less familiar with miscarriages of justice. Perhaps, if they are aware of miscarriages of justice, they are aware of certain high-profile exonerees or miscarriages of justice, such as the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four or the Birmingham Six. Most people will understandably and reasonably assume that victims of miscarriages of justice are compensated, particularly if they spent time in custody before being pardoned or having their convictions quashed. However, this is not the case. In England and Wales, compensation for the wrongly convicted is the exception rather than the rule. The current compensation scheme enables only some people in England and Wales who have had their convictions overturned, or been found not guilty at retrial, to receive compensation.
I make it very clear that my concern is not that miscarriages of justice happen. Sadly, no system in the world is perfect. Miscarriages of justice happen—we cannot get it correct 100% of the time—but when they occur, citizens expect the state to right that wrong. In a survey by Opinium in December 2024, 71% of those asked believed the Government should ensure fair and swift compensation for those who are wrongly convicted. Many will therefore be appalled to learn that this is not the case, that victims of miscarriages of justice seldom receive compensation for the wrong that has befallen them, that the wrongly convicted often have to fight for years, at great cost, to clear their name, and that the justice system unnecessarily forces the innocent to suffer continued injustice.
The issue in this debate is the failure of the state to right these wrongs. We should be clear that a miscarriage of justice inflicts considerable harm on the wrongly convicted. A 2018 report by the campaign group Justice, “Supporting Exonerees: Ensuring Accessible, Consistent and Continuing Support,” underscores the grave hardship and difficulty that the wrongly convicted have in adjusting to life after conviction, and the trauma that they have gone through, which they must deal with for years after the event. The report highlights how victims of miscarriages of justice struggle to adjust. Having spent time in prison, becoming institutionalised and grappling with the fact that they should not be there, they struggle to trust authorities.
The unfairness of the current system was brought into sharp relief for me when I met my constituent Mr Brian Buckle and his family and learned of their experiences. I am pleased that they have made the journey from Fishguard to join us in the Public Gallery.
In May 2017, Mr Buckle was convicted on 16 counts of historical sexual offences and sentenced to a total of 15 years’ imprisonment. He had always maintained his innocence, and in September 2022 the Court of Appeal overturned his conviction and ordered a retrial. He was immediately released on bail, having served five years and four months of his sentence. The retrial took place in May 2023. Mr Buckle and his defence team, led by Mr Stephen Vullo KC, who is also in the Public Gallery, prepared a detailed defence and presented new witnesses and forensic evidence. After three long weeks in court, the jury returned unanimous not guilty verdicts in just over an hour.
I have always believed—and the hon. Gentleman is probably the same—that someone is always innocent until proven guilty. It seems that the Ministry of Justice is saying: “You are actually guilty. Now prove yourself innocent.”
The hon. Gentleman has got to the nub of the matter. That is precisely the effect of the change implemented in 2014. It has devastated the number of successful applications for compensation, because if we consider the data for the period between 1999 and 2024, we can see that, prior to the introduction of the new section 133 test, 45.6% of applicants received compensation for their wrongful convictions, but, following its introduction, just 6.6% of cases were successful—a drop of 39 percentage points. This new test has virtually put a stop to compensation payouts for these kinds of miscarriages of justice—an insurmountable hurdle indeed.
Members may wonder about the purpose of restricting eligibility in this way, and I am sure we will hear arguments that it was done to prevent those exonerated on a technicality from receiving compensation, but the cynic in me fears that the restriction was introduced to cut costs. Prior to 2014, the Ministry of Justice made average annual payouts of £5.9 million. Following the change, we have seen the average annual payouts under the scheme drop by 95%, to an average of £297,000. Even successful applicants have seen their individual compensation payments fall, with the average pre-2014 payment totalling just over £267,000, falling to an average of £61,000 after the change.
I am reminded of Cicero’s teachings, over two millennia ago:
“Justice looks for no prize and no price; it is sought for itself”.
He also said, of course:
“The worst kind of injustice is to look for profit from injustice.”
It is for others to consider whether anyone profits from this injustice, but the savings that the 2014 test realises for the Ministry of Justice perhaps offer an answer to that age-old question of, “What price do we put on justice?” Well, I can tell you, Mr Turner: it is around £5.6 million a year on average, compared with the pre-2014 payments.
Order. The sitting is suspended for approximately 65 minutes for multiple Divisions in the House. If we get back earlier than that and all Members are in their place, I will recommence the debate.
I am grateful for the additional time to conclude the debate.
Prior to the Divisions, I was reiterating the perversity of the situation that the 2014 change has forced the wrongly convicted into. It can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime of which they have already been exonerated. To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles that underpin our criminal justice system, for it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know that this can be challenged in practice, but the fact remains that the current compensation rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime—a crime, of course, of which they have already been acquitted to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond all reasonable doubt.
Let me return to the case of my constituent Mr Buckle. In its rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejecting his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be and remains innocent of the charges brought against him. If we were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, this response is a perfect example. It illustrates the way in which, by reversing the burden of proof, the 2014 change undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive, but illogical, linguistic gymnastics. For if Mr Buckle is presumed to be innocent in law, he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent, who has spent more than five years in jail, should be compensated; if the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man, and deny him that compensation, why should the burden of proving his guilt not fall on the state?
The Ministry’s claims that Mr Buckle is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him ring rather hollow when he is also denied a single penny in redress. It is clearly an affront to justice that the eligibility test prevents those who have been wrongly convicted from enjoying the full and unconditional benefits of being presumed innocent.
It is a pleasure to serve for the first time in a Westminster Hall debate that you are chairing, Mr Turner. It has also been a pleasure to hear the speech of the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake). I thank him for selecting this topic for debate and for the outstanding representation he has given to his constituent, Mr Buckle.
There are concerns about miscarriages of justice that go beyond compensation. This debate is specifically about compensation, which I will come to, but it would be remiss of me not to note at the beginning of the process that there are various concerns, particularly around the role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission and more generally—I will come to the Law Commission report later. I will say no more than that there has been recent turbulence at the top of the CCRC and that the Justice Committee is holding a public session on that body on 1 April, when we might also touch on the subject of compensation.
I will briefly take this opportunity to say to the Minister that we are awaiting the appointment of an interim chair, following the resignation of the previous chair. We need an interim chair, and we need a strong interim chair. We also need a good process for selecting a permanent chair of that body. She will know that the Justice Committee has asked to be involved in that process as part of a pre-appointment approval hearing, and I hope that can happen. If she has anything to say on either of those matters today, that would be most welcome.
It is right that there are concerns about the process for identifying miscarriages of justice. I am pleased to see that my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), who very ably chairs the all-party parliamentary group on miscarriages of justice, is here, and no doubt she will say something about this issue. Unless we clearly identify cases, and do so in a timely manner, the issue of compensation will come even further down the line or will perhaps not even come to the fore.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I wish you well in your new role. I thank the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) for raising this issue. I watched him on TV this morning being interviewed with his constituent. He should be commended and applauded for his efforts on behalf of his constituent to find justice. In my intervention earlier I said to him that everyone is innocent until proven guilty, not the other way round, and that is the thrust of what the hon. Gentleman has put forward. Like him, I cannot comprehend it.
Someone found not guilty is not guilty. If the court cannot prove it and feels that he or she should be freed, then for me the matter is clear. As has been alluded to, Northern Ireland does not operate under the same scheme as England and Wales, but we do have a scheme that has been accessed. Cases can be referred to the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The CCRC investigates wrongful convictions in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It was set up by the Government in response to a number of high-profile miscarriages of justice, including the case of the Birmingham Six. It receives some 1,400 applications a year from across the United Kingdom, including some 40 from Northern Ireland. Anyone in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland can apply to the CCRC about a miscarriage of justice.
I recently read a BBC article on compensation for miscarriages of justice in Northern Ireland. It highlighted that more than £9 million
“has been paid in compensation since 2010 to 16 people who have had their criminal convictions overturned in Northern Ireland.”
So there is a compensation system under the CCRC, which has compensated at least those people in Northern Ireland. That is why the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli is right to pursue similar compensation for his constituent. The article noted that
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I cannot fathom the strain that Mr Buckle has endured as a result of years of legal proceedings and the travesty of being imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit. Let us remember what the wrongly convicted must go through and its impact. He missed important family milestones, such as his daughter’s 18th and 21st birthdays. His imprisonment cost him over £500,000 in lost income and devastated his plan to retire at 55 with a private pension, because he had been unable to make any contributions following his imprisonment. Furthermore, his state pension is now in jeopardy, given that he was unable to make any national insurance contributions for more than five years.
The impact on Mr Buckle is not limited to the period in which he was deprived of his liberty. Indeed, I am afraid to say that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder because of the impact of his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. His mental health is such that he has been unable to work since his release.
Prior to this awful state of affairs, Mr Buckle travelled every week from west Wales to London because he was in charge of an engineering firm. He performed this very important role, which had a lot of responsibility, for more than 15 years. He made the weekly journey on the great western main line or the M4 that the Minister and I also make.
This travesty of justice could befall any of us, through no fault of our own. Although it is difficult to comprehend the nightmare that has befallen Mr Buckle and his family, one can estimate the financial impact of his ordeal in terms of the income and pension that have been lost. Perhaps we can also put a figure on the costs incurred for appeals and legal defences, but how can we begin to calculate the impact on his health or the loss of precious time with his family?
I am sure we would all agree that that is a difficult dilemma, but it was not difficult, it would seem, for the Ministry of Justice, which issued a cruelly simple response to Mr Buckle after he applied for compensation under the statutory scheme. In the decision letter, which was issued almost a year after the application was submitted, the MOJ rejected his claim out of hand:
“Having carefully considered the particular circumstances of the reversing of your conviction, I do not consider your case demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not commit the offences for which you were convicted.”
Mr Buckle spent five years and four months in prison, and he had his conviction overturned by the Court of Appeal. He produced a detailed defence, including new witnesses and fresh forensic evidence, at retrial, at which the jury unanimously returned not guilty verdicts to all 16 counts in just over an hour. Having been subjected to that ordeal and having jumped through all the hoops that one could expect him to jump through, the Ministry of Justice’s response was not only to deny him compensation but, worse, to state that it does not consider that his case
“demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not commit the offences for which you were convicted”—
the same offences of which he was acquitted.
There was no reference to the harm he has suffered, to the impact on his family or to the Court of Appeal being concerned that the original trial was so flawed that the jury had failed to approach their task correctly that it ruled the conviction unsafe, such that the new witnesses and fresh forensic evidence were ultimately unnecessary. All that Mr Buckle received was a pretty meaningless reassurance that the matter had been “carefully considered.” If this is what comes from careful consideration, I dread to think what would result from reckless handling, but it surely could not be much worse for Mr Buckle. After years of legal battles following his wrongful conviction, he has been told that, although he is not guilty, the state will not compensate him for the years spent in prison because it does not believe that he has proven his innocence.
One does not need to be a King’s Counsel to see the unfairness of this situation. There can be no doubt that such a decision prolongs the miscarriage of justice in Mr Buckle’s case. That is a wrong that this new UK Government can and, indeed, must put right.
Before I discuss how the Government can do that, it is worth our reflecting briefly on how we have arrived at the current situation. Before 2006, the Government operated two compensation schemes for victims of miscarriages of justice in England and Wales: a discretionary scheme and a statutory scheme. The discretionary scheme was abolished in 2006, but the statutory scheme afforded the Justice Secretary the discretion to pay compensation to a wrongly convicted person when:
“his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice”.
In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the meaning of “miscarriage of justice” for the purposes of the statutory scheme should not be restricted to applicants who are able to conclusively demonstrate their innocence, and should be extended to cases where a new or newly discovered fact
“so undermines the evidence against the defendant that no conviction could possibly be based upon it”.
However, in 2014, the then UK Government legislated to reverse the effect of this decision. The test for eligibility for compensation under the statutory scheme, as set out in section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, was amended by section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in such a way as to restrict compensation to those who can prove innocence “beyond reasonable doubt”. Therefore, for applications made to the statutory scheme on or after 13 March 2014, there will have been a miscarriage of justice
“if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”.
That modest rewording of a single section of an Act of Parliament has proved devastating. Indeed, it is legally illiterate to effectively reverse the burden of proof in this way, for it places a burden on the victim of a miscarriage of justice to prove their innocence. This is such a high bar that, in the words of the joint dissenting opinion of judges in the European Court of Human Rights case of Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom, it:
“represents a hurdle which is virtually insurmountable”.
Such a claim is not solely a matter of opinion, but an observable fact. The data on applications to the miscarriage of justice application service shows that less than 7% of applications submitted between April 2016 and March 2024 were successful.
The current system therefore places an almost impossible burden on the applicant—one whereby they are required to find a new fact that shows beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence for which they have been acquitted. The perverse situation into
The perverse situation into which the 2014 change forces the wrongly convicted can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime for which they have already been exonerated. I appreciate that this is an academic point, but it is worth considering whether some high-profile exonerees—the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six—would receive compensation if they applied under the scheme today.
To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles underpinning our justice system, because it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know there might be a challenge to that assertion, but the fact remains that the current rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt.
In Mr Buckle’s rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejection of his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him. If you were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, Mr Turner, that response is a perfect example. It illustrates how the 2014 change, by reversing the burden of proof, undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive but legally illogical linguistic gymnastics.
For if Mr Buckle is in law presumed to be innocent, surely he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent who has spent more than five years in jail should be compensated. If the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man and deny him compensation, why should the burden not fall on to the state to prove his guilt? Claims by the Ministry of Justice—
There is a growing acceptance of the need for action on this matter. Sadly, the list of miscarriages of justice that have perhaps not received as much media attention, but which are just as deserving of compensation, grows ever longer. I could mention cases such as that of Sam Hallam, who was imprisoned for seven years; Victor Nealon, who was imprisoned for 17 years; or Oliver Campbell, who spent 11 years in prison and a total of 34 years fighting to clear his name.
All have suffered unimaginable harm as a consequence of their wrongful convictions and, just like my constituent Mr Buckle, deserve justice. The new UK Government have an opportunity to provide it, and I urge them to address this injustice without delay. I know that the Minister will agree with the principle that the state should compensate those who have wrongly been deprived of their liberty by the state, and I would welcome confirmation from her that this is the Government’s position.
The Law Commission is consulting on reform to the law governing criminal appeals, because it, too, acknowledges that the current state of affairs is completely unfair. The Law Commission’s intervention is to be welcomed, in so far as it acknowledges the unfairness of the current position of the wrongly convicted. In its consultation, the commission suggests that, if the burden is to fall on an accused to prove innocence to obtain compensation, it should be to the civil standard, rather than the criminal standard, as is the position in every other situation in a criminal case where the evidential burden shifts to the defence. That would bring things into line with the normal state of affairs. Will the Minister offer the Government’s position on the Law Commission’s proposal? Would the Government accept such a recommendation? If they are minded to accept, will they ensure that the recommendation is applied retrospectively to those wrongfully convicted since 13 March 2014?
Although I cautiously welcome to the intervention of the Law Commission, and agree that it would make the current situation fairer, it still does not explain why someone presumed innocent has a further obligation or burden to prove it, nor would it address the failings made by the scheme in determining Mr Buckle’s application for compensation, or prevent other claims from being rejected after similar careful consideration.
If the Government maintain that it is necessary for a person presumed innocent to prove it to receive compensation, I do not believe the appropriate authority to make that decision is an official at the Ministry of Justice, someone who, through no fault of their own, will be unfamiliar with the facts of the case and will not have witnessed the evidence given under oath, but who instead must work solely from the papers. Such an individual is not best placed to decide on such applications.
Surely it is the trial jury that is best placed to decide whether the evidence proved Mr Buckle—in this case—to be both not guilty and innocent. I request that the Minister meets us to discuss the handling of Mr Buckle’s specific application and also the merits of amending the law to allow a judge to ask the trial jury, in circumstances where they have acquitted the defendant on all charges, to consider also whether they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is innocent of those same charges.
If it is the Government’s intention to ensure that true victims of miscarriages of justice are fairly compensated, asking the trial jury to make the decision must be the fairest way. It is difficult to see any rational argument against it. I ask the Minister to be kind enough to agree to a meeting to discuss how we can ensure that Mr Buckle is granted that opportunity, so that this miscarriage of justice and the ordeal that he and his family have endured is finally brought to an end. Urgency is key, because justice delayed is justice denied.
We have heard that the Law Commission is producing a substantial report—it is a very substantial consultation exercise, at some 700 pages so far—looking at the way that the CCRC operates. The Law Commission correctly says that the test that exists for referring cases is a faulty one. “Faulty” is my word; what the Law Commission says is that there is a real possibility that referred decisions would not be upheld due to a new argument or evidence not raised in the original or appeal proceedings, which effectively means that the CCRC is having to second-guess the view of the Court of Appeal. The Law Commission is consulting on that, and it says that it is provisionally persuaded that the current test should be replaced with a non-predictive one.
The second important change that the Law Commission is putting forward for consultation is that the CCRC should return to what I think it was originally intended and have an investigatory function. In so many cases, evidence presented to the CCRC is not looked at in good time, and when it is looked at, it is looked at purely on the merits of what is submitted, rather than the CCRC going behind the case to see whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Let me turn specifically to the issue of compensation. This issue has been added to the Law Commission review, and it has said, in very strong terms, that it believes that the law as it stands is incoherent on that point. The concluding paragraph in that section of the report, paragraph 16.75, says:
“The current compensation scheme seemingly prioritises minimising the risk of the guilty receiving compensation at the expense of the innocent receiving compensation. Some people who are provably innocent – on the balance of probabilities, which would ordinarily apply in civil compensation proceedings – are denied compensation. The stringent requirements of the current compensation scheme seem to be in tension with the overall objective of the criminal justice system. As noted by Lord Phillips, requiring a wrongfully convicted person to prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt is a ‘heavy price to pay’ to ensure that no guilty person receives compensation. We consider that imposing the criminal standard of proof on an applicant is indefensible and inconsistent with the fundamental principles that underlie our criminal justice system.”
That is incredibly strong language from a body that is as thoughtful and reserved as the Law Commission.
It has also been said that some of the recent, and of course welcome, compensation schemes that have been devised to deal with the injustices in the Post Office Horizon scandal—there are four separate schemes for that—have had to be devised to deal with something that was a national outrage, affecting many thousands of people, because the current system simply does not work on its own merits.
I say gently to the Minister that all those factors are reasons why we have to look at both the issue of wrongful conviction and the issue of compensation for wrongful conviction. I do not want to go over the same ground that has been very assiduously described already by the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli, who secured this debate, but it has been said that, with each passing decade, there have been more and more restrictions.
There have been some positive steps. The previous Lord Chancellor, Alex Chalk, was right to end the disgrace of those who had been exonerated having to pay for their bed and board while in custody out of their compensation. That compensation is already heavily limited. The circumstances under which that compensation becomes available have, as we have heard, become extraordinarily limited. I can give one statistic in relation to that.
In 2005-06 the compensation actually awarded to victims of miscarriages of justice was £14.6 million. Ten years later—this is the total sum—it was £12,493. To all intents and purposes, compensation has ended as far as victims of miscarriage of justice are concerned. Of course, that is not everything. The important thing is to get people out of prison and clear their names once they have been exonerated. But the financial, material and other damages, including emotional damages, that in any field of civil law would be compensated, simply have not been addressed. People are still being punished.
As in the case of Mr Buckle, people are still being punished despite being exonerated. The state should not just be apologising, redressing wrong and vindicating people who have been shown to be in that situation. The idea that the “beyond reasonable doubt” test is a reasonable test, if there was ever an argument for it when it was introduced in 2014, has been disproved. The rationale was that if somebody was cleared on a technicality, it would be wrong for the state to compensate them for that. Well, the system is able to deal with cases like that. What it has done is caught everybody in its net, including the most deserving cases.
The only thing we have to think about when it comes to whether we have a just or unjust system at the moment is which historical cases would now be caught. At the invitation of the chair of the APPG, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside, I attended a 50th anniversary event of the Birmingham Six a week or two ago at which there were representatives of many other miscarriages of justice. The fact remains that were the Birmingham Six now being exonerated, or the Guildford Four, the Cardiff Three or many other cases, they would not receive compensation. The line has moved so far to one side that in almost every case there is an injustice.
Yes, it is vital that we get right the way we deal with miscarriages of justice, whether that is in the Court of Appeal, the CCRC or through legislation. Clearing someone’s name and getting them out of prison when they have been undeservedly sent there is one thing. Ensuring that they, their families and their lives are put back on track requires substantial sums of money—not thousands of pounds, but often hundreds of thousands of pounds, or in some cases millions of pounds.
There are arbitrary limits and insuperable barriers, which is itself a grave injustice. The sooner that we can change that system, the better. I do not know what my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to say today, but within the next weeks and months we have to see not just a review of the rules on compensation, but a review of the whole way that the miscarriages system functions—in particular a review of the role of the CCRC, which appears to have severely lost its way.
“New figures show that 84 people were wrongly convicted of crimes between 2007 and 2017. Charges ranged from murder to rape and included people serving life sentences. At least half of those who had their convictions overturned spent time in prison, amounting collectively to more than 100 years in custody.”
Of those 84 convictions, 30% were for sexual crimes, 90% of those wrongfully convicted were men and 31 cases led to a retrial.
I am always mindful of the victims of crime—this week I have been highlighting the issues of victims in other circumstances. Even in cases where convictions are quashed, we should consider the words of Dr Hannah Quirk—a former CCRC caseworker and criminal law lecturer:
“it’s important to also understand what is meant by wrongful conviction. It would be very unusual for the Court of Appeal to say someone is innocent, instead it decides whether any new evidence has come to light that makes a conviction unsafe. So not all these cases will necessarily be about innocence and more about if the criminal justice system applied the rules fairly at the time and whether or not if the trial happened today that the person would be convicted based on the latest available evidence.”
That last phrase, about whether the person would be convicted based on the latest available evidence, shows why the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli is correct to pursue compensation for his constituent. We need to ensure for victims of crime that justice is carried out. Unsafe convictions are not justice and for those who are innocent, there should be compensation.
The old saying “There’s no smoke without fire” is often used when considering someone’s guilt, but a wrongful conviction leads to people having to restart their lives. What does that mean? I was thinking about it before this debate. It sometimes means that families have to move home, move their children to a new school, seek new jobs, and work out how they are going to take care of their mortgage. The issue of compensation is focal to what has to happen for those people who have to make a fresh start because of failings in the system and not because of their own deeds—the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli referred to that. It is right and proper that there should be help to start a new life for those who are genuinely innocent. However, the criteria for that compensation must be strict—we are not saying that it should not be. However, whenever there is a clear case of innocence, there should be no reasonable doubt from impartial eyes.
In Northern Ireland, compensation for victims of the troubles has been skewed, in that perpetrators of crimes can receive compensation for those crimes. Gerry Adams could receive compensation, or Gerry Kelly, who shot a prison officer in the head during a prison escape. Those people should never receive a single penny adorned with our King’s head, and that is why we must retain a very close scheme for these matters.
When there is a clear case—as the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli clearly illustrated in the TV and radio coverage, as well as today in this Chamber, where he has put forward an admirable case on behalf of his constituent —I support access to redress, but not for any purpose. I believe the judiciary must continue to have courage in its convictions and be supported to deliver real justice in every way possible.