Ministry of Defence: Palantir Contracts

(Urgent question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on his Department’s contracts with Palantir.

Palantir is a strategic supplier to the Ministry of Defence, providing secure data integration, analytics and AI platforms that help to support operational planning and decision making.

In 2022, the Conservative Government signed a three-year enterprise agreement with Palantir, in light of the growing significance of faster operational decision making, and the impact that that technology has had in operations, including in Ukraine. This Government negotiated a new enterprise agreement to update the one signed in 2022, and that was published in a transparency note in December last year.

As part of the development of the new enterprise agreement, the MOD negotiated a strategic partnership with Palantir last September. The SPA reaffirms the strong relationship developed between UK defence and Palantir over the past decade, and includes new commitments that this Government secured from Palantir, including £1.5 billion investment into the UK, a new UK defence tech SME mentoring scheme to help companies grow and access the US market, and a commitment that London is to be the company’s European defence headquarters.

This Government took over what the Tories started in 2022, but we made it work better for Britain and better for our forces. As the Defence Secretary has said, the contract was his decision, and his alone. Peter Mandelson had no influence on the decision to award this contract. The deal that we struck with Palantir will significantly reinforce the innovation of our forces, and reinforce the safety of this country as we move towards warfighting readiness.

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. Before I turn to the detail, let me say that the Mandelson scandal is truly shocking. When debating these matters, it is incumbent on all of us to remember the victims of Epstein’s crimes.

Following Peter Mandelson’s sacking as US ambassador, serious questions surrounding his influence on MOD contracts have emerged, to which we have had no meaningful answers. Specifically, the MOD signed a contract with the US firm Palantir in December 2025 worth £240 million. Critically, at a time when UK defence companies are struggling for orders from their own Government, this contract did not involve a competition with British firms, and was granted to a US company by direct award. Why was that?

For the record, this is not about Palantir or any other US company. From my time as the Defence Procurement Minister, I recognise the huge mutual gain to us and to our closest ally that results from our strong defence relationship. It is true that many contracts in the MOD are rightly let on a single-source basis, but this is about transparency. Above all, the question is: to what extent did Peter Mandelson and his firm Global Counsel, in which he was a controlling shareholder at the time, benefit from privileged access not available to potential UK competitors—access that was used to deliver a defence contract of some £250 million to a client of Global Counsel without competition?

Regarding the meeting between the Prime Minister, Peter Mandelson and Palantir in February 2025 in Washington DC, is it true that no minutes were taken? If they were not taken, why not? Crucially, at the time of the meeting, was the Prime Minister aware that Palantir was a client of Mandelson’s firm? The Minister must answer that. In the build-up to the US state visit, we understand that Peter Mandelson lobbied the UK Government for deliverables. Will the Minister commit to publishing what those deliverables were? Did they involve any clients of Global Counsel?

As I said in my first answer, Peter Mandelson had no influence on the decision to award this contract; it was a decision made by the Secretary of State, and it was his decision alone.

As the shadow Secretary of State well knows, this enterprise agreement builds on the one that Conservative Ministers signed with Palantir back in 2022, and he knows that the MOD uses Palantir tools and technology on a daily basis to support operations and wider data analytics. I am sure he is not suggesting that we should not be maintaining access to those vital capabilities. Is he saying that his Government were wrong to formalise the relationship with Palantir in their 2022 agreement? I do not think he is.

It is really important that we publish the information. Last time I was in Washington, the then ambassador unfortunately was not available to meet, or was not there, but the Prime Minister has been clear at the Dispatch Box that the public and the House deserve transparency. We intend to publish as much material as we can, as soon as reasonably possible. The Cabinet Office is working with the Met police and Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee to ensure that the release of any documents does not prejudice the Met investigation, or the UK’s national security and international relations. That process is under way, and that is in addition to the other actions that the Prime Minister has already taken.

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

In this evolving security environment, it is clear that developments in artificial intelligence and tech are changing the world at a rate of knots. Those things are integral to defence, but that must not come at the cost of transparency, trust and British businesses. Hon. Members who have served in this House for quite some time will know that dealings with Palantir have been the subject of intense scrutiny and speculation for several years. The key question is: why was this particular contract not subject to the usual competitive procurement processes?

The Palantir enterprise agreement was a direct award, justified under the Procurement Act 2023. The agreement covers existing services and areas in which there is a robust technical justification for using Palantir products and services for defence outcomes. All procurement procedures were followed, and a transparency notice was published.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

In 2020, Palantir accepted a fee of £1 for trialling its data collection services during covid. Since then, the company has amassed contracts with the NHS and the MOD worth more than £500 million. Given the growing scale of Palantir’s involvement in the UK, transparency around its operations is vital, yet the Government have consistently chosen to obfuscate, rather than clarify. Such transparency is especially important when it comes to technology that may lock the UK into dependency on one supplier. In respect of the recent £240 million contract awarded to Palantir, I ask the Minister one more time: will he tell the House why there was no competitive process? Was the Defence Secretary aware of Peter Mandelson’s commercial links to Palantir when this decision was taken solely by him, as the Minister has said?

Last month, Donald Trump threatened a NATO ally with annexation. Despite that, the Government have chosen to green-light a multimillion-pound defence contract with a company co-founded by Trump’s billionaire backer, Peter Thiel. We must be alert to the genuine risk that data collected by Palantir in the UK could be fed back to the White House. Will the Minister provide firm guarantees that all data collected by Palantir will not be shared beyond our Ministry of Defence?

The hon. Gentleman will have heard the answer I just gave to the Chair of the Defence Committee about the procurement process. As I set out, the decision was made by the Secretary of State alone; he has been clear about that. The hon. Gentleman will know that the UK has a strong security and defence partnership with the United States. We are clear that we will continue to invest in that strong security and defence partnership, while we deepen partnerships with our European friends and allies further afield. On data, UK defence data used and developed in Palantir software remains sovereign to the UK and under the control of the MOD, and it resides in the United Kingdom. We have clear, contractual controls in place to ensure that, and we have control of the data system that Palantir software sits on. No change can be made to that without the consent of the MOD.

When I was in opposition, I raised concerns about Palantir and the £1 deal that was made. It was always a trap to ensure that Palantir got its foot in where no one else could. The co-founder of Palantir is mentioned in the Epstein files. I think that anyone who is mentioned in the Epstein files should be fully investigated by this House and by the police; the scandal is an absolute disgrace. The Minister must ensure transparency and robust safeguards. Palantir and AI organisations have the ability to bamboozle Ministers, unless we have concrete ways to ensure that they cannot abuse their power.

My hon. Friend is right that investigations are under way. As the Government made clear to the House last week, we will co-operate fully with those investigations, and we will ensure that the information that the House requires to be published is published in a way that creates the transparency that we all seek. There are already safeguards in place around the use of artificial intelligence in Ministry of Defence decision making, and we are looking at ways to enable new opportunities, especially for UK firms, given the growing requirement in the Ministry of Defence for faster decision making and better data management. I understand her concerns about AI and safeguards, and I will continue to update the House as the AI strategy that Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has published is rolled out.

I call the Father of the House.

Most British scandals are fairly pathetic by international standards—they are about things like serving a piece of cake to the Prime Minister—but this scandal is monumental because it involves somebody in service to the Government using his position for commercial gain. In my long experience of such scandals, what brings down Presidents and Prime Ministers is not the original scandal, but the cover up. My advice to the Minister is to answer the perfectly sensible questions that are being put to him, particularly by the Chair of the Defence Committee about the lack of competitive process, and by the Opposition spokesman about the meeting in Washington. Will the Minister now answer the questions put to him?

I have answered those questions. I say politely to the Father of the House that the partygate scandal, which is not the subject of today’s urgent question, is not a trivial scandal, and it is important to put that clearly on the record. It undermined confidence in the Government at a time when we were being asked to do something that the decision makers were not doing themselves. I agree with him that transparency is necessary and important. The MOD publishes its procurement decisions in the usual transparent way, continuing the theme from when his party was in office. We will continue to do that, and I am happy to continue to take questions about the transparency of this contract.

Given the scale of the contract—it is for almost a quarter of a billion pounds—and the fact that Mandelson had had a contract with Palantir, and attended a meeting in Washington with the Prime Minister and Palantir after he became the ambassador, questions inevitably arise. May I ask the Minister explicitly whether all the papers relevant to the Prime Minister’s visit and the contract will be made available to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as we believed we decided last Wednesday? I am aware that at least five or six senior civil servants in the Ministry of Defence have gone to work with Palantir. Can we have an assurance that there are proper firewalls in place to protect the interests of the public, as against the private interests of Palantir?