It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 24 to 28, schedule 2, and the vital amendments 54 and 55 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). Together, those provisions form a crucial pillar of the Bill, which must modernise our framework for the 21st century while not forgetting one of the oldest truths in our social contract: that parents, not the state, bear the first and deepest duty to protect their children.
The Bill will reform an Act that has stood in various forms since 1983, and which was itself built on a much older legacy of how this country balances individual liberty with the need, in rare cases, to deprive someone of that liberty for the sake of that person’s safety, or the safety of others. For decades, that balancing act has been shaped by the so-called “nearest relative” rule. However well intentioned that rule was, it has often failed to serve the people it is meant to protect. Patients have found themselves legally represented by estranged parents, distant cousins or an ex-spouse with whom they have had no contact for years. In the worst cases, that has compounded trauma and undermined recovery. Clause 24 will address that problem by giving patients the power to appoint a “nominated person” of their choosing: someone whom they trust, who understands their needs, and who can speak up when they themselves cannot. That is, quite simply, the right approach for modern mental health care. It is grounded in autonomy, and respect for the individual’s right to shape their own care and safeguard their own dignity.
Good principles must be matched by good machinery. That is why schedule 2 is not a mere administrative detail, but the backbone of this reform. It sets out, step by step, how a nomination is made, who may be nominated, how conflicts are avoided, and how mistakes are corrected. Under part 1 of schedule 2, a patient must make the appointment in writing. It must be signed and witnessed by
“a health or care professional or independent mental health advocate”.
Without wanting to sound abrupt, we all have the explanatory notes and are reading them, so in the interests of brevity might the hon. Member consider getting to the point about what he would add to or take away from the Bill? We all know what the clauses aim to do; the Minister has already set that out.
I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise.
Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation.
In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare.
Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris, not least because I understand you have just returned from New Zealand, where you had duties as the Government’s trade envoy. I thought perhaps we should do a haka in your honour to mark it, but you might rule against that.
I have no comment on that, and we are not going to divide on it either.
Let me address the questions raised in this morning’s debate. First, I was asked how disputes will be resolved when the nominated person and clinicians disagree. Where a specific nominated person, power or right is being used, the nominated person’s decision applies, because these are statutory powers and rights under the Mental Health Act. However, clinicians will have discretion and can overrule a nominated person’s decision, if there is a danger to the patient or others. That will be clarified in the code.
Secondly, I was asked how we will ensure that nominated persons are aware of their powers. In addition to the broader training and familiarisation required alongside the reforms for clinicians, the statutory forms used to appoint a nominated person will set out that the witness should explain the role of the nominated person and make sure that the nominated person and patient understand the powers and requirements of the role. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh raised that point, too.
Thirdly, I was asked whether there is a mechanism to appoint an interim nominated person, and yes, there is. The interim nominated person is the nominated person appointed by an approved mental health professional when a person lacks the competence or capacity to appoint their own nominated person. While the legislation does not refer to the term “interim nominated person”, that in practice is what they are.
A lot of the discussion today has focused on how the provision will apply to children and young people. I understand the concerns raised and the importance of getting this right. In summary, we object to amendments 54 and 55, which would require nominated persons for patients under 16 to have parental responsibility for the child, whether chosen by the child or appointed for them, on the basis that children with the relevant competence should have the ability to choose their own nominated person. That is in line with the recommendations of the independent review, and in keeping with the principles of choice and autonomy and treating the person as an individual. We have put safeguards in place to ensure that their selection is appropriate and to remove anyone who does not exercise those powers in the best interests of the child.
Can the Minister assure us that there are powers in schedule 2 for the removal of a nominated person? One of the grounds is that any person engaged in caring for the patient or interested in the patient’s welfare may raise concerns—for example, a parent or other unpaid carer who has information that the nominated person is not acting in the best interests of the patient.
I can assure my hon. Friend on that. We have safeguards in place both to ensure that the selection is appropriate in the first place and that, if there are behaviours that indicate that the person is not right for the task, they will be removed and their powers taken away.
Can the Minister clarify where these powers are and what they look like? For example, if a 15-year-old decides to appoint someone who is 23—maybe a boyfriend, maybe not—the problem is that once they make that nomination, we are waiting for something to happen. The idea behind the clauses we have been debating, and the use of exceptional circumstances to try to solve this problem, is to ensure that we prevent any problem from happening in the first place. That is the bit I am not clear on. I thought that Government amendments 40 and 41 were possibly intended to address that point, but my worry is that once the person is chosen, we do not know how they will behave. The whole idea is to give parental responsibility first. Could the Minister address where this is in the Bill, or what it looks like in the code? This is the critical bit to get right for children.
With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I am not going to spend time shuffling my papers around. If he cares to look at schedule 2, I think he will find it there.
Government amendments 40 and 41 have been tabled because we believe that it is not necessary to specify in legislation which person the parental responsibility the approved mental health professional must appoint as nominated person for an under-16-year-old. We have committed to clarify this in the code of practice. We have committed to establishing an expert taskforce to support the development of a statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process.
The fourth question was whether we need parental responsibility by default. The current nearest relative provision assigns an automatic relative according to a hierarchical list, which does not reflect modern family structures. For instance, step-parents and parents who live abroad are not included. That can mean that children and young people may have a nearest relative who can make decisions about their care but who may not know the child well or engage with the role, or who could even be a risk to them. Without formal care proceedings, the child would be left to be represented by a relative who will not act in their best interests.
Fifthly, questions were raised about how to ensure that young patients are not isolated from family support if needed. Engagement with children and young people suggests that they are most likely to appoint their parent as a nominated person. If they appoint someone who is not their parent, then parents could still be involved in their care and treatment where appropriate. Safeguards are in place to allow for the overruling and displacement of the nominated person if they are behaving in a way that is not in the child or young person’s best interests.
Similarly, where a child is under a care order and parental responsibility sits primarily with the local authority, the local authority will retain its parental responsibility for the child even if the child chooses a nominated person who is not the local authority. The code of practice will provide guidance on how practitioners should include those with parental responsibility and care in key processes and decisions.
Amendments made: 40, in schedule 2, page 81, line 25, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 82 and insert—
“(3) If no local authority has parental responsibility for the relevant patient but there are one or more other persons who have parental responsibility and who are willing to act as the nominated person, the approved mental health professional must appoint one of them.”
This requires a person with parental responsibility to be appointed as nominated person even if a child arrangements order or special guardianship order is in place.
Amendment 41 to schedule 2, page 82, line 4, leave out “[sub-paragraph removed]” and insert “sub-paragraph (3)”. —(Stephen Kinnock.)
I beg to move amendment 49, in schedule 2, page 87, line 13, at end insert—
“(18A) In section 130B (arrangements in relation to independent mental advocates: England), after subsection (3)(d), insert—
‘(e) support the patient’s carer and family members to prepare for the patient’s discharge from hospital treatment, and
(f) support the patient to access help with social and financial stressors that might otherwise increase their likelihood of future detention.’”
This amendment extends the support offered by Mental Health advocates to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I jumped the gun this morning, so I have already spoken in detail about the amazing initiative at Melbury Lodge with Winchester Citizens Advice. I will not bore the Committee with the details again, except to say that it is a brilliant example not only of delivering really good care for patients, but of a really good cost-effective intervention for the taxpayer. If it is not appropriate for it to be set out in secondary or primary legislation, will the Minister consider a meeting with me, Melbury Lodge and Winchester Citizens Advice to discuss how this type of initiative could be rolled out across the country?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to make some brief comments on amendment 49.
I am sympathetic to aims of the hon. Member for Winchester in tabling the amendment. A patient who is being discharged from hospital may indeed require specific, targeted support. The overall success of their treatment and continued recovery can be greatly enhanced where the right structures are in place to support them in the community. The amendment rightly draws attention to social and financial stressors that may affect an individual at the point of discharge and in the weeks and months that follow. We all recognise that there is a pressing need for a more joined-up approach between in-patient services and community provision. Without that, we risk patients falling through the cracks and suffering unnecessary and distressing re-admissions. Better discharge planning must be at the heart of our efforts.
I have some concerns, however. Although I acknowledge the good intentions behind the amendment, it risks expanding the remit of independent mental health advocates beyond what might be appropriate. There is a delicate balance, but an important distinction, between advocacy and care co-ordination. Independent mental health advocates play a vital role, and it is essential that their independence and clarity of purpose be preserved. If we are not careful, we risk blurring that boundary. In doing so, we may undermine the very effectiveness of the independent mental health advocate in fulfilling their primary function.
The role of an IMHA is to support patients in understanding and exercising their rights under the Mental Health Act. They may already be involved in supporting an individual to prepare for discharge, including by contributing to plans for ongoing care and support. The amendment would significantly increase the breadth of that role and might shift the focus away from the core purpose of advocacy.
My hon. Friend makes a pressing point. Does she agree that if the amendment is accepted, there will be a requirement for additional training to deal with financial and social support, which goes outside the current scope of these important advocates?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. This is not a simple or straightforward addition; it would require potentially substantial training. We would not want somebody in a role that they were not adequately prepared for. With any amendment, we would need to ensure that training, and the time and expense of it, had been factored in.
Even with the best intentions, the success of any extended support role, such as that envisaged in the amendment, will ultimately rely on the availability and integration of local services. Where appropriate services are in place and are working well together, advocates can play a valuable role in signposting and supporting access. Rather than placing additional responsibilities on the IMHA, our focus should be on working with community providers to ensure that the necessary support, particularly for social and financial needs, is consistently available and is effectively joined up across the system.
Having said that, I recognise and welcome the emphasis placed by the hon. Member for Winchester on the role of carers and family members. Too often, they are overlooked in discharge planning, yet their involvement can make a critical difference to a patient’s successful transition from hospital to home. When carers feel informed, supported and prepared, it gives patients the reassurance and stability that they need to continue their recovery with confidence. The primary responsibility of the independent mental health advocate, however, must remain their responsibility to the patient. I am concerned that the drafting of the amendment could create ambiguity about who the IMHA is principally there to support.
Financial stress is undoubtedly a real and urgent concern. Mental ill health can severely affect an individual’s capacity to work, to manage their finances or even to engage with systems of support. Equally, financial instability can exacerbate mental health difficulties. Those are serious challenges that must be addressed, but I would question whether the IMHA is the right professional to take on that role directly. Instead, we should ensure that they are well placed to refer individuals to appropriate services without assuming responsibility for co-ordinating that support themselves.
I do not know whether the hon. Member for Winchester will press his amendment to a vote, but if he does, would my hon. Friend support the idea of having a pilot roll-out of the system before we go the whole hog, because of all the potential problems that she has highlighted?
That is an important point. These are quite substantial changes, and we do not know the full impact that they would have on the system. We have talked about issues such as whether there is sufficient training for advocates and a joined-up approach with what is happening in the community. A pilot would provide the opportunity to see where it is working and where there might be things that need to be changed or considered. It would certainly be a sensible approach. We all want to ensure that we are supporting individuals to be discharged in a safe way that minimises the likelihood of their being readmitted, but we need to do so without overcomplicating the roles and the system that are currently in place.
I commend the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing these important issues to the attention of the Committee. His amendment raises legitimate and timely concerns around the support offered to individuals leaving hospital, as well as the wider context in which recovery takes place. I hope that I have been able to offer some reflections that will assist hon. Members in considering the matter further.
This morning, we touched on amendment 49, so I will not repeat my remarks. I will simply ask a pithy question of the hon. Member for Winchester. He rightly talked about the incredible work that his local citizens advice bureau carries out. How will the amendment blur the lines between social workers, caseworkers and the independent advocates who are already doing this work? How does he perceive that working? I worry about the complexity that it would create. I would be grateful if the hon. Member addressed that point.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue before the Committee. The intention of his amendment is to extend the support offered by independent mental health advocates
“to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.”
It would amend paragraph 18 of schedule 2, which deals with amendments relating to nominated persons. It should more properly be inserted into schedule 3, which deals with independent mental health advocates.
The Bill will already extend the support that advocates can provide to help patients to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment, to be able to make a complaint and to be provided with information about other available services. Those other services could include support following discharge from statutory or voluntary organisations, which may cover social and financial issues, and help to support carers. Those organisations would be better placed to support patients with these specific needs, rather than independent mental health advocates, whose skillset is specific to supporting patients to understand their rights under the Mental Health Act and participate in decisions about their care and treatment. We will consult on guidance in the code of practice to help independent mental health advocates to understand their extended role.
In addition to policy regarding independent mental health advocacy, advance choice documents give individuals the chance to give instructions about practical aspects of their life. Examples of such aspects include domestic, financial or caring responsibilities, such as children or pets. This provision allows the individual to be looked after when unwell and aims to ease additional anxieties. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his amendment.
I appreciate the valid points that hon. Members have made. The point about running a pilot was a sensible suggestion. We have had something that could be viewed as a pilot in Winchester for two years. We know that it works well, and every £1 spent on it saves £14.08. If I have suggested this amendment in the wrong part of the Bill through my naivety and inexperience, or if mental health advocates are not the right people to deliver a solution that we know works, may I ask the Minister whether there is a more appropriate part of the Bill in which to include it or another way to implement this proven system, such as by amending a different Bill, before I decide whether to press the amendment to a vote?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question. Fundamentally, our view is that the role that he is proposing is not the right one for an independent mental health advocate. The role of an independent mental health advocate is to work with the patient around their legal rights, rather than to deal with some of the more practical issues that he is talking about here. Our sense is that there are both statutory and voluntary organisations who are better placed to carry out that work. I do not think that a pilot would work with IMHAs, because by definition that is not the right role for IMHAs.
Currently, under the Mental Health Act, a person detained for treatment can be kept in hospital initially for six months before the responsible clinician must make an assessment to decide whether to continue their detention or to discharge them. The independent review raised concerns that six months is too long. It heard evidence that patients were sometimes detained longer than necessary and were only considered for discharge when a tribunal hearing was due. It found that in up to 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing. That suggests that some patients are being detained longer than is necessary.
The review recommended reducing from six months to three months the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure that patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged.
Clause 29 will mean that patients detained for treatment have their detention reviewed three times—up from twice—in the first year: at three, six and twelve months from the date of detention. The new renewal periods will not apply to part III patients, except in very specific circumstances when an unrestricted patient changes status. I commend the clause to the Committee.
I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?
Clause 29 addresses the length and renewal of detention periods under the Mental Health Act. I begin by acknowledging the important step that this clause represents in shifting towards a more rights-based, patient-centred model, as enshrined in the Bill.
Clause 29 would shorten the initial period of detention for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act from six months to three months. Subsequent renewal periods are, likewise, reduced from six months to three months and then from one year to six months. This is clearly informed by the principle of least restriction, as is rightly highlighted in the explanatory notes in paragraph 212.
On that basis, we welcome the direction of travel, but, while we agree with the principle of moving towards shorter, more proportionate detention periods, we have questions and concerns about implementation, consistency and safeguards, which I hope the Minister will address.
First, will shorter periods lead to better outcomes, or just more paperwork? The goal here is to ensure that detention is not allowed to drift and that patients are not held in hospital for longer than is necessary without rigorous justification. However, the clause still allows for indefinite renewal in increments, once those shorter initial periods expire. Can the Minister assure us that these changes will result in more meaningful reviews and not just more frequent rubber-stamping of detention? It would be helpful to understand whether the Government have assessed the clinical capacity, particularly among responsible clinicians and approved mental health professionals, to conduct these reviews with real rigour. If not resourced properly, we risk replacing one form of inertia with another.
Secondly, what safeguards exist against the resetting of detention periods on transfer? I am by no means a legal expert, so forgive me if I have completely misinterpreted this, and I bow to the legal expertise of the Minister, the Government and, most importantly, to able staff in the Box. However, clause 29(2) introduces into section 19 of the Mental Health Act new subsection (2A), which provides that if a guardianship patient is transferred to hospital, they will be treated as if they had been admitted on the day of transfer. In practical terms, does that not reset the detention clock?
The differentiation looks justified, especially in cases in which public protection is a concern. Indeed, I support a cautious approach when it comes to public safety. However, does it not create a patchwork of timeframes, where some patients have three months, others have six months and some move between the two, depending on the time of their CTO revocation or guardianship transfers? Therefore, is there scope to put it in the checklist? That might ensure that no one falls through the gaps, while also guarding against mistakes. We must be careful not to undermine consistency or clarity for patients and clinicians alike.
Fourthly, are tribunals adequately prepared for more frequent reviews? We welcome the linked reform, which we have discussed in relation to other parts of the Bill, to increase access to mental health tribunals, including automatic referrals for those unable to initiate reviews themselves. It is a crucial safeguard for patients who may be especially vulnerable. However, as detention periods shorten, more reviews will be needed, and more often. That is good in principle, but only if the tribunal system has the capacity to respond in a timely and effective manner.
We raised those concerns on Second Reading, when we discussed numbers. I pointed out then, as I do now, that I do not want to put the Minister on the spot about specific numbers, although I have to admit that he did incredibly well last time by producing them. I want to understand how more automatic referrals, and now shorter time periods, will impact the tribunal system. Can the Minister confirm what assessment has been made of the tribunals’ resources, particularly in the health, education and social care chamber in England, and in the mental health review tribunal for Wales? Patients must not face delays or be left in limbo because the system cannot cope with the very safeguards that Parliament is rightly seeking to strengthen.
With that complexity, the changes introduced in clause 29 are legally intricate. Different rules apply to different patients, such as forensic patients, transfer guardianship patients and CTO revocations—some before six months and some after. Will the Government commit to providing clear, practical guidance to help clinicians, advocates and patients understand those new rules? A principle of least restriction must be matched by one of clear communication, so patients can exercise their rights and professionals can uphold them with confidence.
Finally, I return to the question of balancing patient rights with public protection. While our focus rightly remains on the principle of least restriction and ensuring therapeutic benefit for patients, we must be mindful of the protection of the public, which is a key objective of the Mental Health Act. Some categories of patients, particularly those under part III forensic orders, pose complex challenges in which the risk to others needs to be carefully managed alongside patients’ rights. Can the Minister explain how the Bill ensures that shorter detention and renewal periods do not inadvertently compromise public safety?
Part of the reason for suggesting including public safety consideration in the clinical checklist, as we discussed last week—in my eyes, to strengthen the system—is that we are changing the detention periods. To that end, I offer the following additional step: would the Government consider tailoring renewal periods or review frequencies based on individual risk assessments, rather than applying uniform timeframes? If there have been checklist concerns, this could be added as a simple way of flagging in the system to tailor renew periods to those specific individual risks. I am open to other suggestions about ways to do that, and to working with the Government on approaches, but it is in this House’s interest—and, more importantly, the country’s interest— to get it right. Of course, my suggestion would likely involve closer collaboration between clinicians, teams, the tribunal and criminal justice agencies for forensic patients. However, that is no bad thing.
Alternatively, the Government could consider introducing enhanced risk review panels or multidisciplinary risk assessments prior to renewal. That might provide an additional safeguard without unduly extending detention periods. Such approaches could maintain the spirit of the Bill, promoting liberty and least restriction, while recognising the legitimate need for proportionate safeguards to protect the public. I understand that my suggestions would mean resource considerations and implications. That is why we have not put them to a vote. However, I am keen that the Government consider public safety as part of the Bill’s reform.
Clause 29 makes a welcome effort to bring our mental health laws more closely in line with modern principles, particularly around liberty, autonomy and therapeutic benefit. However, the real test lies not just in the statute book but in practice. We support the principle of the clause, but we urge the Minister to work with stakeholders —including patients, clinicians, legal advocates and tribunal members—to ensure that it is not just a procedural change but a shift in how we treat those living with mental ill health.
The aim of the clause is to ensure that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner. The planned reforms will not change the fundamental power and purpose of the Act, which is to detain and treat people when they are so unwell that they become a risk to themselves or others. Where a patient continues to meet the criteria, their detention will be renewed.
Opposition Members have asked about extra paperwork and workload in general for both clinicians and tribunals. In the impact assessment that we published alongside the Bill, we set out the estimated costs and benefits of the reforms and the expected workforce requirements that are critical to our implementation planning. That includes consideration of the impact on clinicians of additional detention reviews, which we have calculated is estimated to be around four hours of additional workload by the clinician for each patient who is detained beyond three months.
On the clinical evidence for shortening the detention period, in the independent review we found that in 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing, which strongly suggests that some patients are being detained for longer than is necessary.
On a point of order, Mrs Harris. The Minister had not sat down. He had said that he was finishing, but he had not sat down. There is an important point that was not addressed: the issue of resetting, which is fundamental to detention.
The issue is about resetting. As the legislation is written, it would suggest that because people are moving from one place to another, the clock resets. Clinically, that could make sense, but part of the problem is that every time the clock resets, so does the person’s detention. That is a key part. Fundamentally, in this clause we are trying to stop people being detained when they do not need to be. In fact, the Minister has just said that 17% of people were discharged before the tribunal could happen. The question is around specifying, when it comes to admission and transfer, that the clock resets. What safeguards do we have to make sure that we are counting the number of times it is reset, that it is clinically appropriate and, most importantly, that we are not substituting one way of dealing with this with a back-door way of creating a reset motion?
The Chair
Order. Dr Evans, this is an intervention. Can we please keep it as such?
I am struggling a little to understand what the hon. Gentleman is driving at. I pointed out in my opening remarks that the review clearly recommended reducing the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment from six months to three months, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged. The clause means that patients detained for treatment will have their detention reviewed three times in the first year: at three, six and 12 months from the date of detention—up from two, as it was previously. I do not think that there is any implication that it is resetting the detention; it is just a rolling set of reviews.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordinglyordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I will not tolerate any further speaking outside the structure. It is the second time that it has happened this afternoon, and I will not tolerate it any further.
Clause 30
Periods for tribunal applications
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 31 to 33 stand part.
Clause 30 will introduce important reforms to the tribunal process by adjusting the timeframes for when patients can apply to the tribunal regarding their detention. Section 2 patients will now have 21 days rather than the current 14 to apply. This reform addresses concerns that patients in crisis often need more time to fully understand their rights, access legal advice and make an application.
For section 3 patients and transferred guardianship patients, clause 30 will reduce the initial application period from six months to three months. This aligns the application period with the new, shorter initial detention period of three months, reduced from six months, for these patients. This change maintains the current rights for these patients to make an application once during each successive period of detention.
For conditionally discharged restricted patients, clause 30 provides different application periods. These vary depending on whether the patient has been conditionally discharged with or without conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty. Conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—also known as patients on a supervised discharge—can make an application to the tribunal sooner, between six months and 12 months from the date that they become subject to said conditions, and thereafter every two years. In contrast, conditionally discharged restricted patients who are not subject to deprivation of liberty conditions will have application periods between 12 months and two years, and thereafter every two years.
The different application periods reflect the need to consider a patient’s detention more frequently and earlier where more restrictive deprivation of liberty conditions are present. These changes improve access to the tribunal, ensuring greater protection for some of society’s most vulnerable individuals.
Clause 31 will strengthen the system of automatic referrals to the tribunal for patients detained under the Mental Health Act. It ensures that patients who may not be able to make an application to the tribunal themselves are still afforded regular judicial oversight. For patients detained under section 2, this clause reduces the automatic referral period from six months to three months. This improves the current safeguard by bringing the trigger for the automatic referral sooner. This will apply when a section 2 patient’s detention has been extended beyond 28 days and no application or referral has been made to the tribunal for review of the patient’s detention.
For restricted patients conditionally discharged without deprivation of liberty conditions, we are introducing an initial automatic referral at two years after discharge, or since deprivation of liberty conditions ceased to apply, and every four years thereafter, where the tribunal has not previously considered the patient’s case. The automatic referral every four years safeguards against a restricted patient being left without tribunal scrutiny of their detention where they change status.
By making automatic referrals more frequent for restricted patients and introducing automatic referrals for conditionally discharged patients, we are improving access to the tribunal. That will ensure that patients who lack the ability or initiative to make an application to the tribunal can benefit from the safeguard of increased independent judicial scrutiny of their detention by the tribunal.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak on clauses 30 to 33, which go to the core of the rights architecture that surrounds mental health law in this country—namely, the oversight and challenge mechanisms available to individuals subject to detention, supervision or conditional discharge. I think we are all aware that the 1983 Act, although fit for its time, has failed to keep pace with the evolving understanding of mental health illness and modern expectations of legal accountability or procedural fairness. The clauses, although technical in nature, seek to rectify a number of the long-standing shortcomings in the operation of the mental health tribunal system.
Clause 30 will extend and clarify the time period within which patients may apply to tribunals. Essentially, it will do two things. First, it will extend the application window for section 2 patients—those detained for assessment—from 14 to 21 days. Secondly, it will reduce the initial waiting period for section 3 patients and those under guardianship from six months to three months. Those are sensible and overdue changes, because 14 days is a narrow window for any legal action, let alone one initiated by an individual who may be experiencing acute psychological distress.
Extending the application window to 21 days provides a fairer opportunity to seek representation and prepare a meaningful application. Equally, the reduction of the initial period for section 3 and guardianship patients to three months offers an important safeguard against prolonged detention without scrutiny. It restores a measure of clarity between the gravity of the detention order and the speed with which it may be challenged.
The clause will also clarify the rights of conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—that is, those who are discharged from hospital but required to comply with supervisional residence requirements that are so restrictive that they cross the legal threshold for a deprivation of liberty. At present, those individuals occupy a legal grey zone: they are not formally detained, yet the liberty they enjoy is so curtailed that it raises significant questions as to their article 5 rights. Clause 30 will properly address that anomaly by creating a defined, regular route of appeal, initially between six and 12 months from the imposition of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and biannually thereafter. Those are measured and proportionate changes that enhance access to justice, improve compliance with human rights obligations and restore clarity to a field that has suffered, at times, from legal opacity.
Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?
My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. We all know, from our casework or personal experiences outside of this place, about the pressures on the Courts and Tribunals Service. Mental health tribunals are not exempt from that pressure. Changing the timeframe on which tribunals operate, and the frequency with which reviews take place, will inevitably increase the burden on the service. Therefore, although these changes are broadly welcome, it is important that we are cognisant of their impact on the resources that will be required, the number of judges and wing members that will be needed, and of course the hard standing of the court and tribunal infrastructure that will need to be made available. Other issues, such as those around the digitalisation of the service, will also need to be addressed.
Clause 31 will recast the regime for automatic tribunal referrals, replacing the prior six-month structure with the concept of “a relevant period”. For detained patients, referrals will now occur at three months, then 12 months, and annually thereafter. For community patients, they will occur at six months, then 12 months, then annually. Most significantly, hospital managers will be under a new duty to refer a case when no review has occurred in 12 months, regardless of whether an application has been made. That is a sound reform.
The clause will introduce coherence to a previously fragmented system, and establishes a minimum standard of legal oversight. The inclusion of a backstop provision—that no individual should go more than 12 months without review—is essential. In a system in which patients may not always have the means or capacity to apply for a review themselves, it offers a critical safety net. Clause 31 will also repeal section 68A of the 1983 Act, which has become unwieldy and duplicative. By streamlining the referral process, the Bill enhances legal clarity and administrative efficiency, but I would caution that the increased complexity of the new timeframes may require significant training of those responsible for their implementation.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 30 to 33. I echo many of the remarks of the gallant and learned hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, but I will try not to go over too much of the same ground.
These clauses seek to provide clarity and improvement in access to the tribunal process, both for patients detained under the Mental Health Act and for those on conditional discharge, and seek to implement key recommendations from the independent review. Section 66 of the Act is amended to extend the period in which a patient detained under section 2 can apply to the tribunal from 14 days to 21 days. Clause 30 also allows for auto-enrolment in a hearing, reducing that time from six months to three months. It clarifies that conditional discharge patients are included in this package, so they also have the right to have their treatment reviewed at a tribunal. Providing for auto-enrolment simplifies the system for people who, as the hon. Member mentioned, are perhaps not in the best position to make administrative decisions and fill in the paperwork to apply to a tribunal.
Although this framework and these changes are necessary to bring clarity and autonomy back into people’s healthcare, it would be good to hear from the Minister about how we will support patients throughout these processes as we learn about the different timelines. How will we ensure people can access this change in the system and understand what they are entitled to under this new provision?
Clauses 30 to 33 deal with the tribunal access and automatic referrals of patients detained or conditionally discharged under the Mental Health Act. Let me begin, again, by welcoming these provisions, which seek to improve safeguards, ensure timely oversight, and extend the rights of individuals, particularly those under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. These are serious matters of liberty and I acknowledge the Government’s intention to modernise and strengthen protection. Nevertheless, it is important that we look carefully at how the clauses operate in practice. I will take each in turn.
Clause 30, on tribunal application periods, will make important changes to when patients can apply for the tribunal. First, it will extend the time that patients detained under section 2 of the Act have to apply from 14 to 21 days. This is a welcome change. We know that the first few days in hospital are incredibly disorientating, so allowing patients a bit more time to seek legal advice is entirely sensible.
Secondly, the clause will reduce the period for patients detained under section 3 to apply from six months to three. I can understand the logic of that, given that clause 29 also shortens the initial detention period, but is there any reason for choosing that mark? Is there any evidence that the three-month window will still allow patients to have sufficient time and support to exercise their rights?
Thirdly, the clause will introduce new provisions for conditionally discharged restricted patients, setting out different application timeframes depending on whether the patient is subject to conditions amounting to deprivation of liberty. Those under the deprivation of liberty safeguards will be able to apply between six and 12 months after discharge and then every two years. For those not under such conditions, the window begins at 12 months. That reflects the impact of conditions on a person’s liberty, and I recognise that distinction, but can the Minister clarify how patients will be informed about which track they are on? That will be fundamental to exerting their rights. Will any guidance be issued to ensure consistency? Will patients have access to advocacy or legal advice at this point?
Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?
That is a difficult balance to get right. I appreciate that the Government have said that the Bill will take 10 years to implement, but if these measures come into force from day one, we will start to see automatic referrals come through. There will be a lag as the transition happens, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we can foresee scenarios where patients who want to be referred into the tribunal are waiting in inappropriate care places, which may be to the detriment of their personal care and may actually make their recovery worse. He is right to highlight that question, which is why having a broad understanding of how many extra referrals are coming would be useful.
Clause 32 focuses on conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It rightly ensures that those patients are brought within scope of automatic referral, first after 12 months and then every two years. Again, that is a positive step, ensuring that even those not detained in hospital will still have access to a review of their conditions. Crucially, the clause also gives the tribunals the power to vary or remove those DoL conditions.
Can the Minister say more about how that important power will be used? What criteria will the tribunals apply to assess whether a condition is genuinely necessary and proportionate? Will patients be legally represented in those hearings by default? Will another advocate be there, or will it be someone else in their place? Here, too, I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. I hope he will forgive my legal naivety, but my mother always said, “It’s better to ask a dumb question than stay dumb forever.”
The explanatory notes talk about DoL conditions. The current legal framework for authorising the deprivation of liberty for individuals who lack capacity is complex and in transition. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, deprivation of liberty safeguards have been the established mechanism since 2009 to ensure lawful deprivation of liberty in care settings. However, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 introduced liberty protection safeguards as modernising replacements, designed to simplify and broaden protections.
I will try to answer some of the questions. On tribunal capacity, people who are conditionally discharged and those with restrictions that amount to a deprivation of liberty represent only a small fraction of tribunal business—well under 1% of all mental health tribunal cases. The modest increase in hearings is therefore expected to be absorbed within existing capacity, while delivering significant rights benefits to the individuals concerned. It is worth noting, too, that the mental health tribunal continues to perform strongly. Amazingly, it is one of the very few areas of our public services not to be left with a massive backlog by the previous Government. The open caseload has remained stable at approximately 3,700 cases for a decade, despite 31,226 appeals in 2024-25.
I was asked about LPS and replacing DoLS. The previous Government paused the implementation of the liberty protection safeguards; they decided to focus on other priorities. In the absence of LPS, the deprivation of liberty safeguards system will continue to apply. The Department has made it clear that all bodies with legal duties under the DoLS must continue to operate these important safeguards to ensure that the rights of people without the relevant mental capacity are protected.
We have made it clear that we are going to continue with DoLS. Basically, we have to look at whether replacing them with LPS will achieve the stated objectives of the exercise, and I am not entirely convinced about that. It is under review.
On supporting patients, the independent mental health advocate will ensure that patients are aware of their rights. Throughout the Bill we are ensuring that patients have support by moving to an opt-out model. Additionally, if a patient does not bring a case, they will be referred automatically to the tribunal if a specified period has passed. Patients will be supported in getting tribunal oversight, as the referrals are made by a hospital manager.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 31 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Discharge: process
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause seeks to strengthen the protocol on discharging individuals under the Act by introducing a statutory requirement on the person who makes the discharge decision to consult with another. Currently, a patient’s responsible clinician can, in law, unilaterally decide to discharge a hospital in-patient from certain powers of the Act. Under our amendments, they will be required to consult someone else who is professionally concerned with the patient’s treatment, whether that be in the hospital or in the community. Where the responsible clinician is a consultant psychiatrist, the consultee may be a nurse, psychologist or occupational therapist. That is to ensure a more rounded perspective on the patient’s readiness for discharge from the Act.
The clause will introduce a similar protocol for the discharge of people under guardianship, guardianship orders and community treatment orders. For guardianship and guardianship orders, the person who makes the decision to discharge from the powers under the Act may need to consult either the responsible local social services authority or a person’s designated social worker. For patients under a community treatment order, the responsible clinician is required to consult the community clinician, in recognition of the fact that they will likely have a much clearer understanding of the patient’s progress in the community and whether they are ready for discharge under the Act.
Although multidisciplinary-based decisions represent best practice, we know that they are not always taken. The clause seeks to change that by helping to make sure that the decision to discharge is carefully considered and receives greater professional oversight.
I rise to speak to the implications of clause 34 for clinical decision making, patient safety and the operation of the Mental Health Act more broadly. The clause introduces a new requirement for the responsible clinician to consult another professional, from a different professional discipline, who is involved in the patient’s care before they make a decision to discharge a patient from detention or from a community treatment order under section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. If the patient is on a community treatment order, the clinician must consult the relevant community clinician.
At its heart, the clause seeks to ensure that decisions about discharge are not taken in isolation. It reflects a wider shift in mental health care towards collaborative, multidisciplinary approaches. We should welcome that in principle. These are often complex decisions that involve vulnerable individuals, and a single viewpoint may not always capture the full clinical picture. By requiring consultation with someone from another discipline, be that a nurse, an occupational therapist or a psychologist, we can help to ensure that decisions are more thoroughly considered and less likely to overlook risks.
The clause provides an important safeguard against premature or inappropriate discharge, particularly in cases where a patient may continue to pose a risk to themselves or others. It builds in a degree of professional scrutiny that supports safer and more consistent practice and, in doing so, should improve confidence among patients, families and practitioners.
I would be grateful if the Minister provided further clarity on a few practical points about how the clause will operate. First, it requires consultation but does not appear to specify whether the consulted clinician must agree with the responsible clinician’s decision in order for discharge to proceed. In cases where there is disagreement between clinicians of different professional backgrounds, what is the expected course of action? Is the responsible clinician ultimately free to proceed, or will there be an escalation mechanism? It would be helpful to understand how differing professional opinions are to be balanced and how potential deadlock is to be managed.
I rise to speak to clause 34, which inserts new consultation requirements into section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The requirements relate to the discharge of individuals detained under parts II and III of the Act, as well as those subject to community treatment orders or guardianship.
Currently, under the Act, the responsible clinician has the power to discharge patients detained under sections 2 and 3, as well as unrestricted patients subject to a hospital order under part III, without any formal requirement to consult other professionals. This is already considered outdated practice in most clinical settings, where decisions are typically made within the multi-disciplinary team. However, that is not required by law. By contrast, discharge decisions for restricted patients remain with the Secretary of State for Justice or the mental health tribunal and are not affected by the clause.
Clause 34 seeks to change the current situation. It will insert proposed new subsections (2A) to (2C) into section 23 of the 1983 Act, placing a statutory consultation duty on responsible clinicians, local authorities and, in some cases, the patient’s nominated person. The aim, as outlined in the Government’s explanatory notes and by the Minister, is to formalise best practice and ensure that no discharge decision is made unilaterally without appropriate professional oversight. The Opposition welcome the intention behind the clause—strengthening safeguards, encouraging multidisciplinary collaboration and protecting patients from unsafe or premature discharges are all necessary and overdue steps—but we have a few questions about it that I hope the Minister will address.
First, proposed new subsection (2A) requires the responsible clinician to
“consult a person—
(i) who has been professionally concerned with the patient’s care or treatment, and
(ii) who belongs to a profession other than that to which the responsible clinician belongs”.
That is a sound principle, but there is an ambiguity in the phrase “has been professionally concerned”. Who do the Government have in mind? The Minister set out that it could be a nurse or a counsellor, but would it stretch as far as a GP or a practice nurse? Will there be a codifying list, either in statute or in the code of practice, so that we know who is expected to speak to that person? Does it require current involvement in the patient’s care? For example, could a professional who saw the patient only briefly many months ago qualify? If so, is that adequate to meet the clause’s intention? We would welcome clarification from the Minister on whether a definition of who and what an appropriate consultee looks like will be covered in guidance or regulations.
The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked about differences of opinion. The second professional does not have to agree. The ultimate decision in such cases sits with the responsible clinician, to ensure the clear accountability of decision making.
The hon. Lady also asked about delays. We see consultation with another professional as important to making a more informed decision on whether the patient is ready for discharge under the Act. It is especially important that the second professional involved in discharge decisions is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. That will ensure a broader perspective, particularly when the second professional, such as a nurse, may have had more frequent contact with the patient.
On the discipline of the second clinician consulted, is there any guidance as to who might be appropriate? I mean not just the list of potential professions but whether there is guidance on who would be appropriate in different situations. We welcome the multidisciplinary approach, but I would like some clarification. Given your earlier response, saying that they need to agree, it is not really clear how this would add to the process. It would help if there were clarity on the professions.
The Chair
Order. When you say “you”, you are referring to the Chair.
We will absolutely provide guidance on that in the code, but the consultee in the case of a detained person is someone who is professionally concerned with the patient’s treatment, whether that be in the hospital or in the community, and who is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. Those criteria will be applied throughout the process.
Finally, on the question from the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, yes, reasons will have to be given whenever there is a difference of opinion. All the relevant documentation and how that should work will be set out in the code of practice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This amendment seeks to overturn the previous amendment tabled—sorry, I should have said “the clause”. The clause seeks to overturn the previous amendment, tabled by Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. Although we support the intention of the amendment, our view continues to be that it would be duplicative.
There are already many ways in which service user feedback is used to inform policy and practice. For instance, every year the Care Quality Commission conducts thousands of interviews and visits with people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. That may result in the CQC investigating a complaint or requiring an action statement from providers about service improvements. Although there may be room to enhance existing feedback mechanisms, we would prefer to improve what we have rather than create something new that would risk confusion.
If the objective is to provide time and space for the person to reflect on their past experiences post-discharge, I reassure the Committee that that should already form a part of co-producing a person’s care in the community plan. We also intend to create space for individuals to reflect on past experiences when making their advance choice document, with facilitation from a suitably qualified person.
Young people who have been through detention often report challenging circumstances following that detention. Rather than supporting them, that sometimes increases their trauma. Can the Minister assure me that, as part of the changes he just set out, we will still ensure that young people have the opportunity to feed their experiences back? What specific work will the Government undertake to gather those views from young people?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that we create a space for young people to provide feedback. Some of that will be around past experiences when making their advance choice documents, but much broader opportunities for feedback will absolutely be built into the system. We want this to be a learning process. It is important that the code of practice is not just a document that sits on the shelf gathering dust; it should be a live document. That is why the feedback is so important.
It should be noted that although reflecting on past experiences may be therapeutic for some individuals, for others it can be traumatic, so the measure should be entirely service-user led. We also continue to be concerned about the burden that the amendment would place on independent mental health advocacy services, which are already under strain.
I apologise—this may be due to the terminology of “amendment” versus “clause”—but is the Minister saying that the Government are likely to vote against clause 35 as it currently stands? He is talking about amendments and clauses, and that is slightly confusing me. [Interruption.] His officials are nodding.
Yes, but the issue may have a bearing on a potential Division. The challenge that I am facing is that my notes said,
“This amendment seeks to overturn”,
but we are talking about a clause that is seeking to overturn a previous amendment. Are we speaking in favour of a clause that will overturn an amendment? [Interruption.] Confusion reigns.
We will figure it out as we go along. I have now lost my place. [Interruption.]My answer to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon is that the Government are voting against clause 35 stand part.
Right. Advocates have told us that implementing what is set out in the clause would raise logistical and resourcing problems, as it would require a significant shift from their current role. They have also raised concerns that if they acted in effect on behalf of the hospital to collect feedback, their independence and impartiality in the eyes of the patient might be undermined. We would prefer to direct resources to increasing access to advocacy services among in-patients, as proposed by the Bill. Advocates play a crucial role in promoting and protecting the rights of patients. We do not wish to detract from that or to dilute their role. I do not commend the clause to the Committee.
Like many Committee members, I was deeply confused about how we were proceeding.
On the face of it, the clause broadly seems as if it should be part of any Act about mental health care, including post discharge. I have spoken about my own experience of interacting with the Mental Health Act as it stands. I might have found the clause fairly helpful post discharge and others might have found it useful as well. However, I have just heard the Minister’s description of the limitations of the clause, and the speech that I was about to make has been thrown into complete disarray by the confusion just now. But I implore the Minister to consider the fact that, when it comes to encouraging participation, understanding, and co-designing and co-producing services, capturing the experience of those recently detained under the Mental Health Act can be extraordinarily useful. Clause 35, which was added by an amendment from the Lords, seems a fairly useful way to do that.
Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it.
As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses.
Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care.
Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully.
I rise to speak to clause 35, which would insert new section 23A into the Mental Health Act 1983. It was introduced and passed in the Lords, and rightly so. As the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it seems surprising that anyone might want to take it out.
The clause was introduced as a new duty to offer all patients detained under the Act a consultation with an IMHA within 30 days of discharge. The purpose is to review their experience of hospital and learn from that experience through a report shared with hospital managers. Currently, the Mental Health Act makes provisions for access to IMHAs primarily during detention, particularly around decisions concerning treatment and care planning. However, once a patient is discharged, formal advocacy tends to fall away, unless pursued through broader NHS complaints mechanisms. There is no statutory duty to engage with patients post discharge, to understand how they have experienced their care or to systematically learn from those experiences.
In that context, the clause represents a welcome and important step forward. We know from successive reviews from the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and, of course, the independent review of the Mental Health Act, led by Sir Simon Wessely, that patients often feel disempowered during their detention. Many describe experiences of coercion, poor communication or even trauma. Yet those experiences frequently go unheard: lost in the silence that can follow discharge. Clause 35 seeks to change that, creating a pathway for those voices to be heard, and, more importantly, for services to learn from them. I strongly support that principle.
We need to clarify one thing first: the clause says a patient must “be offered” a consultation within 30 days —it is no more formalised than that. It is not a statutory requirement to take part, but purely to offer. That is important when it comes to making sure that reports are made in partnership with the patient. That is positive language, which would help to support the decision making and feedback loop.
Surely the fundamental part of the Bill is self-assessment and self-reflection. That does happen in some cases, and certainly in other parts of the healthcare system, but in this area generally does not; when it does happen, it is done in an inconsistent manner. The clause seeks to formalise things and to ensure that there is a benchmark by which service users and patients can feed back to the service they have just come from, to improve services. Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the Government would want to take that out?
My hon. Friend makes a strong point. In clinical practice, we know that reflective learning is important, but that is not mandated. As we have seen from the reports, part of the reason why we do not see improvements is that we do not know about them. The clause gives patients the chance to empower themselves in a statutory, regulated way, which then allows us further transparency on how those issues arise.
Let us not forget that patients with good experiences would also have the chance to feed those back, further helping to support the services and hopefully leading to beacons of best practice up and down the nation so that we could then learn from those. That is the idea behind the clause: making sure that the likes of the regulator would be able to share lessons about not only those who have struggled but those who have done well. Clause 35 really offers a rare opportunity to hardwire the patient voice into the feedback loop of mental health services. That is a principle that I and my Opposition colleagues strongly support.
Fundamentally, we do not support the clause because it is overkill. It simply puts too much burden on to a system that is already carrying out the tasks that the clause seeks to impose on the system, particularly through the CQC. Given that advocates currently have no role in relation to discharged patients, it is clear that the clause would present a new burden; that has been confirmed through my officials’ engagement with advocates and other stakeholders. One hospital manager said that within their small trust alone, the clause would result in contacting and interviewing more than 1,000 individuals discharged from the Act each year.
The Minister says that advocates had no role in discharge, but they do when advising patients about their rights—that is fundamentally what they do. At the point of discharge, they enable patients to know what their rights are. I take his point about capacity issues. If the Government want to take the clause away, how will they hardwire patients’ feedback into the heart of the Bill?
The CQC visits and interviews thousands of detained patients each year under its statutory duty to monitor the use of the Mental Health Act. Those visits can lead to the CQC requesting improvements from service providers. The CQC publishes annual reports highlighting key findings and themes from those visits.
Trust boards are responsible for collecting and acting on service user feedback to improve services. Under the NHS contract, the patient and carer race equality framework requires trusts to have clear and visible systems in place for gathering and responding to feedback from patients and carers. What is more, Healthwatch England and its local branches also play a key role in representing the views of health and social care users. I do not really know what more the system could do. The clause simply over-embroiders and over-complicates; when that happens, we usually end up with vast numbers of unintended consequences.
We appreciate that concerns have been raised around the CQC’s role in collecting in-patients’ views. As I said, we would prefer to work with stakeholders to understand those concerns and improve the feedback mechanisms that we have, rather than reinvent the wheel and create something new. We recognise that, although there are multiple aims to the clause, the primary one is to provide a space for people to heal from their experiences of being detained. We are strongly of the view that inviting the individual to share their experiences as part of their advance choice document or care plan—
I am glad that the Minister is explaining how capturing feedback and experience is being allowed for in other parts of the Bill. To clarify, in my own head I feel that the clause aims to capture the experience immediately after it has happened, just as hospitals offer women who have just given birth the opportunity to talk through their experience. It is healing for the patient to understand what happened to them, and it provides immediate feedback to the hospital. Is that kind of level captured in other parts of the Bill?
I understand and recognise my hon. Friend’s concerns, but we can rattle through all the different forums where feedback can be captured: the CQC, the trust boards, the patient and carer race equality framework, Healthwatch England and all the other informal channels in the mental health ecosystem. Our view is that adding another layer into all that would in the end be counterproductive. That is the Government’s position.
The Minister mentioned the complex network of ways in which patients can give their feedback; perhaps the aim of the clause is to try to simplify that and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned, make it a bit more direct and immediate after treatment. Are there any plans to simplify the process in another way? The complex cobweb that the Minister described is perhaps the reason why the patient voice is not always captured and utilised in a way that we would want if the services that people rely on are to be improved.
My hon. Friend raises an important point. I do worry about the list of different organisations and agencies throughout the system, and not just in mental health—so many parts of the system have had layer upon layer of bureaucracy added in. That is one of the reasons why we are abolishing NHS England: we want to try to find greater simplicity and clearer channels of communication.
Through the development of the code of practice and the consultation process, simplifying and clarifying the system will be a key objective. Adding another layer would have the opposite effect. But my hon. Friend makes an important point, which will definitely be a part of the process of consultation and development of the guidelines and code of practice. On the basis of those answers, I recommend that we do not adopt the clause.
The Chair
Order. I am expecting four Divisions imminently, so I will suspend the Committee.
Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.
On resuming—
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36 will introduce a subset of the current conditional discharge power where deprivation of liberty conditions are expressly allowed, otherwise known as supervised discharge. The aim of the clause is to prevent a small group of criminal justice patients with specialised support needs from remaining in hospital unnecessarily, while ensuring the risk they pose in the community is robustly managed. The reform responds to a Supreme Court decision, which found that there was no power under the current Act to impose discharge conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty. Prior to the judgment, such conditions were used in a small number of cases in which patients with specialist needs required stringent arrangements to protect themselves and the public from harm.
Careful consideration has been given to the ethical and legal balance of the arrangements. We are clear that the threshold for use of the power is very high, and it will be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. A stringent test will be applied. The conditions will only be applied if the tribunal or Justice Secretary views the conditions as necessary to protect others from serious harm and, for the tribunal, if it considers the conditions would be no less beneficial than if the patient remained in hospital. We are also introducing additional safeguards, which ensure that supervised discharge patients are automatically referred to the tribunal after 12 months and every two years thereafter. That is more frequent than patients subject to conditional discharge, given the restrictive nature of the conditions being placed upon them.
I turn to clause 37. Prisoners and other detainees who become acutely mentally unwell in prison or another place of detention, such as an immigration removal centre or youth detention accommodation, can be transferred to hospital for treatment under sections 47 and 48 of the Act. Clause 37 will make two minor changes to those provisions.
Currently, the criteria for detention under the Act provides that appropriate treatment must be “available” for the patient or other detainee. The Court of Appeal, however, ruled that due to the specialised provision and security requirements relating to this cohort of patients, treatment must be available in practice for the detention criteria to be met, meaning that a hospital place must be identified. That diverges from how “available” treatment is interpreted across the rest of the Act, and it risks creating an additional barrier for this cohort of patients in accessing the care they need.
I will now address clause 38. Prison and other places of detention are not the right environment for people with severe mental illness. We recognise that vulnerable people detained in prison, youth detention accommodation or immigration detention facilities, who may require treatment in hospital under the Mental Health Act, continue to experience delays. This Government are committed to ensuring that people in contact with the criminal justice system can access appropriate and timely support to meet their mental health needs. The clause will create a statutory time limit of 28 days for transfers from prison and other places of detention to hospital. It will place the existing NHSE best practice guidance on a statutory footing. Together with operational improvements, it aims to reduce unnecessary delays and deliver swifter access to treatment.
The transfer process is multidisciplinary, requiring input from numerous health and justice agencies. Clause 38 will enshrine the time limit by placing a new duty on authorities and bodies involved in a potential transfer, seeking to ensure that the transfer takes place within 28 days from the initial referral for a report to admission to hospital, unless there are exceptional circumstances. The clause will also allow the Secretary of State to amend the time limit, as well as the list of relevant authorities and bodies involved in the transfer, to ensure that the duty continues to sit with the appropriate bodies if there are changes to commissioning arrangements or responsibilities.
Clause 39 will remove reference to remand centres in section 48 of the Mental Health Act. Since 2012, remand centres have not been used in the criminal justice system, and children arrested for, or formally charged with, a crime have instead been remanded to youth detention accommodation. When the Crown court remands children to youth detention accommodation, there is currently no provision for the Secretary of State to make a transfer direction in respect of them under section 48. Transfer to hospital for those children would need to be ordered by the Crown court under section 35 or 36 of the Mental Health Act.
Clause 39 will rectify the situation by removing references to remand centres, and it adds youth detention accommodation to the scope of section 48. That will allow children remanded by any court to be transferred directly to hospital. There are also uncommenced repeals of “remand centre” references in schedule 8 to the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. As we are making the change in this Bill to ensure that the references are accurate, clause 39(2) removes the entry referring to section 48 from schedule 8 to the 2000 Act.
Finally, I turn to clause 40. Hon. Members may have noticed that the Bill is technically complex, and this clause is indeed one of its complex provisions. It is a technical clause, which clarifies that part III patients who are not subject to special restrictions are omitted from applications to the tribunal 28 days after a report is furnished under section 25 of the Mental Health Act in respect of a patient who is detained in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment. Section 25 allows the responsible clinician to override a nearest relative’s power of discharge. That does not apply to unrestricted part III patients, as discharge will always be at the discretion of the responsible clinician, not the nearest relative. The Committee should rest assured that there is no legal effect to the clause, which is merely correcting drafting that currently does not work in the way that it was intended. I therefore commend clauses 36 to 40 to the Committee.
The Chair
I remind Members that if they want to take their jackets off, they may. It is very warm.
I rise to support clauses 36 to 40. Clause 36 addresses a legal gap identified in case law, which held that the Mental Health Act 1983 did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty for conditionally discharged patients. The clause provides a clear statutory basis for such conditions, but only under strict safeguards. It aims to balance public protection with patient rights, ensuring that DoL conditions are used only when absolutely necessary and proportionate. This is a positive step, because it clarifies the legal authority, resolving any uncertainty, following court rulings, about the legality of DoL conditions in conditional discharges. It protects public safety by ensuring that high-risk patients can be managed safely in the community, under appropriate restrictions. It includes safeguards that require DoL conditions to be justified and proportionate, with a focus on patient welfare, and it aligns with notable human rights law, especially the definitions and principles from the Mental Capacity Act and the relevant case law.
However, I have a couple of questions for the Minister. My view is that there is potential for overuse. Without robust oversight, there is a risk that DoL conditions could be used too readily. What safeguards is the Minister putting in place to ensure that that does not happen? There is clearly an impact on patient liberty, and we need to get the balance right. Even with the safeguards, these conditions significantly restrict individual freedom and therefore must be carefully monitored. How is the Minister ensuring that that will happen? In relation to the legal thresholds, determining whether conditions meet the legal test may require detailed clinical and legal assessment. We have talked about the practical implications of this Act on numerous occasions. I again ask the Minister whether he is certain that we have the relevant clinical and legal assessors out there to ensure that we can push that forward.
Clause 37, entitled “Transfers of prisoners and others to hospital: conditions”, will update the legal framework for transferring individuals from prison or immigration detention to hospital under the Mental Health Act. The previous wording of the Act required that treatment be “available”, but did not specify that it must be appropriate for the individual’s condition. This clause will align the criteria with more modern clinical standards and broader reforms in the Bill, which emphasise person-centred care and treatment suitability. It will also ensure that immigration detainees are clearly included in the scope of these provisions. Again, it is positive, because it updates and consolidates the list of immigration-related detention powers covered by the Act. It supports human rights compliance, because it aligns with principles of lawful and proportionate deprivation of liberty under article 5 of the European convention on human rights; it brings the Act in line with the current clinical and legal terminology; and, most importantly, it ensures that transfers are made only when appropriate treatment—not just any treatment—is available.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I will briefly speak in support of clauses 36 to 40. These clauses reflect the principle of least restriction, albeit for people who are subject to part III, and who are therefore subject to the deprivation of liberty conditions. It is really important that there are frameworks around conditional discharge, and these clauses will do a lot to bring it in line with best practice, and to put the limit set out in the best practice guidelines on a statutory footing to ensure that there is a 28-day transfer. To be successful, that will require multidisciplinary working between the health and justice systems. With that in mind, will the Minister give an assurance that he is confident that the 28-day limit can be met? If there is already data on how many transfers are made within that time limit, in line with best practice guidelines, that would give some assurance that the new statutory time limit is likely to be met.
I am pleased to see that the time limit should be breached only in exceptional circumstances, and that the Bill specifies that a shortage of hospital beds or staff does not constitute exceptional circumstances. It is really important that that is not used as a reason not to transfer or discharge people later than the 28-day limit. Some of the discharge test rests not only on whether there is a risk of harm to another person, but on a public test. Can the Minister clarify how those two tests will work in tandem? Is that already being done in practice?
Finally, I note that the evidence that we have received from the Care Quality Commission says that it welcomes closing the legal gap following the High Court ruling, as set out in the explanatory notes. However, the CQC believes that supervised discharge should be used only “when strictly necessary”, and I know that there are ongoing discussions between the Department’s officials and the Care Quality Commission. Can the Minister give an update on those discussions and clarify what role, if any, the CQC will play in the oversight of these measures?
I rise to speak in support of clauses 36 to 40, which provide critical legal clarification and technical refinements to the 1993 Act. While differing in scope and impact, each of these provisions is underpinned by a clear shared commitment to enhance public protection, uphold patient rights, and ensure that the legal framework reflects both current clinical practice and developments in case law.
Let me begin with clause 36, which addresses a long-standing lacuna in the legislative architecture governing conditionally discharged restricted patients. It follows the 2018 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Secretary of State of Justice v. MM, where it became clear that the existing Mental Health Act did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty as part of conditional discharge. The decision created uncertainty for clinicians, tribunals and, most crucially, risk-managed patients living in the community. It is therefore pleasing to see that clause 36 seeks to address that gap. The clause introduces new statutory powers for both the Secretary of State and the first-tier tribunal, in respect of imposing deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. It does so with some stringent safeguards.
Under proposed new section 42(2A), the Secretary of State has the powers to impose conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty, where satisfied that such measures are necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm. The tribunal is afforded parallel powers under proposed new section 73(2)(c), but is further constrained by a dual test: the conditions must be necessary to protect others from serious harm, and discharge under those conditions must be no less beneficial to the patient’s mental health than continued hospital detention. Those are not trivial thresholds; they are appropriately calibrated to ensure proportionality and respect for liberty, consistent with the principles enshrined in article 5 of the European convention on human rights. Furthermore, clause 36 adopts a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty, as set out in sections 64(5) and 64(6) of the MCA 2005, ensuring coherence across mental health and capacity jurisdictions. That is an important safeguard in itself, grounding the powers being introduced in a well-understood and judicially interpreted statutory concept.
Of equal note is the retrospective application of the provisions. Clause 36 applies to all restricted patients, regardless of the date of their discharge. That is not, in and of itself, overreach; arguably, it is a proportionate response to a pressing legal vacuum that affects public safety and clinical certainty. It will, however, cause some concern to those who are already under an order that the rules of the game have been changed halfway through the match. With any provision enabling the deprivation of liberty, oversight is paramount. There is a risk of overreach if such powers are applied too readily or without sufficient clinical justification. The measures must therefore be subject to continued scrutiny, and practitioners must be trained to apply the new criteria with care and consistency.
Clause 37 concerns the transfer of prisoners and immigration detainees to hospital for psychiatric treatment. The clause updates the statutory criteria under sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act 1983. It clarifies that transfers may occur only where appropriate medical treatment can be given for the relevant disorder. The change may appear semantic, but its implications are substantive. The previous formulation required only the treatment to be “available”, a term that in practice could permit transfer even where treatment was not tailored or suitable for the individual’s specific clinical needs. Clause 37 rightly raises that threshold, aligning it with modern clinical standards and ensuring that decisions are made on treatment appropriateness, not mere availability.
The clause also provides statutory clarity on the types of immigration detainees that fall within scope, explicitly referencing the Immigration Act 1971, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the UK Borders Act 2007. That will assist practitioners and legal professionals alike in interpreting the law correctly and without ambiguity. I must, however, acknowledge that applying the appropriateness test may introduce new complexities. Clinical judgments will have to be clearly articulated and properly evidenced. Disagreements may arise, so clear guidance from NHS England and the Ministry of Justice will be essential.
Clause 38 further reinforces the safeguards introduced in clause 37 by addressing the delays in transfer of detainees to hospital. For too long, individuals assessed as requiring urgent psychiatric care have languished in prisons, sometimes for weeks or months, due to systematic inertia and logistical bottlenecks. Clause 38 introduces a statutory 28-day time limit for such transfers under sections 47 and 47. This is arguably a necessary step. By empowering the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the commitments of the time limit, permissible exemptions and differentiated arrangements for specific cohorts, the clause strikes a careful balance between legal certainty and operational flexibility.
Crucially, this provision underpins the Government’s broader policy objective of promoting timely, rights-respecting access to mental health treatment, particularly for detained individuals who are among the most vulnerable in our society. It also responds directly to the concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others about the compatibility of the current system with articles 3 and 4 of the ECHR. Self-evidently, there will be implementation challenges. The availability of secure hospital beds, inter-agency co-ordination and resourcing must be addressed in parallel. However, the principle is clear: individuals in need of treatment must not be left untreated due to administrative delay.
Clause 39 is, by contrast, a technical change, but it is a necessary amendment. It updates the terminology in section 48(2)(a) to reflect the statutory provisions governing youth detention. Specifically, it replaces the obsolete term “remand centre” with the modern framework of “youth detention accommodation”, as defined by section 91 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The clause also repeals a now defunct reference to the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, thereby ensuring that the Mental Health Act remains internally coherent and consistent with the current youth justice legislation. While minor in nature, this change is crucial to ensuring that young people in custodial settings remain eligible for hospital transfer where clinically necessary. It also exemplifies the sort of legislative house-keeping that is essential if our statutes are to remain fit for purpose.
Finally, clause 40 introduces a minor cross-reference and correction to schedule 1 to the 1983 Act. The amendment ensures that paragraphs (d) and (g) of section 66(2) apply to the patients who are subject to hospital and guardianship orders but are not under special restrictions. This, I readily concede, is a purely technical correction, but accuracy in statute is no small matter. Ensuring correct application of legal provisions helps to reduce litigation risk, supports clinical decision-making, and enhances the overall integrity of the legislative framework.
In summary, clauses 36 to 40 represent a judicious blend of reform and refinement. Clause 36 resolves a significant legal ambiguity while embedding rigorous safeguards. Clauses 37 and 38 modernise and humanise the framework for transferring detainees to hospital, and clauses 39 and 40 ensure statutory alignment with the current law and best practice. Collectively, these provisions do not revolutionise the Mental Health Act, but they do arguably enhance it, ensuring that it remains lawful, clinically relevant and respectful of both public protection imperatives and individual rights.
I rise to address clauses 36 to 40, which focus on patients involved in criminal proceedings or serving custodial sentences, and how we better align their care and liberty and the protection of the public. These clauses engage serious and sensitive issues—individual liberty, the management of risk and the functioning of the justice and health systems in tandem.
I turn first to clause 36. Under the current Mental Health Act, a restricted patient—typically someone who has been detained under a hospital order with restrictions due to the risk they pose—can conditionally be discharged under section 42 by the Secretary of State for Justice or under section 73 by the tribunal. Conditions can be placed on their discharge, but they cannot amount to deprivation of liberty. This is key. If conditions require constant supervision or control, such as being escorted at all times, then the patient cannot be discharged at all, even if they no longer need in-patient treatment. This was confirmed in the Supreme Court case, MM v. Secretary of State for Justice, in 2018.
Essentially, at the heart of the clause is a group of individuals who have been detained in a hospital under a restricted hospital order. In other words, they are people who have committed serious offences but were found to be suffering from mental disorders at the time. These individuals are not sent to prison; instead, they are detained in secure hospitals under the Mental Health Act. In some cases, clinicians and tribunals decide that someone can be discharged from hospital, but only if they comply with very strict conditions. These can include requirements such as living in a particular place with 24-hour supervision, not leaving without permission, being monitored at all times and other limits that can seriously restrict their liberty.
The issue arose in the case MM v. WL, in which a patient with capacity had consented to highly restrictive discharge conditions involving 24-hour supervision. The court found that the discharge under such conditions could not lawfully take place under the Mental Health Act, even with the patient’s consent, because it amounted to deprivation of liberty, and it was not lawful to call it a “conditional discharge”.
Is the Minister worried about judicial review, especially around the article 5 impact of the changes made by clause 36? I am straying beyond my limited legal knowledge, but I wanted to flag to the Committee and the Government that if we pass retrospective legislation, we should be prepared for all that that brings. There may be a simple reason why this measure is in the Bill, or it may be that, in practice, it is a completely normal provision to make. On this point, my experience of drafting legislation reaches its capacity, and I look to other, more learned hon. Members to explain the reason for the provision, and whether it could have any consequences, unintended or otherwise, that need to be considered.
Moving on, I pause again on the matter of legal interface. The hon. Member for Shipley talked about interoperability between pieces of legislation, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley talked about the importance of good legislative housekeeping. We are considering the complex relationship between the deprivation of liberty conditions under the Mental Health Act and DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act, which were soon to be replaced—although we are now not sure if it will happen—by the liberty protection safeguards.
We know from the Supreme Court’s judgment in P v. Cheshire West and Chester Council that a person lacking capacity may be considered to be deprived of their liberty even in community settings, triggering safeguards. But in the case of the Secretary of State for Justice v. MM, the Court of Appeal made it clear that the Mental Health Act does not permit a deprivation of liberty to apply to a conditional discharge. That ruling led to real uncertainty in practice about how to safely discharge patients in the community with appropriate safeguards.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the challenges of that court ruling, which will stand unless the Bill amends the law, is that there will be people detained for longer than is appropriate because a conditional discharge is not possible under the law as it is currently interpreted? The whole Bill is about the principle of least restriction. Does he not agree that we need to make this change to fit with that principle?
I agree on that, and we will support the clause. But, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out earlier, we need interoperability between the moving parts to make sure that they all align with the provision in the clause. She is absolutely right: this measure is in the Bill because the patient in the MM case had capacity and had agreed to being discharged with deprivation of liberty impositions, and that was found to be unlawful because of a parallel Act. What I am worried about, and the point that I am trying to make, is that there are so many moving parts in these Acts that we could be in danger of complicating the situation further.
Clause 36 seeks to address the uncertainty by legislating for a new power to impose deprivation conditions as part of a conditional discharge, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out. However, in doing so, the clause effectively runs parallel to, and perhaps even conflicts with, the as yet un-implemented LPS framework. The Government introduced the LPS framework through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019. It was intended to be more flexible and responsive than DoLS. But given that the LPS framework has not been commenced, and that there is no clear timetable for implementation—the Minister seemed to suggest that he was unsure whether he will implement them, even though the 2019 Act was passed by Parliament—are we legislating for an entirely separate deprivation of liberty route under the Mental Health Act, and potentially bypassing or duplicating existing safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act?
It all comes back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley about good record keeping and legislative housekeeping. I ask the Minister how the new conditional discharge power will interact with either the DoLS or the liberty protection safeguards—if they are eventually implemented. Are they simply a subsection of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and therefore would not matter? Can the Minister foresee a time where a patient could be subject to both the new powers and the LPS, and if so, who is the decision maker and where do the appeals rightly lie? Should we not wait for the full implementation of the LPS before layering further deprivations in place? That is an open and rhetorical question, but one that vexes me when we are discussing this Bill in detail. There is a real risk here of fragmenting the legal landscape, leading to confusion for clinicians, patients and carers.
On safeguards, supervised discharge will only be used when necessary, given its restrictive nature and significant resource demands. A stringent test will apply. It must be deemed necessary by the tribunal or Justice Secretary to protect others from serious harm, and the tribunal must deem it to be no less beneficial than hospital care. Additional safeguards include automatic tribunal referrals after 12 months and every two years thereafter, if not previously reviewed.
On capacity, our expectation is that this will not have a significant impact on other restricted patients. The small cohort who are likely to be subject to supervised discharge will free beds, and that could positively impact any patient who needs a bed, but the numbers remain small and are unlikely to lead to widespread bed availability.
On demand for secure beds, clause 37 will correct a discrepancy in detention criteria caused by a Court of Appeal decision. Rather than creating further disparity, it aligns the criteria for sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act with the consistent interpretation of available treatment used throughout the rest of the Act. Clause 37 does not alter the approach to clinical prioritisation of in-patient care, or the fact that a person will only be transferred once an appropriate bed has been found, in terms of both therapeutic care and level of security. That also addresses the question on implementation from the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon.
I turn to the questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. She asked about the 28-day limit. Any change to the time limit would require an enhanced level of parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore, the power shall be subject to the draft affirmative procedure to ensure that both Houses are given the opportunity to debate any decision.
On dual tests, the Secretary of State for Justice applies a slightly different test from that of the tribunal in order to preserve their discretion in the interests of public protection, but conditions for patients must still be appropriate and proportionate. We will publish operational guidance to make it clear that the Secretary of State for Justice should have regard to the principle of therapeutic benefit and only use this type of discharge when the evidence indicates that it is in the best interests of the patient.
How will patients be supported to challenge decisions? The Justice Secretary has the power to direct patients to the mental health tribunal to provide further independent scrutiny on an ad hoc basis, in additional to regular, automatic referrals, which will ensure that any patient who does not apply to the tribunal still has their case heard.
How does the LPS interact with deprivation of liberty safeguards? Supervised discharge will bring some parity in the ability to discharge between those who have capacity and those who do not. Individuals without capacity can currently be discharged with deprivation of liberty conditions imposed under the statutory regime in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, whereas those with capacity cannot. The introduction of supervised discharge will stop the difference in treatment. On the timeline for reporting to Ministers, the chair will provide a quarterly report on progress and impact to Ministers in both the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Health and Social Care, with the first report expected in the autumn.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 37 to 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Independent mental health advocates
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13, after “patient” insert
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”.
This amendment extends the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.
I will first discuss clause 41 and schedule 3. Independent mental health advocates are specially trained advocates who can support patients detained under the Mental Health Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions about their care and treatment, but not everyone who would benefit from an independent mental health advocate currently has access to one. In view of the benefits that advocacy can bring, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health patients, including informal or voluntary patients who are not detained under the Act.
We know that some informal patients are not told about their rights and legal status. Informal patients in Wales already have the protection, and we want to extend it to patients in England. It will help ensure that the voices of individuals are heard and their rights respected, and that potentially vulnerable groups, including children and young people, do not go without important advocacy protections.
Moreover, the Bill provides an additional enhanced mechanism for ensuring that the most vulnerable mental health patients, those compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act, are able to benefit from advocacy. We are introducing an opt-out system for that particular cohort, to put the onus on hospital managers rather than patients themselves to request independent mental health advocacy services. Hospital managers must notify providers of advocacy services about the patients who are eligible for IMH advocacy. Advocacy providers must then arrange for independent mental health advocates to interview those patients to find out whether they want to use their services.
The right to an independent mental health advocate will also be expanded to include part III patients who are subject to the new supervised discharge, which allows for part III patients to be conditionally discharged into the community and still deprived of their liberty. The Bill also enables independent mental health advocates to provide extra help to patients to have a greater say in their treatment or to make a complaint. Together, these changes increase the access that patients have to advocacy, which contributes to improved patient rights.
I rise to speak to clause 41, which brings into sharper focus two pillars of a fair and rights-based mental health system: the provision of clear information to patients and the strengthening of independent mental health advocacy. It rightly recognises that, when a person is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, often during a period of acute crisis and difficulty in their life, they need to feel that their clinical needs are being met, but in a way that respects them as individuals, with the same entitlements to dignity and agency as any other member of our society.
The clause provides for informal patients to be eligible for an independent mental health advocate. I welcome the extension to enable more individuals to access this vital advocacy. It empowers patients to know that independent advocacy is available, but we must ensure that there are sufficient resources so that those who choose this help are given sufficient support when they are in a potentially vulnerable position. As someone representing a constituency that is in England but borders Wales, I also welcome that these changes bring care into line so that advocacy help is offered to informal patients, regardless of which side of the border they are accessing treatment.
The clause places a renewed duty on services to ensure that information is given to patients clearly, promptly and in a form that they can understand. It introduces an obligation for advocacy providers to determine, through an interview, whether a qualifying patient wishes to use the service. This support is important; no person should be expected to navigate the complexities of mental health legislation, or their rights under it, without proper guidance. However, where there is a duty
“on hospital managers and others to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients”,
can the Minister clarify who is meant by “others”? Will there be a list of people and roles who are given this responsibility?
The role of an independent mental health advocate is vital. These individuals can be a lifeline. They can help people to understand their rights and any medical treatment, and crucially, can support an individual to have their say about any treatment. Clause 41 rightly reinforces the importance of independent mental health advocates, and it is important that we match that ambition with the legal and practical steps to support them.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Harris—when I wrote my speech, it said “this afternoon”, but it now says “this evening”. I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3. I welcome the role that they will play in extending the right to access the services of an independent mental health advocate to voluntary patients in England not detained under the Mental Health Act, and ensuring that all detained patients are offered these services through an automatic referral, creating an opt-out system.
Independent mental health advocates play an important role in supporting patients detained under the Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions around their care and treatment. Clause 41 and schedule 3 seek to ensure that the individual needs of each patient are taken into account, even where they may not be able to engage in decision making about themselves. In doing so, they recognise the patient as an individual. This provides for important safeguards for patients and reinforces the Bill’s principles of autonomy and least restriction, which is a crucial part of bringing mental health legislation into the 21st century. I similarly welcome Government amendments 42 and 43, which seek to further strengthen the important safeguards in the Bill.
I hear the points that the Minister has made on children and young people admitted informally, but I would be grateful if he could address the matter further. As we know, informal patients are those who consent to an admission to a mental health hospital or whose parents consent to an admission on their behalf. Often, they are treated under the same or similar conditions as those detained under the Act. While detained patients will receive an automatic referral to advocacy services under the new opt-out scheme, my understanding is that that will not be the case for those admitted informally, meaning that informal patients would still be required to ask for the support of an independent mental health advocate.
Children admitted informally are likely to experience the same conditions as another child detained under the Act, but without the parity of access to advocacy services through the opt-out system. Because a parent is able to consent to informal treatment on their child’s behalf, they are one of few groups, if not the only one, able to be admitted informally without their own consent. Therefore, there is a concern that children and young people admitted informally may continue to experience problems accessing the support of an advocate. I seek the Minister’s assurance that the Government have considered fully the provision of advocacy services for informally admitted children and young people, and how this gap might be addressed.
I will speak briefly on schedule 3, which makes a number of important amendments to the 1983 Act concerning the role of independent mental health advocates. The schedule implements several practical reforms to provide consistent and accessible advocacy and support for individuals receiving mental health care. It builds upon existing statutory provisions by extending the right to advocacy beyond detained patients and setting out clearer expectations of how and when advocacy services should be made available.
One of the most notable changes is the extension of IMHA eligibility to include informal patients—individuals receiving voluntary treatment rather than under compulsion. This responds directly to the recommendations made in both the independent review and the 2021 White Paper, which identified disparities in support available to different patient groups. Under these reforms, access to advocacy is no longer limited to those detained under the Act. Instead, all qualifying patients, including informal ones, will be eligible for IMHA support where appropriate. This change reflects the recognition that voluntary status does not necessarily equate to full understanding or confidence in navigating care decisions.
To ensure that eligible individuals are aware of and able to use this support, hospital managers will now be required to notify advocacy services when a patient becomes eligible. This automatic referral mechanism removes the onus from patients themselves to initiate contact, many of whom may not be aware of their rights or may face barriers to asserting them. In turn, advocacy providers will have a duty to arrange an interview with each referred patient to establish whether they wish to use the service. This helps to close the loop between eligibility and engagement, and ensures that advocacy is offered in a timely and structured manner.
Schedule 3 also sets out clearer responsibilities on both hospital managers and advocacy providers. Clearly, that will improve co-ordination and ensure the consistent application of the policy across different care settings and regions. In practice, it should help to reduce gaps where eligible patients might otherwise miss out on support due to ambiguity around who holds the responsibility for initiating contact. It is worth noting that these reforms complement the broader set of changes proposed in clauses 41 to 44, which collectively aim to strengthen patient rights, increase transparency in decision making and improve the overall quality of patient experience in mental health services.
The Chair
My apologies for the noise in the corridor; there was meant to be a yoga event in here at 6 o’clock. I thank the Doorkeeper for trying very hard to keep everything under control.
I do not know whether we could combine yoga with our proceedings, Mrs Harris.
The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford spoke really well in a similar vein to what I am about to say. Our amendment 19 to clause 41 would extend the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal patients under 18 years old. Young people and their families and carers often face a nightmare navigating the mental health system. We find this on every level. A psychiatrist who came into my office in Winchester said that he and his wife, who is also a medical professional, were struggling to navigate the system to get care for their own child. His words were quite profound: “If we can’t navigate the system, what hope has anyone else got?”
Even when young people have secured desperately needed in-patient care, often after many months of delay, they can face real challenges in understanding the care being implemented and its impact. Often, such young people are cared for far from home. Enabling them to benefit from mental health advocacy that ensures the pressures on the system do not lead to unfair or damaging decisions for mentally ill young people is crucial. It can help to ensure that the patient’s whole situation and entire history is always taken into account, and that treatment is always appropriate, rather than symptoms just being addressed in isolation. We should be looking to empower patients and their families and carers across the whole system, not just in relation to those who are sectioned.
You will be delighted to know that there will be no yoga from me, Mrs Harris.
I rise to support clause 41 and schedule 3, which will expand access to independent mental health advocates to not only those detained under the Mental Health Act but informal voluntary patients. Like many Committee members, I am sure, a number of IMHAs in my constituency have approached me about this, and they welcome the expansion. I pay tribute to the amazing work that they do across Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook and the surrounding villages. Previously, only patients detained under specific sections of the Mental Health Act or subject to certain treatments were entitled to IMHA support.
The clause reflects the recommendations of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and the 2021 White Paper, and aims to enhance patient rights and reduce disparities in access to advocacy. That clearly empowers more patients by giving informal patients access to advocacy support. It improves transparency and accountability in mental health care settings. It ensures proactive outreach so that patients are not left unaware of their rights or support options, and supports informed decision making and potentially reduces coercive practices.
Clearly, there may be some resource implications for advocacy services, which the Minister may wish to touch on. Likewise, there may be some implementation challenges, which other hon. Members have raised, especially around ensuring timely and consistent notification and engagement. There could be potential delays in care co-ordination if advocacy processes are not well integrated. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that.
This shift is long overdue. Too many vulnerable people, admitted voluntarily but feeling powerless, have lacked a clear, independent voice. The clause corrects that injustice by embedding advocacy deeper into the system, moving from passive availability to proactive engagement.
Schedule 3 underpins clause 41 by putting clear duties on hospital managers and advocacy providers alike to ensure that patients are automatically offered support. It is opt out, not opt in. That clarity of responsibility will reduce coercion, increase transparency and ultimately lead to fairer treatment decisions.
I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3, which introduce the independent mental health advocate system under the Mental Health Act 1983. I recognise the positive intentions behind the reforms. The proposals respond to long-standing concerns about access to advocacy for people receiving mental health treatment, especially for those who are not detained, but are nevertheless vulnerable, and may struggle to understand the challenges within their care.
Currently, IMHA services are guaranteed only to a relatively narrow group—namely, patients detained under the Act, those under community treatment orders or guardianship, and certain patients undergoing serious medical treatments under sections 57 or 58A. As the explanatory notes make clear in paragraph 313, that excludes a substantial number of informal or voluntary patients, many of whom may be experiencing significant distress or coercion, even if they are technically not detained.
The clause expands eligibility to a new category of English qualifying informal patients, bringing England more in line with a system already used in places such as Wales. This welcome and overdue development reflects the principle that the right to advocacy should be grounded not in a legal status alone, but in need and vulnerability. The introduction of the opt-out referral system for detained patients is also a step forward. Concerns have been raised that eligible patients never access IMHA, often because they are unaware, overwhelmed or too unwell for self-referral. Making the referral automatic is likely to increase the uptake and strengthen patient voices in critical decisions about care, treatment and discharge.
Although the direction of travel is right, I want to raise several probing questions in areas of concern, particularly relating to implementation, scope and safe- guarding. On resource and workforce readiness, the Government are significantly expanding both the pool of eligible patients and the responsibility of advocacy providers. That is welcome, but it inevitably raises the question of capacity. Can the Minister confirm whether additional funding will be made available to local authorities, or is it up to the NHS and IMHA providers to ensure the expansion is deliverable? Are the new roles of the IMHAs explicitly addressed in the new workforce plan that he is introducing? What assessment has been done of the number of new IMHAs that will be required to meet the duties, particularly now we are using an opt-out model? Without the workforce and training in place, there is a risk that the rights introduced in the legislation will not be fully realised in practice.
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but is not the point of an IMHA to ensure that the patient understands their rights under the previous Act and the Bill? That is how they participate in taking decisions about what is available to the patient. Although they might not be clinically trained, they know the legislation inside out, and that gives power and advocacy to the patient.
The hon. Gentleman identifies exactly what the point of an IMHA is. The way the Bill is written, the IMHA determines whether a patient has capacity or competence to make a decision. That determining means that they are making the choice, which is quasi-clinical. According to the definition that the hon. Gentleman has just given, that would fall out of the IMHA’s scope, because that would involve the ability to make decisions about capacity.
My concern is whether we have scope creep here. If so, we should be explicit about it—perhaps it is something we want to consider—but the way it is written, IMHAs will make capacity-based decisions about whether a person has the capacity to decide whether they need help. I would argue that that should be done by someone who is qualified as a doctor, a psychiatrist or community psychiatric nurse, as currently happens. That is the clarification that I am looking for from the Government. If I have the wrong end of the stick, I will happily back down, but this area of the Bill needs clarifying.
To that end, and if the Bill is written as I fear, I would welcome it if the Minister can tell us how IMHA providers will be supported to make best interest decisions appropriately, especially in cases involving fluctuating capacity or complex presentations. Will there be clinical oversight or statutory guidance to avoid inconsistency or overreach in these assessments? Although I support the principle of proactively offering advocacy, we must ensure that the decisions made on a person’s behalf are done with the appropriate checks and accountability, and by the right people.
My third point is about the exclusion of emergency section patients. The welcome change in the clause and the schedule expands the pool of support, but we should also pay attention to those who are, by definition, excluded. Paragraph 317 of the explanatory notes make it clear that individuals detained under sections 4, 5, 135 and 136 will not benefit from IMHA support. Those are often people detained in crisis situations, sometimes in police custody, or brought in under emergency powers.
The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked who can make referrals in addition to hospital managers. The list of responsible persons is in proposed new section 130CC, in paragraph 6 of schedule 3. In addition to hospital managers, the responsible local social services authority is also required to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients; whether it is a matter for the hospital or the local authority depends on the patient.
I was asked whether there are enough people to fulfil the tasks of the IMHA. The impact assessment gives our current best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements and sets out the expected expansion required for each workforce group. We will recruit approximately 330 additional IMHAs.
Does the Minister have any more detail on that? Is there a timeframe for recruiting these advocates and putting the training in place? That would help reassure the Committee that there is provision to ensure that the timing will fit with the introduction of the changes in the Bill.
As has been discussed, as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent we will launch an extensive consultation around the code of practice. The code of practice will cover everything from training to recruitment to capacity building, and the plan will be set out in the first annual written ministerial statement, which will take place one year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about children admitted informally. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform informal patients of their right to a mental health advocate. We will set out the importance of independent mental health advocate representation for children and young people in the code of practice. That could include the importance of a proactive approach for hospital managers.
We will also describe in the code the new role for independent mental health advocates in relation to informal patients, including vulnerable in-patient groups, such as children and young people, people from ethnic minority backgrounds and people with a learning disability or autism.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked whether we have the money for it. The funding requirements will, I think, be related to our best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements. If we are going for 330 additional IMHAs, the funding requirements will be defined by that number.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether it will be local authority funding. We are obliged to fund new burdens on local authorities to resource this expansion of the independent mental health advocates. He then asked a blizzard of additional questions; I got lost in the thread of them all. We will go through Hansard and write to him.
I think the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon has spent more time discussing our amendments than I have, so I would like to give him the opportunity to vote in favour of one of them.
Amendment proposed: 19, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13, after “patient” insert—
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”— (Dr Chambers.)
This amendment extends the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.
Amendments made: 42, in schedule 3, page 92, leave out lines 22 and 23 and insert—
“(c) the patient is not liable to be detained under this Act or any other legislation or by virtue of a court order.”
This changes the definition of “English qualifying informal patient” to exclude those detained under any legislation or by virtue of a court order (rather than just those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983).
Amendment 43, in schedule 3, page 94, line 36, at end insert—
“8 In section 130J (Welsh qualifying informal patients), in subsection (2), for paragraph (c) substitute—
‘(c) the patient is not liable to be detained under this Act or any other legislation or by virtue of a court order’.”—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This changes the definition of “Welsh qualifying informal patient” to exclude those detained under any legislation or by virtue of a court order (rather than just those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983).
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 42
Information about complaints for detained patients
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 43 and 44 stand part.
The clauses will amend section 132 of the Mental Health Act in relation to detained patients, and section 132A in relation to community patients, and insert a new provision in relation to conditionally discharged patients. They place a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply complaints information to detained patients, community patients and conditionally discharged respectively, as well as to their nominated person.
Patients, their family and carers have a right to complain about the treatment they receive, including care and treatment under the Mental Health Act. The patient’s rights to complain are enshrined in the NHS constitution. Although the code of practice currently sets out that information about complaints should be provided to patients when they are detained, there is no statutory duty to do so. Under the clauses, hospital managers will be required to provide information on how to make a complaint about: first, functions under the Bill; secondly, any medical treatment for mental disorder received during their detention; and thirdly, the outcome of any complaint about medical treatment. That includes providing information about how to make a complaint to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the mismanagement of complaints about medical treatment, where the person believes their complaint to another body—for instance the hospital or CQC—was not appropriately investigated.
Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. The duty requires that information must be provided as soon as practicable after the patient is first detained, when the section that they are detained under changes, when the detention is renewed, or every 12 months for restricted patients under part III of the 1983 Act. For community patients, a duty is triggered as soon as it is practical after being placed on a community treatment order and as soon as practical each time the community treatment order is renewed. For conditionally discharged patients, it is triggered as soon as practicable after being conditionally discharged. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.
I rise to speak in favour of clauses 42, 43 and 44, which together strengthen the duty to inform patients—whether detained in the community or conditionally discharged—about how to make a complaint about their treatment and the outcome of that complaint. The Mental Health Act has long included duties to tell patients their rights, but too often that information has been patchy, hard to understand or buried in paperwork. The clauses tackle that by requiring clear, repeated information about not just detention, but treatment and the complaints process.
Clause 42 relates to information about complaints for detained patients. Section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 originally required hospitals to inform detained patients of their rights, but that was often inconsistently applied. This clause responds to long-standing concerns about transparency and patient empowerment, aligning with the broader goals of the Bill to enhance autonomy and dignity in mental health care. Specifically, there is an expanded duty of information. Hospital managers must now ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints, not only about their detention, but about their treatment, along with the outcomes of any complaints.
There are some timing requirements, i.e. that the information must be provided as soon as practicable after detention begins and be repeated annually for restricted patients, or after each section 20 report for others. That will improve patient’s awareness of their rights and how to seek redress. It will promote accountability and mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints, and support better outcomes by addressing grievances early and constructively.
Clause 43 is similar, but specifically for community patients rather than detained patients. Section 132A of the Mental Health Act 1983 originally required hospital managers to inform patients of their rights under the Act. However, that was limited in scope. This clause aligns with the Bill’s broader goal of improving transparency, patient empowerment and accountability in mental health services, especially for those under community treatment orders, who often face ongoing restrictions without being detained in hospital.
Like the previous clause, clause 43 expands information duties, as community patients must now be informed not only of their rights and treatment conditions, but also of how to make complaints about the use of the Mental Health Act powers or any mental health treatment received while under community care, and the outcomes of any such complaints. Again, the information must be provided as soon as practicable after the report is furnished under section 20A of the Act, which relates to periodic reviews of the community treatment orders.
Clause 44 relates to information for conditionally discharged patients, and is slightly different from the previous two clauses. It introduces a new duty requiring hospital managers to ensure that conditionally discharged patients are informed, both orally and in writing, about their legal status, rights and how to make complaints, and that that information is also shared with their nominated person unless they object. Specifically, proposed new section 132B to the Mental Health Act 1983 specifically addresses conditionally discharged patients. There is a clear explanation of legal status, as patients must be informed about the legal basis and the implications of their conditional discharge. There are new tribunal rights, where patients must be told what rights they have to apply to a tribunal while conditionally discharged.
Like in the other two clauses, the complaints procedures are changed so that patients must be informed about how to complain regarding the use of the Mental Health Act powers, any mental health treatment received while conditionally discharged and the outcome of such a complaint. However, key to this clause is that the information must be provided both orally and in writing, and that the nominated person has to be included. A copy of the written information must be given to the patient’s nominated person unless the patient requests otherwise. Those are all excellent parts of the Bill.
I have three questions for the Minister. First, how will we ensure that the information is genuinely accessible, especially for patients with limited literacy or cognitive difficulties? Secondly, what training will be provided to staff to communicate this information clearly and compassionately? Finally, will there be an audit of whether patients feel genuinely informed and empowered to complain?
These clauses will help to move mental health care towards greater openness and patient empowerment and therefore, hopefully with some positive answers from the Minister on those three questions, I commend them to the Committee.
I welcome the strengthening of section 132 of the Mental Health Act in respect of information about complaints, as proposed in clauses 42 to 44.
Clause 42 deals with information about complaints for detained patients. Currently, through the code of practice, there is a requirement that hospital managers will pass on that information. They should do so both orally and in writing, ensuring that the information is accessible, including in easy-read format for people with learning disabilities. Hospital managers should also ensure that the information has been understood. The clause would amend section 132 of the Act by placing that statutory duty on hospital managers, supplying detained patients and the nominated person with the necessary information about complaints, and taking practicable steps to ensure that the information has been understood.
Proposed new subsection (2A) deals with the types of complaints covered by that duty. They include complaints about carrying out of functions under the Act and about medical treatment. Proposed new subsection (2A)(c) ensures that the statutory duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the maladministration of such complaints. Proposed new subsection (2B) sets out that the duty is triggered
“as soon as practicable after the commencement of the patient’s detention”.
That means that the duty will be triggered each time the section under which the patient is detained changes, and when the authority to detain under that section is renewed.
In respect of part III of the 1983 Act, which concerns restricted patients to whom automatic renewals do not apply, the duty will be triggered every 12 months from the start date of detention. As I mentioned earlier, much of that process is already expected to take place, but ensuring it takes place in future by making it a statutory duty is a sensible and welcome strengthening of that safeguard.
That is also the case for clause 43, which relates to information about complaints for community patients and seeks to amend section 132A of the 1983 Act. As a result of the clause’s changes, there will be a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply information about the complaints procedure, as set out in clause 42, to community patients and the nominated person. That will mean that the patient must be provided with complaints information as soon as practicable after they are placed under a community treatment order, and each time that community treatment order is renewed.
I rise to make a few brief remarks about clauses 42 to 44, which would amend the 1983 Act to place statutory duties on hospital managers to supply complaints information to both the patient and the nominated person in respect of detailed patients, patients subject to a CTO and conditionally discharged patients.
These are important clauses. The people concerned are potentially vulnerable individuals. They need to know that they have a voice in this process and feel empowered to speak out and complain, should they wish. There is a duty on hospital managers to ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints. However, I ask the Minister how that duty will be checked and evaluated. We all agree that the ability to speak out to make a complaint is important, but we need to ensure that proper safeguards and parameters are in place on how that will happen.
I also welcome the provision requiring that the information must be provided as soon as is practicable. That is important to give patients confidence. The timing requirements will potentially make a huge difference. The journey of a patient may change rapidly over the course of their treatment, so not leaving it too long will potentially make a substantial difference to their ability to recover swiftly, and ensure that they have been able to speak out if they are concerned not just about their detainment but about the way that their treatment is being carried out, and the potential implications of that.
Like many of the measures that we have discussed, these clauses might have administrative implications. We need to ensure that we have fully considered and are able to put in place the necessary support for hospital managers to deal with complaints appropriately. It is important that if someone comes forward with a complaint, it can be dealt with swiftly.
As mentioned on some other matters, we need to ensure consistency for patients, so that they understand the information that they are being provided and that, whatever region they might live in or hospital they might be at, consistent information is provided. I would like the Minister’s reassurance on that point.
You will be delighted to know that I will be mercifully brief, Mrs Harris, because I am broadly supportive of all three clauses. Having worked as a doctor in clinical practice, and as a barrister, I am cognisant of the importance of transparency, patient autonomy and procedural fairness, in particular with vulnerable patients who are often seen in a mental health care setting.
I welcome this trio of clauses, but I have some gentle challenges to put to the Minister for when he gets to his feet. First, how will data be captured on the information that is to be provided to patients and their families? What feedback mechanisms will be in place, not just for patients but for those who support them—their carers and families—and for clinicians, on the practicalities of how the system is working?
I was a clinician and I practised on wards; patient records are electronic for staff. When staff complete the explanation of section 132 rights, they record that on the electronic patient records. Does the hon. Member agree that that would be a good place to get the data?
The hon. Member makes a very valid point. There is that mechanism, but this is also about ensuring that the quality of the information that has been imparted—not just the process of it being done—is recorded. An audit process must ensure that the important conversations and information are imparted in a way that the patient and their family understand, in sufficient detail and as part of a process whereby, if there are concerns or doubts, they can be addressed in a ready manner. I take his point that there are metrics by which to measure things, but it is not just about capturing data; it is about capturing quality data in order to ensure that that is being fulfilled.
To pick up on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury about regional variability, consistency across the board is important not only in the regions, but in the delivery methods and capacity that underpin this crucial service.
Finally, on potential confusion and legal information being communicated in inaccessible ways, it is important that legalese does not get in the way of clarity for individuals who will have to navigate the information. I am interested to hear the Minister’s views on how we can ensure that the information is imparted in an accessible way for all those concerned—importantly, not just for patients and their families, but for clinicians who have to impart the information. They need to feel comfortable navigating their way around what can often be a complex set of regulations and legislation.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Adjourned till Thursday 19 June at half-past Eleven o’clock.
Written evidence reported to the House
MHB36 Mind (further evidence)
MHB37 Thalamos Ltd
MHB38 West Sussex county council
MHB39 Chris Frederick, founder of Project Soul Stride
MHB40 Amy Poole, associate director of patient experience and participation, Severalls hospital
That is a safeguard against casual or coerced choices. The nominated person must themselves consent: they are not a passive bystander but an active participant. If the relationship breaks down, the patient may revoke the nomination, or the nominated person may resign. Crucially, the county court may step in to remove or bar a nominated person if that person acts unreasonably, abuses their power, or is clearly unsuitable.
Part 2 of proposed new schedule A1 to the Mental Health Act 1983, inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, addresses an issue that we must take seriously: capacity. Not every patient will have the capacity to make the appointment at the moment it matters most. The proposed new schedule therefore provides a fall-back system. A court may appoint a nominated person on the patient’s behalf, or a default can be determined under criteria set by regulation. The court again retains ultimate oversight to resolve disputes or replace a default, if the circumstances require it. It is thoughtful, practical and rights-based lawmaking, and I commend the drafters for getting the balance broadly right.
Clauses 25 to 28 will give the nominated person real power. They are not a figurehead. Clause 25 demands that professionals consult the nominated person before applying for detention or guardianship. If the nominated person objects, the professional must provide a report showing why detention is none the less necessary, with a clear risk-based justification. The nominated person can then challenge that decision. Clause 26 shortens the duration of the bar on discharge requests from six months to three. If a nominated person believes that the person no longer needs to be detained, they can press for release sooner and more effectively than before.
This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse.
Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight.
Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change?
We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected?
Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure?
To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators.
I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child.
I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress.
I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.
Sixthly, in cases where there are safeguarding concerns, what safeguards exist to ensure that the nominated person acts in the best interests of the child? The witness will determine whether the child’s nomination is suitable. Clinicians will also have the power to overrule decisions made by a nominated person if they think there is a danger to the patient or to others. The patient, an approved mental health professional, parents and anyone with an interest in the child’s welfare can apply to the court to displace the nominated person if they think they are behaving in a way that is not in the child’s best interests.
Finally, there was a question about how we will ensure that there is no coercion, including in the example involving an older partner. We will provide guidance to the witness on how to check that no coercion has taken place, as well as wider suitability criteria. A nominated person cannot be appointed if coercion or undue pressure has taken place. We intend to state in the code, subject to consultation, that an advocate should be involved early on to provide support to the child or young person throughout the nomination process. Advocates could work with witnesses to ensure that they have the relevant information about the child to make an informed appointment.
I hope that hon. Members are satisfied with those answers and will not press their amendments. I commend Government amendments 40 and 41, clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Nominated persons
Amendment proposed: 54, in schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—
“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”—(Dr Evans.)
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
To my eyes, this concept of resetting the detention clock appears most clearly in subsections (2) and 29(5)(d) of clause 29, where a patient who is transferred from guardianship to hospital, or who has their community treatment order revoked, is treated as if they had been newly admitted to hospital on that day. This effectively resets the start date of the detention period. Clause 29(2), which will insert proposed new section 19(2A) into the Mental Health Act, states:
“But, in the case of a patient falling within subsection (2)(d), section 20 has effect as if the patient has been admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment on the day on which the patient is transferred.”
New paragraph 5B of schedule 1 to the Mental Health Act states that the modifications
“apply in relation to a patient transferred from guardianship to a hospital in pursuance of regulations made under section 19…In section 20(1)(a)…for “admitted”…there is to be substituted “transferred”.
In new paragraphs 5C and 5D of that schedule, the same resetting principle applies to patients whose CTOs are revoked, with renewal detention starting from the date of revocation, not from their original hospital admission or order.
In practice, this could mean that if a patient is placed under guardianship on 1 January and transferred to hospital on 1 April under section 19(2)(d) of the Mental Health Act, then under proposed new section 19(2A), they would be treated as if they had been newly admitted on 1 April. Therefore, even though they have been under compulsion since 1 January, the new three-month detention clock begins on 1 April. Likewise, a patient under a community treatment order that was issued on 1 February and revoked on 1 August will, under paragraph 5D, start a new in-patient detention period on 1 August, not 1 February.
On one hand, that makes sense. We do not want people whose state is fluctuating to be released, or simply to time out. On the other hand, if we are looking purely from the patient’s perspective, as the legislation asks us to do, with regard to the principles in clause 1, that could be a problem. Will the Minister clarify how many times such a reset could occur for a single individual? Is there any form of oversight, review or reporting requirement where this happens? That mechanism might be necessary in some clinical contexts, but without safeguards it could become a back door to prolonging detention, which is something that the clause seeks to reduce. Is there some kind of register or mandatory recording of these incidents to spot repeat patterns?
Thirdly, another issue that needs addressing is the creation of possible complexity. Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the explanatory notes set out a separate but equally important issue. Clause 29’s welcome shortening of detention periods—from three months to start with, then three months, then six months, then annual reviews—is not applied evenly to patient groups. Who gets the shorter periods? Most civil patients detained under part II and some patients on revoked community treatment orders. Who does not get them? Patients detained by a hospital order from a court, if their CTO is revoked within six months of the order, as in paragraph 218. And, of course, restricted patients—typically those involved in more serious offences.
The clause will also improve the automatic referrals for patients detained under section 3. It does this by triggering referrals on the expiry of three months and 12 months and annually thereafter, where the tribunal has not considered the patient’s case. Additionally, this clause removes the automatic referral trigger on revocation of a community treatment order. It was found in practice that the automatic referral was an ineffective safeguard, as often the patient either was back in the community and subject to a new CTO or had reverted to being a section 3 patient before the tribunal reviewed their case. Now, where a patient’s CTO is revoked, they will be automatically referred at three months and 12 months after revocation, and then every subsequent 12 months. This allows the automatic referral periods to apply afresh from the date on which the CTO is revoked.
The clause will ensure that patients detained under the Mental Health Act are subject to regular and timely tribunal reviews, particularly when they are unable to advocate for themselves.
Clause 32 will deliver important tribunal oversight for the small cohort of restricted patients discharged into the community under conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty, who are also known as supervised discharge patients. The clause will require patients subject to supervised discharge to be referred initially at 12 months after deprivation of liberty conditions are imposed, followed by a further referral every two years, where the patient’s case has not been heard by the tribunal in this period. The clause will also provide a safeguard for patients who may fluctuate between conditional and supervised discharge, to ensure that no supervised discharge patient will go more than four years without their case being considered by the tribunal. Automatic referrals to the tribunal ensure that patients under some of the most restrictive conditions have routine oversight of their detention where independent review would otherwise be absent.
The clause will also clarify the powers of the tribunal when considering the application or reference of a conditionally discharged patient, which include the power for the tribunal to impose conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty. Deprivation of liberty conditions may be imposed or retained only where the tribunal is satisfied that they are necessary to protect another person from serious harm and are no less beneficial to the patient than a recall to hospital. This test preserves public protection, while enhancing the safeguards in place for conditionally discharged patients, ensuring that their care and liberty are subject to regular independent scrutiny.
Together, these changes will promote a more robust system of oversight for patients subject to long-term detention and restrictive conditions, ensuring that their rights are respected and their detention is regularly reviewed.
Clause 33 will extend the same principles of regular, proportionate scrutiny to restricted patients who are not conditionally discharged subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. For restricted patients detained in hospital, section 71 will be amended to reduce the automatic referral period from three years to one year. That amendment aligns with the amendments to increase the frequency of automatic referrals introduced in the Bill for part II patients. Through annual tribunal reviews, it is intended that those individuals are safeguarded against inappropriate detention. That aligns with the broader principles of fairness and accountability, ensuring that individuals in long-term detention are subject to appropriate judicial oversight.
The reforms are not without consequences. A wider cohort of eligible applicants and more frequent review periods will inevitably increase the burden on the tribunal service, on legal aid provision and on clinical teams who must prepare documents and attend hearings. That challenge is not to be dismissed lightly.
Clause 32 will provide for restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It goes further than clause 30 by imposing mandatory referral duties on the Secretary of State. Under the clause, a tribunal must be convened after 12 months, every two years thereafter, and at four years if no review has occurred. Crucially, the clause also codifies the tribunal’s powers. It may now vary or impose conditions, including those that constitute a deprivation of liberty, provided that they are necessary to protect the public from serious harm and are no more restrictive than hospital detention. That clause introduces a principled, proportionate framework for balancing public protection with patient liberty, and avoids vague or discretionary use of such powers.
Finally, clause 33 will apply the same principles to restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty orders. Such individuals, although under fewer constraints, are none the less subject to significant legal orders. The new requirement for a tribunal review at two years, and every four years thereafter, ensures that oversight is regular and non-discriminatory.
All four clauses are united by a clear objective to rationalise tribunal access, enhance procedural safeguards and bring the Mental Health Act into alignment with modern standards of fairness and proportionality. However, I will close with a caveat: rights without resourcing are hollow. If we are to place greater demand on the tribunals service, and to rely on it as the guardian of liberty for thousands of individuals, it must be adequately funded, staffed and supported. Legal representation must be accessible. Tribunal members must be properly trained. Hospital managers must be equipped to meet their new responsibilities.
With those reservations, I broadly welcome clauses 30 to 33 as a necessary recalibration of our mental health law. They reflect the dignity of the individual, the demands of public safety, and the enduring principle that no one should be deprived of liberty without fair or timely review.
On clause 31, automatic tribunal referrals are a crucial safety net for those who for whatever reason do not exercise their right to apply. The clause introduces a new framework of relevant periods after which the hospital managers must refer, as we have heard. For section 2 patients, it will be three months. For section 3 and CTO patients it will be three months, then 12 months and every year thereafter. Significantly, the current three-year review period for many detained patients is reduced to one year.
The clause marks a substantial increase in oversight, which I support, but it also raises practical questions. Given that we have put these backstops in place, have the Government made any estimate of how many extra tribunals will be needed and how much extra work they will generate? The Minister was kind enough to say that there were four hours of clinical work involved in doing the plans, but I do not think we have yet heard how much work the Government estimate that the tribunals will take.
More importantly, what support is being provided to ensure that the tribunal system can meet that increased demand? I am particularly concerned that the benefits of these reforms may not be felt if backlogs or delays undermine the safeguards they are intended to deliver.
LPS are widely seen as an improvement to DoLS, because they extend safeguards to a wider range of settings, including hospitals and people’s own homes where deprivation of liberty might occur. They also streamline the assessment process, reducing bureaucratic delays and better reflecting person-centred decision making. The Law Commission and various stakeholder groups have supported LPS as a way to address the significant practical and legal challenges posed by DoLS, including the so-called DoLS backlog, where assessments have been delayed for many vulnerable individuals.
Despite that, I do not believe that LPS have yet been implemented, leaving DoLS still in force. I wonder if we are therefore creating ambiguity as we update the Mental Health Act through the Bill’s clauses, such as those addressing conditional discharge and deprivation of liberty, without clarity on how those will intersect with the forthcoming LPS framework that will be introduced under separate legislation. That raises important questions about the sequencing and co-ordination of legislation reform. How will the Government ensure coherence and avoid conflicting provisions when different statutes address overlapping issues at different times?
Given that context, have the Government abandoned the planned implementation of LPS, or do they remain committed to bringing them into force? If the implementation is still planned, will the Government provide a clear timeline for when LPS will replace DoLS? How do the Government intend to ensure that the provisions we are debating will align with or adapt to the introduction of LPS? What steps are being taken to ensure that vulnerable individuals and professionals who navigate this complex legal landscape will have clear, consistent safeguards and guidance through the transition? Clarification on those points is essential to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that the reforms provide coherent protection for those deprived of their liberties.
Clause 33 deals with patients who are not under DoLS conditions. It will ensure that even those who are under DoLS conditions, such as detained restricted patients or conditionally discharged patients with lesser restrictions, receive automatic tribunals. It will reduce the current three-year referral intervention for detained restricted patients to 12 months and introduce automatic referrals for non-DoL conditionality discharge patients after two years and then every four years. Again, that is a step forward, but four years feels like a long gap between reviews for those discharged with conditions that still significantly affect their daily lives. Will the Minister explain the thought behind the chosen timeframe? If a person’s condition changes, is there a mechanism to trigger an early referral outside the normal cycle?
The clauses show progress. They reflect a clear intention to strengthen patients’ rights, increase oversight and address historical injustices, particularly for those living under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. But with complexity comes risk, and we need to ensure that patients understand their rights and the legal support available. The tribunal system must be properly resourced to uphold the safeguards that we place in the legislation.
Secondly, although I welcome the intention to improve the rigour of decision making, will the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional consultation requirement will not introduce unnecessary delays into the discharge process? It is, of course, essential to get these decisions right, but it is also important that we do not create new barriers to discharge when a patient is clinically ready to move on. Delays in discharge can have a negative impact on patient outcomes, as well as increasing pressure on services. Although the consultation must be meaningful, it should also be proportionate, timely and clearly understood by all involved.
Will the Minister comment on how the requirement will be implemented in practice? For example, will guidance be issued to support clinicians in understanding their duties under the clause and to ensure consistency across services?
Overall, the clause represents a thoughtful and measured reform. It strengthens patient safety, promotes professional collaboration and introduces a safeguard that is both reasonable and necessary. Notwithstanding the clarifications I have raised, I hope that it will help to ensure that discharge decisions are made with greater confidence and care without becoming unduly bureaucratic.
Secondly, I fully understand the good intent behind proposed new subsection (2B)(c), but as a good Opposition we should point out a possible unforeseen problem. It states that when the nominated person—that is, the person chosen by the patient to act in their interests—is making a discharge decision under guardianship, they
“must consult the responsible local social services authority.”
That raises both legal and practical questions. Is it appropriate to place a statutory duty on a layperson, who may be a relative, a friend or a carer with no formal training or professional support? What is the consequence if they fail to consult? Would their decision be invalid, or could it be legally challenged?
I know that the Government are trying to ensure that relatives and advocates are consulted, which is commendable. I am sure there will be no issue in the vast majority of cases, but there is a risk that the duty may unintentionally create legal uncertainty and administrative burdens for families. Has the Minister thought about whether it might be better framed as a duty on the local authority to advise or support the nominated person, rather than vice versa? I am sure we both agree on the motive and principle of shared decision making; it is simply a question of where to place the burden.
Thirdly, under proposed new subsection (2C), if someone is on a community treatment order, the responsible clinician and hospital managers must consult the community clinician before they discharge the person from that order. Again, that seems sensible, but what happens if there is no identified or available community clinician? As we have discussed, they are legally named, so could that requirement create a bottleneck to discharge? Will there be provision for proceeding with discharge if consultation is not practicable within a reasonable time? Without such a safeguard, there is a risk that patients remain subject to detention, such as conditions under a CTO, even when all parties agree that discharge is clinically appropriate.
Furthermore, the clause does not appear to require the consultation outcome to be documented, nor any disagreement to be recorded. If the responsible clinician consults someone and then disregards their view—as we heard earlier, according to the Minister they have precedence—that may be entirely justified, but surely transparency demands the recording of the reasons. Will the Government consider adding a requirement to document consultation, perhaps in the code of practice, to ensure that reasons are given when discharge proceedings are taken against clinical advice?
The clause represents an important step towards improving safety, accountability and multidisciplinary care in discharge planning, but the Opposition believe that to realise its full potential and avoid creating uncertainty or delay, the Government should look again at the clarity of key terms, such as “professionally concerned”; the appropriateness of placing duties on laypeople, such as the nominated person; the practical challenges around consultations when key professionals are not available; and the need for clear documentation requirements to uphold transparency and safeguarding in decision making. I look forward to hearing the Minister address those points.
The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.
In their rebuttals, I appreciate that the Government may ask whether the clause would mean hospital managers marking their own feedback. They might also ask how we would deal with CQC capacity. Those are reasonable questions, but at the heart of the clause, as agreed by the Lords, is the fact that all too often patients’ thoughts after discharge are not fully taken into account.
We are therefore clarifying the detention criteria to ensure that they can still be met, based on the patient’s clinical need, even when no hospital place has yet been identified. The change is also necessary for the effective implementation of the statutory time limit in clause 38, so that the Secretary of State is not delayed in issuing a transfer warrant when a specific bed space has not yet been identified. Clause 37 will also update the list of immigration legislation provided in section 48 to expand the scope of immigration detainees who can be transferred under that section.
I have just a couple of questions for the Minister on this clause. I see potential for disputes. Determining what constitutes appropriate treatment may lead to disagreements between clinicians and authorities. What are the Minister’s thoughts on those potential disagreements? There are also some resource implications. It may increase demand for secure hospital beds if more transfers are approved under the revised criteria. I would welcome any thoughts from the Minister on how to ensure that we have the right number of secure hospital beds, not just as a totality, but in the specific regions and areas where people may be being detained.
Clause 38 is also about the transfer of prisoners and others to hospital, but specifically about time limits. It responds to a long-standing concern about delays in transferring prisoners and immigration detainees to hospital for mental health treatment. Under the current system, there is no statutory time limit, and individuals can wait weeks or months in prison, despite being assessed as needing urgent psychiatric care. That has been criticised by mental health professionals, legal advocates and human rights bodies. The clause will introduce a legal framework for setting and enforcing time limits, aligning with the Bill’s broader goals, which I think we all agree with, of improving patient rights and dignity and timely access to care. Again, I support the clause, because it will reduce delays. It will help to ensure that mentally unwell detainees are transferred to appropriate care settings without unnecessary delay, and will introduce clear expectations and accountability for decision making. It enables some flexibility, I think, because it allows for tailored regulations, to accommodate different case types and operational realities.
Again, however, I have some questions. I think there will be some implementation challenges. Services may struggle to meet the deadlines without sufficient resources —an issue that I mentioned in relation to the previous clause. Also, time limits may be difficult to apply in complex or borderline cases without clear guidance. Does the Minister see a need for explicit guidance in the code of conduct, or in some other form, to ensure that the risk of a rigid application does not make things more complicated or, more especially, mean that a potential patient is sent to the wrong care simply because we are focusing on the time rather than the appropriateness of the care? Of course, I would welcome his thoughts on how any new tracking systems and co-ordination between prisons, hospitals and the Ministry of Justice might work in this case.
Finally, I will briefly touch on clause 39. This is a technical update regarding the term “remand centre”, because that is no longer used in law or in practice; instead, young people are remanded to youth detention accommodation. Given that the clause is purely technical, I support it.
As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, clauses 67 to 70 bring the Bill in line with youth justice practices and terminology, and with immigration policy. It is important that we take the opportunity to make sure that the Bill is fully up to date and in line with other pieces of legislation, so I support the clauses.
The law as it stands does not provide for that, which is where this clause comes in. Clause 36 seeks to address the impasse by amending sections 42 and 73 of the Act. It allows both the Secretary of State and the tribunal to impose deprivation of liberty conditions upon discharge only where they are necessary to protect others from serious harm, and where conditional discharge is no less beneficial to the patient than continued hospital detention.
I also welcome the intent of the clause: to introduce the principle of least restriction, ensuring that patients are not kept in hospital simply because the law offers no safe option. Paragraph 281 of the explanatory notes states:
“This power supports the principle of least restriction by allowing patients to be discharged from hospital and treated in the community, where otherwise this might have been prevented.”
However, I would like to raise several probing questions for the Minister. Do we know how many patients are currently affected by the MM judgment and held in hospital longer than clinically necessary? How will patients be supported to challenge these conditions, particularly if they have capacity and disagree with the restrictions? Equally, if we flip it and argue for more restrictions, what if there are concerns or disagreements from the services, clinicians or families? How will they be able to challenge the decision in reverse?
I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley is here, as I am not legal expert, but when I was prepping for this, I also noted the retrospective effect of clause 36(5), which allows certain conditions to be applied to those already detained or conditionally discharged when the clause comes into force. The retrospective effect of clause 36 is noted specifically in subsection (5) and reinforced in the explanatory notes. Subsection (5) states:
“The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.”
This is a clear signal of retrospective application. I believe, in legal terms, this has the effect of changing legislation to make a provision apply as if it has always been in law in the past, not just from the date of commencement. What does this mean? This clause effectively retroactively legalises conditional discharges that include deprivation of liberty before the Bill becomes law, even though under current law, following the MM judgment, that was not permissible.
The explanatory notes to the Bill make this point more directly. For example, paragraph 284 on page 53 states:
“Clause 36 subsection (5) allows the new measures to operate retrospectively by providing that deprivation of liberty conditions can be imposed on restricted patients who are already detained, or who are conditionally discharged, at the time the provisions come into force.”
Again, I am no lawyer, but this makes it clear that the Government are intent on validating past decisions, particularly those made before that are contrary to the MM judgment, which held that the Mental Health Act did not permit deprivation of liberty as part of the conditional discharge. Can the Minister confirm that article 5 of the ECHR safeguards has been fully considered in that respect? On page 72 of the explanatory notes, paragraph 394 says that the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) believes that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR. To my surprise, when I was working on this at the weekend, I noticed that it says, “in her view”—a small drafting error that highlights my hours and hours of prep for this.
On a serious note, the real-world effect of clause 36(5) is to retroactively legalise the use of conditional discharges that involve deprivation of liberty even though, under current law as interpreted by the courts, such decisions were unlawful at the time that they were made. Why does that matter? The retrospective provision protects public authorities, particularly the Secretary of State for Justice, and mental health professionals from legal liability for decisions made before, or in disregard of, the MM judgment. It shields decisions that may have breached a patient’s rights, particularly their right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR, by making those actions lawful after the fact.
Clause 37, which is about conditions relating to the transfers of prisoners and others to hospital, addresses a barrier to timely transfers from prison to hospital. At present, under the case R (ASK) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department of 2019, a transfer from prison under section 47 or 48 of the Mental Health Act cannot be authorised unless a specific hospital bed has already been identified. While well intentioned, that threshold has arguably had a negative effect in deterring referrals and delaying access to treatment.
Clause 37 rightly lowers that threshold. It amends section 47 and 48 of the Act so that a hospital place need not be available at the point of referral. Instead, the clinical decision about suitability for hospital can proceed earlier, allowing for better planning and quicker transfers. That seems a pragmatic response to a bureaucratic bottleneck, but how will this amendment be implemented in practice to ensure that it does not create the false expectation of imminent transfer? Will there be national guidance issued for uniform application of that new test across the entire prison estate?
Clause 38 deals with transfers from prisons to hospitals, and their timeline. It introduces a new statutory duty for transfers from prison or detention to hospital to be completed within 28 days of initial review for assessment via proposed new sections 47A and 48A. As we have heard, that reflects good existing practice. The NHS England guidance already recommends that transfers should be completed within 28 days. However, clause 38 now gives that statutory force subject to exceptional circumstances, which the Bill carefully defines. For instance, as we have heard, shortages of staff and hospital beds do not qualify unless they are caused by exceptional events such as fires or flooding.
This clause is welcomed as an important safeguard for therapeutic benefit, because delays in transfer can cause serious deterioration. It must, however, be supported by sufficient resources and capacity, on which I have a few questions. What assessment has been made of compliance with the 28 day target, and what proportion of cases currently fall outside of it? Will investment be made to ensure bed availability and staffing so that those statutory duties may be fulfilled? When this was debated in the other place, the Justice Minister said:
“I am pleased to share that this Government have recently established a health and justice strategic advisory group, which will bring together key partners with responsibility for the various parts of the transfer process. This group will be chaired by a national clinical director, who will report regularly to Ministers and be responsible for agreeing a joint work plan to support implementation of the statutory time limit, identifying solutions to common barriers to timely transfers and holding partners to account.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 31 March 2025; Vol. 845, c. 102.]
That is laudable, so I tabled a written question to find out about the group that Lord Timpson talked about. Fortunately, the answer to my written question came back today. The group have not met and are not meeting until 1 July, so I ask for some clarification around that committee. It seems welcome, and this is a complex area. Given that the Justice Minister raised that issue, who will the group report to—the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health?
Later in his remarks, Lord Timpson talks about the written ministerial statement coming to Parliament. We have heard the Government say that a couple of times about reporting timescales, but in his speech Lord Timpson talked about reporting to Ministers. What kind of time- scales and frequency can we expect if the group has not even met yet? What reporting will there be to Ministers, either in the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health, to address some of the issues that we are debating today?
Clause 39 deals with transfer directions for persons detained in youth detention accommodation. It is rightly pointed out that this is a gap in the law. There is no power under section 48 to transfer to hospital a child who has been remanded to a youth detention accommodation by the Crown court, even if they urgently need in-patient care for mental disorders. That really does seem to be an anomaly. Such power exists for magistrates court remands, so clause 39 rightly corrects this, and I support it. Do we know how many children have been affected by that gap since 2012? I ask because if this is to come into law with immediate effect, it will have an immediate resource effect. We of course want to make sure that everyone—particularly young people—is in the right place. The fact that some of them legally are not may well cause another problem for us all.
Finally, I turn to clause 40, which appears to be a technical clarification of schedule 1 of the 1983 Act, confirming that the whole of section 66(2)(d) is disapplied for unrestricted part III patients. It clarifies the right of application to the tribunal, and to me it seems uncontroversial and helpful.
I acknowledge the thoughtful work being proposed in these clauses, and I understand what they are trying to do. They represent a clear attempt to modernise and humanise the way the Mental Health Act applies to some of the most vulnerable and high risk patients in our system, but we must ensure that any new powers, particularly those involving deprivation of liberty and retrospective legislation, are subject to clear safeguards, scrutiny and proper resourcing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my questions.
Under section 120 of the Mental Health Act, the Care Quality Commission and Health Inspectorate Wales have a duty to monitor the use of the Act. Patients subject to supervised discharge will be captured by section 120 for the purpose of regulatory oversight as a subset of conditionally discharged patients who are liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act.
I turn to the questions asked by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. The Ministry of Justice considers that these measures are compatible with article 5 of the European convention on human rights. In 2018, the Supreme Court case of Secretary of State for Justice v. MM established that there was no lawful basis under the Act to impose conditions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty. The new provisions will provide a statutory basis for the Justice Secretary and the tribunal to impose such conditions.
I will next address amendment 19. We appreciate that people under 18 are a vulnerable group who would benefit from advocacy representation. For this reason, the Bill extends the right to an independent mental health advocate to informal patients, including under-18s, who are often admitted on a voluntary basis. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform them of this right. That means that hospital managers will be expected to proactively approach all children and young people, and others, such as their parents or carers, to make sure they know that they are entitled to an advocate and help them to appoint one.
We will make it clear in the code of practice how independent mental health advocates should support children and young people with their particular needs. However, we think it is right that detained patients, including under-18s—rather than informal patients—receive advocacy on an opt-out basis. This is because they are subject to greater restrictions, meaning that it is even more important that they are supported to exercise their rights.
Finally, I will address Government amendments 42 and 43. Schedule 3 introduces the concept of “English qualifying informal patients”, who, for the first time in England, will be eligible for independent mental health advocacy services. We are amending this measure to change the definition of both English and Welsh qualifying informal patients. Amendments 42 and 43 are minor amendments to address a technical issue with the legislation. There is case law saying that the term “informal patient” would cover anyone there on a voluntary basis and not subject to any compulsory legislative framework. However, as currently drafted, the Bill’s definition is wider, defining an informal patient in England or Wales as an in-patient in hospital who is receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder at the hospital but not subject to the Mental Health Act. A person deprived of their liberty under any other legislation such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or under a court order would therefore be classed as an “informal patient”, which would be incorrect, as people who are detained cannot, under case law, be informal patients.
That would lead to complications in practice. A patient subject to the deprivation of liberty safeguards would be eligible for independent mental health advocacy as well as independent mental capacity advocacy. However, an independent mental health advocate cannot provide any help or support in relation to the Mental Capacity Act. The amendments address that issue by changing the definitions of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient”, to be an in-patient receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder who is not detained under any other legislation or court order.
For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Winchester is satisfied not to press his amendment, and I commend Government amendments 42 and 43, clause 41 and schedule 3 to the Committee.
It is entirely right that we welcome the recognition of the role of independent mental health advocates, who serve a vital function in ensuring that patients’ voices are heard and their views represented, especially when navigating what can be an incredibly complex legal and clinical environment. Their independence is fundamental to not only their effectiveness but the confidence that patients and families can place in the system, which brings me back to my point. It is therefore important that we support independent mental health advocates with the resources that they need to do their job effectively.
If we are to rely further on advocates, we need to ensure that they are in a position to deal with that, so that we do not create statutory entitlements that are difficult to act upon. Actions, as well as words, are needed. At present, many areas already struggle with advocacy coverage. If we now place additional expectations on the service, and I believe that we will through this provision, we must ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained, experienced independent mental health advocates across the country to meet rising demand. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary people with the skills and training are available to fulfil this expanded role?
We must also consider the patients’ experience, as has been the focus of so many of the remarks made in the Committee today. Again, I emphasise the vulnerability of patients at times of crisis. If we are to tell patients that support in the form of an advocate is there for them, we need to ensure that it is accessible and easy to reach and understand. Clause 41 moves us in the right direction, but implementation is everything. It must be backed by local accountability, adequate funding and clear operational guidance. This includes ensuring that all patients, regardless of background, language or capacity, are given support that is appropriate and effective.
It is vital to consider the wider implications of this clause. The reinforcement of the independent mental health advocate’s involvement should be mirrored by greater investment in advocacy services, stronger integration with care planning and more regular engagement with patients themselves on how these services work in practice. In our earlier discussions, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested that we use trials, which could also be considered here to ensure that, as changes are brought in, they are matched by appropriate service levels.
I am largely supportive of clause 41, which I think moves us in the right direction towards a transparent mental health system that is there for patients, ensuring that they have a voice and are not an afterthought. As long as it is deliverable in practice, and does not give false hope to patients, the clause strengthens the Bill.
I welcome how these parts of the Bill will embed those important principles of individuality, autonomy and least restriction, expanding the important safeguards offered by independent mental health advocates. I would be grateful if the Minister could touch on those points about children and young people in his response.
This approach has a number of potential benefits. First, it is likely to improve access to advocacy for groups who have historically been underserved. These include informal patients, individuals with communication difficulties and those less familiar with the mental health system. Secondly, it enhances procedural fairness by ensuring that patients are supported in understanding their options, raising their concerns, or appealing decisions where necessary. Thirdly, it brings the statutory framework into closer alignment with human rights principles and best practice standards, particularly in terms of informed participation and supported decision making.
There are, however, three specific practical challenges that I wish the Minister to acknowledge. First, these reforms will require sufficient resources for advocacy services, particularly as demand is likely to increase once eligibility is broadened. Secondly, effective implementation will depend upon robust co-ordination between hospital managers and external advocacy providers, which may vary in capacity and capability across regions. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s approach to ameliorating that. Thirdly, there is a risk of inconsistency in delivery without clear national guidance and adequate oversight mechanisms, so I would be grateful if the Minister could address the mechanisms that are intended to be put in place.
These are not insurmountable issues, but they highlight the importance of a carefully planned implementation strategy, supported by training, monitoring and adequate funding. Schedule 3 represents a targeted and proportionate set of amendments that support the underlying aims of the Bill to ensure that all individuals receiving mental health care, whether formally detained or not, are able to access independent support, understand their rights and participate more fully in decisions about their treatment. [Interruption.]
Schedule 3 operationalises the principles set out in clause 41 by embedding them in the structure of the Mental Health Act 1983. Like clause 41, it reflects recommendations from the 2018 independent review and the 2021 White Paper, aiming to reduce disparities in access to advocacy and ensure that all patients, regardless of detention status, are supported in understanding and exercising their rights. Like clause 41, it strengthens patient voice, reduces inequalities, improves compliance and encourages the early intervention and resolution of concerns.
Let me turn to Liberal Democrat amendment 19, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Winchester. Clearly, its purpose is to extend the opt-out advocacy services in England to include informal patients under the age of 18. This ensures that children and young people who are not formally detained under the Mental Health Act, but who are receiving in-patient care, still have automatic access to an IMHA.
Currently, opt-out advocacy provisions primarily apply to patients who are formally detained. However, informal patients aged under 18, who may be in hospital with parental consent, can still experience significant restrictions and may not fully understand or exercise their rights. This amendment seeks to close the gap by ensuring that young informal patients are automatically offered advocacy support, recognising their vulnerability and limited legal autonomy.
My view is that this does strengthen patient rights. It safeguards vulnerable patients and promotes equality by aligning the rights of informal patients aged under 18 with those of detained patients. It supports informed decision making and helps young people to understand their rights and treatment options. If the hon. Member is minded to press the amendment, I hope that the Government will at least give it tacit support, even if they do not vote for it. That being said, I would welcome the Minister’s comments on why he does not feel that the amendment, or an alternative draft of the wording, if he does not like the specifics of it, should be included in the Bill. I do believe that this is important.
Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 are relatively technical but important elements of the Bill that align provision in England and Wales. I have just a few questions for the Minister. Robust rights must come with realistic resources. How will the Government ensure that advocacy services are funded and resourced properly to meet the new wider demand? Although they are technical, the Government amendments will still have an impact. What steps will be taken to monitor consistency so that a patient in Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook or one of the villages surrounding my constituency has the same access to an advocate as a patient in Coventry, Aberafan or Swansea. We want to make sure that there is consistency.
Finally, will there be clear standards for timely engagement, especially given the risk of treatment delays if advocacy is not well integrated? If the Minister can answer those questions, I think that this will be a good step forward for patient voice and fairness in mental health, and I would support the clause and schedule 3.
My second point is about capacity, consent and best-interest decisions. I would like to clarify a couple of points on schedule 3. It would appear, as drafted, that IMHA providers will be required to assess whether a patient has the capacity to decide whether to receive advocacy, and if not, whether it is in their best interests to do so. That gives providers a significant and quasi-clinical responsibility.
Proposed new section 130B(2C) states:
“Arrangements under section 130A must require a provider of advocacy services, on becoming aware of an English qualifying compulsory patient for whom they are responsible, to arrange for an independent mental health advocate to visit and interview the patient (if possible) with a view to determining”,
first,
“whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about whether to receive help from an independent mental health advocate”;
secondly,
“if the patient does have that capacity or competence, whether the patient wishes to receive such help”;
and thirdly,
“if the patient does not have that capacity or competence, whether it is nonetheless in the patient’s best interests to receive such help (which, if so, is to be provided under the arrangements).”
On the first point about whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about receiving help from an IMHA, my understanding is as follows. The role of independent mental health advocates is to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, to understand their rights and to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment. IMHAs do not, I believe, have the legal authority to assess mental capacity. The assessment of mental capacity is typically carried out by a qualified healthcare professional such as a doctor, psychiatrist or specially trained nurse, following guidance under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. IMHAs are there to help patients understand the information about their treatment and their rights, and can support them in expressing their views, but they do not perform capacity assessments. So is this a change in professional scope? Is it an oversight? Is it an update? Or is it simply what is happening in practice, which now has legal backing?
For completeness, will the Minister clarify why that group is being left out, given their heightened vulnerability and the likelihood of distress or disorientation? Are the Government satisfied that patients under these emergency powers are receiving adequate information and support at the most critical moments of intervention? Is there a mechanism to support the nominated person if the patient does not have capacity, so that the nominated person receives the information they need to make a fully informed decision? If the answer is that the duration of detention is too short to justify IMHA involvement, I ask the Minister: how short is too short when a person’s liberty and medical autonomy are in question?
It may be that Government amendments 42 and 43 address some of those points, so I will return to this in a second before moving on to my fourth point. In terms of information sharing and patient autonomy, I welcome the retention of the duty to inform patients, especially informal patients, of their right to advocacy, and for that provision to be given both orally and in writing. However, I note that the responsible person must also—except where the patient requests otherwise—be provided with written information to the nominated person. What safeguards are in place to ensure that that does not inadvertently breach the patient’s privacy, such as in situations involving estranged family members, controlling relationships or very personal health issues, which could be disclosed but are not relevant to mental health? It is essential that the nominated person framework enhances advocacy and support and does not undermine the person’s right to control who knows about their care.
Finally, I would welcome clarity from the Minister about how the uptake and impact of expanding the IMHA system will be monitored. Will there be reporting requirements on providers? If so, will that be through the integrated care boards, or is that part of the CQC? Will patients have the opportunity to feed back on the effectiveness of the support they receive?
Before I turn to the amendments, I reiterate that the Opposition support the principle of strengthening advocacy in mental health services. Clause 41 is an important step towards a more rights-based and person-centred system, but the detail of the implementation is key.
I note that proposed Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 specifically change the definition of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient” to exclude patients detained under any
“legislation or by virtue of a court order”,
rather than limiting exclusion to those detained solely under the Mental Health Act. That important clarification partly improves on one of the problems I mentioned when discussing clause 41.
In simple terms, those amendments try to address the issue of clarity and coverage for patients detained under other laws, and I believe that this is how they do that. Originally, the Bill excluded only patients detained under the Mental Health Act from being classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services, but some patients might be detained under other laws or court orders, such as criminal justice laws, which the original wording did not cover. The amendments change the definition to exclude anyone detained under any legislation or by a court, not just the Mental Health Act. In practice, this means that patients detained under other laws will not mistakenly be considered informal patients eligible for IMHA services under this part of the Bill.
The proposals close a gap so that the right groups get advocacy services, and there is less confusion for hospitals and advocates about who qualifies. In essence, by broadening and bettering the definition and defining the exclusion, this will ensure that patients detained under other legislation, such as the Criminal Justice Act, or other court-mandated detention powers, are not mistakenly classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services under those provisions. That reflects a more comprehensive and legally coherent approach to defining eligibility.
This clarity is welcome, as it reduces potential ambiguity in respect of providers. That said, will the Minister comment further on how these changes will interact with existing IMHA provisions or advocacy entitlements for those detained under other legislation? Are there parallel safeguards or advocacy rights for those groups? What guidance will be provided to practitioners and IMHA providers to navigate the complexities of overlapping detention regimes, especially when a patient’s status might shift rapidly between voluntary Mental Health Act detention and court orders? Will this amendment necessitate any further changes in regulations or operational policies to ensure smooth implementation and clarity for patients, families and service providers? Ensuring that no patient falls through the cracks due to definitional nuances is crucial for integrity in our mental health advocacy services.
Finally, Lib Dem amendment 19 would insert after “patient”, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13,
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”.
As the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford and Opposition Members rightly pointed out, it is quite hard to see why the Government would not want to put that in place. The explanatory statement says that it aims to extend
“the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.”
It seems clear in what it does and is a well-defined amendment to that end. I am keen to understand why the Government do not want to support it. Do they believe that this is currently balanced elsewhere in the system? Are there already provisions elsewhere? If not, why—if it is good for adults and we are strengthening their opportunities—should it not be the same for our children?
I will finish on that point. I would be grateful for answers on the clause, the schedule, the Government amendments and the Lib Dem amendment.
Clause 44 deals with information about complaints for conditionally discharged patients and inserts proposed new section 132B, which requires hospital managers to give complaints information to conditionally discharged restricted patients. The proposed new section states that such information must be provided before the patient leaves hospital, or as soon as possible when the patient is conditionally discharged. Patients must receive the information when they are first detained in the hospital, and again whenever they are conditionally discharged. As with clause 42, the hospital manager must ensure that the patient has received such information both orally and in writing, and that practical steps have been taken to ensure that the patient understands the information. A copy of the information must also be given to the nominated person within a reasonable timeframe, unless the patient has requested otherwise. I support the clauses, as the changes made by it will strengthen the Act.
Overall, however, the clause improves patients’ awareness of their rights and how they can seek redress. I think we all agree that that is extremely important. It will promote accountability in mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints. I would like reassurance of some oversight to ensure feedback on any complaints that come forward so that we identify where consistent issues come up, to provide better services not just to the individual but to future individuals. Overall, the clauses support better outcomes by addressing potential grievances and ensuring that they are addressed early and constructively, so I am supportive of them.