Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report

With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the inquiry into the horrendous attack on Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017.

I work closely with MI5. While its activity is necessarily discreet, the whole country should be profoundly grateful for the patriotism and courage of its staff. They work indefatigably every day to keep the British people safe. Since the start of 2017, MI5 and the police have disrupted 37 late-stage attack plots.

An Islamist suicide bomber murdered 22 people and injured more than 1,000, as well as inflicting incalculable psychological damage and misery. I know that the whole House will join me in expressing our profound sorrow and extending our heartfelt condolences to everyone affected by this barbaric act. They were supposed to have a brilliant time and come home safely. What should have been a simple pleasure turned into a hellish nightmare. It is vital that we understand what happened and what lessons we need to learn, because we must do everything possible to prevent a repeat of this outrage.

Volume 3 of the inquiry was published last Thursday. I would like to thank Sir John Saunders and his team, who have spent more than three years on it. Sir John finds that there was a failure by the Security Service to act swiftly enough, and that there were

“problems with the sharing of information between the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing”.

Following the publication of the report, the director general of MI5 and the head of counter-terrorism policing offered their profound apologies for not preventing the attack.

Sir John does not blame any of the educational establishments that the bomber attended for failing to identify that he was a risk, but he does find:

“More needs to be done to ensure that education providers share relevant information about students”.

Sir John concludes that the bomber

“should have been subject to a Prevent referral at some point in 2015 or 2016. However, it is very hard to say what would have happened if”

the bomber

“had been approached under Prevent or the Channel programme.”

The police investigation into the attack, Operation Manteline, is praised.

Although Sir John cannot conclude whether the attack would have been prevented, he finds that there was a significant missed opportunity to take further investigative action that he judges might have led to information that could have prevented it. While this is welcome, and the Home Office will work at pace with both organisations to act on the chairman’s recommendations, we must not lose sight of the fact that responsibility for the attack lies with the bomber and his brother. These conclusions require careful consideration.

Since 2017, the Government have made a number of changes to how we deal with and seek to prevent terrorist attacks. We have given law enforcement and intelligence agencies improved powers. We have strengthened the controls around access to explosives precursors. We have strengthened the management of terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders in prison and on licence. We have ended the automatic early release of terrorist offenders in England, Wales and Scotland, and we have ensured that the sentences served by terrorists reflect the severity of their offending. We have strengthened the tools for monitoring dangerous people in the community.

We have invested heavily in counter-terrorism. We unveiled a new counter-terrorism operations centre in 2021 that brings together partners from counter-terrorism policing, the intelligence agencies, the criminal justice system and other Government agencies. This will allow minute-by-minute collaboration between teams in the police and MI5. Last year’s integration of special branch into the national CT policing network will improve our response to the full range of national security threats, boost skills and ensure better communication between agencies and a more consistent and effective national response.

Work is under way to develop a new faith security training scheme to raise security awareness among faith communities and help them to mitigate threats. We continue to engage with faith organisations and security experts to develop the scheme. In April, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) announced the continuation of the Jewish community protective security grant for 2022. In May, new funding was allocated to provide protective security at mosques and Muslim faith schools.

In response to any terrorist attack affecting British nationals, in the UK or overseas, the Home Office’s victims of terrorism unit works to ensure that the right support is available to them. The unit is conducting an internal review to strengthen its work. I am overseeing a comprehensive review of the CONTEST strategy to combat terrorism. It follows on from the independent review of Prevent, led by William Shawcross, which assessed the programme’s effectiveness in preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. As the review made clear, Prevent requires major reform, and I have accepted all its recommendations.

Prevent has underestimated the threat of Islamist extremism, which remains far the biggest threat that we face, and too often it has minimised the role of ideology in terrorism. It will focus on security, not on political correctness, and its first objective will be to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. The Government have also developed a comprehensive system of support for the owners and operators of public places across the UK. It includes access to research-driven expertise through products delivered by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure.

However, we must go further. Martyn’s law, formerly known as the Protect Duty, will introduce proportionate new security requirements for certain public premises throughout the UK. They will be better prepared and ready to respond, and their staff will know what to do in the event of a terrorist attack. Martyn’s law will clarify who is responsible for security activity at the premises in scope, increasing accountability. We are also considering how an inspection function will oversee compliance, to provide appropriate advice, and, where necessary, to sanction.

Martyn Hett was one of those killed in Manchester. I am enormously grateful to his mother, Figen Murray, and the Martyn’s Law Campaign Team, as well as to Survivors Against Terror and all the security partners, businesses, charities, local authorities and victims’ groups that have informed our work. I have always been humbled when I have met them and heard about their experiences.

The doctrines that underpin the way in which the emergency services respond to incidents have improved since the attack. Let me end by once again recognising the anguish, and the courage, of the loved ones of those who were killed or hurt on that dreadful night. It united the country in sorrow and in disgust. We will continue to work non-stop to prevent further such tragedies from being visited on others, and I commend this statement to the House.

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

On 22 May 2017, thousands of people, including children and their parents, went to watch a pop concert. Instead, they were faced with the most unimaginable horror, and 22 people lost their lives, including children, the youngest being just eight years old. Hundreds more were injured. Those families have endured the unimaginable. All our thoughts are with them today, and with the people of Manchester, who have stood and supported each other through the most difficult of times. I join the Home Secretary in thanking Sir John Saunders for his far-reaching inquiry, and for his vital work in seeking answers for the victims and their families.

The responsibility for this vile attack lies with the bomber and his brother, and with those who may have radicalised and enabled them, and we—all of us—condemn their actions in the strongest possible terms. It is right that the brother has been brought to justice. Rightly too, however, this report has looked at why it happened and at what might have prevented it, to seek the truth for families and their loved ones and to identify changes needed for the future. These are important and serious conclusions which are hard to hear: that there was, in Sir John’s words, a

“significant missed opportunity to take action that might have prevented the attack”;

that there was a failure to act swiftly enough on information; that there were failures in the sharing of information; and that the bomber should have been referred to the Prevent programme in 2015 or 2016, although Sir John says it is unclear whether that would have led to action. These are hard conclusions to hear, especially for those who have lost loved ones.

The Home Secretary has rightly said that agencies and counter-terror police work immensely hard to keep us safe every day. Sir John also says in his report that they have disrupted 27 major Islamist extremist terror plots in recent years, in addition to five right-wing and left-wing terror plots. That is a result of their immense efforts night and day. It is because they are dedicated to keeping us safe that they also recognise the importance of facing up to things going wrong, and they too have expressed their profound sorrow and apologies.

I thank the right hon. Lady for her questions, which I will address in due course. I agree entirely with her assessment that we must now all come together—the Government, the security services and the emergency services—to learn the lessons of this awful tragedy and work to reduce the likelihood of future attacks. It was a truly sad and terrible incident, but I want to reassure the public that our priority is to keep them safe. We must root out extremism wherever we find it, and we must give no quarter to political correctness as we do so. We must respond quickly to all criticisms, but we must also recognise the serious work that has taken place since the attack.

On Martyn’s law, the Government will publish draft legislation for scrutiny in the spring. After that, we will introduce a Bill as soon as parliamentary time allows. Its progress will depend on Parliament passing it and agreeing a date for commencement. There will be a lead-in time to allow for those captured by the Bill to prepare.

Martyn’s law is one part of our extensive efforts across Government, including by the police and security services, to combat the threat of terrorism. There remains an intensive programme of guidance, developed by security experts, counter-terrorism policing and other partners, to provide high-quality advice to stakeholders and others with responsibility for public places. I look forward to moving forward with the solution and to presenting the Bill on Martyn’s law.

We have published a new policy framework allowing for greater scrutiny of the contact between terrorist prisoners and the public. Our new approved contacts scheme, to be implemented this year, will allow greater checks on the visitors and phone contacts of those convicted of terrorism and terrorism-connected offences, regardless of the category of prison in which they are held.

A large amount of work has been done since 2017 to support and improve the consistency of local authority Prevent delivery, and to manage the risk posed by subjects of interest. This includes additional funding and support for the highest-priority areas, the publication of the Prevent duty toolkit and the development of the multi-agency centre programme. We are working across Government to mitigate the risk posed by those about whom we have concerns.

I call the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

On behalf of the ISC, I extend our deepest sympathy to the families and individuals so dreadfully affected by this terrorist act.

I welcome the publication of the third volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry report, and I express my strong appreciation for the work of the inquiry team. Of course, the Committee will carefully consider the report and Sir John Saunders’s request that we should monitor the implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. In the meantime, do the Government acknowledge and accept that the ISC is the only Committee of Parliament equipped with both the facilities and the clearances fully to undertake this type of classified scrutiny?

Sir John Saunders has made it clear that he is determined that the recommendations are monitored, and he has made arrangements with the ISC to that effect. The open part of volume 3 has only just been published, and the closed recommendations have not yet been shared with the Government. We will carefully consider the report’s findings and recommendations in full. We will also consider any recommendations that Sir John makes about the role the ISC can play in the light of the memorandum of understanding that exists between the Committee and the Government. That MOU is available on the Committee’s website.

Yes, the ISC is a very effective and secure forum in which, as has happened in the past, the delivery on the back of such inquiries can be properly scrutinised.

I call the Scottish National party spokesperson.

The awful events on 22 May 2017 led to the deaths of 22 innocent people and to hundreds more being injured and affected for the rest of their lives. Of course, the ultimate responsibility lies with the bomber who detonated his homemade device in the foyer of Manchester Arena as the crowds left an Ariana Grande concert. I welcome the fact that MI5 has reflected and apologised for its role in failing to prevent this heinous attack. For example, the report finds that intelligence could have led to the bomber being followed to a car where he stored his explosives. The inquiry also found that two pieces of information about the bomber were assessed by the Security Service as not being terrorism-related. An officer also admitted that they considered a possible national security concern on one of those pieces of information, but did not immediately discuss it with colleagues and did not write up a report on the same day.

May I first ask the Home Secretary what steps she is taking to ensure that the security services improve in their communications and information sharing, guaranteeing that professional standards do not fall short, as they have done in this case? Secondly, the inquiry has found that the bomber was probably assisted by someone in Libya, but because of gaps in available evidence, that line of inquiry has not been addressed sufficiently. Can the Home Secretary provide further information on whether the investigation will continue to search for those who assisted the bomber? Given how much frustration the victims’ families are experiencing, understandably, as a result of information being withheld due to national security implications, will the Home Secretary at least provide reassurance to those families that the UK Government will leave no stone unturned in finding justice for their relatives?

I thank the hon. Lady for her question. Following the attacks in 2017, MI5 and counter-terrorism policing together carried out a series of reviews. Their 126 recommendations included: better data exploitation; the wider sharing of intelligence; and changes to how terrorist threats were assessed and investigated. An independent review by David Anderson concluded in December 2017 that

“the recommendations taken as a whole will strengthen MI5 and the police in their ability to stop most terrorist attacks.”

So a wide range of measures and actions have been taken since 2017 to improve data sharing, data exploitation and the assessment of intelligence. Let me give her and the British people the assurance that no stone will be left unturned by this Government to keep the British people safe. That is why have announced an investment of £370 million in a new counter-terrorism operations centre—CTOC. The new headquarters for London-based counter-terrorism policing, the intelligence community and Government partners will increase the strength, resilience and collaboration of our wholesale UK counter-terrorism effort.

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for this statement. With 22 people murdered and more than 1,000 people injured, the impact of this attack on families will go on for a lifetime. We must not only learn lessons, but ensure it never happens again. I welcome the Government backing for Martyn’s law. That is really important, because people want to know that when they go into a venue they are safe. While we are waiting for that to come forward—I hope it can be brought forward quickly—what conversations is she having and what instructions is she giving to venues to make sure that they start to act now and do not wait until the legislation is put in place?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to refer to the steps we are taking. We are going to introduce Martyn’s law to impose legal duties on public venues and those responsible for public spaces to secure them against potential terrorist threats. We are already taking considerable action to ensure that there is high-quality advice, best practice and support for those responsible for public places. Many businesses and organisations already do excellent work to improve their security and preparedness, but legislative requirements will go just that step further in ensuring that there is a robust approach and that everyone knows what their duties are.

I wish to thank Mr Speaker for allowing me to speak as a constituency MP from the Back Benches today.

The Manchester Arena attack led to the devastating loss of 22 innocent lives, including those of Alison Howe and Lisa Lees, who were killed as they waited for their 15-year-old daughters to come out of the concert. I wish to place on record my heartfelt sorrow for the family and to reflect on their courage and dignity over the past nearly six years during the course of this investigation and report. I say to the Home Secretary that, given how long the victims have been waiting to see this report and the outcomes, the cruel findings of that report have to be acknowledged. Although she has done some of that, can she go further and put on record what will be done for the victims finally to put right the wrongs that have been identified in the report?

May I associate myself with the comments that the hon. Gentleman has so powerfully made about his constituents? The report does not pull its punches. Sir John is unequivocal in his assessment of what happened, what should have happened, what could have happened, and what may have resulted as a consequence. That is why the director-General of MI5 and the lead at Counter Terrorism Policing did not shy away from the words that they expressed last week. It is absolutely right that we support the families going forward. I want them to know that I have full confidence in the process that Sir John has just run. It has been extensive and it has taken a long time. Some of the hearings had to be carried out during covid, with additional burden. The process was exhaustive and robust at all times. We have here an authoritative conclusion and assessment of what happened and, importantly, lessons that we can all learn and take forward, so that such an incident does not happen again.

The Home Secretary is to be commended for her statement today and for her refocusing of Prevent on Islamist fundamentalism. That tyranny is the greatest threat to us. Will she take account of the recommendations of this inquiry in two particular respects? The first is the relationship between counter-terrorism police and the intelligence services—she spoke about collaboration a moment ago. Secondly, as the shadow Home Secretary said, the continuing observation of those who were formerly subjects of interest but then moved to less stringent surveillance seems to be a critical element in this inquiry.

As Sir John said in his report, no one should underestimate the very difficult job that the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing do, and that job has become more difficult with the emergence of lone-actor terrorists whose activities are more difficult to track. That is why the Government, including MI5, are committed to doing everything in their power to strengthen our defences against terrorism. That is also why Prevent remains a vital tool for early intervention. Without a Prevent referral being made, it is impossible for authorities to intervene to support those susceptible to radicalisation. It is an essential tool in minimising and eliminating the threat posed by terrorism, and it is vital that we now carry out the reforms of William Shawcross to improve it so that we stamp out this insidious behaviour.

I am also grateful for special dispensation to speak from the Back Benches on this matter.

The arena bomb was one of the most distressing and difficult episodes in the history of Greater Manchester—I think because so many children were affected by life-changing injuries from having been at a music venue. One of my constituents has been left without her hearing, possibly for the rest of her life. My constituents have never wanted this inquiry to be about blame; they wanted it to be about being able to say that we will learn lessons from the response that the country makes and that in future we will be better and stronger as a result.

I will raise just two specific matters. First, the report highlights the lack of an update to the counter-extremism strategy; the Home Secretary mentioned many things that I think form the strands of that, but I want to know that, if somebody who has links to a country such as Libya is visiting a known terror offender in prison, that will be closely monitored in future. Secondly, from the point of view of the survivors and the victims’ families, who have shown great courage throughout this very difficult process—I pay specific tribute to groups such as the Manchester Survivors Choir, which has been a huge source of support for some of my constituents—can the Home Secretary confirm how they will be supported now the that inquiry has finished?

The hon. Gentleman asks about changes to the counter-terrorism system and in particular the refresh of our world-leading counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, which is being updated to protect the public from new and emerging threats to our way of life. As I say, we expect to publish the updated version of CONTEST later this year. We want to ensure that it achieves its aim of reducing the terrorism risk to the UK, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. It is based on prevent, pursue, protect and prepare, and we must ensure that it is fit for purpose so that the public are kept safe from terrorism.

In terms of support for the families, they have been frankly heroic in the ordeal that they have been through in voicing their concerns, giving evidence and dealing with the tragedy of this horrendous incident. They have been very powerful. Their evidence has informed the recommendations and the conclusions, which will inform the practice of MI5 and all our security agencies, and for that I am grateful.

Olivia Campbell-Hardy, from Bury, was 15 years of age when she went out that evening and did not come back. She was a beautiful, wonderful person. Today we have the third volume of the report, which says there was

“a significant missed opportunity to take action”

on the part of MI5. We have also had previously highlighted the shocking failures of the venue’s owners, the security contractors and the emergency services. Some of those who died—not all of them—could still be alive today, and I would like to know about accountability. Too often in this place, an apology from an organisation seems to be enough. Well, it is not. People died as a result not only of the actions of this bomber, but because of the gross negligence of some of the bodies I mentioned. Who is being held accountable, who will be responsible, and will that information be passed on to the families?

As the inquiry’s report makes clear, the responsibility for the events of 22 May 2017 lie with the bomber and his brother. Responsibility rests with them. When it comes to whether lives could have been saved, the Government are of course incredibly sorry—I understand that sorry is a weak word for the people directly affected, and our thoughts remain with them—but Sir John Saunders is also clear in his conclusion:

“It remains quite impossible to say whether any different or additional action taken by the authorities could have prevented the Attack. It might have done; it might not have done.”

He also says that it is

“very hard to say what would have happened”

if the bomber

“had been approached under Prevent or the Channel programme.”

It is difficult to make those clear, direct causal connections. However, as I have said before, he does not shy away from saying that there was a significant oversight and there were failings in the process. There are no words that will provide solace to the families affected, but I hope that they can gain confidence from knowing that huge seriousness is attached to this report and we are doing everything in our power to make sure that the lessons learned will be applied in the real world.

Our thoughts are with the families of the victims, and I thank Sir John for his report. The Home Secretary will be aware that in 2018, the ISC, which I sit on, did a report on the Manchester bombing and the other terrorist attacks that took place in 2017. Many of the conclusions are mirrored in Sir John’s report, including on the purchase of precursor chemicals. Five years on, nothing has been done about that.

The Home Secretary said to the Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), that she respects the Committee’s work. As we are the only Committee that can look at the closed report and closed evidence, it is important that if we make recommendations, they are acted on. To date, the Government’s response to ISC’s work is not good. Last July, we produced our right-wing terrorism report. The memorandum of understanding says that the Government have 60 days to reply but we are still waiting. I also say to her that the actions of her Department in our scrutiny of the National Security Bill were far from helpful.

On chemical precursors, we have enhanced our capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and their precursors, and to control and safeguard those materials. Since 2017, among other things, we have strengthened the controls on access to explosive precursors. We regulated sulphuric acid, for example, in 2018. In 2023, we have laid secondary legislation that will improve how suspicious activity reports are made. We have done a lot of work on that issue, but we can always go further.

The UK has some of the best intelligence agencies in the world. They have many successes every day, many of which, as the Home Secretary will know, cannot be made public. However, they also make mistakes, and they admit that, as in this case and others.

More widely—but not linked to this specific inquiry at this point—is it not time for the Justice and Security Act 2013, and the memorandum of understanding that allows the Intelligence and Security Committee to do its work, to be updated so that there can be full, comprehensive, up-to-date scrutiny of our intelligence agencies, which have huge budgets, huge powers and a huge number of personnel?

We have a very high level of scrutiny of our agencies, whether that is through the Intelligence and Security Committee or the independent reviewer. In relation to the Manchester Arena attack, there have been several reports and hundreds of recommendations, many of which have been implemented by the agencies. There is a high level of scrutiny, but we need to balance that with the need not to tie the hands of our agents, because they do vital work and we do not want to start chilling the effect of that work.

The Manchester Arena bombing was an utterly despicable attack on innocent children and adults, and our sympathies go to all the families who were affected.

Sir John Saunders’ report recognised failings in information sharing. The fact that Salman Abedi was a person of interest would not have been known to many of those who were perhaps best placed to spot his radicalisation, and they were unaware of the risk that he presented, including at the mosque where he worshipped. The Home Secretary mentioned the new faith security training scheme. Will she expand on how that scheme might appropriately equip religious institutions and community groups to assist the authorities in identifying potentially radicalised individuals, so that they can help to thwart future attacks?

There are lots of measures that we have implemented and are continuing to roll out to ensure that those who may pose a risk receive some kind of intervention. The “ACT Early” campaign, for example, seeks to raise awareness of the signs of radicalisation and where to go if a person needs support about someone they know. The Shawcross report looked into educational establishments and how they can more effectively support counter-terrorism work. There is a multi-agency job of work to do and everyone needs to be clear about their responsibilities to ensure that we prevent and minimise the risk.

I thank the Home Secretary for her statement, and of course all our thoughts are with the victims, their families and the survivors.

Prevent’s original principles were about rooting out extremism and stopping people from turning into terrorists. As the Shawcross review found, a number of its projects drifted away from that. Does my right hon. Friend agree that what has happened only underlines the need for a successful and effective Prevent programme that deals with the people most at risk of becoming terrorists, whatever their motivation?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: whether we are talking about Islamist extremism or far-right extremism, the Shawcross review is clear that we need a more transparent, efficient and sustainable programme. We need more independent oversight; we need to build an extensive programme of communications and community engagement; we need new risk assessment tools; and we need to ensure that a consistent approach is applied to all risks, so that we can be effective in minimising the threat.

Elaine McIver was a serving police officer with Cheshire police who went along to a concert and was killed, like 22 other people—the youngest victim being eight. A very close family member worked in the immediate aftermath of that terrorist atrocity. What I am seeking from the Home Secretary today, like all other Members from across the House, is reassurance that the recommendations of Sir John’s report will be implemented in full, no ifs and no buts.

We want to ensure that all the recommendations of Sir John’s reports are fully reflected upon and make a difference. That is what I am focused on—that we learn the lessons from this tragic incident, and improve our operational responses and our manner of dealing with the risks. We also want to make sure that victims of terrorism receive the support that they deserve, which is why the victims of terrorism unit is conducting an internal review to see how we can improve the package of support available to victims in that terrible situation.

Liam Curry and Chloe Rutherford from South Shields were murdered in the Manchester Arena attack. The Home Secretary will have seen their brave parents in reports outside court last week. She will also know that archaic law in relation to terror attacks is denying them the chance to register their precious children’s deaths. After being told repeatedly that there was a willingness from Government to try to change that law, they recently attended another meeting with Ministers. This time, they were treated with contempt, patronised and insulted. It then became clear that they have been misled by the Government for nearly a year, because despite it being entirely possible to change that law, the Government and, in particular, the Home Secretary’s Department simply do not want to. This is adding to the parents’ anguish and pain. Will the Home Secretary please reconsider and meet with them?

Of course, I deeply feel for and sympathise with the families who have been so tragically bereaved by the Manchester Arena attack. Any family bereaved in unexpected and tragic circumstances deserve our full support and condolences.

There is no legal flexibility on that requirement, as the death would not otherwise be registered in accordance with the legislation. I know that this is a disappointing situation. This is not an issue that the Ministry of Justice alone can resolve, and the Home Office Minister, Lord Murray of Blidworth, explained to the Manchester Arena families that long-term change would interfere with the coherence of the General Register Office’s registration process. I know that that is disappointing, but I am always willing to consider new approaches.

This report details opportunities tragically missed by MI5, but also reminds us of the need for us all to be vigilant. We know that a member of the public who saw the perpetrator and thought he looked suspicious raised his concerns with a member of the Showsec security staff, but no effective action was taken. While welcoming the Government’s approach to Martyn’s law, can I ask the Secretary of State what more the Government are proposing to do to ensure that security staff in both the public and the private sector have proper training and well-rehearsed procedures for how to respond in similar circumstances, to help prevent future such tragedies?

I thank the hon. Lady for raising the proposed Martyn’s law. The details in general have been set out: premises that will be within the scope will be those that are a building or event within a defined boundary. There will need to be a qualifying activity at the location, and the maximum occupancy of the premises will need to meet a specific threshold—either 100-plus or 800-plus. That will potentially cover a lot of public spaces and be a real step change in how we ensure more protection for users of public spaces.

After the horrific, tragic, cowardly Manchester Arena bombing, survivors and victims’ families have shown immense strength and courage throughout the whole inquiry process. However, the victims and survivors of previous disasters, including the Hillsborough tragedy, have had to wait years and years for Governments to act on the recommendations of reports and issue a full response. Can the Home Secretary commit today to ensuring that the Manchester families do not have to suffer a similar delay?

We are working on that, and as I have said, there has already been a huge amount of change, reform and improvement within the agencies as a response to the event in 2017. This report marks another step forward. We will consider everything and we will move forward accordingly, but we will also be responding both to Bishop James Jones’s report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families and to the report of the Daniel Morgan independent panel, following which we will consider fully the recommendation on the full duty of candour.

First, may I thank the Secretary of State for her statement and the compassion and tone of her response? I think we all deeply appreciate it and thank the Secretary of State for that. On behalf of my party, the Democratic Unionist party, I wish also to record that our thoughts and prayers are with all those who lost loved ones and who today grieve greatly.

Will the Secretary of State accept that the parents of the children slaughtered and maimed are not looking for apologies? Instead, they are looking for improvements to ensure that no parent goes through the devastation that they have felt and still feel. For those parents and those families, what further changes will stem from the finalisation of this report?

The hon. Gentleman puts it very well. Just to give a sample, even before this report was published, since 2017 MI5 and other partners have conducted a series of reviews, subject to robust external oversight, and the Intelligence and Security Committee has published a report. There were hundreds of recommendations, and many of them have been implemented already to improve counter-terrorism operations, to improve intelligence sharing, to build a better response that goes traditional security agencies, and to connect expertise and all kinds of public sector authorities. A lot of work has been delivered, and we want to build on that.