My Lords, in January this year, the Constitution Committee report into the roles of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers was published. All inquiries have their context. Since the committee’s last report in 2014 which examined these issues, the Government’s commitment to the rule of law has been called into question; the then Lord Chancellor’s lacklustre defence of the judiciary in the wake of the Daily Mail’s “Enemies of the People” headline has been heavily criticised; and the global rise in authoritarianism and the impact of the digital revolution on democracy have imposed threats to a rules-based global order.
The rule of law is the common thread which links the distinct constitutional positions of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers: the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and Advocate-General of Scotland. It is the only constitutional concept with a presence in Cabinet consideration supported by statute, courtesy of the Lord Chancellor’s duties under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
The Act does not define the principle of the rule of law but its fundamental tenets are set out by Lord Bingham and are well understood. Lord Bingham’s formulation was that
“all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts”.
He expanded on this formulation with eight principles which are set out in the report. Those principles point to an important element of the rule of law: that it is not simply rule by law. The law itself must conform with the fundamental concept of justice.
Our constitution requires that the Government act according to the rule of law: that Ministers understand its key principles and consider it to have primacy over political expediency. The Lord Chancellor and the law officers have special responsibilities for its maintenance: they take special oaths; their duties, while also being Ministers, place them in a special constitutional position; and they are among the chief guardians of the rule of law.
The eighth principle in Lord Bingham’s definition states:
“The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law”.
This conception has been politically resonant in recent years. The committee reported that the Government had, at that point, twice knowingly introduced legislation in Parliament that would breach the UK’s international obligations, contravening Lord Bingham’s eighth principle. In the case of Part 5 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act, the Government admitted doing so. In the case of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, the Government failed to produce a credible legal justification for doing so.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and thank her not only for her comprehensive opening remarks and for the committee’s report but for inviting me to give evidence to the committee last year. It is a very balanced report which, if I am right, underlines the importance within our constitution of the roles of both the Lord Chancellor and the law officers in protecting the rule of law. The noble Baroness was entirely right to remind us of the recent occasions when that has broken down. I am also delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Hennessey, in his place, because it means we can benefit from his wisdom this afternoon, and also because, I hope, it suggests that his health has been restored to him. I look forward to hearing from my noble friend the Minister and from other noble Lords speaking this afternoon.
At the risk of doing something unusual, I will talk about myself. I am by no means the only lawyer here, but I believe I am the only person here who can claim membership of the former Solicitors-General club. Long ago, an Attorney-General said that being Attorney-General was the worst job in government and being Solicitor-General was the best. Both have their upsides and downsides, but I have a certain pride that I held an office in the 21st century that was held in the 18th century by my direct ancestor William de Grey. I have inherited his gout but not his intellect: he had what we nowadays call a stellar chancery commercial practice at the Bar and, although in his final years his hands were riddled with gout, preventing him from holding a quill, he was able to give extempore judgments as Lord Chief Justice after long and complex trials that stand the test of time to this day.
Shortly after my appointment in 2010, I was showing off to the then Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that de Grey had been successively Solicitor-General and Attorney-General from 1763 to 1771, under five Prime Ministers. After that, I told him, de Grey became Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. The noble and learned Lord smiled engagingly and gently reminded me that some apparent precedents are easily distinguished upon their facts.
I am just doing precisely that. The law officers have party-political allegiances and accept collective government responsibility. Their offices and that of the Lord Chancellor are not bad because they are old; they are old because they are good. So long as we can encourage good lawyers from all parties and all three jurisdictions to come into Parliament—as we actively should—these offices should remain to serve our constitution. Let us therefore work tirelessly to restore that fellowship between the law and Parliament, which has been lost, and do both institutions a favour.
My Lords, what a delight it is to see the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, in his place. I have followed his wise counsel on many occasions, and it is great to see him back—not least because he was a very effective member of the Constitution Committee, even though he was at the other end of a television link.
As a member of the Constitution Committee, I first express my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for her calm, careful and considerate chairmanship of the committee, on this issue as on others. I am grateful to the clerk, John Turner, and his team for their invaluable work in putting the thoughts of the committee together in a compelling report.
I want to focus my remarks upon unfinished business: the dual role embodied in the one person of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. I am pleased to find myself again on the same side as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. This issue was very firmly kicked into the long grass by the Constitution Committee. In paragraph 186 of the report, we concluded that the advantages of separating the two roles were not clear and that we were not in favour of making changes at this point in time, having regard to the burdens inherent in any major machinery of government change. However, we recommended that a new Government, or a Prime Minister embarking on a reorganisation of government, might wish to consider or at least contemplate removing responsibility for prisons from the Lord Chancellor’s remit.
I do not think anyone on the committee wished to resurrect the Lord Chancellor of old as Speaker of this House or as head of the judiciary controlling the appointment of judges. His department had its problems in that regard in the old days. I met an old friend and colleague of mine a week ago. We took silk on the same day in 1979. Some years later, he discovered that, according to his personal but secret file in the department of the Lord Chancellor, he had fought eight general elections as a Liberal candidate, which was not really an advantage for judicial preferment. Unfortunately, his press cuttings had been mixed up with mine. It was not, in those pre-digital days, a perfect system.
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, on her skilled chairmanship of the sessions of the committee that gave birth to this report. It was not an easy task at all. I also echo strongly the words of welcome to the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. It is marvellous to see him again. Although we have both long since been rotated off the committee, we worked together on earlier reports. That was a real honour and a pleasure, and something to keep in my memory. I greatly look forward to what he has to say in a few moments.
My contribution will focus not so much on the role of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers in upholding the rule of law—on which we have already heard some wise words—as on the first section of the report, which interestingly analyses what the rule of law really means today, and to what that rule extends.
First, I add briefly my agreement with the report’s finding that the Lord Chancellor must be a massively credible figure and the pillar not only in advising the Cabinet what is or is not constitutional and robustly defending the judiciary but in ensuring that no one is above the law and that it applies equally to both rulers and the ruled. That fundamental point seems to have escaped the comprehension, for instance, of the autocrats in today’s world, particularly the Chinese leaders, who often assert indignantly that of course the law applies to the people—but not to the leaders of the Government or the all-powerful Chinese Communist Party. That is the big geopolitical dilemma we all face.
All this begs the key question for us, which the report bravely faces in its first few pages, of what exactly the rule of law means and, especially, what it means in an international context, where other parties outside our national judicial space may not be playing quite the same game as we are. As one witness to the committee’s inquiry put it,
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their welcome back; it is an undiluted pleasure to be with you all again. It is funny what one misses. There is serious business, of course, but being a Member of this House is the most agreeable form of adult education the world has ever seen, and when it comes to providing weapons-grade gossip, it has no equal in any Parliament that I have ever come across.
Any nation that wishes to claim for itself the much-prized title of an open society has to meet, nourish and cherish a hierarchy of needs. Right at the top are the rule of law and regular elections conducted in a free and fair manner. In our country, so seriously do we take the rule of law that we keep a man or woman at every Cabinet table to incarnate it and to defend it through thick and thin in the person of the Lord Chancellor. As my noble friend Lady Drake has emphasised already, no other principle has a shop steward in the room to represent it at Cabinet meetings. If a Lord Chancellor fails in his or her duty of care, especially the defence of the independence of the judiciary, we feel, rightly, seriously let down at best and truly alarmed at worst.
Of all the senior posts in the Administration, the lord chancellorship must at times be a real short-straw draw of a job, for there will be occasions when your colleagues are itching to cut a corner, awash on a dopamine high or flushed with the righteousness that can befall those who think they have a special insight into the minds of the British people, unlike those tenacious human rights lawyers or the bewigged Inns of Court-polished smoothies sitting on the judicial benches nitpicking away at or, even worse, sabotaging the mandates of elected Ministers. I parody of course, but not entirely, for the Lord Chancellor lives by the light of an oath solemnly sworn, an oath for all seasons, with an overriding duty of speaking truth unto power in every circumstance.
My Lords, it is a true pleasure to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, who, like me, is a Bencher of Middle Temple. I declare my interest in the register, as chair of research for the Society of Conservative Lawyers, and I welcome this committee’s thoughtful report.
Historically, as we have heard, the Lord Chancellor and law officers have had special responsibilities. Lord Chancellors have had a special role in ensuring that their Cabinet colleagues adhere to the role of law. They sit in Cabinet; the Attorney-General, on the other hand, is not a member but attends Cabinet. The Government website describes the Attorney-General as the “chief legal adviser to the Crown”. That carries a heavy responsibility.
We are fortunate that the current Lord Chancellor has been a serious practitioner. He will properly understand the judges’ role in our unwritten constitution and the need to defend them against ill-considered abuse and commentary. As we know, sadly that entirely passed the notice of one of his non-legal predecessors. But we cannot undo the past. Today, there are many fewer serious lawyer politicians in either House, so there is a practical reason why it may be hard to appoint a lawyer as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. The committee and the outgoing Lord Chief Justice have suggested that prisons might be removed from the portfolio. I do not suggest that is a bad idea, but I am not convinced it will necessarily help with the problems with which we are truly concerned. It is not only because what would be left would be a small department. Put simply, it will not restore the authority of old. We need to look elsewhere for a parliamentarian to protect the rule of law, and we must do so.
We do not have a written constitution. We rely on the Crown in Parliament as the Executive, together with Parliament itself and the judiciary, each knowing where each stands and its respective role and, importantly, that each must not overstep the lines. Each of these three actors must observe their invisible boundaries. Recent events have stretched that understanding to their limit. I need only refer to the decision to advise the late Queen to prorogue Parliament. It is not the point whether the Supreme Court was right in strict constitutional theory to hold the prorogation unlawful. What is plain is that the Executive, the Crown, sought by fiat to render Parliament impotent. I ask noble Lords to think of this: if throughout the Supreme Court judgment, one substituted for the words “Prime Minister” the words “King James I” or “King Charles I”, would the court’s critics still find the decision questionable? This constitutional gambling was followed by the internal markets Bill. That led to the resignation of a distinguished Lord Advocate, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, who was here a moment ago.
My Lords, I very much welcome this considered report, building as it does on earlier reports of the committee, not just on the role of the Lord Chancellor and the office of Attorney-General but on other constitutional issues, to which I shall refer. The report is thorough and balanced.
None of these commendations applies to the Government’s response, which no speaker so far has mentioned; there may be a reason for that. It is, regrettably, not untypical of some of the government responses we have had to committee reports. Where the report entails no action on the part of government, the Government agree with it; where there is a recommendation for change, the Government either disagree or deflect responsibility elsewhere. Indeed, the Government’s response reminds me of an episode of “Father Ted” in which Father Jack is coached to respond to difficult questions by saying, “That would be an ecumenical matter”. In the Government’s response, the equivalent is, “That would be a matter for the Prime Minister”. The response says:
“Ministerial appointments are a matter for the Prime Minister”,
and
“These, along with tenure … are all matters for the Prime Minister”,
at paragraph 9. Paragraph 13 says:
“It is ultimately the Prime Minister who has overall responsibility for the constitution”.
Paragraph 14 says that
“it is entirely for the Prime Minister to determine where constitutional responsibilities should sit”.
Paragraph 16 says:
“Decisions around Law Officer appointments are for the Prime Minister”,
and paragraph 22 says:
“Amendment of the Ministerial Code … is a matter for the Prime Minister”.
The next speaker will be my noble friend Lord Cormack.
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Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament is able to legislate in this way. This does not alter the Government’s responsibility to ensure, to the best of their ability, that international obligations are adhered to. They should refrain from knowingly inviting Parliament to legislate contrary to the UK’s obligations. Parliament is ultimately responsible for the form of any legislation passed, but preparation and introduction of government legislation is an executive action.
I turn to the role of the Lord Chancellor. The CRA fundamentally altered the role of the Lord Chancellor and the constitutional framework surrounding it, including replacing the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary in England and Wales with the Lord Chief Justice. It put into statute the Lord Chancellor’s existing constitutional role in relation to the rule of law. It created a new oath that the Lord Chancellor would respect the rule of law, defend the independence of the judiciary and discharge their duty to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and effective support of the courts.
The Lord Chancellor’s responsibility for the rule of law is not limited to the maintenance of the justice system and the independence of the judiciary. They have a role which, as a full member of the Cabinet, goes beyond that of the Attorney-General to ensure that rule of law issues are defended and understood by government. The committee was concerned that their oath does not adequately reflect the Lord Chancellor’s role and recommended that it be amended to explicitly include their duty to uphold the rule of law.
In 2007, the Lord Chancellor’s role was combined with that of Secretary of State for Justice, so acquiring a wide range of policy areas in addition to duties as regards rule of law and judiciary independence. Some commentators suggest that this has undermined the Lord Chancellor’s ability to fulfil their core duties by giving them distracting or conflicting responsibility for prisons. Others argue that the budgetary responsibility for the Ministry of Justice, including the Prison Service, increases their authority in government. The advantage of separating those responsibilities is not clear, particularly in the light of the disruption caused by machinery of government changes. We recommend, however, that a new Prime Minister embarking on a more comprehensive reorganisation of government might consider separation at that point.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, the Lord Chief Justice, pressed the case for further consideration in comments made at the recent Lord Chancellor’s swearing-in ceremony. At his annual session with the committee, he said:
“It is time to look at it calmly and rationally … and simply to ask the fundamental question of whether the current system is serving the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the administration of justice generally as it should be”.
Does the Minister agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett?
Judicial independence is a vital element of the United Kingdom’s uncodified constitution and defending the judiciary against abuse is a core part of the Lord Chancellor’s role. The Daily Mail’s “Enemies of the People” headline and the then Lord Chancellor’s response to it at the very least caused alarm within the judiciary and damaged trust. In 2017, the committee asked the right honourable Elizabeth Truss about her response. She argued that senior judges could speak publicly about what they did and appeared to criticise their reticence to do so. She added:
“Where perhaps I might respectfully disagree with some who have asked me to condemn what the press are writing, is that I think it is dangerous for a government Minister to say this is an acceptable headline and this is not. I am a huge believer in the independence of the judiciary; I am also a very strong believer in a free press”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed of Allermuir, President of the Supreme Court, advised the committee that he had made an effort recently in judgments,
“to spell out what the constitutional relationships are … That has been a response to criticism, because it was evident that people did not understand our role”.
Lord Hodge, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, added that,
“it is very important that we do not enter the fray in the face of political criticism, and we leave it to the Lord Chancellor, if necessary, to defend us in the context of defending the rule of law”.
Criticism of the content of a judgment is acceptable; targeted personal criticism that unfairly impugns a judge’s impartiality or inflames public sentiment against the judiciary is not. In such cases, the committee firmly believes that a Lord Chancellor must intervene promptly and publicly. For the judiciary to feel secure in its duty to decide cases without fear or favour, it needs a Lord Chancellor who is willing to defend it.
The CRA did not require the Lord Chancellor to have a legal background. At the time of the report, only six of the 11 post-2005 officeholders had a legal qualification. The five Lord Chancellors preceding our report spent an average of less than 14 months in office. We would expect a Lord Chancellor normally to be a senior legal figure commanding the respect of the legal community and Parliament. However, in the final analysis, character, intellect and commitment to the rule of law are the most important attributes for a Lord Chancellor to possess.
The responsibilities of the law officers touch on the rule of law in various ways. Our report focused on their role as legal advisers to the Government. On the lawfulness of government action, government lawyers, including the law officers, currently operate on the basis that action may justified if a respectable legal argument can be found that is lawful. The concept of a respectable legal argument is found in the Government Legal Department’s guidance to government lawyers. An updated version was published on 2 August 2022 and the then Attorney-General elaborated on her expectations of government lawyers in a series of tweets.
The existence of a “respectable legal argument” as set out in the guidance and elaborated on by the then Attorney-General could sometimes represent a very low threshold for authorising legally uncertain action. The validity of the respectable legal argument depends on an uncertain threshold in the Attorney-General’s guidance—the level at which an argument becomes respectable. The guidance explains that this is an argument that could be properly put before the court but also refers to an absence of such arguments being “rare” or “exceptional”. It is unclear whether this suggests that the threshold is so low that an argument will almost always be found or that the Government would not expect to be contemplating legally dubious action. Public confidence in the Government’s commitment to the rule of law demands that any threshold is meaningful and aligns with an ethos of genuinely seeking to comply with the law and that a decision by Ministers would not be based solely on a calculation of legal inconvenience.
Decisions to authorise armed conflict require greater certainty, and merely a “respectable” argument in this context is a fig leaf and undermines the trust of the public and particularly the military. It was therefore comforting to hear the current Attorney-General tell the committee in recent evidence that,
“the Government have extra duties as a litigant before the courts”,
including the “duty of candour”, and
“a duty to advance proper arguments”.
However, we shall have to see how this develops in practice, and the concept may yet require further elucidation.
The law officers are senior legal advisers to the Government. They are Ministers and Members of Parliament. Depending on the function, varying degrees of independence are required. Their main duty as senior legal adviser requires a high degree of independence from the Executive. Their responsibilities for legal advice and individual prosecutions are non-ministerial and not subject to collective responsibility. There is great value in the law officers being politicians. It provides them with an understanding of the political context and bolsters the authority of their advice; as MPs, they are accountable. However, it is necessary to balance political status with rule of law functions. Former Attorney-General Suella Braverman KC confirmed this view when she told the House of Commons Justice Committee in 2020 that the officeholders’ primary duty lay with the rule of law above party interest. In the same session she went on to say that,
“I am a member of the Cabinet and I subscribe to collective responsibility. I am an elected politician. For me, the political thread that runs through this role is vitally important”.
In evidence to the committee, the current Attorney-General said,
“although I have other, sometimes competing, considerations—I have, for example, duties to my constituents … duties to my party, and duties to the Government, of which I am a member—I definitely feel, particularly in this role, that there is no question, but that my duty to the court comes first”.
It is vital that law officers recognise that they are different from other Ministers. Key aspects of their role require independence from party politics and government priorities. Public confidence in their impartiality must be retained and they should refrain from making public statements that damage that confidence.
In recent years, Attorneys-General have been appointed with less legal experience than was previously the case. We recommended that codification of law officers’ duties would improve confidence in their role, and that the Ministerial Code and the Cabinet Manual be amended to clearly define those duties, including identifying which are subject to collective responsibility and which should be conducted independently of government. Given the differing conceptions of the rule of law and the duties of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers that have politically resonated in recent years, can the Minister say whether, in the updating of the Cabinet Manual currently being undertaken, it will be amended to define clearly the duties of the law officers? I beg to move.
Before I return to the subject of law officers, I agree with the current Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who said earlier this week at Mansion House—reflecting some of the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, a moment ago—that:
“It is my belief that a Lord Chancellor’s primary interest should lie in nurturing the long-term health of the Courts and Tribunals, the legal system and the independence of the judiciary”.
If I had my way, I would return to the Lord Chancellor’s duties doing the things that the noble and learned Lord mentioned. Some would say that the ship carrying that sort of Lord Chancellor has sailed, never to return. I disagree. If it can be changed in one way, it can be changed in another way.
Government departments are frequently repurposed. It simply requires the political will to do it. I would release the Lord Chancellor from the prisons portfolio and the expenditure responsibilities that go with being Secretary of State for Justice, save those connected with the administration of justice. The Lord Chancellor does not need to be an elderly lawyer devoid of ambition; our current Lord Chancellor is, after all, young—at least from where I am looking—but by no means the youngest there has been. He is a very able lawyer, bright and enterprising, and a member of the former Solicitors-General club. Whoever it is, they should be someone with sufficient calibre and character to hold their own in and be listened to with respect by the Cabinet—and someone who does not feel the need to ring up Downing Street for permission to support the judiciary. Elizabeth Truss’s response to the committee, as cited by the noble Baroness a moment ago, was inadequate. I agree with the assessment of the noble Baroness of what one needs in a Lord Chancellor.
In my evidence to the Constitution Committee last year, I said that one of the things I have worried about over the last several years is that the fellowship of lawyers and Members of Parliament, between the judiciary and the Government and the judiciary and Parliament, has gone. We no longer speak the same language. When I took one of the many recent Lord Chancellors to dinner in my inn, they felt like they were going into a foreign country. Not so very long ago, the Lord Chancellor not only would have known most of the people there but would have appointed many of the judges in the room. There was a shared constitutional understanding about their separate roles: the role of Parliament, the role of the Executive and the role of lawyers and the judiciary. That has gone.
It is a great pity, and it discourages members of the Bar and solicitors from entering public life. By that I mean not just those who have law degrees or those who are called to the Bar or admitted as solicitors or advocates in Scotland; I mean those with High Court and appellate practices, men and women of standing within the legal professions who command the respect, if not always the agreement, of the judges they appear before. These people are discouraged from coming into the House of Commons. Why give up a good practice? Why swap all that for the likely inability to continue your practice and, associated with that, the public obloquy that goes with being a Member of Parliament in an era of social media? I know plenty of people much younger than me who would make excellent Members of Parliament, excellent Ministers and excellent law officers, but they will not come anywhere near Parliament because they see it as poison. The consequence is that, although we may from time to time find lawyers of sufficient experience fit to be law officers, it is becoming increasingly difficult.
I was lucky enough to have a London-based practice, which required me to travel no further than the Royal Courts of Justice on the Strand, so I could maintain it to a reasonable level while a Member of Parliament. However, for a criminal barrister with a circuit practice, nowadays it is either Parliament or practice but not both. In 1992, when I first got in, the Whips kindly told me that I could not have two passports: I was either at the Bar or I was a Member of Parliament. I ignored them. But when, for example, my noble friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham was first in the House of Commons, he was in court in Birmingham during the day and in the Commons in the evenings. My late noble and learned friend Lord Rawlinson of Ewell told me that, when he entered the House of Commons in 1955, he was told by the Whips that he was not expected to be present until late afternoon and that, if he did come in, it would be assumed that he had no practice.
More than 40 years ago, Lord Rawlinson, a former Solicitor-General and Attorney-General, led me in a very long libel action that gave us plenty of time to get to know each other. He told me that, when he was appointed Solicitor-General in 1962, the then Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, said, “Remember, you are the last of the Crown officers who remains a Member of the House of Commons”. He then gave him a learned seminar on the history and constitutional role of the law officers. It was made clear that, as Solicitor-General, his first duty was to the Crown, his second was to Parliament and his third—and it was only third—was to the Government of which he was a member. He was told that the Attorney-General is the principal agent for enforcing legal rights and is required to intervene when the public interest, not the Government’s interest, is affected. Sir Hartley Shawcross, one of the great Attorney-Generals, said that
“although the Attorney-General is a member of the government he has certain duties which he cannot abdicate in connection with the administration of the law, especially the criminal law”.
Of course, along with the DPP, the Crown Prosecution Service and other prosecution agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office, the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General are responsible for criminal prosecutions as part of their quasi-judicial, independent role. Although Dominic Grieve and I made a point of going to court, for example to prosecute in contempt cases and to appear in criminal appeals that had nothing whatever to do with the Government or in the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice to represent the United Kingdom, we wished that we could have done so more often. I think that we appeared in court a good deal more than both our immediate predecessors and those who came after us.
More recently, the law officers have appeared in court only rarely and most often in unduly lenient appeals, but this was an important part of our duties that had nothing whatever to do with our political existence. Neither of us found it difficult to separate ourselves into our respective functions as politically aware but apolitical law officers on the one hand and party-political Members of Parliament on the other. Having a foot in both camps made us more useful advocates and advisers in a way that a Civil Service lawyer could not be.
Mr Cameron appointed me Solicitor-General in 2010 during a three-minute telephone call. Had he had the time to think about it, I am sure that he would have agreed with Macmillan. I certainly tried to keep Harold Macmillan’s advice to Peter Rawlinson in the forefront of my mind when I was Solicitor-General.
To many Ministers and Members of Parliament, the law officers are either mysterious, barely known creatures or an inconvenient reminder that the law of the land applies to them. Like lawyers in private practice, law officers cannot talk in detail about their work, which is confidential to their client—the Government. However, nor should they just say “no”; they should try to be imaginative and help the Government navigate through their difficulties. Their power, if they have any at all, lies in speaking truth unto power and in resignation. The law officers are more like submarines than the ships of the line in the Cabinet: you know that they are down there somewhere, unseen and unheard, quietly going about their business patrolling the murky waters of Whitehall, but, if they surface and their concerns or disagreements with the Government become known to the wider world, either the Government are in trouble or they are.
It is the fate of the law officers, if they behave as law officers and restrain themselves from making excessively political speeches, to be seen by their parliamentary colleagues as part of some mysterious priesthood, out of touch with the cut and thrust of political controversy. Their offices are off Central Lobby, well away from those of the departmental Ministers behind the Speaker’s Chair, and they cannot show off about their work because it is largely confidential. However, they are not vestal virgins or Trappist monks. They are active constituency MPs or legislators in one House or the other.
Things changed in 2003 when the Lord Chancellor’s Department became the Department for Constitutional Affairs. In 2006, the appointment of judges became the responsibility of a new Judicial Appointments Commission. The Department for Constitutional Affairs morphed into the Ministry of Justice in 2007 and took over responsibility for prisons from the Home Office. Thus, the administration of courts, its staff and its estates merged with the administration of prisons.
In a speech on 24 May last, on the occasion of the swearing in of the latest Lord Chancellor—the excellent and able Alex Chalk—the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who has been quoted already many times, said:
“The functions of Lord Chancellor in a modern age might be thought enough to keep a minister fully occupied. The original concept of a Department for Constitutional Affairs did just that. But then along came prisons, bringing with it an obvious potential conflict of interest and problems themselves enough to consume the energies of a superhuman. That marriage may not have been made in heaven. When political breathing space allows, the time may well have come for the role of Lord Chancellor to be looked at again”.
The reason given by a number of witnesses to the Constitution Committee in the course of this inquiry for maintaining the joint responsibilities for courts and prisons in the hands of one Minister was that, unless the Lord Chancellor were given a significant spending department, he or she would have no clout in the struggle for funds from the Treasury. I defer to the experience of the former Lord Chancellors who appeared before us, but the fact is that both the court system and the prison system, which do need money, are starved of resources. I can put it no better than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, who told us in his evidence:
“The present Lord Chancellor has the misfortune of presiding over a department both the large chunks of which are in a pretty dire state—worse than I can recall for years ... In both these particular cases, you have a really dire problem of trying to get resources applied to tackling the problem against a background of economic crisis when the public finances are in a dire state”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, was nevertheless the advocate of no change, as was Mr David Gauke, on the basis of the “clout” reasoning, but having “clout” has not prevented the criminal Bar going on strike for lack of funds, the ceiling of the court in Hereford’s magnificent Shirehall collapsing or the general crumbling of our famous Assize Courts and indeed more modern courts. Nor has it prevented the shortcomings in staff, of which I have often spoken, in the large and modern Berwyn prison near Wrexham, my home town. Alex Chalk opened the new Fosse Way prison in Leicestershire two weeks ago as part of the Government’s £4 billion programme to create 20,000 new prison places. He had clout enough to lock people away—I mean, he is part of a Tory Government—but increasing room for prisoners must surely impact on sentencing policies and the courts: build it, and they will come.
Meanwhile, the Chief Inspector of Probation, Mr Justin Russell, wrote in his 2023 report on serious fraud offences:
“It is very concerning that assessments for the risk of harm a person on probation may pose remain inaccurate, incorrect, or incomplete. It is clear that reduced staffing levels within local services continue to have an impact on the quality of work we are seeing, both in these serious further offence reviews and the findings from our local inspections. Once again, I call on HMPPS to ensure services have the staff they need in order to manage every person on probation actively and effectively to monitor any risk of reoffending”.
Rehabilitation is not a priority compared with building prisons. On bread-and-butter issues, today we learned that the MoJ missed a statutory deadline by six months for dealing with intestate estates, in a time of inflation.
To my mind, certainly as to the mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others, the role of the Lord Chancellor is not to be a nuts-and-bolts mechanic but, as we have described in the report, to be the guardian of the rule of law: the one person of experience, judgment and standing who can say to a Prime Minister, “No, your policy is unlawful”. What we have seen under this Government is unlawful Prorogation, the unlawful United Kingdom Internal Market Act and now the Illegal Migration Bill, described yesterday by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Volker Türk, as
“contrary to prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsions, rights to due process, to family and private life, and the principle of best interests of children”.
That is the current unlawful way in which this Government act.
The Lord Chancellor is now a diminished figure. It is not surprising. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, pointed out that Alex Chalk is the seventh Lord Chancellor he has served alongside in his six years as Lord Chief Justice. There have been 13 Lord Chancellors in the 20 years since 2003. Before then, there had been 13 Lord Chancellors in 64 years. In former days, it was a final destination job to close a distinguished career. Now it is but a stepping stone, with its independent role of guardian of the rule of law marred by hopes of preferment to a more important Ministry.
So, there it is in the long grass. I hope a new Government will recognise, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, said, that the administration of justice is one of the building blocks of society, and that courts and prisons each require the focused energies of a single Minister to tackle their separate problems.
“One person’s legal nicety is another person’s rule of law”.
Other witnesses talked about the rule of law as a “protean”—presumably meaning “evolving”—concept, or, in one case, as being “somewhat nebulous”. There is also the dilemma, put to us by several very senior legal figures as witnesses, that when it comes to what some deem our international legal obligations, Parliament can legislate to the contrary, and since the will of Parliament is the law of the land, it must take precedence in the enforcement of the law in the courts.
The gospel to which many legal minds seem to return in untangling this dilemma—and to which the report itself returns—is the opinion of the late Lord Bingham, whose views get a whole half-page box in the report. Tom Bingham was pretty unequivocal about the rule of law applying just as much in the international legal order as in national domestic law. Others were more doubtful about that and that identity, arguing that international law raises quite different and changing issues. Personally, I share their doubts perhaps a little more strongly than the report consensus does.
It seems obvious to me that where one side in an international agreement or treaty is a foreign power or institution which then bends or even flouts the spirit of the agreement or treaty, or interprets it in unexpected ways, the other side—meaning us—has every right to alter its stance. Where dispute machinery exists, as in Article 16 of the EU withdrawal treaty, plainly, that should be the first port of call. That is obvious. The Vienna convention on treaties—which does not get much of a mention—makes allowance for this, in Article 60 and possibly Article 62 as well, if the dispute machinery fails to get a constructive and satisfying consequence, or in some cases is simply disregarded, as, for example, the Chinese nowadays often do.
In these circumstances, it seems to me that a unilateral response, even if temporary, to a unilateral move by another party may well be justified. Frankly, I am sorry that we did not go deeper into those kinds of circumstances. Moves by the UK Government such as the famous—some claim notorious—two clauses tacked on to the internal market Act, which were deemed to be in breach of UK treaty obligations, seemed to be assumed from the start to be “legal sins” rather than moves in an unfolding and wider drama. I know that that will not have the support or agreement of many colleagues. This all requires more careful thought before rushing to judgment.
The report both begins and ends its summary by emphasising the vital link between upholding the rule of law and the whole health of our modern democracy. That means being open-eyed and honest not only about the unfolding meaning of the rule of law but about our liberal democracy and how in the digital age it is evolving rapidly in response to the revolutionary change in the way people and institutions relate—indeed in all relationships, from the humblest, the family, up to the highest level of international exchange.
Democracy is not in decline, but it is certainly under attack. We must attend to what Alexis de Tocqueville called “the errors of democracy” if our rule of law is robustly to uphold democracy’s health as a better performer than the authoritarian alternatives. That is surely better than just standing by and letting democracy’s obvious errors and weaknesses grow or complacently assuming that it all works fine and needs no defence or adaptation.
Warning against that dangerous tendency is one more major task for a truly influential Lord Chancellor at the heart of the Government and the Cabinet but also at the heart of our independent judicial system—he or she is the bedrock—but that is clearly a task for another day and, maybe, another report.
The last great service Tom Bingham, the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, did for us was to author a classic work on the rule of law in 2010. It was as if he stood at our shoulders as your Lordships’ Constitution Committee went about its work on the inquiry we are discussing this afternoon. Witness after witness praised it as the modern template for a rule of law country. For me, Lord Bingham’s thoughts and words help to explain why a society that lives by the rule of law is utterly different from one that does not. Perhaps my favourite passage in his book is the section where he cites the best-known encapsulation of the principle delivered by Thomas Fuller in 1733:
“Be you never so high, the law is above you”.
Lord Bingham wrote,
“If you maltreat a penguin in London Zoo, you do not escape prosecution even if you are the Archbishop of Canterbury”.
In case of any of your Lordships may have misheard what I have just said, I am not suggesting that any Archbishop of Canterbury, living or dead, has ever had such an encounter with a penguin, and nor, I am sure, did Lord Bingham.
The rule of law is a principle for all of us to live by, all of the time. As the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, put it on BBC Radio 4 on 11 June this year,
“the rule of law depends on enormous universal acceptance”.
People in political and public life need a string of rule of law alarm bells strung around their cortex. Somewhere in the minds of everyone engaged in the professions of Government, and the law in particular, there needs to be a bell tower ready to peal out a tocsin of warning when the rim of the rule of law is being approached by some new policy, plan of action or draft statute. Such a capacity should become innate, a crucial and permanent part of their political consciousness. For living up to the conventions and probities of the British system of government is very much a state of mind, given the absence of a formal written constitution. That is why we have various codes, ministerial and Civil Service, and the Nolan principles of public life. That is why we have Lord Chancellor’s oath, and that is why we need a Prime Minister’s oath as an aide to keeping all of the decencies and conventions alive and flourishing—but that is a subject for another day.
It is clear that the Executive must be constrained from overstepping important boundaries. These things matter; politicians must understand that. Our constitution and Parliament are not playthings for Prime Ministers. I do not have a complete answer, but it will not lie just in future Lord Chancellors, notwithstanding their statutory duty. If they do not properly understand our constitution, in the way that decent lawyers do, as some have not in the past, how can they attempt effectively to uphold the relevant law? So, it is with the law officers that our protections must rest. Here, I interject a personal note. James Mansfield, my four-times-great-grandfather, was like my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, Solicitor General and later Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. He was also one of those who represented Somerset, the slave, and achieved his freedom—so he knew something about the rule of law and proper principles.
First, I agree with the committee that the concept of a “respectable legal argument” needs firming up. It is one thing for the Government to litigate a case in the English courts, having been advised that the prospects are weak—that is not improper—but how low should Government be free to go? They are not an amoral, commercial client. Nor are they necessarily wrong to act when the advice given by an Attorney General is that a proposed step might breach a treaty—and I emphasise “might”. While legal advice should ordinarily remain confidential and privileged, in matters of international law the Attorney General’s determination on the lawfulness of government action in relation to a treaty can provide an important legal constraint—or not, as the case may be.
Importantly, because advice on such an issue will not be tested in the courts—at least not till long after the event; it is not like advice which leads to one going into litigation. So the Attorney-General must be particularly mindful of the solemn and constitutional duty to advise on such questions objectively and impartially and, in my view, free to explain that decision to Parliament, which has a legitimate interest if a treaty is, or may have been, broken. Indeed, I suggest that the Attorney-General should be obliged to confirm to Parliament that the advice was given that this was not a deliberate knowing breach of treaty. Furthermore, and perhaps even more seriously, when it comes to going to war, government should act only if it is confident that this is the right course. Our Armed Forces, and in particular their commanders, must be confident that, in case of armed conflict, they are not in the wrong.
To conclude, I will make some points in summary form. As my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier just explained, law officers must be Members of one or other House of Parliament and answerable to it. They should be well-established practitioners. We can look at provisions such as seven years’ or 10 years’ practice; I will not go into the detail now.
To strengthen their role, the statutory duty currently imposed on the Lord Chancellor to defend the rule of law should be extended to the law officers, and the oath taken on appointment updated to reflect this situation. The law officers should also have to appear once a year before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons. The current powers given to a departmental Select Committee to send for persons should in this respect be put on a statutory footing of compulsion.
Next, an Attorney-General, while of course continuing to attend Cabinet, should not be a member of the Cabinet—there must be that element of detachment—nor should they be a member of a Cabinet committee that is not clearly related to legal or criminal justice issues. They should not be a pure politician.
Finally, law officers should not engage in media briefings on a range of government issues. Given the short time available, I leave things there.
The Prime Minister, then, has ultimate responsibility. The Government say, at paragraph 12, that they see greater strength
“in having a number of senior Ministerial leads on discrete constitutional matters, all answerable to the Prime Minister”.
That position is stated but no justification is offered for it. Indeed, the Government now appear to have departed from it. Last month, I tabled a Question asking
“which member of the Cabinet has overall responsibility for constitutional affairs and upholding the constitution”.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe replied on 26 June:
“The Deputy Prime Minister holds ministerial responsibility for constitutional policy, with support on matters relating to the constitution from a wider ministerial team within the Cabinet Office and across Government”.
So there is now a senior Minister, other than the Prime Minister, with responsibility, which is to be welcomed. The Government have departed from the position they took in March.
The only problem is that I cannot find anywhere on the public record, other than in my noble friend’s Answer, the fact that the Deputy Prime Minister has responsibility for the constitution. It is not in his list of responsibilities on the Government’s website. It is obviously not in the List of Ministerial Responsibilities, which has not been updated since December. Last week, in answer to another Question of mine, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said that the updated list
“will be published before the summer recess”.
Perhaps my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy can confirm that it will appear in the updated list.
It would also be valuable to hear from my noble and learned friend which Ministers comprise the wider ministerial team within the Cabinet Office and across government that supports the Deputy Prime Minister. In the December List of Ministerial Responsibilities, only three Ministers—all of them junior, including my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy—have the constitution listed among their responsibilities.
Attempting to locate responsibility within government for dealing with constitutional issues is a task that has variously been undertaken by the Constitution Committee. I very much endorse its recommendations in this report, which are designed to enhance the position of the Lord Chancellor as the upholder of constitutional propriety within government. I also therefore endorse much of what other speakers, not least the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, have said.
As the report recognises, the shift is as much to do with culture as with law and regulation. This entails, as we have heard, ensuring that we have a senior figure who has the qualities detailed by the committee and—this is equally important and has been stressed—is widely recognised within Parliament and the legal profession and beyond as having those qualities. It is imperative that there is a dedicated Minister with the responsibility not only for upholding constitutional propriety but for actively promoting the values of the constitution.
The Prime Minister is now the Minister for the Union; that establishes the importance of the union, but a Prime Minister does not have time to focus consistently on it. As I and the Constitution Committee have argued before, the Government need to be on the front foot in making the case for the union. We have to stress the benefits of coming together as one United Kingdom and not simply be on the back foot, responding to demands from different devolved bodies for more powers. We need to stop treating devolved parts of the union on a grace and favour basis.
John Major was the last Conservative Prime Minister to put the integrity of the constitution at the forefront of government thinking. His successors have been tied up with dealing with specific constitutional as well as economic and other issues. There has been no serious thinking about the constitution as a constitution.
I see merit not only in having a senior Cabinet Minister with responsibility for the constitution but in the Lord Chancellor being that Minister. Giving the task to the Deputy Prime Minister is a step forward—it means that a senior Minister has that dedicated responsibility—but not all Prime Ministers accord the title of Deputy Prime Minister to one of their colleagues, and it is a title and not a post. Oliver Dowden’s posts are Secretary of State for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Giving responsibility to a different chancellor—the Lord Chancellor—not only ensures consistency but places it with a Minister who has or should have standing appropriate to the task and who will ideally be in post for some time. It provides a dedicated voice in a way that the Prime Minister cannot usually provide. The Lord Chancellor can ensure that other Ministers respect and are alert to the values of our constitution and the need to uphold them. Otherwise, there is the danger of those values being overlooked by Ministers as they address their departmental responsibilities and the Prime Minister addresses other crucial issues facing government.
I will not go through all the recommendations in the report. However, the report is like other reports from the committee: an extremely valuable and important study, which highlights the need for a body to address constitutional issues. The report merited a more substantive response, both in length and substance, from government. I look forward to my noble and learned friend the Minister providing such a response.