My Lords, in what has turned out to be a troubled and turbulent year in global affairs—from the war in Ukraine to bitter conflict in the Middle East and renewed conflict in Asia and Africa, alongside a range of humanitarian crises across several continents —it is important that we should give ourselves time in this House to consider the long-term perspective on our country’s international interests and priorities. In that context, few countries in the world assume as great a relevance to long-term global stability and prosperity as the People’s Republic of China. I therefore welcome the opportunity to commence this debate by explaining the policy approach of His Majesty’s Government to the many facets of our relationship with China.
The House will remember that in 2021 the Government’s integrated review assessed that China’s increasing assertiveness and growing impact on many aspects of our lives will be one of the defining factors of the 21st century. Earlier this year, the integrated review refresh explained how we are responding head-on to a more volatile and contested world. It recognised the major events of the last two years and the epoch-defining and systemic challenge that China presents in terms of military, diplomatic and economic activity. It also set out the three pillars of the Government’s approach to China: protecting our national security, aligning with our allies and partners and engaging with China where it is in the UK’s interests to do so. In speaking of our interests, let me be clear: when there are tensions with other objectives, we will always put our national interests and security first.
In his Mansion House speech in April, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary explained the Government’s policy on China in some detail. A starting point for our approach must be to recognise
“the depth and complexity of Chinese history and civilisation”.
One of the greatest strengths of our relationship are the personal and cultural links between the people of our countries. The British-Chinese diaspora plays an important role in our communities and our culture and we continue to welcome hundreds of thousands of Chinese students to the UK, always working to ensure that they are treated as well as any other students, whether from Britain or elsewhere.
Just now I used the phrase “epoch defining”. Let me therefore explain the systemic challenge that China under the Chinese Communist Party represents. Like it or not, we must recognise that China is becoming more authoritarian at home and more assertive overseas. Internationally, China’s new approach to multilateralism is challenging the centrality of human rights and freedoms in the UN system. Within its borders, people face growing restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and the Chinese authorities continue to commit widespread human rights violations. Internationally, China is failing to live up to its commitments, as well as to guarantees in its own constitution. Along with our partners, we want to see all countries respect fundamental freedoms and the rights of ethnic minorities. We expect China, as a leading member of the international community, to adhere to the legally binding agreements it has freely signed up to.
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for his introduction. There is a recognition that we are in very dangerous and difficult times, but I understand that it is important to focus on this relationship in particular. In his introduction, he outlined the policy towards China through three interrelated strands—or pillars, as he called them: protect, align and engage. That means to protect by strengthening national security protections, to align by deepening co-operation and alignment with key allies, and to engage through bilateral channels with China and international forums.
But has that policy been translated into action? I think we will hear in this debate some of the challenges to the assertions made by the noble Earl. For example, Bronwen Maddox of Chatham House has suggested that positions taken by the United Kingdom on China have sometimes differed from those of the Biden Administration. How are we working and aligning ourselves with our key allies in the Atlantic treaty and the European Union?
The belt and road initiative has seen China actively financing infrastructure in developing countries, with investment in more than 150 countries since 2013. In 2021, reports stated that the Prime Minister was working with democratic allies to design an alternative. Is that progressing? Where is the evidence? What have we seen in recent times?
The noble Earl mentioned artificial intelligence. We have seen interference in our democratic processes and the use of AI in fake news, particularly in the attacks on the leader of the Opposition. These are real threats to our democracy. All telecom operators have been told to strip Huawei from 5G by the end of 2027. What progress has been made on that? What measures do the Government have in place to combat potential threats through telecoms until our systems are free of that equipment?
My Lords, I am also grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity to study and discuss this question of the long-term strategic challenges posed by China. It will be no great surprise, and scarcely a matter of a declaration of interest, for me to say that liberal democratic principles are absolutely key for me and liberal democratic practices are something that I want to continue to engage in and encourage. Nor would it be doing more than stating the obvious to say that this was not shared by the People’s Republic of China.
In doing so, it is important for us to try to deepen our understanding of what is happening in our wider world. It is changing, and it is not easy to know how best to deal with it. It is important that we stand up for principles, for example those of human rights. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, for commending my noble friend Lord Alton of Liverpool for his strong stance in that regard—not only in respect of China, but notably so.
I also noted what the noble Lord said about Taiwan and the WHO. It reminded me of an experience I had myself quite some years ago. I was president of Liberal International, which has had consultative status on the ECOSOC committee of the UN since 1985. But, in March 2007, the DPP, a member party from Taiwan, was on a Liberal International delegation at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The question of WHO membership for Taiwan was raised by the DPP member—not very surprisingly. There was no questioning of the diplomatic status of China, which had always been respected by Liberal International—just the possibility of WHO membership for Taiwan. However, the People’s Republic of China took grave exception to this, and in May of that year, 2007, just a few weeks later, the UN NGO committee recommended the withdrawal of general consultative status for Liberal International because of this incident.
I discussed this with UN representatives from a number of our friendly nations: the United States, all the EU members and the ambassadors of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Israel and of course the United Kingdom. All of them were opposed to the exclusion of Liberal International on the basis of this episode. However, it became clear that it was going to be approved anyway, because the People’s Republic of China in 2007 effectively had control of the United Nations General Assembly. There were enough of the other members that were going to support the PRC whatever the situation. So, I engaged directly with representatives of the People’s Republic of China at the embassy here in London, and after negotiations we were able to reach an agreement. It was that Liberal International would accept exclusion for one year but the PRC would not object to its restoration and, when restored, the LI would observe a self-denying ordinance whereby its delegates would not address, in the name of Liberal International or as part of its delegation, issues that referred to its own domestic agenda. Others could refer to the case of Taiwan but not the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese could refer to anything else; Taiwan was not even mentioned in the agreement, but the background to it was very clear.
My Lords, I, too, welcome this important debate, but what a pity that we could not have held it a year ago, following the report of your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the UK’s security and trade relationship with China, rather than the meagre and truncated affair we had in the Moses Room at the time. The passage of a year has, however, not diminished the report’s arguments. Its central thrust remains as valid today as it was then, and is reflected in the second part of its title: “a strategic void”.
In his opening remarks, the noble Earl made frequent reference to the Government’s integrated review and its subsequent refresh. That review contained many aspirations and listed many activities, including in the sections on China and the Indo-Pacific, and it is difficult to disagree with them. But lists are not strategies; nor, frankly, are the pillars to which he referred. They do not aid clarity; indeed, they often confuse. A fundamental aspect of a strategy is a clear sense of priority. The International Relations and Defence Committee’s report, like that of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, called on the Government to produce a strategy which would set out a prioritised framework for dealing with China, and, indeed, suggested what such a strategy might look like.
In their response, the Government seem to suggest that they have a strategy, but that they are not going to tell us what it is for security reasons. This, if it was more than just camouflage, is, to say the least, unconvincing. No one expects the Government to reveal exact plans, specific means and tactical details, if indeed they exist. I for one certainly acknowledge that intentional ambiguity can be useful in certain situations, but businesses wishing to engage with China need a clear idea of the risks they might be running. Academic institutions, too, need a sense of how the Government might react to certain developments on the international scene. They do not need to know exactly what those reactions would be, but they need to be aware of where the Government’s priorities are.
My Lords, we have heard some very interesting, excellent and clear speeches so far in this debate, starting with my noble friend the Minister. It is particularly a pleasure to follow the speech we have just heard from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup.
The truth is that our relationship with China gets discussed almost everywhere on a whole spectrum of attitudes. At one extreme, we have those who say, “Stop worrying: do not get overly hysterical” and take a relaxed view that there is nothing much to be done—China is China, just carry on and it will rise and fall, and maybe rise again in the way things do in history. At another extreme, we have the “China is the enemy brigade” in line with the hard-line Manichean view held by some people in America like Mr Pompeo in the Trump Administration. It is an almost McCarthyite attitude that says China is going all-out to undermine and destroy everything around us, there are Chinese under every bed, and Chinese sympathisers must be hunted out and denounced.
Midway between these two extremes we have the UK official position, set out very closely by the noble Earl, as stated in the latest “refresh” version of the Downing Street integrated review—and I am afraid, with the way things are going, we are going to need another one quite soon, as events move so fast on this planet.
That one states, as my noble friend said, that China poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge” and calls for the three items that my noble friend mentioned: protection, which is safeguarding our critical national infrastructure and supply lines; alignment, which means working with everybody else to contain Chinese activities around the world; and engagement in varying degrees, which means creating space for a positive trade and investment relationship. All that sounds really quite sensible as far as it goes, but I believe—I am with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, here—that even this position, let alone the extreme stances described, is not really clever or subtle enough to deal with the phenomenon of today’s China.
My Lords, I begin by thanking the Leader of the House, the noble Lord, Lord True, for delivering on the promise he gave the House that this debate on the Intelligence and Security Committee report would take place in your Lordships’ Chamber. I also thank the noble Earl for the way he opened the debate and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, who will wind up for the Government at its conclusion. All the speeches made so far speak for themselves. They show the breadth and depth of the knowledge about these issues in your Lordships’ House.
I declare some non-financial interests: as co-chair of the All-Party Group on North Korea, as vice-chair of the all-party groups on the Uyghurs and on Hong Kong, and as a patron of Hong Kong Watch. I am not sure whether it qualifies as an interest but, as others have referred to, and for the purpose of transparency, I should say that I have been sanctioned by the People’s Republic of China and, for good measure, by Iran now as well.
The debate is taking place at a time of great darkness in the world and against the backdrop of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine and the Hamas terror attacks in Israel. Putin and the Chinese Communist Party chairman Xi Jinping have told us that they have “no limits” in their partnership. Both Xi and Putin are aligned with Khamenei in Iran, whose theocratic regime has been bankrolling and arming Hamas and Hezbollah.
Not to be outdone, in recent weeks North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, has delivered millions of artillery shells and rockets to Russia for use in Ukraine. China and North Korea have a mutual aid and co-operation treaty, signed in 1961, which is currently the only defence treaty either country has with any nation. I have written to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, about the decision taken only last week by the PRC to forcibly repatriate North Koreans, who have been sent back to Pyongyang, in contravention of the 1951 convention on the treatment of refugees. Can the Minister tell us whether that is an issue we will be raising in the United Nations Human Rights Council, to which the People’s Republic of China, ironically, was re-elected just a few days ago?
My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, referred in his trenchant speech to the increasingly belligerent comments coming from President Xi. He is absolutely right so to do, given the continuing militarisation and building out of the South China and East China Seas, which many of us have viewed for many years with increased concern, not least because of the uncertainty it is causing in the region for countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and of course Japan. It is also worth saying that there have been 180 incidents of coercive and risky operational behaviour against US planes over the past two years, and a further 120 incidents by the PLA on US allies. All this shows that the Chinese are probing constantly the defences of our allies.
It is no secret that Mr Putin, in Beijing recently to mark the 10th anniversary of the belt and road initiative, spoke of “common threats”, so seeking to bind China closer to Russia and tilting the relationship with China in terms of the increased trade and dependency on China that Russia will now have. We can all assume that among the things they did not discuss in front of the camera were the current situation in Ukraine and, obviously, that in Israel and Palestine.
I want to divide what I am going to say into several sections and talk quickly, trying not to repeat what those who have spoken already have said much more eloquently than I ever could. To touch briefly on the human rights aspect of this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for whom I have huge respect, having worked with him on these matters in the past, referred to the situation in the DPRK. I do not wish to detain your Lordships on this because I am seeking to obtain a debate on the DPRK in the near future, but on Monday 9 October China repatriated to the DPRK 600-plus North Korean refugees, many of whom were Christians. We can only assume that of those 600-plus North Koreans, the lucky ones are languishing in a concentration camp and the less fortunate ones will no longer be with us. We should absolutely call out China on every aspect of its human rights policy, be it in the DPRK, with the Uighurs in Xinjiang or indeed in Tibet—matters it refers to as internal matters and on which it is quick to close down any opposition.
My Lords, I endorse what others have said about human rights abuses in China, so I will not indulge in any repetition. I will use my contribution to flag up how Mandarin teaching in the UK fits in with His Majesty’s Government’s long-term strategic objectives and challenges. I spoke about this in the debate a year ago referred to by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and there are some relevant new facts and figures to report since then, following the latest independent evaluation of the Mandarin Excellence Programme, including the role and significance of the Confucius Institutes, which themselves pose one of the strategic challenges to be resolved. I declare my interests as a current member of the International Relations and Defence Committee and co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages.
In the integrated review refresh, the Government announced that they would double their funding for their China capabilities programme in 2024-25, and that this would include training for government staff on economic and military policy and Mandarin language skills. The Government are to be congratulated on acknowledging and targeting the importance of language skills as one of the decisive factors in both foreign and economic policy. Whenever I draw attention to the UK’s shortcomings in the teaching and learning of foreign languages within the education system, I always try to make sure that I draw attention to the fact that the Armed Forces and the diplomatic and security services are exemplary in their understanding of, investment in and rewarding of language skills. What level is the additional funding indicated in the refresh policy now to be set at? How many government officials are expected to receive the language training, and up to what standard?
This is obviously not the right debate to discuss the detail of the Mandarin Excellence Programme’s educational value, pedagogical approach or results. Rather, the main issue I want to highlight is whether there is any legitimate concern that the programme and its delivery in the classroom is at all compromised by undue influence from the Chinese Government in relation to content or personnel. His Majesty’s Government have made a significant investment in the MEP, which funds the teaching and learning of Mandarin in state schools, aiming to provide an increased
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In Xinjiang, members of Uighur and other predominantly Muslim minorities continue to suffer serious violations of their human rights. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has concluded, relying extensively on China’s own records, that Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang
“may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”.
In Hong Kong, China’s imposition of the national security law has seen opposition stifled and dissent criminalised. Three years on, we have seen how this opaque and sweeping law has undermined rights and freedoms enshrined in the joint declaration and in Hong Kong’s own basic law. Alternative voices across Hong Kong’s society have been all but extinguished, and changes to electoral rules have further eroded the ability of Hong Kongers to be legitimately represented at all levels of government. Hong Kong’s governance, rights and social systems are now closer to mainland norms.
Turning to the wider region, China’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait threatens to bring danger, disorder and division, risking the rule of law and global security and prosperity. China has rapidly modernised its military and done so in an opaque manner. It has militarised disputed islands in the South China Sea. We in the UK have a clear interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan but a strong unofficial relationship, based on deep and growing ties in a wide range of areas, and underpinned by shared democratic values. As the Foreign Secretary outlined in his Mansion House speech, the UK believes that the tensions over Taiwan must be settled by the people on both sides of the strait through constructive dialogue, without the threat or use of force or coercion. We do not, and will not, support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.
As I mentioned, there are three pillars in our approach to China: protect, align and engage. Let me talk first about “protect”. We are strengthening our protections in those areas where China’s actions pose a threat to our people, prosperity and security. The Deputy Prime Minister has spoken of the reported allegations of espionage on behalf of China within Parliament. As the House will expect me to say, I cannot comment on any specific aspect of what is a live investigation. However, it remains an absolute priority for the Government to take all necessary steps to protect the United Kingdom from any foreign state activity that seeks to undermine our national security, prosperity and democratic values.
We have structures in place to identify foreign interference and potential threats to our democracy. These include the new National Security Act, including creating a new offence of foreign interference, and the defending democracy task force, which was established in November last year. These measures supplement steps we have taken to protect the UK’s interests, having created new powers to protect our critical industries under the National Security and Investment Act, having removed Huawei technology from UK 5G networks and having instructed the Chinese embassy to close the so-called Chinese overseas police service stations this year.
On human rights, the UK has led international efforts to hold China to account for its wide-scale violations, including in Xinjiang. We were the first country to lead at the UN a joint statement on China’s human rights record in Xinjiang. I am pleased to say that, just yesterday, the UK led a further joint statement in the UN on the situation in Xinjiang, with 50 other signatories. In this statement, we urged China to end its violations of human rights in Xinjiang, engage constructively with the UN human rights system and fully implement the recommendations of last year’s UN assessment. We have worked tirelessly through our global diplomatic network. Our leadership has sustained pressure on China to change its behaviour and has increased the number of countries speaking out in support of human rights in China.
We have also implemented measures to ensure that UK organisations are not complicit in these violations through their supply chains by introducing new guidance on the risks of doing business in Xinjiang. In addition, we have enhanced export controls and announced the introduction of financial penalties under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We continue to call China out and pressure it to change course.
On Hong Kong, we have made clear that China’s attempts to use the national security law to pursue self-exiled activists are unacceptable. We will never tolerate attempts by the authorities to intimidate and silence individuals, whether they live in Hong Kong or overseas. In response to the introduction of the national security law in 2020, we acted quickly and decisively to introduce a bespoke immigration route for British national (overseas) status holders and their immediate family members. More than 176,000 BNO visas have been granted by the Home Office, providing a route to UK citizenship. To support their integration into our communities, the Government launched the Welcome Programme in 2021 for Hong Kongers moving to the UK through this route. We welcome the contribution that this growing diaspora makes to life in the UK, just as we welcome the contribution of the diaspora with links to mainland China. We will continue to stand up for the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong—rights and freedoms that China promised to protect when it signed the Sino-British joint declaration.
As the integrated review refresh makes clear, the UK has limited agency to influence China’s actions on our own, which is why we are deepening our alignment with core allies and a broader group of partners. Regional partnerships are especially important in defence and security. We are deepening our engagement with Indo-Pacific countries bilaterally and multilaterally, and with smaller groups of like-minded partners. The Five Power Defence Arrangements, where we work together with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, reached its 50th anniversary last year. The AUKUS defence partnership with Australia and the US also strengthens regional peace and stability, and the UK has responded positively to requests to build their capacity in maritime security through the AUKUS submarine project.
We have demonstrated our commitment through the successful deployment of the UK carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific in 2021. It engaged with 40 countries there, and we will also be deploying the littoral response group into the region in 2024. The Prime Minister has announced a further carrier strike group deployment in 2025. Two Royal Navy offshore patrol vessels, now stationed permanently in the region, are further deepening this partnership and supporting capacity building.
The Government recognise that China uses its influence in the global economy to pursue its foreign policy objectives. That brings risks to trade, investment and our supply chains in today’s interconnected world. We monitor this closely and are working to strengthen the UK’s critical supply chain resilience and avoid strategic dependency. This includes international collaboration with allies and partners to discourage trade restrictions and coercive measures.
We are in the final phase of accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will deepen the UK’s economic ties with partners in the Indo-Pacific region. By acceding to the CPTPP, the UK will join a valuable network of countries committed to the international rules and norms that underpin free trade.
The third and final pillar of our approach to China is “engage”. Here it is essential for us to recognise the size and significance of China’s influence on almost every global issue. China is a major global actor as a G20 member with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It accounts for nearly a fifth of the world economy and is a major investor in the developing world. Therefore, no significant global problem can be solved without China. We must engage with Beijing, alongside our partners, on issues that will affect us all. We must continue to engage directly with China towards open, constructive and stable relations to manage disagreements, defend our freedoms and co-operate where our interests align. That is exactly what the Prime Minister did when he met Premier Li Qiang at the G20 New Delhi summit last month, and what the Foreign Secretary did when he met his counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing in August.
It is through engagements such as those that the UK can find ways to work together as well as discuss issues where we disagree strongly with China through direct and unambiguous dialogue. AI is a good example, and the UK will host the AI safety summit next month. Some have called for China to be excluded from this conversation, but it is clear that it will take global co-operation to tackle the challenges that come with that emerging technology, even if we do not share the same values.
Take global warming. As the world’s largest investor in sustainable energy and the largest emitter of carbon, the choices that China makes are critical to our collective ability to tackle climate change. To deliver our global climate goals, we must engage with China. For example, we are working with China and other financiers of international coal to accelerate momentum and ambition for the global transition through our COP 26 energy transition campaign. In other areas, such as global health and pandemic preparedness, decisions taken by China have the potential to have a profound impact on our lives at home.
The UK is an open economy. The Government welcome foreign trade and investment to support growth and jobs, including from China. We will not accept commercial activity that compromises our national security or values, and we have safeguards in place that enable us to engage with Chinese investors and businesses with confidence. The National Security and Investment Act came into force in January 2022 to allow the Government to intervene in acquisitions where we have national security concerns. We will not hesitate to use the Act’s powers if necessary. The Act’s annual report and final orders document the use of NSI powers to date, including to block eight acquisitions by Chinese companies. We also introduced a package of measures in May last year to update the UK’s export control regime. This enhanced our military end-use controls and added China to the list of destinations to which those controls apply. These changes strengthen our ability to prevent exports, and address threats to national security and human rights.
The complex challenges posed by China call for a carefully nuanced policy from government. The three-faceted approach that I have outlined—to protect our national security, align with our allies and partners, and engage with China where it is in the UK’s interests to do so—is, I believe, the right and responsible approach for the long-term peace and prosperity of our country. I commend it to the House and beg to move.
“The UK’s academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China”
to gain political and economic influence in the United Kingdom. The noble Earl mentioned the review on protecting the academic sector that was outlined in the integrated review. When will we see the results of that? MI5 has estimated this week that 10,000 UK businesses, particularly those involved in key technologies and sciences, are at risk of Chinese espionage. Where is the evidence that we are acting on that? The ISC has warned that:
“China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”.
Will the Government therefore back Labour’s plan for a joint Treasury-Home Office task force to drive forward work on keeping the UK safe from these economic threats to our security?
In government, Labour will take a strong, clear-eyed and consistent approach to China, standing firm in defence of our national security, international law and human rights while seeking to engage where it is in our interests to do so, particularly on the global challenges the noble Earl mentioned, such as climate change and global health. Our strategy is to compete where we need to, co-operate where we can and challenge China where we must.
China is the world’s most populous country and its second-largest economy. As the noble Earl said, our relationship is complex. China is one of the UK’s largest trading partners, with bilateral trade worth more than £100 billion and 140,000 Chinese students studying here. However, its rising economic and political power has seen a growing pattern of repression domestically and more assertive action abroad, as well as unfair trade practices. We are also very concerned about hostile Chinese action on UK soil—for example, in its efforts to silence and intimidate critics. It is essential that we work with our allies and partners to address these challenges, strengthening the international rule of law and the multilateral institutions that support it.
China remains crucial to addressing many global issues and is deeply integrated into the world economy. We will engage with it on the basis of our national interest, based on clear principles, but not be afraid to speak out on human rights. We have consistently condemned the dismantling of democracy in Hong Kong and the plight of the Uighur people, which the United Nations has said may constitute crimes against humanity.
We too welcome and support the BNOs who have arrived in this country and are a very important part of our community. We show support also for those BNOs and nationals who are still in Hong Kong, particularly those who, like Jimmy Lai, have been imprisoned for standing up for democracy. I hope the Minister will respond in terms of what we are doing to support him and other British nationals who have been imprisoned for standing up for democracy.
The problem is that we have had an approach to China that has been inadequate and does not focus sufficiently on managing future security risks. In government, Labour will carry out a complete audit of UK-China relations to ensure that the relationship reflects our interest and values so we can set a consistent strategy for the long term—something that this Government have refused to do or adopt. A Labour Government will increase our independence in critical national infrastructure and not repeat some of the mistakes this Government made over Huawei and nuclear power. We will work with our allies to provide real alternatives to China’s finance and investment in the developing world, focused on addressing poverty, strengthening global health and accelerating climate action and adaptation. We want to see a dialogue and peaceful moves to address the issues across the Taiwan Strait. We have been clear in our serious concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions towards Taiwan and the attempts to intimidate its democratic leaders.
It is important to avoid accidents and miscalculations that raise tension or risk escalation. As the noble Earl mentioned, these actions are part of a wider pattern by China, which is becoming more assertive, as we have seen in the South China Sea. We have been very clear in challenging repression in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. It is also absolutely wrong that China has brought sanctions against UK parliamentarians for raising these concerns, particularly Members of this House—I mention the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
The Government are divided on how to approach China and have no clear strategy, leading to U-turns and inconsistent rhetoric. Despite the noble Earl’s assertion, there is a lack of guidance for business on trade with China, and the Government’s so-called “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific has been underresourced. The Labour Government would take a strong, clear-eyed and consistent approach, and we will maintain the consistent position of successive British Governments around the recognition of Taiwan. However, we support Taiwan being an observer at organisations such as the WHO. If we are to really challenge global health pandemics and address global health issues, we need to ensure that Taiwan’s expertise is heard in forums such as the WHO.
The noble Earl mentioned AUKUS, which has Labour’s full backing. We welcome increased defence co-operation with key allies. The US and Australia are two of our closest partners. We need to ensure that that continues and my noble friend will address this in more detail in his contribution. We are confident that AUKUS adheres to all nuclear non-proliferation treaties and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
In conclusion, this debate is not about tilting one way or the other. Maintaining serious, long-term strategic approaches to the Indo-Pacific, through arrangements such as AUKUS, is an essential response to the shifting centre of gravity in world affairs. This will not come at the cost of our security commitments in Europe, nor mean that we can safely ignore our own neighbourhood.
That was accepted by the PRC and I wrote to the chairman of ECOSOC in that regard. Liberal International was removed for 12 months and then came back. There was no objection from PRC and has not been in the 15 years since then. I took three things from that. The first was that, while I had previously visited Taiwan, I had not, I think, understood quite how exquisitely sensitive the issue of Taiwan was. Indeed, one of the diplomats from the embassy here said to me, “It is the most important foreign policy issue for China”. I said, “Look at all the other important issues”, but he said, “No, you don’t understand. It is the most important issue”. I think we need to keep that in mind.
Secondly, whatever our thoughts about these things and however much support we have from our traditional friends, the General Assembly of the United Nations has, in effect, been controlled for some decades by the PRC, which also has its veto power in the Security Council. Thirdly, and more positively, if one were to reach an agreed and negotiated outcome, the PRC would live with it and continue to do so. As I said, 15 years later, it has not reneged on the decision on Liberal International.
The situation in our world changed and we have to recognise that we are no longer quite the power that we were in the West. In 2008, undoubtedly educated by that experience the previous year, I wrote a paper with my friend Sundeep Waslekar about talks and dialogue in the Middle East. We did not call it “the Middle East” because he comes from India, so I learned that to him it was “west Asia”—another example of how we need to take into account the cultural and intellectual perspectives of others from a different part of the world. It was published in India andGlobal Affairs in 2008. We wrote:
“If Israel and the Arab parties do not find a comprehensive solution soon, Iran can be expected to be an even more direct player in the near future. If a few more years are allowed to pass”,
Russia and China will develop significant stakes in the region. We also said that, at that time, it would have been possible to negotiate knowing English, Hebrew and Arabic, but if it were left too long people would need to learn Russian and Chinese as well.
One of the difficulties that has emerged is about our understanding and appreciation that people have very different perspectives from ours. As liberals in the Isaiah Berlin tradition, we have long been prepared to indicate that, of course, others have cultural differences from us and different principles and perspectives. But when they start having different perspectives on, say, human rights or fundamentally different cultural perspectives, or an attachment to forms of religion we do not easily accept, our tolerance and appreciation of those differences sometimes become difficult to sustain. For example, in July 2023, an article in China Daily, “Toward a Fair World Rights Order”, described how very important it is that we accept that there is no enforcement of
“uniformity on others, in the belief that certain traditions and systems are inherently superior”.
When we were sure that ours would be superior and would carry the day, we would have been happy to sign up for that, but now that that is no longer the case it is much more of a challenge for us. It seems to me that there is a very significant challenge, intellectually and politically, to us as we to try to struggle with this question.
I will take a more practical aspect: economics. One of the things that struck me a great deal when engaging with colleagues around the world was how absolutely enormously much of the rest of the world resents the power of the US dollar. The fact that it is the reserve currency has allowed massive debt to be created that can be resolved simply by printing more dollars. My sense of things, as I have listened to people over the last few years, is that we may well, in the next year or two, find Russia, China and others trying to construct some kind of alternative reserve currency. We have been through that before: sterling used to be a strong reserve currency. We still have our pound, but it is not in the same place as it was. If the United States finds itself experiencing that, it will be difficult intellectually—in terms of human, civil and political rights—to complain about it, but the consequences would be absolutely enormous; indeed, potentially catastrophic. It seems to me that there is a lot to be said as we struggle with these questions, so I entirely appreciate that, when the integrated review refresh talks about
“an epoch-defining and systemic challenge”,
it is absolutely right to do so.
It is important to appreciate that China is a challenge, a competitor—it may be a rival in some areas but I am not sure that we measure up enough for it to be a rival in the major areas. Economically, the rivalry is with the United States and the European Union, militarily it is with the United States, but what is crucial is that this rivalry, challenge, difference and disagreement do not lead us into what Graham Allison called the Thucydides trap of making China into an enemy. That is why it is crucial that the Foreign Secretary went to Beijing, kept open the channels of communication, talked, listened and engaged, because when someone is a competitor or a rival, but you maintain communication, they do not necessarily need to become an enemy. You can sit there and disagree, argue, discuss and perhaps even sometimes to some degree change each other’s mind, but you do not become an enemy. What humankind would not be able to sustain is China becoming an enemy of the United States, Europe and our allies.
There are many things that we can co-operate on. Some of them have been mentioned by the Minister: environmental questions, crucially, and artificial intelligence. I welcome the fact that the Chinese will be here next month at Bletchley Park. There is the whole nuclear question. In the 1970s, we had to engage across the Cold War divide with Russia and establish the CSCE and, ultimately, the OSCE. Why? Because we agreed? No, because we did not agree and we needed to engage with those whom we disagreed absolutely profoundly, including on all issues such as human rights, the economy and so on. Why? To make sure that there was still a world for our children and grandchildren to inhabit and not one that was destroyed by nuclear war.
It will be absolutely critical that on a question of that kind we have the kinds of structures that enable us to engage China and ensure the safety of the world. China can be helpful to us on the Russia/Ukraine question, it can be helpful to all of us on the Middle East question—the west Asia question—and it can even be helpful to us on issues such as North Korea, but it will be able to be helpful only if we can disagree in a civil way, engage in communication and collaboration on some common interests, and ensure that China becomes whatever kind of competitor—and it may be more successful than we would like to believe—but that it does not become an enemy.
The issue of Taiwan is clearly the most dangerous aspect of our engagement with China. Supporting that country’s independence while avoiding a general war over it should be our top priority. President Xi’s statements in recent years have only added to the tension over Taiwan. The Government’s response to the report acknowledged the importance of the issue, as did the noble Earl. However, the Government have not said what assessments have been made of the risk of likelihood of conflict and its possible consequences, particularly for the UK. This is not an area where I would look for detail, but I do look for an assurance that such work is in hand.
Beyond that, it is clear that China is, as one of the inquiry’s witnesses put it, out to make the world safe for autocracy. Events over recent months have served only to reinforce that judgment—witness President Xi’s comments at the belt and road forum in Beijing yesterday. Meanwhile, as we have heard, the head of the Security Service has said that China is engaging in an “epic scale” of espionage. The fact that he was making common cause with the heads of security of the other members of the Five Eyes partnership at an unprecedented public event should give us pause.
The Government’s response to the International Relations and Defence Committee’s report admitted:
“Aspects of China’s approach to the multilateral system run counter to UK interests and values”.
The response went on:
“We will continue to take targeted action with international partners to defend universal human rights, free and fair trade, and ensure that in areas, such as emerging technology or space, that new rules, norms and standards enable freedom and democracy to survive and thrive”.
This is woefully inadequate. It makes the whole thing sound like a piece of peripheral business. In fact, we are—or certainly should be—engaged in a fierce contest to determine the rules of the international order under which we will have to live and operate for most of the rest of this century. Very few things could be more central to our future welfare and prosperity. Securing the right outcome should be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the UK. It certainly is for the United States. President Biden has made his Administration’s position very clear on this and has set about assembling the necessary international economic, technological and military weight to counter that of China.
None of this is to argue against the desirability of business, academic and cultural links with China, but setting out the UK’s priorities in this regard would make it clear that those other areas of engagement would all be contingent upon the pursuit of our objectives regarding the international order. This would be a much clearer and harder-edged statement of intent than a general reference to our national interest. It is difficult to see how spelling this out would endanger our security. It would, however, give those in business and elsewhere a clearer idea of the downside risks associated with such engagement. As it is, if one reads the Government’s comments regarding Huawei, for example, one gets the clear impression that this company would now have a substantial hold over our 5G network had the Americans not rather annoyingly imposed additional sanctions on them. The Government’s response to the committee’s report said that the National Security and Investment Act is “country agnostic”. That might be true with regard to the wording of the Act, but to suggest that the same is true of its application seems to be breathtakingly complacent. I welcome the fact that the noble Earl was somewhat more robust on this point today.
The principal risk for UK business is the likely adverse China reaction to our opposition in the contest to determine the future rules of the international order. The committee called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment of such an outcome. The Government’s response was a fine example of departmental waffle. Let me offer some examples:
“The … relationship … is multifaceted … We will … manage disagreements and defend our values while preserving space for cooperation in tackling … positive trade and investment relationship in line with our national security and values”.
It is cakeism at its best. But what do we do if somebody takes away the cake? We are given no answer.
This Panglossian approach was equally evident in the Government’s response on higher education, which said:
“We will also ensure that Chinese students are treated equally to all British and international students, including protecting them from any undue pressure on political issues”.
Really? How? Are we going to ensure that their families in China are protected from official pressure or sanction? Are we going to monitor all their interactions with their own Government? Or perhaps these matters do not fall under the heading of “undue pressure”.
The Government’s response on supply chain resilience was little better. We were told:
“The Foreign Secretary has been clear that it is important that the UK does not become strategically dependent, and that, particularly in areas of Critical National Infrastructure, we work with reliable partners”.
The noble Earl repeated such assurances in his opening remarks today. What action has followed? What exercises have been undertaken with a range of scenarios to give us a better idea of critical vulnerabilities and how these might be reduced? What specific command and control processes have been set in place to train for and respond to threats to our national resilience? Once again, we have been given only vague reassurances.
I hope that the Minister might be a little more forthcoming when he winds up this debate, because the Government could and should do much better. We are dealing with an increasingly autocratic regime in China. Our experiences with Russia over the past decade should have taught us what we should never have forgotten: how dangerous such regimes can be, especially when they are militarily powerful and most especially when they have nuclear weapons. We need a long-term strategy for dealing with them.
The Government should set out such a strategy; they should give some shape and sense of priority to their otherwise all too comprehensive and sometimes contradictory aspirations with regard to China. The International Relations and Defence Committee proposed such a shape: finding a satisfactory but peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue is at the top, but close behind it comes our pursuit of an international order that is fair to all and helps to protect the world from autocracy. Trade and wider engagement with China should be pursued, but not at the expense of higher priority objectives and in the knowledge that such prioritisation will at times lead to Chinese retaliation and will give rise to associated and sometimes severe risks. How much longer must we wait for some clarity on these issues?
In a leader article on China last year, the Economist said:
“handling the most powerful dictatorship in history was always going to require both strength and wisdom”.
It was not clear to me then, and it is not much clearer to me now, that we see enough of either.
I would argue that some deeper approaches are needed, which I will comment on. I first give a few facts. I begin with climate issues, which my noble friend on the Front Bench referenced. Even though China is an enormous investor in renewables—maybe the world’s biggest—its coal burning for electricity is currently around 1,000 gigawatts, which is about 58% of all its electric power. This is down from 80% but, with a recent surge of new coal-fired plants—with 45 being built or revived and 52 more planned—it is rising again. To put things into perspective, it now ends up at about 1,000 times our small, residual coal burn in this country. Together with India’s 250 gigawatts of coal plants and America at a little less, those three countries account for over 60% of rising world emissions. There is absolutely no hope of curbing climate violence, however zealous we are with our own net zero, unless these soaring emissions are somehow reversed. That is where full co-operation, and the full focus of our contribution to the battle, should be directed if we are serious about climate change.
Sometimes it seems that, with all our concentration directed inwards to achieving our very worthy net-zero goal, we forget the main aim, which is to curb world emissions and to head off the worst climate violence and planetary destruction. Sometimes I even sympathise a bit with Greta Thunberg, not her latest escapade with trying to stop oil now, which would of course cause huge world suffering and disruption for the poorest, but her more general fear that the next generation will feel completely betrayed. I do not see that the worthy but costly net zero here will make the slightest difference to the frightening rise in world emissions carrying on now. The UK is not making anything like the best and most focused contribution that it could to checking global warming, and that has strong implications for our relations with China.
Secondly, we must face the fact that, for all the rhetoric about China around the western world, trade with China is still extremely high and is growing in most areas. For the EU, it is back up to £450 billion for the last 12 months, and cheap electric vehicles are about to flood into the European system, to the alarm of the entire European motor industry. Then there is security. Obviously, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup said, Taiwan is there. The question is whether the Israel horror, coming on top of the Afghanistan withdrawal model, will tempt Xi to go earlier. Most people say that he will delay for a while, but I am not so sure. He must be looking at the situation again and wondering. I also wonder whether our eye is on the ball as China hoovers up the developing world and quite a lot of members of the Commonwealth with it. Let us keep our Five Eyes assembly, which we have just seen gather in a rather encouraging way, fully alert and supported. Whitehall seems to think that a lot of smaller islands in the South Seas and the Caribbean are too small or remote to be strategically important. But the Chinese foreign policy strategists think quite the opposite: the control of maritime routes and the so-called assistance to these small countries with policing, training and, indeed, even weapons and military advice is a crucial part of the strategic game of the world.
As for the heavy hand in Hong Kong and the appalling persecution of the Uighurs, I know that the speaker coming after me will explain with his usual perception and accuracy just what is happening. I hope we can somehow influence and delay the crushing of Hong Kong’s freedoms. It is China that will be the loser. Hong Kong was an enormously valuable asset to China in its full heyday and even now could be if China played things very differently.
As for the Chinese economy, it is a mixed picture. It all looked very good for China earlier this year. It appeared to be recovering from the Covid drama, but investment is plummeting and so is consumer demand. We now see in China slower growth; soaring debt; attempted, but of course resisted, capital flight; massive youth unemployment; a shrinking population; what is called economic long Covid; and a distinct alienation of China’s friends, thanks to the general aggressiveness of Xi Jinping’s stance. The belt and road initiative, which has been mentioned, is running up a lot of debts.
My advice would be in some respect the very opposite of that of the blinkered Sinophobes and hardliners who seem to want us to cut off all links with and somehow cancel China. We should not only engage but bring it all on. We should not only ensure that we do not cut off China but actively welcome Chinese capital, students, technology and brands. That would in fact weaken and undermine Xi’s imperial ambitions. The sensitive sectors should of course be protected, and we are going to do that, but much of Chinese intellectual property theft comes from cybercrime and espionage, some of which is very naive and childish.
Our story, under the rule of law and in freedom, is a lot better than the Chinese story. It should be told to the world with much more vigour and elan. The Chinese information flow, designed to undermine our values and our democracy, is formidably good and effective at reaching the free world and all the non-aligned countries, which is most countries now. I hope, but of course do not know, that ours is just as good in somehow reaching the Chinese on the dangers for China itself if it persists in stepping outside the comity of nations, flouting international law and disdaining the alliance of civilised nations against the coming dangers that threaten us all, of which the bestiality and bottomless evil of 7 October by the Hamas butchers is the most vivid example. The powerful attraction of an open society, draining capital out of China—as one commentator put it, “suction, not sanctions”—is the best way to weaken Chinese dominance and benefit us at the same time. It is the path we should follow.
Beyond North Korea, this new and deadly axis wants to replace the rules-based order—which has been referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Howell, Lord Alderdice and Lord Collins, and my noble and gallant friend—and the global stability that has been delivered pretty much since World War II, with rule by force and by diktat. It would be a mistake to see this alliance of dictators, theocrats, authoritarians and jihadists as separate threats. Their ideological differences will be parked temporarily as they use one another to pursue their shared hatred of the free world and its democracies. Xi Jinping sees us as weak and has frequently attacked Western values and multi-party democracy. His declared ambition is for the CCP regime to become the dominant world power by 2049, when his Communist Party will be 100 years old.
Dictators protect one another and exploit geopolitical chaos. Xi thinks nothing of making alliances and deals with Iran or, for that matter, with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, he secures the compliance of dependent countries—a point referred to by earlier speakers—by indebting them through belt and road projects and then demanding the votes of those countries at the United Nations. That too has implications, of course, for global order and security. I would be particularly keen to hear what assessment the Minister is making of the CCP’s current activities across Africa, a point made regularly in the International Relations and Defence Select Committee—on which I was proud to serve with my noble and gallant friend—by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, who is in his place.
It is against this disturbing international backdrop that the House is considering some of the key observations of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Let us remember what that report begins with:
“China’s national imperative continues to be the continuing dominance and governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, it is its ambition at a global level – to become a technological and economic superpower, on which other countries are reliant – that represents the greatest risk to the UK.”
It explores what it calls
“the multifaceted nature of the intelligence threat posed by China”
and warns us that China pursues a “whole-of-state” approach, meaning that
“Chinese state-owned and non-state-owned companies, as well as academic and cultural establishments and ordinary Chinese citizens, are liable to be (willingly or unwillingly) co-opted into espionage and interference operations overseas”.
Most alarmingly, though, for me, the committee concludes that China has been able to
“successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”;
that
“Chinese money was readily accepted by HMG with few questions asked”;
and that external experts concluded
“very strongly that HMG did not have any strategy on China, let alone an effective one”.
The lack of action to identify and protect UK assets from a known threat was, the report argues,
“a serious failure, and one that the UK may feel the consequences of for years to come”.
Furthermore, the committee found there is “no evidence” that government departments tasked with countering Chinese interference have the necessary resources, expertise or knowledge. The level of resource dedicated to tackling the threat “has been completely inadequate”, and
“The slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented also leaves a lot to be desired”.
The committee added:
“Without swift and decisive action”
a “nightmare scenario” could emerge whereby China represented not just a
“commercial challenge, but … an existential threat to liberal democratic systems”.
That is not hawks speaking, of the kind referred to in the preceding speech, but a serious committee of Parliament.
In their response published last month, His Majesty’s Government pointed out that the committee’s inquiry related to evidence primarily presented in 2020 and that the Government’s integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy in 2021 and its refresh in 2023, which was referred to by the noble Earl, strengthened the United Kingdom’s position on China, recognising what it calls the
“epoch-defining and systemic challenge”
posed by China, and making it clear that
“national security will always come first”.
That was echoed by the noble Earl.
I welcome that progress and look forward to hearing the Minister set out what that means in terms of practical action, which the noble Lord, Lord Collins, referred to. But even since 2021 there have continued to be inconsistencies, mixed messaging and inadequate government responses to the threats posed by the CCP regime.
What is not in contention—here, I again echo what the noble Earl said—is that it is perfectly possible to admire the people, culture and civilisation of China while opposing the brutal dictatorship that rules China, currently led by Xi Jinping. But that is not the position of the Government, who pursue a Pushmi-Pullyu approach worthy of Dr Doolittle and believe you can make more trade deals with a regime accused of genocide against Muslim Uighurs.
That approach was in evidence again this week in reports about the reconvening of JETCO. Would it not be better to reduce our dependency on a regime with which we have a trade deficit of around £40 billion —a point the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, often makes—increase own resilience, especially in manufacturing, and enhance trade with countries that broadly share our values and beliefs? Here I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, said about the importance of the Commonwealth. But instead, we ignore the threats and seek deals with a regime which despises and threatens the world.
This is a regime that is intensifying atrocities in Tibet and that dismantled Hong Kong’s promised freedoms and autonomy, in total breach of the international treaty, the Sino-British joint declaration. It is a regime that stands accused of severe persecution of Christians, Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, of committing the crime against humanity of forced organ harvesting and of unleashing a crackdown on civil society, lawyers, bloggers, journalists and dissidents across China. It is a regime that has escalated threats to Taiwan. It is a regime that, at least twice in the past year, has been accused of infiltrating this very Parliament with influencers and alleged spies. It is a regime that the head of MI5 has on multiple occasions—as recently as this week describing the threats to British businesses, as my noble and gallant friend said—warned poses a significant threat. The writing has been on the Great Wall of China for years.
We recall that in 2020, the Government were poised to invite the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei into our 5G network. The noble Earl made a virtue of the decision not to proceed with that, but it was only as a result of amendments here and a serious rebellion in the House of Commons, combined with pressure from the United States, Australia and other allies who saw the dangers, that the Government changed their mind. That failure to act in concert with our allies cost this country significant sums of money and damaged its reputation.
The same thing happened with Hikvision’s surveillance cameras. Since January 2020 I have raised this issue on more than 25 occasions in your Lordships’ House, describing them as tools of genocide because of the way surveillance cameras have been used in Xinjiang to facilitate the atrocity crimes perpetrated against the Uighurs. As I said in a previous debate,
“A negligent procurement policy means that we will ultimately end up stripping them out, as we did with Huawei, at huge public cost”.—[Official Report, 25/5/22; col. 878.]
That is exactly what we have ended up doing.
Sometimes the Government have done the right thing but very late in the day. The decision to force a Chinese-owned tech firm to sell at least 86% of its stake in Britain’s largest microchip company, Newport Wafer Fab, because of fears about the national security risks involved was the right one, but why did we allow China to invest in such a critical sector in the first place? The mixed messaging continues. I applaud His Majesty’s Government for joining the US and Australia in forming AUKUS, our security alliance, but while this is the right response, there is plenty that is not.
During our International Relations and Defence Committee inquiry into China, the noble Lord, Lord Patten of Barnes, using a word that my noble and gallant friend used himself in his remarks today, described our approach to China as “cakeism”—wanting to be more secure while simultaneously wanting more trade deals. An example of that is the failure to sanction Hong Kong officials responsible for their involvement in some of the events described by the noble Lord, Lord Patten. In January, two submissions on sanctions were made to the FCDO by Stand with Hong Kong via the All-Party Group on Hong Kong and by Hong Kong Watch. In February, FCDO officials said the submissions would be reviewed and a decision made by April. There has still been no response. Perhaps the Minister, particularly in the light of the growing number of political prisoners—there are more than 1,000 in prison in Hong Kong—will speak to his right honourable friend Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP to establish when a response will be forthcoming.
I have some other questions for the Minister—I will try to be brief. Why was the governor of Xinjiang invited to meet Foreign Office officials earlier this year, and why did it have to take public pressure for the visit to be cancelled? Why have not one but two Hong Kong Ministers—the Secretary for Financial Services, Christopher Hui, and then the Financial Secretary, Paul Chan—been in London this year? When the CCP has completely dismantled Hong Kong’s freedoms and autonomy and undermined its rule of law, is that appropriate?
Why was the first ministerial visit in five years by a British Minister to Hong Kong made by the Trade Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, with no apparent agenda to discuss human rights, during the continued imprisonment of British citizen Jimmy Lai—whose son Sebastien has been here in Parliament again this week? When will the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary follow the example of the US Administration, the European Union Parliament and the United Nations special rapporteurs and call for the immediate release of Mr Lai? Why did the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, speak at the Chinese embassy’s celebration of the 74th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China earlier this month? What kind of message does that send to a regime that the Government themselves say poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge”?
The Prime Minister gave a personal pledge to shut down the CCP’s Confucius Institutes in our universities and schools. Why do we not work with the Government of Taiwan for language and culture studies rather than with the CCP? In January this year the Times, following research by Civitas, highlighted the fact that more than 40 of our universities have links with institutions that are tools of the Chinese state, including institutions complicit with, facilitating or directly involved with the Uighur genocide, nuclear development, military research, espionage and hacking. What are we thinking of? What steps are being taken to help British universities reduce dependency and diversify their funding sources?
What are the Government doing to address concerns highlighted by Charles Parton, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, and others that Chinese-made electric cars—or even simply Chinese-made cellular modules that are components in non-Chinese-made cars and other electronic equipment—could be used to spy on us? What assessment has been made of those security risks?
Why, following the physical assault by the Chinese consul-general in Manchester and several Chinese diplomats on Hong Kongers peacefully protesting outside the consulate, with the consul-general claiming it was his “duty”, did the Government not immediately expel those diplomats and declare them persona non grata?
It was instructive that Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, a former British diplomat who until recently was HSBC’s head of public affairs, described Britain as “weak” for siding with the United States against China. But we have been too weak in failing to stand up to the CCP. If UK businesses are in doubt about the nature of the regime with which they are dealing, they should meet Peter Humphrey, the British businessman and journalist who at a meeting here recently described his two and a half years in Chinese jails, some of the time with 12 men in a cell.
In response to this damning indictment from the Intelligence and Security Committee, we need to completely review our procurement policies, our university sector, our critical infrastructure and our diplomatic messaging. We need to ensure that we have the resources to counter the threat from the CCP, and that we are consistent and robust in defending our values of human rights, our national interests and our national security.
The Minister, my noble friend Lord Howe, talked rightly about the situation in Hong Kong. Before this debate I read the Foreign Office’s latest six-month report, which makes for sober reading. While undoubtedly the economy of Hong Kong is thriving, the steady erosion of free speech and liberties, and the application of the national security law in Hong Kong, are causes of real concern.
We find ourselves in a position far from that we were in when I was the Minister for Asia. We were engaged on good relations with China; it was designated as a win-win situation, although some of us may have had our private doubts about it. To put it into context, that was when we were seeking finance for our critical infrastructure—for Hinkley, Sizewell and Bradwell—and when Huawei was still part of the deal. It coincided with a prime ministerial visit led by David Cameron in 2013, on which I was one of those who went to China with a large business delegation, and in return an incoming state visit from President Xi in 2015.
The one thing the United Kingdom cannot be accused of is consistency in its approach to relations with China. I have some sympathy with the Chinese, who take a very long-term view about everything in the same way that, increasingly, we take an incredibly short-term view. They must be left wondering why only a few years ago we were trying to attract them into almost every aspect of investment and infrastructure, but then closed the door on them.
The peril of following my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford is that he always mentions the Commonwealth, which is what I always want to mention too. He was right to do so. I declare my registered interest as the deputy chairman of the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council. There is much talk about China’s pursuit of rare earth minerals all around the Commonwealth, but I have to say that China has a very large and growing economy. It seems to me that it is as entitled to secure the tools to grow that economy as anyone else is.
If there is any fault for the fact that China is in places which were previously in the sphere of British influence, it lies at our door. It is because of our continuing neglect of the Commonwealth family in those parts of the world, which looked to—and still look to—the UK for friendship, leadership and co-operation. We have created a void; nature abhors a void and the Chinese have filled it—for example, in the Pacific islands, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands.
Next year, we have the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Samoa. I hope that will concentrate minds on what is going on in that part of the world. However, it is not just there but all across Africa and the Caribbean. I regret that we cut our overseas aid budget, which has affected some of these places so adversely and left the door open for others—very often the Chinese—to come in. We cannot blame the Chinese for doing what we want to do, just because they are prepared to put the money on the table and we are not.
Let me give noble Lords two examples. For example, Sri Lanka is in the newspapers today. There is much criticism of people attending a seminar to attract investment in the Gulf for the Port City Colombo because the funding is Chinese. The whole idea of that webinar was surely to show the rest of the world the opportunities to dilute the Chinese funding. You cannot criticise on one hand and practise inactivity on the other. The first Commonwealth visit destination of our new king is Kenya, which is coming up shortly. Where has the new President Ruto just been? Trying to extend a loan in China. Kenya is a Commonwealth country, and we are so outraged that he has gone to China to extend a loan, but what are we doing about it? Again, you cannot criticise others for stepping into the breach.
Trade with China is growing. In 2017, Chinese investment in the United Kingdom was about £2.46 billion, but by 2021 that had increased to £5.1 billion—effectively doubling. Our relationship with China, whether we like it or not, is important. It seems that the Government’s approach, although I have found fault with the lack of consistency, is broadly right: to protect, to align and engage. However, as well as being alert to the threats posed by China—they are very real—we must also be alert to the opportunities, while remaining predictable and consistent in our relations with the Chinese.
“pipeline of fluent Mandarin speakers to meet the future business and economic needs of the country”.
By all measures, the programme continues to be successful and to exceed its own targets. By 2023, 11,000 students from 79 schools were enrolled in it, and this is expected to increase to 13,000 by 2024. The latest independent assessment shows that it is an effective model for developing young Chinese scholars with no prior or family link to China or Chinese.
The MEP is delivered by the University of London’s Institute of Education, in partnership with the British Council. The DfE’s contract for the programme is with UCL, not the Confucius Institutes. No one sent by China works in the MEP office. Every school participating in the MEP is responsible for engaging its own teachers locally, in exactly the same way as they employ teachers of Spanish, French or anything else. The teachers are not provided by the Confucius Institutes; they supply guest teaching assistants from China but these are supplementary to the core classroom teachers. Schools do not have any contractual agreements with any Chinese organisation; their agreements are with UCL and governed by English law, covering adherence to data protection and freedom of information.
However, for some time, high-profile concern has been expressed about the role of the Confucius Institutes and their presence within the UK education system. The China Research Group of MPs described them as an arm of the Chinese state and inaccurately claimed that the government funding of the MEP is channelled through the Confucius Institutes—as I said, this is not the case. Others have accused them of engaging in lobbying more than simply education, and there has been talk of the Government phasing out Confucius Institutes altogether and replacing them with Taiwanese alternatives. Here I respectfully disagree with my noble friend Lord Alton, because these alternatives would be educationally inadequate and would kill off the educational excellence of the MEP—although those details are also clearly not for this particular debate.
I have no doubt that it is a perfectly fair assessment to claim that the Confucius Institutes are effectively an arm of the Chinese state, but I would caution the Government against throwing the baby out with the bathwater by responding to pressure to sever all connection between them and the MEP. While the Confucius Institutes’ involvement with the teaching of Mandarin in our universities may well be giving rise to some legitimate concerns about undue influence in content, structure or personnel, the evidence shows that it is wide of the mark to suggest that this is the case with the schools programme. I urge the Minister to acknowledge this very clear and important distinction. As I have said already, there is clear blue water, legally, contractually and organisationally, between the institutes and the schools programme. The concerns that have been expressed are not shared by students, parents, teachers or head teachers. At the same time, it must of course be conceded that closer monitoring of the situation in some universities is clearly advisable, but any action against the Confucius Institutes should be proportionate and properly targeted.
I realise that the Mandarin Excellence Programme, which comes under the DfE, is one of the few things that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is not responsible for as Minister. However, I should be grateful if he would contact and liaise with colleagues in that department and perhaps write to me later to confirm that the MEP’s funding will be extended into 2025 and beyond. I hope that he will be happy to nail this down with the DfE, because it is as much in the long-term strategic interests of our foreign and economic policies as it is of education policy that we should maintain this pipeline of non-Chinese Mandarin speakers. We know from recent ground-breaking research by Cambridge University that, if more money were invested in the teaching of Mandarin, the UK could increase the value of its exports by £5 billion a year. Building and developing a larger cohort of Mandarin speakers is important not just for trade but for the all-important intercultural understanding that underpins so many geopolitical challenges, including human rights, climate change, counterterrorism and AI.
I look forward to the Minister’s comments on the issues I have raised.