26: Clause 8, page 8, line 4, leave out paragraph (f)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that the duty to allocate seats to political groups to the executive of a CCA or to a committee of such an executive would continue to reflect the requirement for political balance defined in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 30, 31 and 43 in my name. On Tuesday, I spoke on Amendment 51; I share the concerns expressed on that occasion by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. I am a signatory to that amendment, in the name also of the noble Lord, Lord Bach.
I have a particular concern in relation to Amendment 30. I should give the Minister notice that, assuming that the response I get is similar to the one I got in Committee, it is my intention to test the opinion of the House.
On Amendment 26, I expressed concern in Committee that the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 will be disapplied in so far as political balance is concerned on a combined county authority. All this group is about power structures in combined county authorities. Some of the proposals in the Bill are worrying because they will centralise power within a CCA. The disapplication of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, because it eliminates political balance on a CCA, could lead to dominance by one party in the combined county authority and encourage a further centralisation of power.
I also have a concern about centralisation of power away from CCAs into the Treasury. With Amendment 43—I raised this matter too in Committee—I am concerned that, in terms of the Government’s ambitions for devolution, of which a great deal is claimed, no further devolution of fiscal powers is planned that I can see. For example, in the recent West Midlands deal, there is provision for the collection of local business rates locally for 10 years, but other fiscal powers are missing from that devolution agreement. I therefore have a concern in respect of Amendment 43 as well. I do not plan to test the opinion of the House on it but I hope that the Minister will understand that it is important to have a system for power structures that will stand the test of public scrutiny. I fear that these do not.
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I understand totally that you may wish to hear from somebody who has expertise. It is a very different matter to say that that individual, for temporary purposes, could have a vote on an issue. Who decides who is a business leader? I served for seven years on a regional development agency. I was appointed by the Secretary of State. The business leaders who were on the regional development agency were appointed by the Secretary of State. Here the appointment will be made by the CCA.
As I try to point out in Amendment 26, the CCA’s structure as it is now composed, because it disapplies the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, means that the power structure is being heavily centralised and it is not necessary for associate members to be given a vote. It could lead to an abuse of power, and that is what I am seeking to prevent.
I will finish by quoting the noble Earl, Lord Howe, further, because there was quite a debate on this issue late in Committee. He said:
“The point I was seeking to make is that the CCA would in some, if not many, circumstances want to maximise the input from associate members by allowing in certain circumstances those associate members to vote on such matters. The amendment would prevent that happening and could risk undermining the combined county authority’s ability to work in collaboration with local experts who can contribute positively to the working of the CCA”.—[Official Report, 27/2/23; col. 113.]
I do not understand what that means. They can work “positively” alongside the CCA as an associate member. The question is whether they should have a vote. I submit to the Government yet again the view that they should not have a vote and that the only people who should have a vote are the full members of the CCA. I beg to move.
My Lords, I very much support the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, particularly about the district council situation. Noble Lords might recall that in Committee I raised the issue of Oxfordshire and Oxford City Council, of which I used to be a member, which would be a non-constituent member of the combined authority, but Oxford University could be invited to come in as a participating member under this thing, and that does not seem right.
The noble Lord also kindly mentioned my Amendment 51, which is related to my Amendment 53A, which we debated on Tuesday, albeit to a rather limited audience; the formal taking of the amendment comes up later. My Amendment 51 would retain the right of members of a combined authority to give their consent to a change in the membership of the combined authority. Currently, Clause 51, quite extraordinarily, takes that away from the members of a combined authority so that members of a current combined authority have no say whatever in whether the boundaries of that combined authority should be extended and a new member brought in, despite the consequences for the combined authority.
This takes us back to the West Midlands, I am afraid, because we know why this is being done. This is being done to gerrymander the boundaries of the West Midlands Combined Authority to give Andy Street, the Tory mayor, a chance of being re-elected next May, and the Minister tabled late amendments to make this easier. This is being done over 12 weeks. The cabinet paper to Warwickshire County Council, which I think was discussed this week, makes it clear that in order for this to be rushed through, it must undertake a governance review and publish a scheme with details of the proposed expanded area of the West Midlands Combined Authority and its membership, voting and other constitutional arrangements, functions and the way it would be funded. A public consultation also has to be undertaken—in August, essentially, because Ministers have told the county council that to meet the deadline for the May election an application must be submitted in early October. The paper to the council cabinet openly admits that this
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 28 and 29 in this group and will make some brief comments on the other amendments. We completely understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in Amendment 26 that the current way that combined authorities are brought together means that they could very well not be subject to any political balance mechanisms and the power structures could be centralised, as the noble Lord outlined.
The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 provisions are designed to deal with, for example, political proportionality on council committees. Of course, the political balance of combined authorities will vary across the country depending on the make-up of the constituent members, who will have been selected by dint of local elections. Although it is not impossible to put a balancing mechanism in place, it is difficult to see how that could be addressed without introducing a considerable level of complexity. It may result in some areas being represented by members who were not leaders in their own council, for example, which might bring its own difficulties. We need to think about how we get a sense of political proportionality in these combined authorities.
My Amendments 28 and 29 and Amendment 30, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, seek similar objectives. In Committee, as far back as March, we had long discussions about the composition of combined authorities and the role of the respective councils on them in two-tier areas. I will not repeat all the points I made then but will focus on the key issues. First, the presumption in the Bill that only county councils deal with strategic issues is based on an outdated idea of district councils and is entirely wrong. As a brief example, the workstreams on the Hertfordshire growth board planning for the future of the whole county consist of town centre development, growing our economy, housing growth, tackling climate change, et cetera, and are all led by district leaders. It is hard to see how willing they would be to do that if they did not then play a full part in the work of the full growth board and were not allowed voting rights at its meetings.
My Lords, Amendment 26, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would prevent the executive of a combined county authority being able to represent the political make-up of its members. As I made clear in Committee, that is not something that the Government can agree to. A CCA will be made up of members from each constituent council on a basis agreed by those councils through their consent to the establishing regulations, which will provide for the make-up of the CCA’s executive. It is essential that the CCA’s executive properly reflects the local political membership of that CCA, which this amendment would prohibit. It would also place the CCA’s executive in a different position from those of a local and combined authority, which do not require political balance under existing legislation. I do not believe I can say any more but I hope the noble Lord will see why I cannot accept his amendment and that, on reflection, he will agree to withdraw it.
Amendments 28 and 29 from the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, seek to allow a combined county authority’s non-constituent members to be able to be made full constituent members and to give non-constituent members the same voting rights as full constituent members. Conversely, Amendment 30 from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would prevent associate members being given any voting rights, and his Amendment 31 would make planning authorities constituent members.
A key underlying factor of the CCA model is that only upper-tier local authorities can be constituent members and have the associated responsibilities. That is the key difference between it and the existing combined authority model, which, I remind the House, remains available to areas. A non-constituent member of a CCA is a representative of a local organisation; it will not necessarily represent a local authority. I make that point because, since a CCA is a local government institution, it would be inappropriate for any organisation other than an upper-tier local authority to be a constituent member. Constituent members are those who collectively take the decisions of the CCA and are responsible for funding it.
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As associate members will be appointed by a CCA for their expertise on a particular topic—for example, a police and crime commissioner on public safety—the CCA may deem it suitable for the associate member to be given voting rights on that subject. Again, in line with the Government’s policy, the model allows for genuine localism; it is down to the combined county authority to decide whether or not associate members should have voting rights on CCA matters and what those voting rights should be, rather than that being imposed by Westminster.
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The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, has two amendments in this group. I shall say nothing about those other than these Benches will support her if she decides to seek a vote on either Amendment 28 or Amendment 29.
Amendment 31 raises a fundamental issue of principle that the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, also address: the concept of a non-constituent member of a combined county authority. That is a body, not an individual member; I will come to associate members, which are about individuals, in a moment. It refers, of course, to district councils. My Amendment 31 tries to make it clear that, where a council is the local planning authority, it really ought to be a full member of a CCA. I do not understand why that principle is opposed by the Government. I can hear the objection to what I am saying, which is, “Well then, a county will be dominated by the districts”, but there is a power in the Bill to organise a voting system, weighting it appropriately by population, to solve that problem. As a matter of principle, a district council that is a local planning authority should not be excluded from full membership of a CCA.
I move briefly on to Amendment 30. As I have said, I have a concern about the centralisation of power. There should be a principle, understood and agreed by all parties, that voting members in a CCA should be full members of the CCA and not part-time or temporary members. For that reason, I am in favour of non-constituent councils being full members of a CCA, which I have tried to explain in the context of the local planning authority.
Amendment 30 in my name seeks to prevent one party with majority control of a CCA appointing individuals as associate members then giving them a vote when those individuals are not full members of the CCA. I cannot think of any parallel. I understand why there may be a category of associate member; what I have not understood is why a CCA would have the power to permit an associate member, an individual, to have a vote on an issue. I raised this matter in Committee. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, will forgive me if I quote to the House what he said on that occasion because I got very worried about this. He said:
“For instance, a combined county authority may have provided for an associate member who, for example, may be a local business leader or an expert on a local issue to enable the member’s input on matters on which they have relevant expertise in the CCA’s area”.—[Official Report, 27/2/23; col. 113.]
“may require … urgent decisions being made during the process”;
in other words, the consultation is a sham because we know that the decision has already been made in the Minister’s department. So much is unknown, not least the financial consequences for Warwickshire. Indeed, what about the impact on the existing members of the combined authority, who have no say whatever in whether this should happen because of the Bill before us today?
On Tuesday, the Minister very kindly said that the Bill is a bottom-up process, but this decision has already been made. So why is her boss intensely engaged with the county council to persuade it to do it? Can she answer that question? Can she also tell me whether the MPs in Warwickshire have been consulted? One would have thought that when considering something as dramatic as putting Warwickshire into the West Midlands Combined Authority the Government might have asked all the MPs what they thought about it. I do not think that has happened.
I love Warwickshire. I live quite close to it, as the Minister knows. It is a delightful county. Do the people of Warwickshire really want to be absorbed into an urban combined authority? Do they really want a mayor situated in Birmingham to have such a key influence on their affairs? Indeed, the same could be said for Shropshire, where, again, I think Mayor Street seems to be very interested. I do not think so. I do not think the shire counties in the West Midlands want this, and we should change the Bill to make sure that it cannot happen without the consent of combined authority members as they are.
In response to the point I made on this in Committee on 15 March, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, responded that district councils
“cannot be a constituent member of a co-operative local government grouping whose membership is determined by reference to strategic functions and powers which are the primary province of upper-tier and unitary authorities. That is the logic”. —[Official Report, 15/3/23; col. 1342.]
I do not see the logic of excluding the strategic leaders of 183 councils that not only run services but are responsible for the planning, housing and economic development of 68% of the land in the UK from taking part in strategic functions and powers.
My noble friend Lord Hunt has set out his concerns about the proposals relating to boundaries. He rightly points to the dangers of these being used for gerrymandering. It is simply not acceptable to use primary legislation for that purpose; it is the very opposite of devolution. My noble friend used the example of Wiltshire the other day and Shropshire today. I think also of Hertfordshire, right on the borders of London, and the idea of it being scooped into a huge authority without leaders in those areas having a say is unthinkable.
The Government’s proposal in the Bill that combined authorities may give their associate members a vote but do not have to give that same ability to district council members or leaders leaves combined authorities in the unprecedented and very unwelcome situation of having democratically elected representatives on their body who cannot vote and appointed members who can. That is surely not tenable. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, recognises this issue and would restrict associate members from voting. We urge the Government to consider that, if other amendments in this group are not successful. If the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, is minded to test the opinion of the House then he will certainly have our support on that.
My Amendment 28 would automatically confer voting rights on non-constituent members, but we would prefer that that was in the hands of the combined authorities themselves. Amendment 29 would establish a process for the Minister to introduce a mechanism that could allow combined authorities to give non-constituent members full member status. We feel strongly that this decision should absolutely rest with the combined authorities themselves. It is the opposite of devolution for the Government to determine which locally elected representatives should be permitted to take part in local decision-making and which should not. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has outlined clearly that weighted voting systems are perfectly possible. Therefore, unless we hear from the Minister that there has been a change to the Government’s view on this issue, we would like to test the opinion of the House.
It would also be inappropriate for the same voting rights to be conferred on all non-constituent members, given the range of potential bodies. The CCA should have flexibility to vary voting rights to reflect its membership. We want there to be genuine localism in this area, as in others. Depending on the decision of the combined county authority, its non-constituent members can be given voting rights on the majority of matters.