Justice

My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lord Bellamy KC) has made the following statement:

I announce today the publication of “Setting the Personal Injury Discount Rate: A Call for Evidence”. This call for evidence is intended to obtain evidence to inform the second review of the personal injury discount rate (PIDR) under the Civil Liability Act 2018. The call will remain open for 12 weeks.

The PIDR is important in ensuring that claimants who suffer serious, life-changing personal injuries receive full damages, including for their future financial needs. It is the percentage figure used to help calculate how much a compensator—usually an insurer or body such as the NHS—pays to a claimant, in the form of a lump sum. It is assumed that claimants will invest this lump sum and accrue a return on that investment and the PIDR represents what the real rate of return on this investment is expected to be.

The Civil Liability Act 2018 introduced changes to the way the PIDR is reviewed and set, and this is the second review under that methodology. It is also the first where the Lord Chancellor will consult with the expert panel he has appointed as well as His Majesty’s Treasury.

The responses to this call for evidence will inform the work of the expert panel and the Lord Chancellor’s considerations in reviewing the PIDR later this year. The Lord Chancellor will formally consult the expert panel in due course and inform both Houses, in line with the timetables set out in part 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2018.

Copies of the call for evidence can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/setting-the-personal-injury-discount-rate.

[HCWS183]

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lord Bellamy KC) has made the following statement:

On Friday 12 January, the UK signed the Hague Convention of 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (hereafter: “Hague 2019”; “the convention”). The signing of Hague 2019 follows from the UK Government’s decision, which was announced on 23 November 2023, to join the convention as soon as possible, following a public consultation.

Once in force, the convention will provide greater certainty and predictability for citizens and businesses dealing in cross-border civil and commercial disputes, about when judgments from courts in the UK will be recognised and enforced in the courts of other parties to the convention, and when judgments from those states can be recognised and enforced in the UK. By facilitating cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments, the convention will provide a welcome uniform set of rules for a wide range of judgments between the UK and other contracting parties; increase confidence in the UK legal system; support international trade, investment and cross-border mobility; enhance access to justice and reduce the costs for litigants of determining whether a judgment obtained from one court is enforceable in another contracting state. And, by joining the convention the UK is indicating its position as a global leader in private international law—an area in which the UK undoubtedly has significant expertise.

For these reasons, the UK Government believe that joining the convention will be highly beneficial for the UK. Therefore, the UK Government have signed the convention as a signal of the UK’s commitment to co-operation with our international partners and will now work to ratify the convention. Ratification will occur once all the necessary implementing legislation and rules have been put in place to facilitate the convention’s smooth operation. As per the rules set out in the convention, Hague 2019 will come into force 12 months after the UK has deposited its instrument of ratification. As part of the procedural stages that precede any ratification, the treaty will be laid before Parliament for scrutiny in the coming months under the terms of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (“CRaG”).

The Illegal Migration Act 2023, once commenced, will provide for accelerated claims and appeal timescales for individuals subject to the “duty to remove” provisions of the Act when making suspensive claims relating to the narrow grounds of serious harm and removals conditions. The Act provides that these appeals are to be heard in the upper tribunal—Immigration and Asylum Chamber—rather than the first-tier tribunal.

The Act sets out that, once issued with a third-country removal notice, individuals will have eight days to make a claim to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Having received a claim, the Secretary of State will have four days to consider the claim and decide whether it should succeed, and if not, whether to certify it as clearly unfounded.

Where a claim is certified as unfounded, there is no automatic right of appeal. The individual can be removed unless they apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal within seven working days from being given notice of the certification. These applications will normally be dealt with on the papers, noting that this is a judicial decision. The upper tribunal must decide whether to allow the appeal to proceed and notify the parties within seven working days from when the application is made—there is no right of appeal against the tribunal’s decision. The upper tribunal may not extend either of these timeframes, unless it is satisfied that it is the only way to secure that justice is done in a particular case.

Where the Secretary of State for the Home Department rejects the initial claim but does not certify it as clearly unfounded, or where the upper tribunal gives permission to appeal, the individual has seven working days from when they are notified of the Secretary of State’s decision, or from when they are given permission to appeal, to give notice of appeal to the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal must make their decision and give notice of that decision to the parties within 23 working days from the day the appeal was lodged. Again, the upper tribunal may extend either of these timeframes only if it is satisfied that it is the only way to secure that justice is done in a particular case.