I wish to inform the House of publication of the latest report of the Iraq fatalities inspector, Dame Anne Rafferty, which I have laid before the House of Commons Library today. I am grateful to Dame Anne and her team for the rigour and commitment they have shown in this work.
This report represents the culmination of a lengthy legal process in the aftermath of operations in Iraq during Operation Telic—2003-09. As part of this, the UK High Court [1] determined that publicly accountable investigations into the deaths of individuals were required to meet the UK’s obligations under article 2 of the European convention on human rights. The Iraq Fatality Investigations were established in 2014 to conduct “quasi-inquests", with the involvement of the families of the deceased. This was one of a number of measures, including the creation of special investigative functions—the Iraq Historic Allegations Team and subsequently the Service Police Legacy Investigation—which reviewed around 3,500 allegations of misconduct by UK forces in Iraq. Many of these were deemed to be unfounded or malicious, with proven malpractice by one of the prominent lawyers involved in bringing these claims.
This work has inevitably been complex and time-consuming. The sad death of the first inspector, Sir George Newman, in 2016, and his successor, Baroness Hallett’s, appointment to chair the covid 19 Inquiry in April 2021, have further delayed completion of the work.
This final report by Dame Anne covers the deaths of three Iraqi civilians in the custody of UK forces, dating back to 2003. Mr Radhi Nama and Mr Mousa Ali died on 8 and 13 May respectively, while in the custody of UK forces at Camp Stephen in Basra, southern Iraq. The report also covers a further investigation into the circumstances of the death of Mr Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, who Sir George Newman had previously found was left to drown in a waterway by UK forces.
The report makes for sobering reading. In the case of Mr Mousa Ali, the inspector finds that he was forced to carry out strenuous circuit-type exercises as well as holding a “stress position” in temperatures of over 30°C, and that these exercises were causally significant to his death. The report allocates blame to two soldiers—neither of them still serving—directly involved in this mistreatment, but found no evidence of the involvement of others or of a cover-up at Camp Stephen. The report further considers whether there was evidence of a concerted policy of “wetting” of detainees, following the death of Mr Ahmed Ali. Dame Anne concludes that “there was no concerted policy of wetting by troops in 1st Battalion the Black Watch” and that senior commanders did not condone any such practice. Nevertheless, the report highlights multiple examples of “wetting” and differences of opinions among witnesses as to the level of senior officers’ knowledge. Finally, the report notes that stress positions were deployed in the case of Mr Radhi Nama, who was forced to spend some time squatting with his hands on his head, though this was not a causal factor in his death. The report criticises the way in which information relating to Radhi Nama’s death was relayed to his family, though Dame Anne notes that policy and procedure have since been improved such that this would be unlikely to happen again.
In total, five members of the armed forces were referred to the Director of Service Prosecutions for offences connected to the deaths of Mr Radhi Nama and Mr Mousa Ali, including unlawful killing, threats to kill, commission of an outrage upon personal dignity and failure to exercise command responsibility. However, in all five cases, prosecutors considered that the evidential sufficiency test had not been met and no prosecutions were brought.
While no prosecutions followed these investigations, we cannot underestimate what these episodes have meant for the standing of our armed forces. The misconduct of a small number of service personnel has detracted from the reputation of the thousands who served bravely and loyally through some of the most challenging operational circumstances we have encountered since the end of the second world war. It has generated a protracted and expensive legal process. While we know that many of the allegations directed at the armed forces were fraudulent and malicious, we must also recognise the damage that this process has inflicted and resolve never to allow a repeat. The reforms we are pursuing aim to do that.
I am reassured that Dame Anne found that the changes since implemented to policy and doctrine on handling of detainees, if fully implemented, would reduce the risk of a repeat of these events. Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, “Captured Persons”, updated in 2020, sets out clear guidance for the detention of personnel, setting out the circumstances and arrangements for handling military and civilian detainees. It makes provision for vulnerable persons including women and children, incorporates clear direction on the questioning of detainees, and emphasises the importance of command responsibility.
However, we cannot be complacent. Doctrine is effective only in so far as it is understood by personnel at all levels, and implemented in practice. With this in mind, the Army is carrying out a root-and-branch review of operational law training. This review, which I expect to report in the very near future, will make recommendations to the Chief of the General Staff to improve understanding of and training in the legal framework governing operations, to ensure legally compliant behaviours from the most junior, to the most senior, rank.
I also note and agree with Dame Anne’s concern regarding the “crucial importance of ensuring that soldiers are aware of their obligations to report violations of law by their British Forces colleagues and that they feel protected when making such reports.” We have already announced a review, to be led by the Minister for Veterans and Personnel, into whistleblowing in Defence. The review will produce initial findings by the end of this year and a final report and recommendations by spring 2026.
The “Raising Our Standards” initiative introduced in 2024 aims to accelerate, expand and maximise behavioural improvements taking place across the whole of Defence. ROS aims to improve culture and tackle all unacceptable behaviours. Initial work is focused on initiatives under five pillars—data and analytics, tackling unacceptable behaviours, behaviour change through communications, leadership and careers, and education and training. ROS is an opportunity to make lasting improvements for the people of Defence and for all those whom they deal with in a professional and operational context.
This report completes our investigative duties stemming from allegations relating to Iraq, in line with the mandate from the High Court. In addition to considering this report, the MOD has separately reviewed the final caseload of service police investigations relating to Iraq. We have concluded that all reasonable and proportionate lines of inquiry have been pursued, that these cases reveal no additional systemic concerns and that we have discharged our obligations under articles 2 and 3 of ECHR. As such, we have concluded that there is no requirement for further referrals to the IFI.
Finally, we should all reflect upon the personal tragedies which these deaths represent, and the impacts on the families and communities involved. I would like to offer my deepest regret and condolences, not just for the deaths themselves but for the lengthy process which has led to this conclusion more than two decades later.
[1] R(Ali Zaki Mousa and others) v Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin)
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