My Lords, this instrument contains measures to deter the Government of Iran, and groups backed by Iran, from conducting hostile activity against the UK and our partners. It was laid on 13 December 2023 under powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures entered into force the following day. The instrument has been considered and not reported by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
The Iranian regime poses a clear threat to the UK and our partners, with hostile acts ranging from assassination plots to significant support for armed groups. The new legislation provides sanctions powers to respond to this appalling behaviour. We can now introduce sanctions designations in relation to Iran’s hostile actions in any country. It could be used in response to Iranian support to Russia, destabilising conduct in the Middle East or hostile acts in any partner country. We can use these powers where acts are perpetrated by Iran or by armed groups backed by Iran.
Since January 2022, the UK has identified at least 15 threats emanating from Iran to the lives of UK-based individuals. This is totally unacceptable. Furthermore, Iran continues to destabilise the Middle East through its development and use of weapons, along with support for groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
Our priority is the safety and security of the UK, the people who live here and our international partners. That is why we have taken action, using this legislation, to sanction the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, and other senior IRGC figures involved in Iran’s long-term support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We will not stop there. For as long as Iran continues to threaten the UK, our interests and our partners, we will respond firmly and decisively. We will use this legislation as a key tool within the broader diplomatic approach aimed at deterring Iran.
Sanctions are particularly effective when imposed alongside international partners and combined with other diplomatic tools. For example, following the murder of Mahsa Amini, a 22 year-old Iranian woman, we sought to expose the extent of Iran’s abuses on the international stage, including at the UN Human Rights Council. This was accompanied by regular sanctions designations co-ordinated with partners including the EU, the US and Canada. We delivered a clear message of international condemnation while holding those responsible for human rights abuses to account through sanctions.
I turn now to trade measures, the other substantive addition made by this legislation. Iran continues to expand its drones programme and is sending them to Russia to use against Ukraine. We have already sanctioned a range of entities and individuals involved in the provision of Iranian drones to Russia, using the existing Russia sanctions regime. However, drones are also a feature of Iran’s hostile activity beyond Ukraine. This legislation imposes new restrictions on the Iranian regime’s drone programme, targeting UAVs and their components, which is crucial to its collaboration with Russia. It draws on knowledge of the Iranian drones deployed in Ukraine and elsewhere. The trade restrictions strengthen our existing export controls on drone components, ensuring that no UK business or person, wherever they are in the world, can facilitate the trade of these items.