To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their policy towards Iran; and what engagement they have had with the government of that country on (1) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and (2) the detention of dual nationals.
My Lords, as our proceedings on the Bill have already concluded, this Question for Short Debate becomes our last business. As a result, Back-Bench and Opposition speakers may take a little longer than as set out in today’s list and speak for up to six minutes, should they wish.
My Lords, I want to take this opportunity to discuss the British national hostages in Iran and refer briefly to the JCPOA. I had the privilege of meeting Richard, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s husband, and Gabriella, their daughter. The length of her imprisonment is a shocking and heartbreaking story, made even worse by the fact that her appeal was turned down just two or three days ago. But of course, it is not just Nazanin but other British nationals who are in arbitrary detention in Iran. As far as I know, four British nationals remain in this detention: Nazanin-Zaghari Ratcliffe, Anoosheh Ashoori, Morad Tahbaz and Mehran Raoof. There may be others. My first question is: why do the Government insist on keeping the names and numbers confidential? After all, the Iranians know perfectly well who they are holding in detention or some form of custody. So, what is the benefit of our not knowing how many there are altogether? The four I have mentioned may not be the total.
My second criticism of the Government is that there seems to be no strategy for the British prisoners there. They are being held as hostages. Do we have a certainty of getting them out or is the Foreign Office simply sitting there, saying, “Well, let us hope something turns up?” I do not think that would be good enough. These are heartbreaking stories of people innocent of the crimes of which they have been accused, held in detention or, in Nazanin’s case, long detention—she is now under house arrest. It is simply unacceptable that British citizens should be held in this position.
Surely, we should consider punishing the perpetrators. We talk about the Magnitsky sanctions; why do we not threaten to use them on those people in Iran who are holding our people in detention in that way? In addition, we need an independent investigation of the torture allegations. It is fairly clear that prisoners have been held in a situation where they have suffered torture. An independent investigation of that would surely help.
My Lords, I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the register of Members’ interests. I am the unpaid chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce. I join the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in condemning the cruel treatment of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe; the extension of her sentence without even a court hearing was an absolute disgrace. I have seen through my work as a trade envoy that the Government are making huge efforts to get Nazanin released. I have been in many meetings where the subject has been put very forcefully to Iranian Ministers.
It is also shameful that Iran should attempt—or appears to be attempting—to link the fate of a young, innocent woman to the tank money owed to Iran by the UK. The two should never be linked, although I have to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that many of us are puzzled by the Government’s failure to pay the debt and meet Iran’s claim, which, after all, has been upheld by the UK courts. If it is US sanctions that are preventing the UK Government resolving this issue, that would in itself be bizarre. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a specific reason why this money cannot be paid.
I will concentrate mainly on the JCPOA and the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. It would be a mistake to think of the JCPOA only as something helpful to Iran. It is immensely important to the rest of the world. That is why it would be a mistake to link the efforts to get Nazanin and others home to their families with any negotiations over the JCPOA. That agreement would have prevented Iran getting a nuclear weapon for 15 years. It was a good agreement and, I believe, extremely important.
The best way of ensuring that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon is for the United States to return to the agreement that it broke. Despite the confirmation from the International Atomic Energy Agency on 10 or 11 occasions that Iran was complying with the agreement, it was Donald Trump who, unilaterally and for no good reason, tore up the agreement and imposed punitive sanctions on Iran. This hit ordinary people extremely heavily and had the effect of undermining the political standing of the moderate President Rouhani, who favours engagement with the West. It confirmed the suspicions and accusations of hardliners in Tehran that the US and the West could not be trusted.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, with his considerable experience on this issue. I agree with his central argument on the benefit of returning to the discussions. It was depressing to read that the latest effort by the European Union envoy in meeting Iranian officials had a negative response on the return to discussions in Vienna. We hope very much that this stalling will not continue.
I shall return to that in a moment but, first, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for his tireless work on this issue. I reread the Questions that he has asked and his contributions to debates in the House on this topic. The questions that he posed to the Minister are very valid, especially regarding the definitions of hostages and of torture. It is now incumbent on the Government to be clear as to whether they consider that international obligations on these key areas are now being breached by the Iranian officials.
After a number of years on the Front Bench, my noble friend Lady Northover has stood back as the Liberal Democrats spokesperson. I put on record my admiration for how she carried out her role. It is very relevant to refer to her work in this debate; I checked the Official Report and she has raised the case of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe in this House on 20 occasions through debates and Questions. Most recently, on 7 June, following a Question from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, her supplementary question was very prescient as she asked about UK officials attending court cases and hearings. The Minister replied that
“we continue making the case to attend any hearings that we can”.—[Official Report, 07/6/21; col. 1190.]
However, the most depressing news about this, of course, was that the so-called appeal would not meet the international norms of good legal practice in fair and open appeal. It was held in secret, without any possibility of observation. Can the Minister confirm what representations the UK has made to Iranian officials during this process, which has now led to the intolerable position referred to—of Nazanin not knowing whether she will arbitrarily returned to prison?
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I served on the International Relations and Defence Committee of your Lordships’ House. As the noble Lord has said, we came to the very clear conclusion that it was in Britain’s interest to sustain the JCPOA and t do everything possible to reverse the action taken by the Trump Administration. That was our clear position, and I think it was the right one.
Successive British Governments, as far back as when Jack Straw was Foreign Secretary, and of different parties, including the coalition, took the view that active diplomacy backed up by economic sanctions was the best way to head off the risk of Iran acquiring fissile material capable of arming a nuclear weapon. Those Governments sustained that policy even in the face of great pressure from the Trump Administration to renege on the JCPOA which had been agreed with Iran in 2015. I believe they were right to do so and are right now to continue doing so, in concert with the Biden Administration’s efforts to revive the JCPOA and to bring Iran back into conformity with its provisions.
Why so? Because alternative courses of action, including that chosen by President Trump of “maximum pressure,” showed no signs whatever of working and contained massive risks to the whole international community: the risk of an Iran either with nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, or so close to that as to represent a credible threat to obtain them; a potential, indeed probable, nuclear arms race in a very volatile region; irreparable damage to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a cornerstone of international peace of security; and the possibility of another armed conflict in a region which has already seen too many of them. Frankly, that is quite a list of risks.
Of course, it takes two to tango in this attempt to revive the JCPOA. The hiatus in the Vienna talks following the Iranian presidential election leaves the diplomatic route hanging by a thread, exemplified by the visit to Tehran last week of the co-ordinator of the E3’s position. But the risks from the diplomatic route collapsing makes going the last mile worthwhile—indeed, necessary, I suggest—and I strongly support the Government’s policy of doing just that.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Dubs for initiating this important and timely debate, and I join other noble Lords who paid tribute to him for his tireless work on this and other humanitarian issues. He is an admirable member of this House. I agree with everything said so far, I think, and it is a privilege and a challenge to follow such thoughtful and informed speeches. I will do my best.
Only three days ago, an Iranian court apparently upheld Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s sentence of another year in prison, prolonging her cruel and unjustified detention that began in 2016. The Government say they are doing all they can to get her home, but Iran has made it clear that her freedom and that of the other dual nationals has a price: the repayment of the debt owed since Iran bought tanks that were not delivered after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. On 7 June, in an Oral Question referring to Nazanin’s case, my noble friend Lord Dubs asked about the money owed by the UK. The Minister, in his Answer, said:
“On the long-standing debt, we continue to explore options to resolve this case, but I do not want to go into details here.”—[Official Report, 7/6/21; col. 1188.]
I will not ask him to go into details of plans, and in fact I will offer him a plan at some point in this speech.
On this issue, I agree with my honourable friend Tulip Siddiq, the Ratcliffe family’s MP. She said:
“It’s time for the UK government to pay the debt we owe to Iran, stand up to their despicable hostage-taking and finally get Nazanin home.”
In preparation for this debate, I asked my colleagues in the European Leadership Network—particularly a young man called Sahil Shah, who helped me enormously—who have been working since 2018 to preserve the JCPOA across Europe, Asia and the United States, to come up with a plan. I have a proposal. The speakers thus far have asked enough questions of the Minister; I will not ask him any questions, but will instead put to him a proposal that, if it can be made to work, may help both to secure Nazanin’s release and to unlock the stalemate of the JCPOA talks—without linking them together.
Thank you. I have just a few sentences left, that is all.
On the condition that the reserves will not be transferred outside of the countries in which they are held, the US could recognise the authority of these four independent Governments to determine the scope of acceptable bilateral humanitarian trade with Iran. This approach could extend to the United Kingdom; we could use what we owe Iran to pay for the purchase of vaccines and other necessary medical supplies through INSTEX, which we set up with France and Germany but through which we have been unable to mobilise any trade. I commend this plan to the Minister and the Government.
My Lords, it is a pleasure and a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Browne. I congratulate him on the plan that he set out, which I am sure the Government will consider.
I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, on securing this important debate. He is completely right to describe the kidnapping and plight of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe as heart-breaking; he is also completely right to say that the Government should examine whether Magnitsky sanctions could be used against the perpetrators. Our new Foreign Secretary was right to adopt a resolute and determined approach to securing the release of detained British citizens; she was also right to make this a high priority as soon as she was appointed.
We must be absolutely clear about the nature of this regime. This is not a democracy run by reasonable people with whom negotiation bears fruit. It is a brutal regime that executes its opponents, hangs gay men from cranes, denies women basic rights and even, as we have heard, kidnaps British citizens for use as political pawns. In the past few months, it has killed a British national and a British serviceperson in its attacks on ships in international waters. It equipped Hamas terrorists with the missiles that they rained down on civilians in Israel earlier this year, causing the terrible conflict that we saw in May. It has prolonged the brutal civil war in Syria and attacked allied forces in Iraq, while its support for Hezbollah terrorists led to last week’s carnage in Beirut and threatens another civil war.
I never accepted that relaxing sanctions on Iran would encourage the regime to behave more responsibly and reasonably, given that, under the previous sanctions regime, with its economy on its knees, the regime spent huge funds on sponsoring and supporting terrorism. It was always clear that, with sanctions relaxed and more funds at its disposal, the regime would increase the funds provided to terrorists such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
8:01 pm
Viscount Waverley (CB)
My Lords, this short debate is a helpful opportunity to attempt to offer an insight into the complex world of Iran. Some are of the view that modern-day Iran, which is now pivoting towards the East, is of the West’s making. The corrupt leadership in Iran does not represent its people, who should not be punished with policy failures and requiring long-term planning.
At the core of this evening’s short debate is the strategy to resolve the JCPOA. What is the Government’s strategy to bring this all to an end? What is made of Iran’s increasing implied threat of going military on its nuclear programme unless the world does this or the other? Is the regime trusted in negotiating in good faith?
Although the Revolutionary Guard is loyal to the regime, in practical terms the regime is more reliant on the Revolutionary Guard than the Revolutionary Guard is on the leadership, who consequently have become more assertive. Iran is in reality a de facto military Government, with all key positions controlled by commanders. They are in full control of the running of the economy of the country. The Iranian people, the West and the world are hostage. How long is the West going to allow this behaviour to continue?
Worryingly, Iran will more increasingly negotiate through hostage diplomacy; China has provided evidence just recently that it can be turned to an advantage. This is a dangerous turn of events, with the potential to get out of hand globally. A crucial question is: how will the Government respond if Iran, or any other state, continues to follow a policy of hostage-taking to achieve its goals?
I fear that the raising of dual citizens might play more into the hands of Tehran as there is an association with the return of money that is legally due for return. While the regime believes that it has right on its side, it will do nothing. I sincerely hope that I am proved wrong. The UK not returning the tank money plays into the hands of the leadership as it is an easy message to explain that it is the UK that is not abiding by the rule of law.
There still remains the recognition by Iran of Israel. It should not be forgotten that Israel also owes money from the days of the Shah, giving credence to an international coalition against it. Some are of the singular view that there is only one state that has the means to bring about resolution to the situation in Iran and the region: Israel.
In today’s climate, we should forget regional negotiations with the US at the table. We are entering a cold-war phase, with Iran having cut a 25-year deal to give first rights to Russia and China on construction, intelligence and military matters. Where does this leave us? There is, however, one core fundamental: the language of power is all that is understood. When faced with credible condemnation pressure, the leadership buckles. Will the Minister set out before the House where the Government perceive the regime’s weak points are so that we can all join in to make for a better world with Iran at the table?
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There is the vexed question of the £400 million we owe the Iranians. Having looked at the previous comments made by Ministers, the Government’s answer has been that they will investigate the full range of options, but the Government say they do not link the two—the prisoners and the £400 million. Surely, if we have said to the Iranians that we accept that we owe them the £400 million, I cannot see what is to be gained by then saying we will investigate the full range of options. It seems to me that if we owe them money, the least we should do is negotiate that money against the release of those prisoners. That seems clear, and I think the Iranians—I do not want to speak for them—will feel that they were promised the money and they have not got it. We should keep the promise and do it.
My next question is: are these people hostages in the eyes of the Government? The Minister talked in June about an early release of all hostages in Iran. Do we therefore recognise that they are hostages? Sometimes, Ministers tend to say something else and not to refer to them as hostages.
I understand other countries have got their prisoners out: Australia, Germany, Canada and the United States. I wonder if the Minister could throw some light on how that happened. How was it that other countries managed to get their prisoners out while we failed? Did we try hard enough? Is there something the other countries did that we did not do? The Minister should tell us.
Then, there is the issue of diplomatic protection, which was offered to Nazanin a year or two ago. What happens with this diplomatic protection? Is it in fact still there? Are we using it with full force? Have we extended that protection to the other British nationals I mentioned and, if not, why not? Are the Government saying it was just a token gesture and there is no benefit to it? If there is a benefit to it, we should make full use of the fact that we have given Nazanin diplomatic status, and act accordingly.
My next and related point is this. At Nazanin’s court hearing—not the recent one—there was no United Kingdom presence. The Government will argue they were not allowed in. The Germans sent their consular official to a trial of a German national. The official was not allowed in but he or she did manage to have a conversation with the judge, so there was something to be gained by doing that. I cannot understand why we are so reluctant to use our diplomatic presence in Iran to aid and bring comfort to the people we are talking about. I know that at one point Nazanin was not even visited by British consular officials and when her daughter sent a gift, it was brought over by a driver. The consular officials did not even take it over to give it personally. It seems that we are not doing very much; we could be doing a great deal more than we seem to have done.
Furthermore, negotiations on the JCPOA are now taking place or, at least, I think that, with the change of regime in Tehran, there is a pause. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether that pause will soon be over. We should certainly press to ensure that Iran’s policy of taking hostages should be on the table as part of negotiations on the JCPOA. We are losing an opportunity, and we should use it, and the £400 million, as a way to put some pressure on the Iranians.
If we are talking about restoring the JCPOA—I understand that the Government are fully committed to doing that and to undoing the damage done under the Trump regime—but we cannot get the full JCPOA, can we at least argue for an interim arrangement where some of the benefits of the JCPOA will be on the table, in return for which there could be certain concessions from the Iranians? Rather than leave it as all or nothing on the JCPOA, it would be good if we could have a backstop position and seek an interim arrangement.
The Minister may not want to talk about that, because he may not wish to admit that the JCPOA may not work. Of course, we all fervently hope that it will and we can resume the position we had before President Trump got involved so mistakenly, but it would be nice to feel that we had a back-up position. In any case, it should surely be our policy to encourage some form of regional dialogue. Could we use our influence along with EU countries to try to achieve that?
Furthermore, would it not be possible for us to start engaging with Iran on both refugees from Afghanistan and the problem of drugs? We might well find some sympathy and the chance to have a proper, big conversation with the Iranian authorities, despite there being a new regime there, given that it is estimated—the Minister may correct this—that 700,000 refugees from Afghanistan have gone to Iran. More than a million have gone to Pakistan. That is quite a responsibility for the Iranians, and surely it would be worth our while talking to them about that. We are talking about nearly 2 million people who have gone to Pakistan and Iran altogether, so there is a real issue there on which we should engage with the Iranians. Then there is the question of drugs—the perennial problem of dangerous drugs being cultivated and produced in Afghanistan and then exported. The Iranian authorities might well have a joint interest with us in stemming that trade.
Then there is the question of international co-ordination. How much are we working with other countries to try to deal with the hostages? I think we joined the Canadian initiative against arbitrary detention in February, and James Cleverly said:
“We continue to work with G7 partners to enhance mechanisms to uphold international law, tackle human rights abuses and stand up for our shared values.”—[Official Report, Commons, 27/4/21; col. 234.]
My question is: how much effort are we putting into that international co-ordination? We would surely have a stronger hand to play if we worked closely with other countries, some of which also have hostages in Iran.
The danger for Nazanin, who is one of the four I mentioned who, I understand, are in house detention but not in prison, is that she might now be returned to prison. That will be a terrible thing to happen after all the years she has spent there but, given that her appeal has been refused, the prospects are not wonderful. How will the Government respond to the possibility that she might have to return to prison? The Government have been a bit coy on this issue in previous debates. “Coy” is rather a bland word; the Government have not been very forthcoming. Can they be more forthcoming? We need a far more robust approach—robust enough to put pressure on the Iranians—and we need to work with other countries to see whether we can bring out these unfortunate victims of Iranian injustice and give them the right to return to their homes.
Those, like Mr Netanyahu, who claimed that President Rouhani was just some cynical PR front figure for hardliners ought to contemplate what is now happening in Tehran, where steps are being taken in the Iranian Parliament to put the former President on trial for having negotiated an agreement that has had such bad effects on Iran and Iran’s economy. The only way forward is for the US to rejoin the JCPOA and for Iran to return to the enrichment and centrifuge limits set in the agreement. Iran has indicated that all the recent steps it has taken to boost its enrichment and number of centrifuges are reversible—in other words, that it is establishing a negotiating position. To attempt new, additional demands on Iran, such as to agree a follow-up agreement on regional issues, would be totally counterproductive. Iran has not returned to the negotiating table. We need to get Iran back to that table but it will not return until the additional sanctions imposed by Trump have been removed.
I also strongly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said about trying to find common ground with Iran—on areas where we have a mutual interest. Indeed, Afghanistan is one such area; the Taliban are very strong enemies of Iran. Before this situation, Iran had already taken 4 million refugees and, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said, has probably had another 700,000 in the last few weeks. Fighting ISIS was another area of common ground where there was initially some co-operation, but it eventually broke down. Although there had been a certain amount of mutual understanding, it was at a distance.
Narcotics are another common interest. We used to have a Metropolitan Police presence in Afghanistan. I agree that the more we find common ground, the more we might find that we make progress on other issues, such as the dual citizens who are being held so wrongly.
As I said, I have been involved in some talks with Iranian Ministers. I have worked with the families of some of the other people—not of Nazanin herself—who have been in similar situations. I know that the Government are trying extremely hard on this. Let us keep that going, but we ought also to make it a major objective to get Iran back to the negotiating table on the JCPOA. Without the JCPOA, the Middle East is an even more dangerous place.
With regard to the valid question on torture, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ratified the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It is not a far stretch to suggest that Iran’s conduct in this case is in clear breach of this international convention as well as of the optional protocol and the ICCPR that Iran has signed up to. What are the Government doing? The Foreign Secretary said in her statement:
“We are doing all we can to help Nazanin get home ... and I will continue to press Iran.”
It is now incumbent on the Government to state exactly what they are doing and what levers they are seeking to pull. The Iranians will know that she is the fourth Foreign Secretary to have made similar comments about this. What will be different this time?
Turning to the wider issue of the JCPOA, I had the privilege of serving on the International Relations Committee. Its report on nuclear non-proliferation and the hearings we had specifically on the JCPOA were very clear that the UK Government were correct not to follow the path of the United States but to maintain their position and to work much more closely with the E3 within Europe and the other signatories to seek a way forward for the United States to recognise its responsibilities as a signatory; and also for Iran to be open and allow much greater access, the lack of which has frustrated international inspectors in recent months. In that regard, can the Minister outline the position of the Government regarding the lack of access on the inspection of certain facilities? I understand that the Iranians are using the drone attack as a pretext for saying that there was a breach of security and damage, and for preventing the continuation of international inspections. Do the Government agree with that position, and how are we seeking to persuade the Iranians to open up access?
As the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, indicated, this is a regional issue as well. There have been some welcome signs of dialogue between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent months, looking at opening consular access and with slow but hopefully positive work towards full diplomatic relations being restored. There are a couple of areas still outstanding, which I should like the Minister to refer to. One was referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord Lamont. How are the Government treating the debt issue? Do they believe that this is completely separate from the wider negotiations, or have they or the Iranians tabled this issue as part of the wider discussions with the UK and our partners on JCPOA? What is the Government’s understanding of the latest position of the United States regarding compatibility? The new US Secretary of State has made his public comments known. Do the Government agree with Antony Blinken on what Iran needs to do for restoration, or do we have a separate position? All these issues are valid and timely, and I commend the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for raising them.
I also share the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord Lamont, that we ought discreetly to look for ways in which our interests and those of Iran overlap, whether it be the future of Afghanistan, drugs or the handling of flows of refugees. I do hope that the Government will find some way of opening up channels of discussion—not linking it with any other issue but simply reflecting the fact that there is an overlap in our fundamental interests in these matters. Iran suffers as much as any country from the flow of drugs, suffers hugely from the flow of refugees, and will be a victim of any terrorist outbreaks based either on the activities of ISIS in Afghanistan or on the Taliban themselves—because they will be directed against Iran’s co-religionists, the Hazara.
In the long run, the best solution to tensions in the Gulf region remains agreement by all sides to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease meddling in each other’s internal affairs, and to work together on economic co-operation, of which there could be a massive amount. But that will be a work of years, not of weeks or months. I just hope that we will not lose sight of it, because it is the only viable way forward in a region where we have considerable political, security and commercial interests. Until we can get to that position, we will be continually faced by these crises.
As to the cruel and unjustified treatment of British-Iranian dual nationals, exemplified by the case of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, no effort to bring that to an end should be spared by the Government. However, I have to say that linking it in any way to the nuclear issue is only too likely to prove counterproductive and unsuccessful.
This week, the Iranian Foreign Minister explained to lawmakers in Tehran their policy of “action for action”. He said that the US must show good will and make a serious move before Iran returns to nuclear talks. Since Trump unilaterally abrogated the JCPOA, Europe, including the UK, has strongly opposed US secondary sanctions imposed under its “maximum pressure” campaign and, to keep the deal alive, has offered multi-sector economic engagement. However, because of fear of US sanctions, which are all-pervasive, it has failed to deliver any economic engagement—including, importantly, in the humanitarian sector. As a matter of fact—or a matter of law, I should say—sanctions on humanitarian trade are against both US domestic and international law. Contrary to expectations, the Biden Administration have essentially kept to this Trumpian strategy.
The need for increased Covid aid to Iran is dire. The Delta variant hit Iran hard: a recent study by BBC Persian found 200,000 excess deaths there, and many believe that to be a gross underestimate. Neither America nor Europe will ever be secure from the virus until the world, including Iran, is secure. We already have enough petri dishes allowing the virus to run riot and develop variants. We should be picking them off where we can; Iran is one that we can pick off. It is in our interests. We should ask the US to allow Iran to use its foreign exchange reserves, which are held in key countries, to aid its pandemic response. Doing so would ease humanitarian trade during a time when the pandemic has caused immense human suffering in a population already toiling under severe economic hardship from years of sanctions. The death toll in Iran is appalling.
The IMF estimates that, because of the maximum pressure sanctions, Iran has access to only around 10% of its total foreign reserves. Iran negotiated with South Korea, Japan, Germany and Iraq—countries where it maintains foreign reserves, but also where the US maintains strong bilateral relationships and exercises its muscle. Trump successfully discouraged all four from accommodating Iran, both directly and indirectly. The Biden Administration are now doing the same. I remind noble Lords that this all should be in contravention of US domestic and international law.
Instead—this is the plan—Biden could go beyond the escrow structure that has been used to facilitate the use of Iranian oil revenues for humanitarian trade.
Iran has clearly broken the promises made in 2015. Experts estimate that it is now just two or three months away from acquiring enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. It promised not to enrich uranium above 3.67% or stockpile enriched uranium higher than 3.67% for at least 15 years. However, according to the IAEA report in May, it had 62.8 kilograms of enriched uranium at 20%. At the start of September, the IAEA estimated that it had 84.3 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium, plus an additional 10 kilograms of nearly 60%-enriched uranium. Last weekend, Mohammad Eslami, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, announced that Iran had more than 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium.
None of these actions—installing advanced centrifuges and obstructing IAEA inspectors, both before the US Administration withdrew from the JCPOA, while enriching uranium to 60% and producing uranium metal, which is a significant component of nuclear weapons—have any credible civilian applications. This is why Israel’s new Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, said this last week:
“The Iranian nuclear program is at its most advanced point ever … the Iranians are playing for time, and the centrifuges are spinning.”
Professor Eyal Zisser said:
“The only thing separating Iran from a nuclear weapon is a political decision from its leaders … Iran has enriched enough uranium to make a bomb, and even if it hasn’t done so yet and hasn’t developed the ability to launch one on a ballistic missile, this is still just a technical matter requiring just a few weeks of effort”.
Can the Minister tell us what steps will be taken to build a concerted multilateral push against Iran to address the nuclear issue and its destabilisation of the rest of the region? Is it now time to refer back to the UN Security Council and to consider the snap-back of prior sanctions, which were clearly pivotal in bringing Iran to the negotiating table in the first place? Will the Government ensure that any new deal must include Iran committing to unfettered IAEA access to the full extent of its declared—and undeclared—nuclear facilities?
Finally, given Iran’s use of its funding to sponsor terrorism across the region, what assessment have the Government made of the case for banning Hamas in its entirety? This is a genocidal terrorist organisation opposed to any peace agreement in the Middle East. It wants to wipe Israel off the map and murder the Jews who live there. I believe that it should be banned in its entirety in the UK to prevent it raising funds in this country.