I beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of international parental child abduction.
It is a privilege to make my remarks under your very capable stewardship, Dr Murrison. I understand that these issues are very sensitive and of huge human significance, so I feel privileged to be able to bring the eyes and ears of the House to them. I salute the left-behind parents, some of whom have joined us in the Gallery this afternoon, for their indefatigability and courage. I know that they will take little comfort in such words, but I must say them anyway. I think it important to emphasise the need not to prejudice ongoing legal proceedings, but as representatives of our constituents we feel a natural and proper inclination to advocate for them.
According to Reunite International, more than 500 children are abducted from the UK by a parent every year. Among the families that attended the most recent roundtable on this subject in Parliament, there was upwards of half a century in lost years—that is to say, lost contact with their children. The testimonies I have heard, although individually unique, paint a troubling, consistent picture of deliberate misleading, ill-fated recovery attempts and financial costs running into the millions. Many have travelled to foreign jurisdictions, time after time, in the hope of recovering their children. The human toll on both sides is staggering.
The Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction provides the principal international framework governing these cases. Crucially, it mandates the expeditious handling of abduction proceedings, yet according to testimonies that I have received, months often elapse before the first substantive hearing, in a clear breach of the convention. Such delays risk the factual entrenchment of the abducted child in the new jurisdiction, entirely undermining the notional remedy of return. The convention exists precisely to prevent that outcome, but far too often it does not.
Several structural concerns recur across the cases that have been brought to me. The first is about the undermining of established jurisdictional findings. In one instance, the High Court here had already determined the child’s habitual residence to be in England. The Polish first instance court was aligned, ordering return. However, the appellate outcome reversed that position, despite there being no dispute as to the original wrongful removal and no clear finding that the article 13 threshold had clearly been met at the first instance. That raises a concern about consistency in applying Hague principles at an appellate level and about the degree to which appellate courts revisit or expand factual assessments beyond convention limits.
The second concern is about the creeping expansion of article 13(b) welfare arguments as a basis for refusing return. These provisions were always intended to be narrow exceptions, not an open door for wide-ranging allegations. Where such arguments are routinely entertained without proper substantiation, there is a considerable possibility that summary return proceedings will be converted into de facto welfare determinations, which is not what the convention intended.
The third concern is about the insufficient use of protective measures. In the case I mentioned, the UK had jurisdiction and capacity to implement protective measures upon return, with an active High Court framework available. These mechanisms should be taken seriously and fully operationalised. Failure to do so risks theoretical concerns hardening into grounds for non-return. The post-decision consequences of such outcomes are stark: the child remains outside the jurisdiction of the habitual residence, there is no effective restoration of the pre-removal status quo and contact arrangements remain limited and unresolved. That illustrates how delay, combined with appellate intervention, can effectively neutralise the convention remedy entirely.
I am, of course, conscious that not every parent who crosses a border with a child is a wrongful abductor in the conventional sense. There are genuine cases—we must be clear-eyed about this—in which a parent flees with a child from real, documented domestic abuse, and the law must be sensitive to that reality. Article 13(b) exists precisely for such circumstances. Where the threshold is genuinely met, it should of course be engaged.
The concern is not about the protection itself, but about its expansion and, at times, its misapplication. The difficulty is that the very features that make these cases so emotionally charged also render them susceptible to the weaponisation of abuse allegations as a litigation strategy. It is therefore incumbent on courts and authorities to apply rigorous scrutiny to such claims, neither dismissing them reflexively nor accepting them uncritically, so that the protection is reserved for those who genuinely need it rather than becoming the means by which the convention’s core remedy is routinely frustrated.
The Child Abduction Act 1984 does not provide for the occurrence of a criminal offence when a parent has consent to take a child out of the country but then fails to return them. That legal loophole became known as the Nicolaou problem, following a 2012 judicial review process. The Law Commission’s 2014 report identified this legal blind spot and recommended a change in the law. I am pleased to say that the Crime and Policing Bill, which completed its passage through Parliament late last night, will finally close that loophole. All abductions from the UK will now be criminal.
Based purely on the volume of human stories, Poland appears to be at the sharp end of these affairs. I must set out the record plainly as it stands. The European Commission launched infringement proceedings against Warsaw, and the European Court of Justice concluded that steps taken by the Poles to disrupt and ignore UK convention orders were in contravention of EU law. A financial penalty was imposed for such intransigence. I would very much welcome the Minister’s reflection on the status of the British Government’s support for the European Commission’s proceedings in relation to Poland’s infringements in this area.
The European Court of Human Rights found that although initial steps were timely, subsequent enforcement actions were marred by delays, ineffective procedures and a lack of co-ordination. Moreover, the court determined that authorities repeatedly relied on flawed or misleading information and failed to adjust their strategy when previous steps had failed. The failures were primarily attributable to the authorities, and not solely the abductors’ actions. It therefore held that there had been a violation of article 8 of the convention.
The bottom line is this: abductions to Poland often endure because of the incompetence, deliberate or otherwise, of the authorities. At the very least, the conduct of the Polish authorities has been marked by wilful negligence, if not a sinister concerted effort to frustrate enforcement orders. That speaks to practices that have seemingly been institutionalised. On listening to some of these stories, it is hard to shake a distinct impression of conspiracy—that the abducting parent is in co-ordination with the authorities, aided and abetted to evade enforcement.
Britain and Poland have a close bond. I think of the brave Polish pilots who fought with distinction, with British wings, in our country’s finest hour. In recent decades, many of Poland’s sons and daughters have made their home on these shores. They say that friends should be able to talk candidly, openly and earnestly with each other, even when it comes to uncomfortable discussions—in fact, especially when it comes to tricky home truths.
The Government line is that these issues are raised at every opportunity with Polish counterparts. I appreciate that this is a delicate diplomatic dance, but Poland’s famous intransigence on the issue has hardly been subtle. Beyond the diplomatic niceties, I would like to know what the response is when the question is put pointedly to Polish officials. When sincere representations are made at the highest level, they should not be met with prevarication.
There is much angst about how the current default position is to enforce the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders without any scrutiny at all. In practice, that can result in maintenance being enforced against a left-behind parent, even in cases in which there has been an abduction and an existing Hague return order. REMO case hearings are typically held abroad, without the involvement of the other parent and with no opportunity for defence. Amounts are often arbitrarily assigned, with no consideration given to affordability. To the best of my knowledge, REMO enforcement has been successfully challenged on only one occasion, and even then only on a technicality. For left-behind parents, it adds insult to profound injury that they are expected to fund the illegal abduction of their own children and are often forced to spend thousands of pounds pursuing appeals in UK courts against REMO enforcement.
This mechanism is problematic, for clear reasons. Hague convention return orders are effectively disregarded in financial enforcement proceedings. Left-behind parents may be required to pay backdated and ongoing maintenance. Worse still, the system risks inadvertently incentivising abduction, because it can have the perverse result of delivering a financial reward to the abducting parent. Surely any case in which there is a Hague convention return order should not qualify for maintenance payments of this kind. That should be enshrined in law here. I ask the Minister to help us understand what measures the Government can take to ensure the adequate protection of abduction victims against being penalised in this way when foreign courts reward abductors with high maintenance orders in unreasonable circumstances.
There is also understandable concern that Britain’s position outside the European Union may be influencing how such cases are handled in EU jurisdictions. There is a prevailing sense that the UK has been left out in the cold and perhaps even punished, and that other states have used the Brexit farrago as a smokescreen allowing them to turn a blind eye. Although the precise impact is unclear, it is a mood worth acknowledging as part of the broader context. Will the Minister reflect on that point?
I am told that the European Commission has a team actively working on these cases. Is there an argument for a dedicated taskforce within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office? I absolutely understand the pressures under which our foreign service finds itself in these times of geopolitical turmoil, but I would welcome the Minister’s view on that point.
Much has been said recently about the fragility of international law. It is for countries with shared values that believe in the primacy of the rule of law and international treaties to make the case for it by practising it. I remind Warsaw that Poland was a signatory to the Hague convention too.
As I bring my remarks to an end, I ask the Minister to outline what support children and families who have been victims of abductions can access. Will he furnish us with the statistics on repatriation, specifically from Poland? If he does not have the figures to hand, will he commit to providing that information to me in writing?
I also ask, perhaps naively, whether sufficient consideration is given to the child’s perspective in these often highly fraught cases. The child’s voice is a good place to start and to return to throughout. Our role is not to litigate constituents’ cases in the Chamber, but to push the Government to ensure that our counterparts honour the decisions of our courts, call on them to fulfil their obligations under international law, and oversee the safe and timely return of abducted children back to the country whence they were taken. I implore the Government to bring to bear all the diplomatic power that we have on this matter, because British children, wherever they are sent or taken, deserve nothing less.