Information Disclosure: Pre-trial Abuse of Process Hearings

It emerged in particular that before the hearing in September 2003, the defence solicitors, Blaser Mills, had engaged in private correspondence with the school on the subject of the availability of the school pupil records to the defence. Had that correspondence been disclosed to the court, it could have assisted the prosecution in opposing the application for the stay and, in all probability, would have undermined the grounds of the application to stay the proceedings on the indictment. However, neither the judge nor the prosecuting counsel ever saw the correspondence because it was never produced in open court, even though, according to the transcript of the proceedings, the counsel for the defendant, A. J. Bright QC, had it with him in court and was aware of its contents.

The contents of the hidden correspondence only became known publicly five years later, when in November 2008, the school released it into the public domain. It then became apparent to everyone involved in those proceedings how the non-disclosure meant that the court had been misled and, in effect, deceived into making the order for the stay of the original indictment. That situation was bad enough, but according to my constituent, what followed was arguably worse still.

With the trial on the second indictment looming, my constituent and his co-complainants, who had resigned themselves to the impossibility of their cases ever being heard in open court, were naturally concerned about the position of the other five former pupils whose abuse at Caldicott School was the subject of the second indictment. Their concerns grew when it became known that the defence intended to argue that the second indictment should be stayed on the same grounds as had applied to the first indictment. Accordingly, they repeatedly pressed the CPS to ensure that those submissions made to the judge and accepted by him in the September 2003 abuse of process hearing should be formally corrected to the court.

Their argument was that those submissions, which the defence already knew to be false at the 2003 hearing, were now known to be wrong by all parties and the public at large following the release into the public domain of the correspondence between Caldicott School and the defence solicitors, Blaser Mills. Formal correction of those false submissions was needed to prevent the possibility of the court being misled in the same way that it had been in 2003.

Attention was drawn to the explicit wording of both the Solicitors Regulation Authority handbook and the Bar Standards Board handbook—I have made the relevant sections of both available to the Minister—and to the professional obligation resting on all solicitors and counsel, as officers of the court, to correct submissions of fact made to the court once they are known to be erroneous, to prevent the court from being misled further. It was noted that no one, not even those responsible for making the wrongful submissions in the first place, has been heard to deny that false submissions had been made at the September 2003 hearing or that the effect of that was that the court was misled and proceeded to rule on the basis of false information.

To my constituent’s complete and abiding astonishment, the CPS did absolutely nothing. While not disagreeing that the defence had acted improperly by telling the judge that the pupil records could not be obtained from the school, or even tacitly accepting that the court had been misled by that, it took no action at all. However, not only were the records available but, in the hidden correspondence that the judge never saw, the defence had actually relinquished its request to be given them.

In addition, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar Standards Board took no action. Likewise, the Office of the Attorney General, from which at least my constituent might have expected some intervention, given the failure of the regulatory bodies to deal with the situation, did nothing. Only at a much later stage, when the defendant, following his conviction and sentence, applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, did the CPS finally agree with the complainants that, if leave to appeal conviction were granted and if the defence were to argue that the grounds of the imposition of the stay of the indictment in September 2003 were relevant to the appeal—in fact, it transpired that the defence did intend to argue exactly that—it would finally take action. It would require corrections to be made to the false submissions made in 2003 by counsel and solicitors for the defence in order to ensure that the Court of Appeal would not be misled in 2014. However, the appeal did not proceed and in the event, therefore, those corrections were never made.

At the request of my constituent, I have referred to what he considers—as I do—the embarrassing irregularities that unexpectedly and unusually came to light in the Caldicott School case, and those have a public profile. I have been led to believe, however, that similar problems were experienced in a number of other cases of lesser profile. My constituent has generously offered to provide the Minister with the details, if she so wishes.

It is too late now for the complainants in the Caldicott School case to be accorded the simple justice of the correction of known false submissions that were made to the court, that derailed the first indictment and that they believe denied them justice in 2003.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on those failures to disclose and on the misleading of the court consequent to the erroneous submissions made to it. The formal confirmation of the Minister is needed to reassure my constituent that solicitors and counsel are professionally obligated to make such corrections as soon as possible, and that in future, where necessary, robust and firm action will be taken by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar Standards Board in order to prevent the possibility of any court being misled in that way in the future.

I hope that the Minister, in responding, will bear in mind that I have known my constituent, Mr Perry, for 20 years. I have been dealing with his case and other matters pertaining to him for a long time. He is a man of great honour and integrity, and he has come forward to speak out in public about some horrendous abuse he suffered in childhood, thereby hoping to prevent something similar happening to other children in the future. This is just part of that pattern. I hope that the Minister will give a positive response in this debate.

Furthermore, in 2012, one of my predecessors as Solicitor General personally considered whether to bring contempt proceedings arising from what the judge was told in 2003, but he concluded that there was insufficient evidence to do so. I understand that the trial judge in the proceedings that led to Peter Wright’s conviction in 2013, as my right hon. Friend said, also considered the arguments that had been employed in the abuse of process application in 2003 but declined to lift the stay on proceedings.

I am not aware of any adverse findings made against any lawyers involved in the criminal proceedings arising out of the abuse at Caldicott School between 1959 and 1970. None of that is in any way designed to diminish the profound effect that those crimes must have had on Mr Perry’s life, or to detract from our commitment as Law Officers superintending the prosecuting departments to promote best practice in the care that victims of sexual abuse receive from the criminal justice system. However, the issues that Mr Perry continues to raise have not been ignored and have received serious consideration in the past.

As Members know, it is open to a defendant to argue that a prosecution is an abuse of process—for example, because of the effect of delay on the fairness of the trial—and that proceedings should therefore be stayed. That arises from the overriding duty on courts to promote justice and to prevent injustice. In these cases, the burden lies on the defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that there has been an abuse and that a fair trial is no longer possible.

There is clear authority from the Court of Appeal that there is a strong public interest in the prosecution of crime, and that ordering a stay of proceedings is a remedy of last resort, even where there has been significant delay in bringing proceedings. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) pointed out, the bar for a stay is very high. Even when a judge imposes a stay of proceedings, the prosecution can apply to lift the stay in future. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham mentioned, such an application was made in Mr Perry’s case in 2012. Although the judge declined the prosecution application to lift the stay on the 2003 proceedings, she allowed the fresh allegations against Peter Wright to be tried by a jury, and also allowed details of the abuse that Mr Perry suffered to be admitted as bad character evidence during the trial. As a result, the jury found Peter Wright guilty of abusing five pupils during the 1960s and he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

My right hon. Friend makes some important observations about disclosure in the criminal justice system. Hon. Members will be aware that the Attorney General recently carried out a review of disclosure and made recommendations to improve performance across the criminal justice system. In our criminal justice system there is a statutory duty on prosecutors to disclose to the defence any material or information that may assist the defence or undermine the prosecution case. That duty applies to abuse of process hearings as well as trials. There is also a residual duty on the prosecution at common law to disclose any information that would assist the accused in the preparation of the defence case. That duty applies from the outset in criminal proceedings and requires the disclosure of material that might enable an accused to make an early application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process.