Illegal Migration Bill

Commons Amendments and Reasons

Motion A

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 1, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 1A.

1A: Because it is unnecessary, as the Bill does not require any act or omission that conflicts with the obligations of the United Kingdom under the European Convention of Human Rights or other listed international instruments, and it would undermine the UK’s dualist legal system.

My Lords, in moving Motion A, I will, with the leave of the House, also speak to Motions D, S, T, U and V.

The Lords amendments do significant damage to the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Bill will only prevent and deter illegal migration if persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 are swiftly returned to their home country or removed to a safe third country. For that to happen, we must end the cycle of late, repeated and spurious legal challenges. The Lords amendments will perpetuate that cycle.

Motion A relates to Lords Amendment 1, which would replace Clause 1 with a new clause that sets out that nothing in the Act shall

“require any act or omission that conflicts with the obligations of the United Kingdom under”

the five international agreements specified in the amendment.

As I have set out throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the Bill that requires any act or omission that conflicts with the UK’s international obligations. The only way to break the business model of the criminal gangs and to deter illegal migrants is if it is abundantly clear that the only outcome of illegal entry is not a new life in the UK. Therefore, it is essential that we take bold steps. Although some of the provisions in the Bill are novel, the Government are satisfied that the Bill can be implemented in line with convention rights.

As my noble friend Lord Wolfson set out on Report, Lords Amendment 1 is also objectionable from a constitutional perspective. In the United Kingdom, we follow a dualist approach, whereby international law is integrated into domestic law solely through parliamentary legislation. The Government are often criticised for rushing legislation and not allowing adequate scrutiny. Here, the tables are turned. Amendment 1 has profound and wide-ranging implications. It should not be shoehorned into this Bill without proper consideration of its consequences and an opportunity for Parliament properly to scrutinise the significance of such a step. If a future Government want to incorporate into domestic law the refugee convention or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is open for them to do so, but that would be a significant legislative undertaking and a profound change to our domestic legal landscape. Amendment 1 is not the way to do it.

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 1B in lieu—

1B: Leave out Clause 1 and insert the following new clause— “Introduction In interpreting this Act, regard shall be given to the intention that its provisions, and any acts and omissions made as a result, are intended to comply with the United Kingdom’s obligations under- (a) the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; (b) the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees including the Protocol to that Convention; (c) the 1954 and 1961 UN Conventions on the Reduction of Statelessness; (d) the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; (e) the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking Human Beings.””

My Lords, I beg to move Motion A1 as an amendment to Motion A. Ministers suggest that our Amendment 1, Amendment 7 as a consequential and Amendment 90 are wrecking and unnecessary. These criticisms are contradictory. If the Government take their international obligations so seriously, why should they be afraid to ensure that those charged with operating this proposed legislation, which clearly impacts on the rights of vulnerable people, understand that Ministers intend not to violate these rights? Why should Ministers have been unable to make a statement of their belief in ECHR compatibility in the Bill?

Alongside that strange logic comes a pseudo-legal argument from the Mickey Mouse school of jurisprudence that even to reference binding international obligations in domestic instruments somehow offends the sanctity of our dualist system. This is nonsense. It is because of our system, whereby international obligations signed by Ministers do not automatically become directly enforceable domestically without parliamentary approval, that successive Governments of both stripes have had to refer to various treaties or their contents in a host of relevant domestic measures. Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 expressly gave primacy to the refugee convention. In 2009, in the EN Serbia case, the Court of Appeal found that that provision did not constitute informal or backdoor incorporation or undermine the principle of dualism, which is designed to protect parliamentary sovereignty and not to insulate Governments from their obligations. The Children Act 1989 takes its central best interests of the child principle directly from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—two of numerous precedents.

The treaties in our Amendment 1 were chosen by truly cross-party, all-party and non-party consensus for relevance to the people, measures and rights engaged by this Bill. The Government’s real objection, and to consequential Amendment 7 and Amendment 90, is that no one, especially His Majesty’s judges, should be able to second-guess Home Office decisions. That is simply contrary to the rule of law on which any civilised society, let alone a great democracy, must be built. None the less, in the spirit of respectful dialogue, we have listened, compromised and amended our new Clause 1, softening its requirement to require having regard to the various conventions when interpreting the Bill. There is no way that that can now be regarded as incorporation rather than interpretation.

My Lords, there are three reasons we should be stubborn about not allowing the Bill to go through. The first is that this was not in the Tory Party manifesto: we do not have a duty to pass it. Secondly, Rwanda is not a safe country. Thirdly, we cannot pass legislation that allows the Government to break the law; that does not make sense.

My Lords, I support the amended version of Clause 1, put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Whether or not Parliament intends to incorporate international treaties within our own law depends on the wording. The point was made on Report that the noble Baroness’s previous wording had no reference to interpretation. It seems to me quite clear now that the emphasis has been put on having regard to the provisions in these international treaties which bind this country for the purposes of interpreting this Act. I consider that this falls plainly on the right side of the line.

As for my own amendment to Motion S, which the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has addressed, I thank the Minister for his time, patience and reasonableness over the discussions concerning this. I was principally concerned that those who are entitled to the protection of the convention because of a well-founded fear of persecution in the country stated in the removal notice should not have to have an additional test of irreversible harm in order to prevent removal there. The assurances the noble Lord has given have satisfied me over that concern, particularly in relation to the principles in the case to which he drew attention, HJ (Iran) for LGBT refugees. My concerns have been satisfied and for that reason I will not oppose the Motion of the Government on this point.

My Lords, briefly, we on these Benches support all the Motions to amend the government Motions. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has well made the point that even if one could have argued that the original Amendment 1 was a backdoor incorporation—an argument I always found unpersuasive—that objection certainly cannot be made of the new text of Motion A1, which is clearly nothing of the sort. The Prime Minister has been at the NATO summit in Vilnius upholding international law against breaches through Russian aggression. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 cited the rule of law at one of the core principles. The Prime Minister was also recently at the Council of Europe summit. Again, the core values in the declaration were the threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

On Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, talked about how this amendment

“is firmly in the Conservative tradition of strengthening, not undermining, the international rule of law”.—[Official Report, 28/6/23; col. 704.]

She reminded noble Lords that

“Conservative Governments were instrumental in creating the first four conventions listed in the amendment”.

Finally, on Amendment 93, we still have concerns, as do doctors, about the proposals in the Bill for as yet unproven medical age assessments. Amendment 93 provides the most basic safety net for those undergoing age assessment: the right to appeal a judgment. Removing that right will not deter any smugglers, or child refugees in need of appropriate safety and protection. We urge support for the amendment Motions.

My Lords, I do not know whether I should declare an interest as a pseudo-lawyer, or perhaps as Mickey Mouse. I am not entirely convinced that framing the debate in that way is appropriate.

I have a number of things to say. First, the fact that Motion A1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has been rephrased as it has been, shows that those of us who argued that the previous version was substantive, and not interpretative, were right. However, the Motion as redrafted is also improper because it does two things—here I again respectfully part company with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. He read the Motion but omitted words in its second line. Let us have a look at what it actually says:

“In interpreting this Act, regard shall be given to the intention that its provisions”—

that refers to the provisions in the Bill—

“and any act and omissions made as a result, are intended to comply”.

Even now, it is not properly an interpretative provision, because it does not just apply to interpreting the words; it is also said to apply to any acts and omissions made under the Act, as it will become. That still has substantive consequences, and the effect is still—this time in an evening rather than in an afternoon—that we are effectively incorporating these treaties into our domestic law.

That is why the words

“and any acts and omissions made as a result”

are still objectionable, but the rest of it, while maybe not objectionable, is unnecessary. As I mentioned on Report, the law of this country has always been that, in the absence of express words to the contrary, all statutes are presumed to be in accordance with our international obligations. That was most recently set out by Lord Dyson, speaking for the Supreme Court in the Assange case, when he said that

My Lords, I have the misfortune to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. I support entirely what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said. The key words in this reformulated amendment are “In interpreting this Act” and “regard”. It would not write these conventions into our law, as the previous amendment was in danger of doing. This a pure interpretation provision, and it is entirely consistent with the way the courts approach these various conventions. The assumption is that the United Kingdom, having signed up to the conventions, will respect them in the formulation of its provisions in our domestic law. The court applies that principle in finding a meaning of the words before it in statutory instruments and in primary legislation. This is entirely in accordance with the way the courts approach the matter. The key words are, “In interpreting this Act”, and “regard”. It is not binding; it is just that regard will be had. That is the way the provision should read. I support the amendment because it is entirely orthodox and consistent with principle.

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s Motion A1 and the various provisions that follow from it. Without getting into the legal arguments that have just been articulated by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Etherton, I support the fact that the key words are the first few words, in particular to try to deal with the criticism that was made of the previous amendment.

The only point I would add is that it is important for us to have something like this in the Bill given the criticism, concern and questions that have been raised about the Bill by many well-respected international organisations, bodies and individuals. We all expect something to be done about the challenge that we face, but we want it done in a way which enhances our international reputation and conforms to the various international treaties and our responsibilities. That is why Motion A1 is particularly important and should be supported.

My Lords, I thank the House for the dispatch this group has been dealt with and for the contributions from across the Chamber. It will come as no surprise to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that I disagree with her interpretation and agree with that of my noble friend Lord Wolfson. Frankly, if one looks at Amendment 1B, one can see that “regard” must be read alongside “intended to comply”, so this revised amendment is equally problematic. The point my noble friend Lord Wolfson made is entirely right: it amounts to an acceptance that the earlier version of the amendment would also have been a very significant constitutional innovation, predicated on the back of an amendment to the Bill and a massive change to our constitutional framework. I am afraid that I therefore disagree with the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Amendment 1B.

On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the Bill of course sets up a framework whereby a person can be removed to a safe country. In the litigation in the Court of Appeal, as this House well knows, the court unanimously found for the Government: that it is lawful and within the meaning of the refugee convention for a country to allow processing by a third safe country. Clearly, that is what the Bill provides for.