Today, I am launching our consultation on proposals to overhaul the Human Rights Act and replace it with a Bill of Rights. I thank Sir Peter Gross and the panel he chaired for conducting the independent Human Rights Act review—the report of which is published today—which has influenced and informed our thinking in this regard.
The Government’s proposals for a Bill of Rights will strengthen this country’s proud tradition of freedom, curtail abuses of the human rights system and reinforce the democratic prerogatives of elected Members in this House over the legislative process in respect of the expansion of human rights. Above all, we will restore some common sense to the system.
At the outset, let me reassure the House—this issue was raised earlier in oral questions—that the UK will remain a party to the European convention on human rights. As we have shown with the introduction of our Magnitsky regime for human rights abuses, we will continue to lead internationally in the championing of freedom around the world.
Our objective in overhauling our human rights legislation will be to change, reform and revise the domestic interpretation and application of the convention by the UK courts. Following the reforms to the convention system reflected in the 2012 Brighton declaration, we will assert the margin of appreciation, as appropriate, in the UK’s dialogue with the Strasbourg Court.
As I said, we have a long, proud and diverse history of freedoms in this country that stretches back to Magna Carta through the 1689 Claim of Right Act and Bill of Rights, the Slave Trade Act 1807 and the Representation of the People Act 1918. It is a tradition steeped in great thinkers such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin, and in the advocacy of great champions of freedom and human rights from Emmeline Pankhurst through to Violet Van der Elst.
As we take the next step in our country’s reforms, and as we look to the future, we can and, I believe, should confidently build on those traditions and values.
Our proposals will recognise the right to trial by jury, as it applies variably across the different nations of the United Kingdom in important ways, as part of the common law tradition of human rights. We also have the opportunity to reinforce the weight we attach to freedom of speech, a quintessentially British right—the freedom that grants all the others—that we have seen eroded of late by a combination of case law that has introduced continental-style privacy rules and the incremental narrowing of the scope for respectful but rambunctious debate in politically sensitive areas, which is something we in this House should resist both on principle and in the interest of effective decision making that comes only from a full airing of contrary views. Freedom of speech sometimes means the freedom to say things that others may not wish to hear.
While retaining the European convention on human rights, we will prevent the misuse and distortion of those rights that we have seen from time to time through elastic and innovative expansions that go well beyond anything the architects of the convention had in mind during the post-war settlement. Some of this has arisen from Strasbourg case law, and some has arisen from UK case law, and I make it very clear at the outset that my critique is levelled at the Human Rights Act and how it operates; it is not levelled at the UK judiciary, who have quite properly sought to implement legislation passed by this House.
I will give three examples of the problems we have encountered and a sense of how we can address them. Under our proposals, we will be able to prevent serious criminals from relying on article 8, the right to family life, to frustrate their deportation from this country. One example—the case law is littered with them—is the case of the convicted drug dealer who was also convicted of battery against his partner. He paid no child maintenance but, none the less, he claimed the right to family life to trump the public interest in his removal.
To give a sense of scale, because it is easy to cite one case or another and people will say it is not representative of the problem, article 8 claims now make up around 70% of all successful human rights challenges by foreign national offenders against deportation orders. Our proposals will enable us to legislate to curtail that abuse of the system, and hon. Members will have to decide whether they are for or against that proposition.
Secondly, under our proposed reforms we will be better able to protect the public in other ways by addressing our well-intentioned but, frankly, distorting jurisprudence. I cite the example of the Osman case, which has skewed the operational priorities of some of our major police forces. The ruling has required police forces to divert officers, resources and focus to protect criminal gangs from the threats they make to each other, which are of course time, effort and resources that could otherwise be prioritised towards protecting law-abiding members of our society.
Thirdly, these changes will help to deliver root-and-branch reform of parole proceedings, which hon. Members on both sides of the House raised with me in the aftermath of recent cases, including the case of Colin Pitchfork.
In these areas and others, our reforms will enable Parliament to act and, where necessary, assert the margin of appreciation with respect to Strasbourg while remaining party to the convention. We will achieve these objectives through carefully targeted reform under our Bill of Rights, which will revise and replace the framework provided under the Human Rights Act.
Our independent judiciary and parliamentary sovereignty are the cornerstones and the foundations of our democracy and, indeed, our success as a country. With that in mind, we will sharpen the separation of powers and reform the duty in section 2 of the Human Rights Act that requires UK courts to take account of Strasbourg case law, but has at various times been interpreted as a duty to match the Strasbourg jurisprudence, which is neither necessary nor desirable—[Interruption.] I see hon. Members shaking their heads, and I point them to the Ullah case in particular, but of course the case law has ebbed and flowed. That ebb and flow has created uncertainty, so it is right that we provide greater legal certainty by making clear the primacy of the UK’s own case law and primary legislation and the role of the UK Supreme Court, not Strasbourg, as the ultimate judicial arbiter when it comes to interpreting the European convention on human rights in this country. We will make it crystal clear that the UK courts are under no duty to follow Strasbourg case law, which itself does not operate a doctrine of precedent.
Next, we will replace section 3 of the Human Rights Act so that our courts are confined to judicial interpretation and are no longer—effectively, in practice—licensed by the Act to amend or dilute the will of Parliament expressed through statute. One of the consequences of the elastic extension of rights has been the incremental expansion of so-called positive obligations on public authorities by the courts, which are something that has no basis in the convention, as even a cursory reading of the travaux préparatoires to the convention—the negotiating history—will demonstrate. That was the case in the Osman ruling, which I referred to; it has had the much broader effect of skewing public service priorities and allocation of precious public resources. Our approach will provide a check on what is quite properly a legislative function that ought to be left to elected lawmakers in Parliament.
Finally in this regard, as we reinforce a clearer demarcation of the separation of powers, we will consult on plans for a democratic shield. This will help to promote meaningful dialogue with Strasbourg—which we achieved in cases such as prisoner voting, which hon. Members on both sides of the House will remember—by asserting the margin of appreciation where it is appropriate. It will recognise the proper role of Parliament in responding to adverse rulings from Strasbourg, but let me be crystal clear: hon. Members in this House must have the last word on the laws of this land.
Next, one of the consistent complaints that we hear from the public is that human rights can be subject to abuse. Our proposals will address this in a number of ways. We will introduce a permission stage, similar to that which exists in continental jurisdictions, including in the German Constitutional Court and indeed the European Court of Human Rights itself. This will bring an appropriate check by requiring claimants to demonstrate that they have suffered a significant disadvantage, which will help to prevent spurious or unmeritorious claims.
We can also do more to recognise that rights come with responsibilities, so we will reform the approach to remedies so that our courts give greater consideration to the behaviour of the claimant and the wider public interest when considering the compensation that may be paid out. That will give judges greater discretion to strike the right balance between claimants’ rights, their responsibilities and indeed the rights of others in our society when considering human rights cases. It is not right that those who have broken the law can then reach out and claim human rights, to claim large chunks of compensation at the taxpayer’s and the wider public’s expense.
Our proposals also recognise the diverse legal traditions across the United Kingdom, as well as the common heritage that binds us together. That is the linchpin of our success as a Union. We will consult with each of the devolved Administrations and across the UK to get that balance right. We want to guarantee protections across the Union in accordance with a common framework reflecting our common traditions, while respecting devolved competences.
In this country, we have a long and proud tradition of liberty, but we must actively cherish and nurture it. As we write the next chapter in that proud history, our proposals for a UK-wide Bill of Rights will strengthen our freedoms, reflect our legal traditions, curtail those abuses of the system, reinforce the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches and respect the democratic authority of this House, which—as so often in our history—has been a bulwark and the protector of our freedoms. I commend this statement to the House.