That this House is concerned that serious human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, together with widespread grand corruption, continue to escalate in an increasingly unstable global environment; notes that global human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, commonly known as Magnitsky sanctions, remain an essential mechanism for accountability and redress, yet their implementation by the United Kingdom is inconsistent and insufficient, and lacks oversight; regrets that numerous individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses and corruption remain unsanctioned, that enforcement and transparency around decision-making remains inadequate, and that sanctioned individuals continue to exploit evasion methods while victims receive limited support; further notes the absence of a long-term strategy for the management of frozen assets and a lack of clear criteria for delisting, alongside growing concerns that sanctions are becoming politicised internationally; urges the Government to strengthen the credibility of the Magnitsky sanctions regime through consistent and impartial application, enhanced enforcement, and by ensuring greater Parliamentary oversight and expanded measures to support victims, including developing pathways for compensation; and holds that, relevant to this, those involved in the arbitrary detention of British nationals should face Magnitsky sanctions, including those involved in the detention of Ryan Cornelius, Jagtar Singh Johal and Jimmy Lai.
I rise to speak to the motion in my name, which is supported by 17 hon. and right hon. Members from across the House. As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation, I welcome the advent of the growing use of Magnitsky sanctions as a major development in accountability for human rights abuse and corruption.
These sanctions are named after Sergei Magnitsky, a tax adviser killed in a Russian prison after exposing fraud by Russian Government officials. Magnitsky sanctions freeze perpetrators’ assets and stop them travelling internationally, and they are now used by the UK, the US, the EU and Canada, which together represent over one third of global GDP. In the UK, Magnitsky sanctions stop perpetrators accessing London, the world’s second largest financial centre and the world’s largest luxury property market. Sanctions are most effective when the various jurisdictions work together to close perpetrators off from, and drive them away from, financial markets.
Looking at the comparative picture, the US has sanctioned 608 individuals and entities under its Magnitsky-style regime, though 20 have been delisted. Of those designations, 17 relate to Russia, with one since delisted, and 34 are against China and six against the United Arab Emirates for corruption. By contrast—and this is the point I really want to make—since introducing Magnitsky sanctions in the legislation passed in 2020, the UK has imposed 164 designations under its global human rights regime and 65 under the global anti-corruption regime. That makes a total of 229 Magnitsky-style designations, of which 60 relate to Russia, eight to China and none to the UAE.
I apologise for intervening on my right hon. Friend so early on, but he has mentioned Russia several times. He will be aware that there has been much talk about ceasefires, but there is no sign of one yet, because Putin still thinks he is winning in Ukraine. Would he agree with me that, if we really want to compel Putin to stop killing Ukrainians, we need to increase sanctions on the Russian Government, particularly on their hydrocarbons, which means action not just by us and Europe, but further sanctions from the United States?
I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend. We have a tool here that can be used to drive back those who act badly—in this particular case, against a country illegally invading a neighbouring democratic state—so we should use this ability to sanction those involved and to increase such sanctions dramatically. I know Labour Members will be raising this issue, but they will have noted what he has said.
The UK and the US have imposed extensive additional sanctions on Russian individuals and entities under the Russia-specific sanctions regimes. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) may want to note, those regimes use broader designation grounds and, crucially, do not usually acknowledge an individual’s direct involvement in human rights abuses in Ukraine or elsewhere. That distinction matters, and this should be rectified by the UK Government. The symbolic and moral force of the Magnitsky sanctions is precisely to name perpetrators and link consequences directly to human rights abuses, and that is what sets them apart. In sheer volume, the contrast is stark. The US has imposed well over 5,000 such Russia-related non-Magnitsky designations, and the UK about 2,900. Yet despite this scale, the absence in most cases of any explicit human rights attribution in such regimes means an important opportunity for accountability is being missed.
As a mechanism in the Government’s foreign policy toolkit, Magnitsky sanctions have a huge potential. However, important gaps remain in their implementation, raising serious concerns about their overall effectiveness. There is no publicly available information on the number of Magnitsky sanctions evidence dossiers received by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. However, based on estimates since the inception of the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, the FCDO receives on average about two or three dossiers of evidence per month from civil society organisations, which often identify between three and 15 individuals or entities alleged to be implicated in human rights violations. This means that since July 2020, the FCDO has received evidence on anywhere between 360 and 3,000 alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. In stark contrast, only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under the global human rights regime and global anti-corruption regime, to date.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on obtaining the debate and on highlighting how the Magnitsky sanctions could be used more effectively. Could he explain to the House, and for my benefit, what effect, if one applies sanctions to some foreign leader, dictator or person who is in a completely different jurisdiction, does a sanction actually have and how can it be made to bite on the interests of that person so that the sanctions are actually felt by that person?
It has two effects. First, anything to do with any finance or movement or visitations to the United Kingdom are immediately ruled out and the seizure of financial entities can take place. Secondly, it influences other countries to do the same. America may work with us on that, too. Two of the greatest financial markets are then shut to an individual, who may be part of a Government, thus making it highly difficult for them to operate, or to come and enjoy themselves—a lot of that is done. They become pariahs internationally and that has a huge effect, because it influences what others near them will do when they realise they are about to lose their access to very important areas—cities and financial markets. It has already shown to have had a massive knock-on effect.
Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House who actually does the research that leads to people being identified for sanctioning, whether there is resistance in such places as the City of London, which no doubt could make enormous financial profits from having illicit money deposited there, and whether such places are incentivised to turn a blind eye when attempts are made to camouflage the real sources of the dirty money flowing in?
Many groups are doing that research at the moment, some of them private and voluntary organisations, but the Foreign Office itself is meant to be doing it. I am struck by the fact that it does not always check everybody’s backgrounds. The reality is that it must be much more intense and we must start going after these people. The City of London had a bad reputation for dirty money. A lot of that has stopped now as a result of the Russian sanctions. More importantly, individual sanctions also helped to end that. We need to be much more particular about where that money is coming from and how, and who are the individuals who are behind the use of that money. My right hon. Friend is quite right about that.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He is right to bring this issue forward. Some 229 people have designated by the United Kingdom, and 3,000 Russians have been designated after the invasion of Ukraine. However, weak enforcement risks hollowing out the regime. To date, no fines have been imposed for breaches of the UK’s Magnitsky-style sanctions. If this House is serious about protecting life and dignity, we must ensure that these tools are used consistently and enforced credibly. I am often reminded of the example of Jesus Christ, the greatest leader and yet the greatest servant. He protected lives by giving his own. We, as leaders, should echo his example by diligently helping those who cannot help themselves.
The hon. Gentleman is, of course, absolutely right. It is important to get justice and to make sure that others who would be tempted to go down that road realise there will be real penalties to pay.
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate on Magnitsky-style sanctions for serious human rights abuses. There are numerous ways that sanctioned individuals have attempted to evade UK authorities, in particular when it comes to cryptocurrencies. Does he agree that co-ordination with our international allies, as well as being at the cutting edge of technology, is key to ensuring that increasingly evasive individuals are brought to heel?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and that is the whole point of today’s debate. My feeling is that this Government and even the previous Government have to a degree dragged their feet. I often say to the Minister, who I know very well—we have debated with each other endlessly—that it seems not to matter who is in government, because the Foreign Office retains its reluctance over many sanctions. He will deny that, of course, because it is his job to do so, but I see him as a very decent individual and he must know in his heart of hearts that there is more that we could do. I will leave that for the moment, until he has the chance to wind up the debate.
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a perception in my constituency and across the country that the money laundering checks on individual consumers going for a mortgage or buying something expensive such as a car seem to be more stringent than those for the millionaire- billionaire foreign investors who are investing in the City of London?
The whole point of the debate is to ensure that we know where the money comes from, that we know how it has been gained, and that the individuals must pay a penalty if they are involved in what is illegal or inhuman. The key point is that all those matters can be picked out by the Magnitsky sanctions.
I mentioned Myanmar earlier. Despite historically leaning on sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta for its role in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against its civilian population after the 2021 coup, the UK has failed to target the State Security and Peace Commission, the military’s successor to the UK-sanctioned State Administration Council. Without additional sanctions, the State Security and Peace Commission, which was established in an attempt by the military to rebrand itself and rebuild financial ties with international partners, has effectively succeeded in its mission. That is exactly what we should have been tackling through the sanctions available to us, but we have not done so.
Finally, last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. However, no action was taken against their key military and diplomatic backer, the United Arab Emirates, or their chief commander. That highlights a broader, troubling trend: to date, only a fraction of Magnitsky sanctions have ever been applied by the UK Government to perpetrators from countries considered strategic allies of the UK. That is a very important point to make; politics have an awful lot to do with this issue. As reported by REDRESS, several of the most notorious human rights abusers and corrupt actors, including in Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, China, Eritrea, the UAE and Egypt—we have mentioned Russia, too—have not been sanctioned by the UK.
I really do not know the answer to that question. All I can say to my hon. Friend is that we act individually and are supposed to co-operate, but that does not always work. We have seen with the Chinese and others that America leads the way and we half follow, or do not follow at all. My concern is that we do not champion such action in the way that we could and should as an upholder of human rights and freedom. This country has a huge record in that area and we need to use it much more.
I am not the only Member of this House to have raised concerns about the relationship between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the activities of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. What is going on in Sudan is brutal, bloody and huge, even in comparison to what is happening in somewhere like Gaza. It is an astonishing abuse of human rights and the value of life. The RSF is responsible for brutal murders, rapes, attacks on hospitals and significant numbers of killings, and yet this organisation has been supported heavily by the UAE. It is said that without the support of the UAE, there would not now be a major war going on in Sudan. There are really big questions to be asked here, because without those arms shipments and other support, there would not be the fighting and terrible consequences that we see in Sudan.
I wish to draw the attention of the Minister to reporting by The New York Times in June last year, which, citing US intelligence sources, references the involvement of Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Deputy President of the UAE, in co-ordination with the RSF and in his role as chair of two charities funding hospitals in Chad that have allegedly been used in the distribution of weapons to the RSF. The investigation further reports that the US envoy to Sudan confronted Sheikh Mansour personally in 2024 about his support for General Hamdan of the RSF. As the ultimate owner of Manchester City football club, Sheikh Mansour is possibly the most high-profile UAE investor in the UK economy. What are we going to do about that? That is a signal and serious problem for us.
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The limited number of Magnitsky sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. Designations tend to overlook broader command structures, instead focusing on isolated actors, excluding key backers or enablers and failing to adopt when sanctioned entities rebrand. For example, Chen Zhi is one of the many leaders of scam networks with bases in south-east Asia trafficking and torturing vulnerable individuals to compel them to scam citizens here in the UK and abroad. The news that the UK and the US sanctioned some of those responsible is always welcome, but those sanctions fail to target Cambodian Government figures who are themselves implicated in the practice, or who turn a blind eye to those violations.
I will now come to some examples of individuals and contexts that remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of involvement in corruption and serious human rights issues. Let me deal now with China. While the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in China’s violent repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from human rights organisations. REDRESS— I know, because I have seen the evidence—previously submitted it to the FCDO, calling for targeted sanctions on the following individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations in Xinjiang.
All of the following are sanctioned by the US—our ally—but not by the UK. The persons recommended for designations are: Chen Quanguo, party secretary of the Xinjiang Chinese Communist party and the key driver of the policy of genocide; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; Sun Jinlong, former political commissar of the XPCC, who was sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; Peng Jiarui, deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC, sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; and Huo Liujun, former leader of the Public Security Bureau, sanctioned by the US on 9 July 2020. As somebody sanctioned by the Chinese Government myself—like you, Madam Deputy Speaker—for raising the issues of Xinjiang at the time, I think that that is a major omission. These are the key people—close almost to President Xi himself—who, when sanctioned, will really feel it. They are locked out of America, but have not been locked out by us. Will the Minister therefore outline what steps the FCDO will take to ensure that sanctions are consistently applied to all actors involved in human rights abuses and corruption?
Will the Minister confirm that, given the appalling crimes of the RSF, which fall squarely in the purview of the global human rights sanctions scheme, the Department has carried out a full assessment of whether representatives of the UAE Government may meet the criteria for sanctions, given the significant role the UAE is alleged to play in support of the RSF and the substantial influence of the UAE on investments in the UK economy and public life? If such an assessment has not been carried out, will the Minister say whether it is the Government’s intention to do so?
Individuals arbitrarily detained abroad are particularly vulnerable to torture, ill treatment and other serious human rights violations, from the moment they are detained. The Government’s own figures show that in 2024 the FCDO received 186 new allegations of torture and mistreatment from British nationals overseas. Arbitrary detention and related human rights abuses have long-lasting effects on those who experience them; following release, survivors must bear the physical, psychological and socioeconomic toll of their captivity.
This makes it all the more concerning that the list of British nationals currently subject to arbitrary detention abroad is long. I am going to read out the names on it: Jagtar Singh Johal; Ryan Cornelius, whose family are with us today in the Gallery; Jimmy Lai; Nnamdi Kanu; Christian James Michel; Matthew Alexander Pascoe; Ramze Shihab Ahmed al-Rifa’i; Charles Ridley; Mehran Raoof; Craig and Lindsay Foreman; and Ahmed al-Doush. I want to focus on two particular cases that exemplify the FCDO’s reluctance to use Magnitsky sanctions to challenge arbitrary detention: first, Ryan Cornelius; secondly, Jimmy Lai.
A case that underscores the ongoing failure of the UK Government—and, I have to say, that of their predecessor—to effectively employ Magnitsky sanctions to deter and punish those responsible for arbitrarily detaining and mistreating UK nationals is, of course, that of Ryan Cornelius, who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for more than 17 years. I want to mention the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), who has raised this issue on a number of occasions. I congratulate him on his support for the Cornelius family. This arbitrary detention also applies to Charles Ridley, Ryan Cornelius’s business partner, but I will focus today on Ryan.
Unlike the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ryan’s plight has been met with deafening silence, despite well-documented evidence of an unfair trial and the inhumane treatment that has been meted out to him. His detention has been found arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. Ryan’s original 10-year sentence was extended by 20 years at the behest of the Dubai Islamic Bank, which has used his imprisonment as leverage to seize his assets, rendering his family essentially homeless.
The FCDO has been reluctant to engage fully with the detail of Ryan’s case from the very beginning. Even now, Ryan’s family—who, as I said, are with us in the Public Gallery—are repeatedly forced to set out the basic facts of his case at every single meeting with the FCDO or Ministers, despite the fact that they are fully known to them. Despite repeated calls from Ryan’s family and from MPs for sanctions against Dubai officials, the UK Government have taken no action. Not a single individual has been sanctioned for their role in this case.
I urge the Minister to look at imposing targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for Mr Cornelius’s arbitrary detention and asset seizure. I am going to list just eight people who are involved in the board of the Dubai bank: His Excellency Mohammed Al Shaibani; Yahya Saeed Ahmad Nasser Lootah, vice-chairman of the board of directors; Hamad Abdulla Rashed Obaid Al Shamsi, a board member; Ahmad Mohammad Saeed Bin Humaidan, also a board member; Abdul Aziz Ahmed Rahma Mohamed Al Muhairi; Dr Hamad Buamim; Javier Marin Romano; Bader Saeed Abdulla Hareb; and Dr Cigdem Kogar. I offer up the names of these people, all of whom are involved in this case, for the Government to think carefully about taking action. Unfortunately, Ryan’s case appears to be a clear example of economic interests taking precedence over human rights, largely because the UAE is such a major financial investor and trading partner.
I am afraid that that double standard is not limited to Ryan’s case. India—another country with a recent trade deal—continues to hold a British citizen in arbitrary detention without consequences. Jagtar Singh Johal, from Dumbarton, Scotland, was violently arrested in 2017 while in India to get married. He was tortured and has endured eight years of detention, which the UN working group on arbitrary detention has ruled
“lacks legal basis and is arbitrary”.
After lots of hearings—hundreds of them—prosecutors in India have failed to produce credible evidence against Jagtar, and the UK must now use every diplomatic lever to bring him home.
I want to return, finally, to the case of Jimmy Lai. The time has come, surely, for the UK to wield its sanctions authority against the officials responsible for repression in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai’s guilty conviction for “foreign collusion” and “sedition” on 15 December, which paves the way for Hong Kong’s courts to sentence the 78-year-old British citizen to life in prison, is the final straw.
Beijing has trashed the Sino-British joint declaration, crushed the freedoms it promised Hongkongers and the world, and imprisoned nearly 2,000 political prisoners, including Jimmy Lai. I have long called for the Government to hold the Hong Kong authorities to account for their persecution of the pro-democracy campaigner, who is guilty only of performing his duties as publisher of Hong Kong’s Apple Dailynewspaper by speaking to diplomats and other overseas officials.
Not a single Hong Kong individual is named on the UK sanctions list, which sets out all the people, entities and vessels sanctioned by Britain. In comparison, the US has sanctioned 11 officials from the top of Hong Kong’s Administration downwards. How is it that this country, which used to administer and run Hong Kong, has not sanctioned a single person in that process? The three judges responsible for Jimmy Lai’s outrageous guilty verdict—Esther Toh, Alex Lee and Susana D’Almada Remedios, two of whom were called to the bar in London—should be immediate targets, as should the prosecutors: Maggie Yang, Anthony Chau, Ivan Cheung, Crystan Chan and Karen Ng Ka-yue.
Despite the clear role that Magnitsky sanctions could play in these cases, the Government do not treat them as a core foreign policy tool for protecting British citizens abroad. They should not be reserved for politically convenient situations but applied consistently, particularly when we have economic leverage over the perpetrating state. The UN special rapporteur on torture has formally recommended the use of Magnitsky sanctions to deter state hostage taking, and survivors themselves have repeatedly called for their use.
I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say, as I think the House wants to get a sense of where the Government are moving on this and whether they intend to increase the level of sanctions or speed them up. If they do so, they will receive my support and, I believe, the support of the Opposition side of the House. These are important moments, and this debate is important.
When this House passed the Magnitsky Act, we did so in good faith. This singular tool would help us in the fight against the abuses of powerful people, particularly in the defence of British citizens who have been wrongly detained and are without the ability to defend themselves. It will help our fight against the powerful people who have control over others who have no redress and no hope for their future.
With the rise of totalitarian states and their satellites, who threaten our very belief in freedom and due process, and who are tearing apart what we call the international rules-based order—such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran—this facility is needed more than ever. Its use is to deter others as much as to punish those who have acted without the law, and such action should be co-ordinated among our allies.
This House has to hold the Government to account—that is our task—and that is what today’s debate is all about. If we do not speak for those languishing under the control of others and the power of powerful states, then who will? I say to the Government simply: this is not parti pris, and nor is it personal; it is an idea that originated here in this place. It is the idea of freedom—freedom of the individual and their protections under the law. For those who carry out the most heinous crimes, there has to be some kind of sanction. The Magnitsky sanction is the best tool that we have. We should surely use it, and use it well, and we must make sure that those out there realise that if they get up to these most disgusting and debilitating acts, they will face a consequence and that consequence will last as long as they do.