House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Committee (4th Day) (Continued)

Amendment 74

74: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause— “Future composition of the House of Lords (statutory appointments commission)Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft Bill containing legislative proposals for—(a) conferring power on the House of Lords Appointments Commission to recommend the appointment, as crossbench peers, of one third of the membership of the House of Lords other than the Lords Spiritual, and(b) conferring a duty on the House of Lords Appointments Commission to consult with—(i) the Leader of the House of Lords,(ii) the Shadow Leader of the House of Lords,(iii) the leader of the third largest party-political group in the House of Lords, and(iv) the Convenor of the Crossbench Peers,on an ongoing basis, when discharging their power under paragraph (a).”Member's explanatory statement This amendment is connected with others in the name of the Earl of Dundee which provide for further reform of the House. It would require a draft Bill providing for an Appointments Commission appointing crossbench peers as one third of the temporal members of the House.

My Lords, the purpose of this group of amendments is, within a reformed House, not to diminish but instead to preserve and improve the high standard of function of the present House. This is our successful ability of legislative scrutiny and holding the Government of the day properly to account.

It is proposed that the House is capped at 620, with 600 temporal Peers and 20 Lords spiritual. As indicated in subsection (a) of the new clause in Amendment 74, a Lords appointments commission would recommend 200 temporal Peers, or one-third of the total of 600, as non-political Cross-Benchers; subsection (b) of the new clause also confers a duty on the commissioners to consult on an ongoing basis with the Leader of the House and the shadow Leader of the House, with the leader of the third-largest party-political group in the House and the Convenor of the Cross Benches.

An electoral college, representative of all parts of the UK, indirectly elects 400 temporal Peers, or two-thirds of the 600, as political Members, the government and opposition parties having exactly the same number at 150 each, or 37.5% each out of 400, as stated in subsection (3) of the new clause in Amendment 75, while the other political parties, chiefly comprising the Liberal Democrats, have 100, or 25% of 400. This means that, at 200, the non-political Cross-Benchers have 50 more members than the Government or the opposition parties, at 150 each. That in turn ensures a far better standard of legislative scrutiny than otherwise obtaining if, within a reformed House, either the government or opposition political parties had a majority instead.

For two reasons, indirect elections of 400 political Members are much preferable to direct elections of 400 political Members. First, direct elections would lead to conflict with the House of Commons, whereas indirect elections avoid that. As a result, and secondly, arising from direct elections, such competition with another place would also distract and undermine the democratic value and quality function of a reformed House as an effective revising Chamber.

Turning to Amendment 79 on consultation and regard for effect, subsections (b)(ii) to (iv) of the proposed new clause refer to three connected areas of advantage which the House, if reformed in a competent manner, should have produced. Thus, as detailed in subsection (a) of the new clause, in preparing necessary draft Bills, it would become the duty of the Secretary of State to consult the four group leaders in the House to ensure that this happens. These areas of advantage are: first, the quality of legislative and government scrutiny that the House provides; the balance of power between His Majesty’s Government and Parliament; and the example that the Parliament of the United Kingdom sets to the Commonwealth, ECHR member states of the Council of Europe and the rest of the world.

For the necessary transitional period between the present House and a reformed one, as your Lordships are well aware, in his report the noble Lord, Lord Burns, whose Amendment 82 I fully support, presents a good workable system, which is this: in a given year, the collective total of life Peers who retire or die are replaced at 50%. This means that, in a natural way and over not too many years, the current number of temporal Peers, which is now just under 800, will have come down to about 600.

Obviously, it comes down more quickly if life Peers are coerced to retire at 80 or 85. However, it is surely far wiser not to enforce that. Instead, with the retirement age of 90, the transitional period would be over more years than otherwise, yet with the huge advantage of enabling some new Peers in the reformed House when they first begin to serve their 15 years, to do so alongside a sufficiency of existing life Peers, thereby which association all the more can help new Members to develop and uphold the skills, usefulness and democratic efficacy of this House as a revising Chamber.

That is why, within this group, subsection (b) of the new clause in Amendment 77 indicates the capped number of 620 which a transitional House seeks to achieve by reducing the present number of just under 800; advocating in subsection (a) that, in a given year, the collective number of life Peers who retire or die is, therefore, replaced at 50%; and in subsection (c) that new Peers, whether coming in during the transitional period or after it has ended, would serve for a maximum of 15 years.

In summary, this group of amendments advises arrangements both for a reformed House and for a transitional one. The objective, as referred to in Amendment 79, is to preserve and ever improve the present high standard of legislative scrutiny and other attributes. This is accomplished through a temporal House of 600 Members, of which 200, or one-third, are appointed as non-political Cross-Benchers, at 50 more than the government and opposition parties, which at exactly 150 each, and along with the Liberal Democrats and other political parties altogether numbering 100 Members, then make up the combined political element of 400 within a reformed House of 600 Members, these 400 political Members being indirectly elected by an electoral college representative of all parts of the United Kingdom.

Taking into account recent discussions on this Bill, it may be that the various elements in this group of amendments are already partially acceptable to your Lordships.

For example, the noble Baroness the Leader of the House has said that she supports the government and opposition parties having equal numbers. My noble friend the opposition Leader of the House has also said that he adopts a flexible approach towards numbers.

The Liberal Democrat party has taken steps to assess how a reformed House can best serve UK democracy. Its recent leaders Lord Steel of Aikwood and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, are the architects of a formula for an electoral college, representative of all parts of the United Kingdom, to indirectly elect a proportion of political Members to the House.

During our current discussions from their Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, along with my noble friend Lord Hailsham and others from different groups and parties are in favour of the Cross-Bench amendments tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich; these being through an appointments commission to increase the numbers of non-political Members in the House.

Yet where there may be strong consensus among all your Lordships is on a central point running through all stages of our deliberations and emphasised by many, including the noble Lords, Lord Moore of Etchingham and Lord Inglewood, and my noble friends Lord Tugendhat and Lord Lucas.

This is that, whether in the planning stage or in its delivery of a transitional House or a completely reformed one, the priority is to sustain a high quality of function, to which at all times composition of membership should remain a secondary and subservient consideration.

These amendments correspond to that way of thinking. I beg to move.