House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Report (1st Day) (Continued)

Amendment 5

5: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause— “Life peerages not to be conferred against recommendation of the House of Lords Appointments Commission(1) The Life Peerages Act 1958 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1 (power to confer life peerages), after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) The power under subsection (1) may not be exercised in relation to a person if the House of Lords Appointments Commission has written to the Prime Minister to recommend that a peerage should not be conferred on that person.””Member’s explanatory statement This new Clause would prevent a life peerage being conferred on a person if the House of Lords Appointments Commission has recommended against the appointment.

My Lords, Amendment 5 is in the names of my noble friend Lord Newby, me and others. In preparing for this, I was also looking at preparation for Friday’s debate on a report from our Select Committee on the Constitution, Executive Oversight and Responsibility for the UK Constitution. That report in effect says that the chief responsibility for maintaining constitutional behaviour in Britain rests with the Prime Minister. That is to say the Prime Minister, who is the all-powerful Executive, is also responsible for making sure that the Executive behave themselves. That, of course, is one of the underlying problems with our unwritten constitution: it relies on our Head of Government being a “good chap”, or a “good chapess” in the case of Liz Truss. The responsibility, authority and power to appoint Members of the second Chamber also lie with the guardian of the constitution and Prime Minister, more or less unchecked.

The Written Statement we had the other week—quietly put out on the Government’s behalf—suggests that future party appointments to this House should require the party nominating them to provide a short note on the qualifications for the—

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord but, just as a matter of accuracy, I think he is talking about the citations that are already in place and were used in the last list to come forward.

My apologies. The Prime Minister in future would have to justify overriding the House of Lords Appointments Commission. This perhaps is some control mechanism on the Prime Minister’s power of appointment, but we have lived through a difficult period in which we have had Prime Ministers who did not particularly pay attention to constitutional conventions and did override the advice on the integrity and suitability of nominations presented by the Prime Minister.

I think the long-term answer to this is clear: we change the way in which this House is constituted. The Bill we presented when we were in the coalition in 2011 and 2012 suggested that we would do much better to have a second Chamber elected in thirds for 15-year terms. That would resolve a lot of these problems, but in the meantime, with the very slow pace of partial reform that we have on these occasions, we need a number of interim measures to limit the Prime Minister’s prerogative and to guard against the real risk that we might again have a Prime Minister who is not a good chap or chapess.

Over the last 30 or 40 years the British have constructed a number of what are called constitutional guard-rails to limit the Prime Minister’s untrammelled prerogative power. We have the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests and the House of Lords Appointments Commission itself. The Labour Party’s manifesto committed to construct a new ethics and integrity commission that will also be a means, yet undefined by the Government, of checking the Prime Minister’s untrammelled authority and holding the Prime Minister to account.

We are all painfully conscious that not all Prime Ministers or presidents respect constitutional or ethical constraints. We have experience in this country, the United States has an extremely painful experience at the moment, and we might again have the experience after the next election, so this interim measure seems to many of us necessary and highly desirable. I beg to move.

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 5 and 6. I very much support enhancing the powers of HOLAC, largely for the reasons explained by the noble Lord. Too many appointments made by previous Prime Ministers have been of people who I rather doubt were in any sense appropriate. That, I am afraid, has happened on too many occasions.

In Committee I tabled an amendment which did not find favour with my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. It would have required HOLAC to state its reasons for not approving an individual and allowed that individual the opportunity to make representations. I did that because I was very conscious that injustices can happen, and I think natural justice requires some form of remedy. My noble friend argued very persuasively, as he always does, that this would open up the prospect of judicial review. I am bound to say that I think he was unduly pessimistic; I do not agree with him. But I took the sense of the House, and I have not repeated that part of my amendment.

I come to Amendment 6. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Dundee. Here we are dealing with a fundamental question. HOLAC should carry out a fit and proper person test and should assess the propriety of appointing somebody. Furthermore, it should carry out a test as to that person’s likelihood of attending and participating. That is the first part of the amendment to which we have both put our name. I commend it to your Lordships’ House.

Is my noble friend not aware—I speak as a former member of HOLAC—that it does indeed subject any applicant for membership of your Lordships’ House to quite stringent questioning on the extent of the commitment they are likely to make to the House and the attendance they are likely to give to the considerations which take place within the House, and that that represents one of the key factors in HOLAC’s decision-making process?

I think we are in agreement. What I am in favour of is putting this in a statutory frame. I do not doubt that it is done in a discretionary manner, but I would like it to be statutory. I think it is a very slight difference between us, and I hope we will not fall out on the matter.

My second point—I feel sure that I will not have the agreement of the Front Bench here—I make as a permanent, paid-up member of the awkward squad, and it relates to the oath. It has been a long time since I took the oath of a privy counsellor. I did not take away a copy and I am not quite sure what it said. But I have been on the internet to have a careful look. What it actually says is that, when members of the Privy Council have a clear and informed view, they should vote and speak accordingly. I actually believe that is the duty of your Lordships—all of us. It certainly seems to be the duty of members of the Privy Council.

There are many matters—I now speak personally—on which I do not have a formed or an informed opinion. I like to think that they are the same. In respect of those matters, I am quite happy to take the guidance of the Front Bench. But then I ask myself: what is one’s duty when one has a formed and informed view? I think it is quite plain; it is to vote in accordance with one’s conscience and opinion. We are not echo chambers. This is not an echo chamber. We are not part of a chorus line; we are here to express an unfettered view in accordance with our settled opinion. I would like Members of the House to take an oath to that effect before they sit in this place. So when a member of the Whips’ Office comes along and says, “We want you to vote”, you would simply say, “My dear, I simply don’t agree with you and, what is more, I have sworn an oath that I will speak in accordance with my conscience”. That would be conclusive of the matter.

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 19, in my sole name, which proposes the replenishment of the Cross Benches following the departure of the hereditary Peers with 20 appointments over five years via HOLAC, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, which is chaired so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech.

Currently, there are 32 hereditary Peers sitting on the Cross Benches of your Lordships’ House—an increase in the years since I joined, when I believe there were 28 hereditary Cross-Benchers. No group will be greater impacted by the impending removal of the hereditary presence. Unlike other groupings within the House, the Cross Benches do not speak with a single voice, despite being so ably convened by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and his illustrious predecessors, nor do we have any political or parliamentary machinery with which to lobby for replacements to ensure the relative proportion of the Cross Benches remains consistent after the passage of the Bill.

Contemporary political scientists and commentators —and, after this afternoon’s debate, I think the majority of your Lordships—consider that the expert, independent and ameliorating presence of the Cross Benches in this House is an essential element of its good legislative function. The Cross Benches provide considerable subject matter expertise not found on the more political Benches and tend to carry an apolitical casting vote that acts as a dampener to the political noise that emanates from the other place and is echoed here through the party-political Benches. We mess with that tempering role at our peril. I would ask the Minister to explain clearly in her closing speech how the Government propose to ensure that the Cross Benches of your Lordships’ House will not be diminished as a result of this legislation.

Your Lordships may recall that we debated this in Committee with Amendment 51, to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, added their names. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, apologises that he cannot be here today, but he reiterated his support when we spoke this morning. He previously noted the importance of HOLAC and the people’s Peers process as a means of admitting distinguished and apolitical expertise to your Lordships’ House. The angels of HOLAC would not gain access by any other means. Think of the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson, Lady Lane- Fox, Lady Bull, Lady Watkins and the indefatigable Lady Kidron—the champion of our creative industries. Think of the tireless work of many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Krebs, Lord Pannick, Lord Patel, Lord Currie and Lord Adebowale. None would have been here but for HOLAC.

As a former member of HOLAC, I wonder if I might intervene briefly. In the term in which I served on HOLAC, we would have liked to have introduced two or three Cross-Bench Peers a year, which had normally been the case. I am afraid that we were prevented from doing so by the Prime Minister of the day.

That is very helpful, because I was going to propose a possible number. As I was saying: in other words, from initially making nearly six HOLAC appointments a year, we now have only one such appointment annually.

Despite having a non-partisan, highly qualified appointments commission, we are simply not making use of it. Given that this Government are determined to honour the constitutional commitments of the Blair years with the Bill’s passage and the final abolition of the hereditary peerage, should they not also honour the Blair Government’s connected commitment to HOLAC and permit the replenishment of the Cross Benches in the way proposed by Amendment 19, which would ensure a modest appointment rate of perhaps four people’s Peers per annum?

As I have previously noted, I do not think that hereditary Peers should be converted into life Peers in any significant number. Amendment 9 should not pass. This is because our particular demographic will remain well overrepresented among the remaining Members of your Lordships’ House. I do not therefore see Amendment 19 as a route for abolished hereditaries to return to these seats, albeit that they would be welcome to apply with anybody else as common citizens. Rather, we should take advantage of the removal of the hereditary presence to increase the diversity of our membership and bring a broader array of expertise and opinion to bear upon your Lordships’ legislative efforts.

As I understood it—and as mentioned earlier—one of the main reasons for retaining a rump of hereditaries back in 1999 was that it would encourage the further reform of this House, leaving it better, not worse, as a legislative body. I am concerned that the Bill, as currently drafted, removes a group of largely independent-minded Members and increases the proportion of Members that are politically motivated. Amendment 19 would reverse that and replenish the House with a group of non-partisan and technically expert Members. It also has the benefit of diluting, if only a little, the relative increase in prime ministerial patronage that will result from the loss of hereditary Peers, which must surely be a good thing.

My Lords, in this grouping I support Amendment 6, proposed by my noble friend Lord Hailsham.

Your Lordships will agree that the membership composition of a reformed House must sustain and continue the high legislative scrutiny standard of the present House—and thus, conversely, that future membership composition should be designed to serve this priority aim.

If, within the temporal membership of a reformed House of 600, the political numbers were to be 450, the non-political representation appointed by HOLAC would then be 150 Cross-Bench Peers.

As a result, within that total of 600, respective proportions could then become: the government and opposition parties at 175 political Members each; next, the independent non-political Cross-Benchers at 150; and, next, all other political parties at 100.

These respective proportions would then provide a good balance for sustaining and continuing our present high standard of legislative scrutiny.

However, regarding life peerages conferred on independent non-political Cross-Bench life Peers within a reformed House—and as my noble friend Lord Hailsham emphasises—in the first place it must be HOLAC and not the Prime Minister of the day who recommends these appointments to the King.

My Lords, I intervened in Committee to explain why I could not support Amendments 5 and 6. I will repeat my argument briefly now. These two amendments would put the committee, HOLAC, into a position where it overruled the Prime Minister. In one case, the Prime Minister could make appointments to the House of Lords only on the advice of HOLAC:

“No recommendation may be made to His Majesty to confer a life peerage except by the House of Lords Appointments Commission”.

So HOLAC would make the recommendation. In the other case, the Prime Minister could be prevented from conferring a peerage on the recommendation of the appointments commission. Both these cases would mean that the Prime Minister was entirely constrained by this advisory committee.

My argument is that the Prime Minister’s powers should not be constrained by a non-elected committee of people, however distinguished. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to other committees that constrain the power of the Prime Minister, but they are crucially different because they are simply advisory. In this case, what is being proposed is committees that would enforce their decision on the Prime Minister. In the case of non-elected people, that is wrong. If Parliament were constraining the power of the Prime Minister, either to appoint or not to appoint, that would be acceptable. It is not acceptable that a non-elected committee, however distinguished, should do so.