I remind hon. Members that there have been some changes to the normal practice in order to support the new call list system and to ensure that social distancing can be respected. Members must arrive at the start of the debate and are expected to remain for the winding-up speeches if there is space to do so. Members are also asked to respect the one-way system around the room and to please exit by the door on the left.
Before Members use their microphones, they should sanitise them using the cleaning materials provided and dispose of the cleaning materials in the bin by the door as they leave the room. Members can use the seats in the Public Gallery, as they are being used to ensure we have enough space for people to be able to join this very well-subscribed debate. I now ask John Howell to move the motion.
That this House has considered Government policy on Iran.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller. I will concentrate on two issues: the nuclear issue in Iran and state-sponsored terrorism. That will leave the field open to others to consider matters such as human rights. For many years, colleagues from across the House have raised concerns over Iran’s malign activities and their impact on the UK’s interests in the region and beyond. The recent expiration of the UN arms embargo and the election of President-elect Joe Biden offer us an invaluable opportunity to review events in the region and consider the UK’s policy towards Iran. It is a policy that I believe requires urgent reassessment and that would benefit from a clear-sighted assessment of Iran and the challenges it poses to the UK and its allies.
Ever since the Islamic revolution altered the course of Iran’s hitherto great history, its fundamentalist leaders have been driven by a central goal: expanding Iranian hegemony in the region and exporting the revolution. The founding father of the Islamic Republic spoke clearly of his vision for the new Iran:
“The Iranian people’s revolution is only a point in the start of the revolution of the great world of Islam.”
That is a mantra that Tehran’s leaders have ruthlessly and violently pursued ever since.
The radicalisation at the heart of that ideology has led to untold suffering in Iran, throughout the region and far beyond. Iran’s support for international terrorism is perhaps the best documented means of exporting its fundamentalist concept of Islamic revolution. It is why Iran is often referred to as the world’s biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It certainly explains why, to this day, Iran’s leaders ensure that vast sums are invested in its terrorist proxies, even amidst a devastating pandemic and economic crisis, to the detriment of its long-suffering citizens.
Before I call the next speaker, I remind colleagues that they cannot contribute from the seats in the Gallery. Perhaps others can make space to allow people to move forward as and when. This is a heavily subscribed debate, so I suggest a three-minute informal time limit to try to get everybody in. I will be calling Front-Bench speakers at 3.28 pm.
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller.
The hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) outlined the issues to do with the nuclear threat, and I will not touch on that, to give hon. Members time on other issues. He was right to say that Iran is one of the world’s most malevolent pariah states. It is a destabilising influence across the middle east, and it now stretches its extremist statecraft across Europe.
Iran backs terrorism. In 2018, Members from this House were caught up in an event in Paris; some people in this room attended it. One of Iran’s front people tried to murder people at that protest by way of a bomb. Many Members were moments from death. The person who was accredited with carrying out that bombing was an Iranian diplomat who is now using his diplomatic immunity to avoid prosecution.
Iran sponsors direct links between Hezbollah and the Real IRA. Its radicalism drives via the Muslim Brotherhood to radicalise people in this country. The UK has a choice to make to now—to urgently take action against the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a surrogate for Iran and for extremist ideology in this country.
We have quite rightly proscribed Hezbollah, which was funded by Iran. I believe that Iran uses other surrogates—al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Daesh and the Real IRA—and I call on the UK Government to signal that they are now going to tackle the terrorism and extremism sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood seriously by signalling that they intend to proscribe that organisation as urgently as possible. The Muslim Brotherhood is a cesspit for extremist ideology and for training young people in this country to hate this country. We should be taking actions to pull them away from that.
Today, I have left in the House of Commons Library a very important report by Cornerstone into the Fakhrizadeh assassination, which links some of the activities in the Gulf with Qatar and Iran, and with the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of the reading in that report is very worrying indeed. For example, it indicates that the USA—our partner—no longer shares information that has military intelligence associated with it with Doha, because of its concerns over the proximity that Qatar has to Iran. I know there is going to be a debate in the House on Qatar tomorrow, but these things do not stand alone, and I urge Her Majesty’s Government to use their power, authority and influence to influence Qatar to influence Iran to pull itself away from some of these things. At the moment, we in the UK buy something like 31% of all our gas from Qatar, which is astounding, and yet that country is playing a role in Iran, which is influencing extremists in this country also. We really have to stand up for the Arab quartet—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates—and help those countries stand up against the extremism sponsored by Iran.
2:51 pm
Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller, and I congratulate my dear Friend the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) on securing this important debate. Forgive me if I repeat some of the points that he touched on.
Iran is a malign and malevolent influence in the Gulf region and more widely, and has been since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Its actions greatly concern us in the UK, as a P5+1 member, a signatory of the joint comprehensive plan of action—the Iranian nuclear deal—and a nation with a long history of vital strategic interests in the region. Despite recent moves by other Gulf states to promote a more peaceful neighbourhood, such as Israel signing a peace deal with the UAE, Iran continues to promote terrorism and instability throughout the Gulf and the wider middle east. It is supporting the Houthi militia in the civil war in Yemen; it is supporting Hezbollah and other proxies to prolong the “no war, no peace” struggle against Israel; it has undertaken attacks on shipping in the Gulf; it continues to work towards developing a nuclear weapons capability, despite the 2015 nuclear deal; and it uses hostage diplomacy. The terrible case of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe is a very obvious example. In all these matters Iran has shown consistent bad faith, and demonstrated its destructive and aggressive policy towards its neighbours and us in the west.
My constituent, Mr Anoosheh Ashoori, was captured some three years ago while visiting his sick mother in Tehran, and has since been held in prison under really brutal conditions, which have included solitary confinement and physical torture. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that British citizens such as Mr Ashoori who are subject to unjust trial are being held as hostages due to their dual nationality, and that the UK Government must acknowledge them as such?
Jack Lopresti
I completely agree with the hon. Lady: something must be done. These terrible acts, which are clearly politically motivated, need to be sorted by HMG.
Just yesterday, the UK and our French and German allies warned Iran that its plans to expand its atomic energy programme risked the collapse of the international agreement put in place in 2015—the JCPOA. Last week, the Iranian Parliament voted to end UN inspections of its nuclear facilities and boost its uranium enrichment. Many lawmakers reportedly chanted “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” following the vote. I am sure that in his summing up, the Minister will join me in condemning those actions and deeds. Tehran is enriching uranium to a higher fissile purity than is permitted under the nuclear deal, and putting itself on a trajectory that brings it closer to possessing weapons-grade enriched uranium.
As I do not have much time left, I will go straight to my conclusion: our policy towards Iran should be based on considerations of our security, our values and our vital strategic interests. Our policy should mirror that of the US and Israel, our allies, in saying that the Iranians must never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) both on securing this debate and on an excellent speech. I found himself in agreement with most of what he said.
My view is simple: not only does Iran support terrorist groups and foment unrest across the middle east, but its strategic aim is an arc of influence from Tehran to the Mediterranean sea and the border with Israel. It is currently fitting global positioning systems to its Zelzal-2 missiles for that purpose. Iran recently showed on state television pictures of one of its missiles, with the words along the side in Hebrew: “Israel must be wiped out.” Iran is absolutely clear about its objective. Its supreme leader said in 2015 that it was his intention that Israel be destroyed within 25 years, with or without a nuclear agreement. Iran’s ideology is simply riddled with a hatred of Jews.
Iran is not content with suppression at home or turning the middle east into a cauldron. We have heard, as the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) said, that Iran’s agents are active across Europe. I think that it was last year that our own security services found a Hezbollah bomb-making factory in north London. And in Belgium at the moment, we are witnessing scenes that could come from a John le Carré novel, with Asadollah Asadi, a diplomat from Iran’s embassy in Austria, on trial for both planning and facilitating an attack on an opposition rally in Paris. Apparently, when questioned, he threatened reprisals from the regime if there was any attempt to take action against him. Also, of course, Foreign Minister Zarif has recently conceded that Iran is interested in prisoner swaps, which possibly explains why innocent dual nationals are being seized; they may be insurance against further terrorist attacks.
This is a regime that I say we cannot negotiate with. If there is any attempt to negotiate with it, President-elect Biden should not go back to the joint comprehensive plan of action. And if we have any influence on the President-elect, I hope that the Minister will say that we must stick with what the President-elect himself said during the primaries—that we need a stronger and longer arrangement, which must include Iran’s terrorist activities and ballistic missile programme. And we should certainly proscribe the IRGC, because it is a terrorist organisation and should not be allowed to operate anywhere in Europe, let alone in this country.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) on securing this debate and agree with everything that he said. I am now, unfortunately, in my fourth decade of saying negative things about the Iranian regime; it would be good to still be here in Parliament when I can say something positive about it. However, I was not best pleased when I read in the newspapers recently that when I was leading a delegation at a rally in Paris in 2018 I was, together with one or two colleagues who are present in this Chamber today, the target of a terrorist attack.
As we take the presidency of the G7 next year, the United Kingdom will be at the centre of the world stage, with increased opportunities to influence international policy. Even though it was agreed last year at the G7 summit in France that we would foster peace and stability in the middle east, and ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons, that message needs to be reiterated and taken further. I was very encouraged by the words of my right hon. Friend the Minister, but it has not always been the case that the Government have taken that view. Nevertheless, I thought that what he said was splendid and I very much hope that he will take it even further when he responds to the debate.
In November 2019, the Iranian regime killed at least 304 people and injured thousands more at peaceful protests, using lethal force and institutional violence. However, the death count may be much higher than that, as Government forces confiscated the bodies of the dead protesters to hide the true casualty count.
Last week, the Iranian Parliament voted to end the UN’s inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and to boost Iran’s uranium enrichment. I hope that the Minister’s Department is working carefully with our close allies to create a more robust deal that particularly focuses on deterring Iran’s human rights abuses. Of course we have all received countless emails about Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe—and the hon. Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby) mentioned her constituent. I went to see Nazanin’s husband when he was on hunger strike last year, and I very much hope that we will continue to build on the pressure created by that action.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) on securing this debate. I will not repeat the points that he made.
At a time when the United Kingdom needs to be really clear-sighted about our strategic priorities and international objectives, our policy on Iran risks appearing—forgive me for saying this—confused and unclear. We are caught between, on the one hand, a desire for rapprochement and normalisation of relations with Iran, and on the other hand, the certain knowledge that Iran’s posture on the international stage is a negative one. Its activities across the middle east are deeply harmful to the region and are a direct threat to global peace, our own interests and those of our closest allies.
The desire for normalisation was enshrined in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2015. The hope at the time was that—we were in government, Mrs Miller—that would herald the beginning of a new, brighter phase of UK-Iran relations, and that the UK would somehow play a role in helping Iran find its way back into the mainstream of the international community. The truth is that the hopes that we had at the time were not well founded. Although it might still say on the gov.uk website that we believe the outlook for UK-Iran trade is positive, and that we want to see greater engagement between UK businesses and Iran, reflecting a desire for normalisation, what is the reality? This year, 2020, has demonstrated what the reality is.
The year started on 11 January in Tehran with the illegal arrest of our ambassador by the Iranian regime, in a complete violation of international law. We said at the time that Iran was at a crossroads moment, and that it faced a choice whether to continue its march towards pariah status. We warned that there would be consequences if it chose that path, and that is exactly what it has chosen. It has spent the year openly, belligerently and defiantly breaching its obligations, breaking international law and breaking its commitments under the JCPOA, and it is not clear to me what the Government’s response has been.
3:04 pm
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Iran’s operation of an ever-expanding nuclear programme presents the international community with an historic challenge. The joint comprehensive plan of action nuclear agreement has not restrained Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and certainly has not made it reassess its harmful trajectory, as many wishfully advocated at the time of its signing. The JCPOA was signed in 2015 and was heralded as an historic moment in non-proliferation. Sadly, events have shown that that was far from the truth. Although the deal included extensive verification mechanisms to allow the international community a line of sight into aspects of Iran’s nuclear work, it has fallen short of the necessary safeguards in many areas.
Mindful of the time we have for this debate, I will provide a brief overview of the most concerning aspects. First, much of Iran’s advanced nuclear infrastructure was merely mothballed, instead of being dismantled. That has enabled Iran rapidly to bring enrichment equipment online in recent months, after it decided to breach the terms of the JCPOA and enrich uranium, not only at a higher purity, closer to that required for weapons grade, but in higher quantities. By the International Atomic Energy Agency’s own estimation, Iran now has 12 times the permitted amount of enriched uranium. That far exceeds the amount required for a peaceful domestic nuclear programme and is reportedly sufficient to produce two nuclear warheads. Much of the advanced enrichment work has even taken place deep underground in new production halls at the controversial Natanz nuclear facility.
Secondly, Iran’s historic nuclear activities—especially those with possible military dimensions—were inexplicably left unaddressed by the JCPOA. It emerged in 2018 that Iran entered the 2015 nuclear deal on false pretences, after an Israeli intelligence operation found documents proving that Iran had conducted more advanced testing related to nuclear weapons development than it had declared.
Thirdly, the deal failed entirely to address the pressing problem of Iran’s support for international terrorism. The failure to pursue a broad deal and the segregation of core issues from Iran’s nuclear activities was a costly strategic mistake. Iran has shown no inclination to open those activities to negotiation following the JCPOA’s signing. Why would it? It achieved invaluable sanctions relief at a critical moment in the country’s economic life; and, besides, the export of terrorism is the very cornerstone of exporting revolution.
Fourthly, the JCPOA failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which we must not forget is the primary means for delivering a nuclear warhead. While the UN sanctions in effect may relate to that programme, that has not for one second given Iran cause to pause its test launching and construction of advanced missiles capable of delivering explosive material thousands of miles from Iran.
Fifthly, human rights abuses were not even discussed in the negotiations, despite Iran’s having one of the worst human rights records in the world. The manner in which any country treats the lives of its own citizens sends an unmistakeable message about its integrity. I am a member of the Council of Europe, the foremost human rights organisation in Europe, and it is an embarrassment having such a pariah on our own doorsteps.
Last, and by no means least, by lifting all nuclear-related sanctions with immediate effect the P5+1 lost any leverage it retained to prevent Iran from subsequently breaching the terms of the nuclear deal.
It should be little surprise that our Prime Minister said earlier this year that this was “a bad deal”. While the deal itself was unquestionably bad, I fear that the P5+1 has further undermined its collective efforts in the implementation of the deal. This year, despite many breaches, there have been no tangible consequences for Iran. Just this week, the UK joined its E3 partners in speaking of their efforts to preserve the JCPOA, and Iran’s egregious breaches warrant nothing more than the expression of deep worry.
I wholeheartedly supported the UK’s triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism at the beginning of the year. That stood to be an important moment in restraining Iran’s actions. Conversely, it appears that the E3 has allowed the process to become an interminable period for dialogue, without any tangible action or sense of authority, despite the fact that the IAEA has provided extensive evidence of increased Iranian non-compliance. Will the Minister please outline the strategy of Her Majesty’s Government in the administration of the dispute mechanism and say whether, in his assessment, it has any impact on Iran’s nuclear activities? In addition, what outcome is the E3 working towards with the dispute mechanism?
The snapback of sanctions was an important failsafe measure enshrined in the JCPOA—a measure that has not been initiated by the P5+1 signatories, with the exception of the United States—so will the Minister please outline how the Government’s position on the reimposition of sanctions on Iran as a result of its non-compliance is going to work out? Have the Government notified Iran at any stage of the possibility of sanctions being re-enforced? What message does the Minister think it sends to Iran when we condemn its nuclear non-compliance but do not enforce the consequences agreed in UN Security Council resolution 2231 and repeatedly state our commitment to preserving the JCPOA?
The expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran was problematically mishandled this year. By this point, Iran was in full defiance of the JCPOA. Allowing the embargo to expire without extension sends a regrettable signal to Iran that its actions elicit no consequences, regardless of how flagrant they are. That is particularly relevant, given that a further set of embargoes, including on missiles, is set to expire in 2023. The depth of concern felt on the Conservative Benches about the expiration was seen clearly in October when more than 80 Conservative parliamentarians signed a letter to the Prime Minister, co-ordinated by Conservative Friends of Israel.
Earlier this year, Ministers stated that the UK was
“working…to address the planned expiry”,
but we ultimately abstained on a US-led UN Security Council resolution to extend the embargo to August. I regret to say that the UK’s assessment at the time that the motion would not have passed anyway so we should not support it seems illogical. I am sure it is not UK Government policy to abstain on votes purely on the basis that they are unlikely to pass.
It should cause additional alarm to Her Majesty’s Government that our P5+1 partners Russia and China opted to enable the resumption of advanced weapons sales to Iran, which will further Tehran’s dangerous regional activities. China is reportedly negotiating a $400 billion deal with Iran to increase military co-operation. I fear that history will not favourably judge our inability to bridge the divide between the United States and our European allies by ultimately abstaining.
What is the Minister’s assessment of the growing divergence within the P5+1 and its implications for any future attempts, first, to bring Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA and, secondly, to negotiate a broader framework with it? Although an EU arms embargo is set to remain in force until 2023, does the Minister accept that concerns are centred around Iran’s ability to procure advanced weaponry from states outside the EU?
Iran seeks nuclear weapons as a protective umbrella for its dangerous activities throughout the middle east, which is why combating its support for terrorism abroad should be part and parcel of our Iran policy. In Lebanon alone, Iran has armed the Hezbollah terror organisation with an estimated arsenal of up to 150,000 rockets—more than 10 times more than it had in the 2006 war. I welcomed the UK’s proscription of Hezbollah last year, and it has been reassuring that several other countries have followed suit, but there is much work still to be done.
Iran is reportedly distributing almost $20 billion per year to its proxies throughout Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and Yemen, and it is backing President Assad in Syria. The sanctions relief windfall that Iran received from the JCPOA would have directly facilitated such extensive financial support. The consequences of Iran’s investments need no explanation. As the Defence Secretary said, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is one of the foremost architects of Iran’s malign activity. Yet although the IRGC is believed to be responsible for the deaths of dozens of British servicemen and women, and IRGC-linked terrorist activity in Europe is well documented, the UK does not proscribe the group as a terrorist organisation. The US proscribed the IRGC last year—a significant step in the fight against international terrorism.
The UK Treasury lists the IRGC, the IRGC Aerospace Force and the IRGC Quds Force as being subject to UK terrorism and terrorism-financing sanctions, so they should surely meet the criteria for full proscription. I am aware that the Government do not comment on such matters, but perhaps the Minister can highlight that discrepancy with cross-departmental colleagues. The US includes non-nuclear Iranian targets in its sanctions regime. Does the Minister agree that our new Magnitsky-style sanctions regime should be used to keep the pressure on Iran on non-nuclear issues?
It is of great regret that the UK’s policy towards Iran in recent years has failed to curtail its wider regional aggression. Iran has shown no desire to come in from the cold, and continues to subvert regional peace and stability. That stands in ever more stark contrast with the push for peace in the region that we have seen between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Not only is it in the UK’s interest to curtail Iran’s regional aggression, but it is quite simply the right thing to do. It is incumbent on the UK to work with our international partners to formulate a new strategy to combat the Iranian threat. The acceptance that Iran’s war by proxy and nuclear programme are not mutually exclusive must be at the heart of our new programme.
There are some who say we should keep the JCPOA on life support indefinitely, as it is the only deal on the table. In reality, that deal has been dead for some time, and we must accept that in order to make progress. As we all know, the US withdrew from the agreement in 2018, but President-elect Biden has expressed willingness to return to the deal as an interim step, if Iran complies with its terms. If, in due course, Iran begins to indicate a preparedness to return to the JCPOA, it will be critical that sanctions relief is not given prematurely. The UK, along with its P5+1 partners, must ensure that Iran reaches a number of verifiable technical milestones, proving it is committed to compliance before sanctions are lifted. Specifically, it must remove its stockpile of enriched uranium and end enrichment beyond the permitted JCPOA limit. Beyond that, the only way forward is a new comprehensive agreement, addressing all of these concerns. What steps has the Minister taken alongside our international partners in working towards that?
Iran’s actions over the last year are of concern to many in this place, as witnessed by the number of hon. Members who have turned up for this debate. I hope that the Government will take this opportunity to adopt a clear-sighted approach to Iran. Unless we begin rolling back Tehran’s harmful activities, UK interests and the much-desired peace and security of the middle east will be jeopardised.
Iran’s global terrorism reach has infiltrated Europe and, as I have said, it has transpired that at a rally in 2018 Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, decided to launch a terrorist attack; some people may be disappointed that it was unsuccessful, but I am very pleased.
In conclusion, we must address the regime’s diplomatic blackmail and acts of terrorism in Europe and hold those responsible to account by imposing sanctions on the regime’s leaders and officials. I know that oil is very important, but we must be firm on this. We must include a halt to the regime’s ballistic missile programme and uranium enrichment programme. We must make any future diplomatic and economic relations contingent upon an end to the regime’s state terrorism. By doing that and supporting the National Council of Resistance of Iran, we can help to bring peace and stability to Iran. And we should do more to support Mrs Maryam Rajavi.
I do not understand, for example, why—I am sorry to say this—we sat on our hands at the United Nations in August and did not support our closest allies, the Americans, in voting for an extension of the arms embargo on Iran. I do not understand why we continue to try to keep the JCPOA on life support when it is clear that there were huge failings in that agreement.
I will finish shortly to allow others to speak. I know the Minister understands these issues thoroughly; we have discussed them previously. I urge him: I want to see the UK Government playing a really strategic role between the EU and the new American Administration and looking towards a new agreement that does not just narrowly focus on nuclear-related obligations, but deals with Iran’s ballistic missile programme, its support for terror, its human rights abuses and its systematic undermining of democracy all across the region. That would be the clear-sighted, positive role that the United Kingdom could play.