Global Military Operations

I beg to move,

That this House has considered global military operations.

It is fantastic to be able to have this debate on global military operations in Government time. Looking back in Hansard—as I have done on many occasions—I noted that there was once a time when the House had an annual debate on each of the three services. Those debates were well subscribed and Members enjoyed them. While of late we have had a number of opportunities to discuss Ukraine specifically, I think it is some time since we have had the chance to discuss the totality of military operations around the world. I look forward to hearing speeches which, I suspect, will range across geographies and issues. It will be great to hear defence matters considered so widely and prominently—

—not least by my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee.

I am sorry to intervene so early, but my right hon. Friend has raised an important aspect of the debate: namely, the mechanics of what we are discussing. I was pleased to hear him refer to the debates that we have had in the past, when there was more of a steady drumbeat. I hope that his words—which, I am sure, will be repeated by other Members, and I look to the Chair as well—will be heard, and I hope that the message that we need more debates and a greater understanding of what is going on in the world and our role in it can be sent to the usual channels, so that that can actually happen.

My right hon. Friend is entirely right, but he need not worry: the Ministry of Defence is a favourite of the Whips Office. Whenever the Whips come calling for us to take the opportunity to debate defence matters in the House, we are only too keen to do so, and I am delighted to have been provided with that time today.

The “Integrated Review Refresh 2023”, published in March, was clear about what we needed to do to respond to the deteriorating global security situation. It was about shaping the global strategic environment, increasing our focus on deterrence and defence, addressing the vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed, and investing in the UK’s unique strengths. Defence is obviously at the centre of that ambition.

Ukraine has dominated defence matters over the past couple of years, so I thought I should make some mention of that, given the work that the UK has been doing in supporting the Ukrainians in their fight back against the Russian illegal invasion. Really, the update that it falls on me to provide to the House is that there is no update to give. Instead, I offer a word of caution. These are the very early stages of a necessarily complex plan, given the scale of the challenge that Ukraine faces. It will take a number of weeks until anyone can make a credible assessment of the success of the offensive. But it is under way; that much is clear. It is clear that there have been some early gains for the Ukrainians. In some parts of the Russian line, the regiments are performing credibly and holding their ground, but in many other parts of the line there is evidence of abandonment and mutiny.

But that should in no way encourage us to believe this is some war movie that ends with a wonderful, glorious, decisive victory. That might happen; it is perfectly possible, as the Ukrainians have shown time and again that they are brilliant at exceeding what normal military laws should expect. But it is also possible that a successful counter-offensive will still bring with it the requirement to go again next year. It matters enormously to our Ukrainian friends—just as it is important that Putin hears—that the international donor community is ready to rearm, retrain and go again next year, and the year after and the year after. If Putin thinks he can wait out the west, he is wrong. This counter-offensive will be successful—of that I am sure—but whether it will be decisively successful does not matter, in so much as the international community is ready to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.

The Minister is setting out the situation facing Ukraine very accurately. The most worrying recent intervention has been the destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, which has caused massive disruption not only to the infrastructure but to the wider area. Is he able to say anything about the UK response to that and whether there is anything further the UK can do, given its logistics experience, to support the Ukrainians to get the plant working again and help those affected by the disaster?

The dam was in Russia’s control when it was damaged, so the opportunities to get in and assist with rebuilding in the immediate term are quite limited. It is probably too early to say for absolute certain who did it, but I think everybody in this House will probably have the same view on who did it and why. There is only one side that had any direct advantage in doing it at that point, and it is a war crime. The destruction of a dam like that with the impacts on the civilian population beneath it is a war crime. I cannot offer the hon. Lady the reassurance she seeks on the UK’s intent to rebuild—that would be premature—but we have been clear with the Russian Government that it is those sorts of actions that cause us to consider whether we should increase our support to the Ukrainian armed forces. What we saw was disgraceful, and her comments have been noted.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for the cautious note that he has sounded. Maybe later in his remarks he will agree with what I am about to propose. If we were to have a victory—if, for example, this offensive were to remove the Russians from Donetsk or even Crimea; who knows—that would not be the end of it. They are not going to turn around and say, “Okay, fine, never mind. Sorry about that, chaps. You’ve won.” Equally, we cannot possibly let them do anything other than remain where they are, so by far the best thing we can hope for is a very long, stretched-out stasis where neither side wins. Is that not a reasonable assessment?

No, I actually disagree with my hon. Friend on that. If the conflict were to freeze with some sort of Russian territorial gain accepted, implicitly—

Okay, I might have misunderstood my hon. Friend’s point, in that case.

To clarify the record, I am a great friend of Ukraine and it would be quite wrong to be misunderstood. No, absolutely not; we must of course remove Russia from Ukraine if we possibly can. It must not in any circumstances be allowed to hold the territory that it has. None the less, the hope that we can remove the Russian troops swiftly or easily, and that they will somehow just go away, is a fallacious vision and we must not slip down that track.

I completely agree, which is why I sound caution on what success looks like this summer. It must not be assumed that there must be a decisive victory in this counter-offensive. Putin must know that the west has the patience to continue to provide Ukraine with the strategic depth it needs to win eventually; and the Ukrainians must know that they retain our support and, although they must give everything in this counter-offensive, we are also ready to support them for subsequent counter-offensives. In that knowledge, Putin will see the futility of continuing to hold the ground, because the west will not blink in its support of Ukraine.

The Minister is surely correct in saying that we must be prepared for a long struggle, but it is vital, of course, that the Ukrainians have a continuing supply of arms to support their war effort. Is he absolutely confident that we have the manufacturing capability and the necessary supply chains to produce the weapons required by the Ukrainians?

Not solely in the UK, no, which I do not think will surprise anyone. Collectively, around the donor community, yes. Bear in mind that the majority of the arms that have been provided to Ukraine by the donor community thus far have not been manufactured in or for the donor countries but are munitions and weapon systems that we have procured from the world beyond and then donated to the Ukrainians.

It is also true that, after 18 months of my colleagues and I travelling around the world to buy up all this stuff, global stockpiles are diminished and global manufacturing capacity is torn between the market for the donor community to support Ukraine and the many countries—the UK included—that want to spend more on restoring stockpiles, because we have seen the importance of stockpiles to the credibility of our conventional deterrence. There is a challenge, and it is a good time to get into the defence industry. UK-based defence companies are clearly responding to that demand signal, as would be expected.

Ukraine has been able to hold off the Russian advance and then push it back, primarily because of the courage and resolve of the Ukrainian armed forces, but also because the international economic response has constrained Russia’s capacity to rearm and resupply, while the donor community, galvanised by the UK, has mobilised to do that for the Ukrainians.

As I said, President Putin thinks he can wait out the west, which is the biggest mistake he can make. He believes we lack strategic patience, but he is wrong. The United Kingdom and our allies around the world will stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes. It is that strategic patience that gives Ukraine its strategic depth. That depth, in support of a nation motivated against an existential threat, will surely be successful, whether that is this autumn, next autumn or the autumn after. It will eventually bring the Russians to the negotiating table on Ukrainian terms.

I thank the Minister for his resolute address to the Chamber today, and we totally support his message. There is no doubt about the determination of this United Kingdom and the west to move forward. I do not know whether it is real, made up or cosmetic, but is there a difference of opinion between the leader of the Wagner Group and Putin? Does that undermine the Russians in Ukraine? If it does, perhaps other people could make it change, too.

From the perspective of Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov, who needs enemies when there are friends like Prigozhin? There appears to be an extraordinary internal struggle, but the House should be clear that the position of the UK Government, and certainly the focus of the Ministry of Defence, has never been and must never be about Russian domestic politics; it must be about ensuring that Russia fails in Ukraine and is seen to fail in Ukraine, and ensuring that our actions in support of Ukraine not only restore its sovereignty but draw a line that says might cannot be used anywhere in the world to achieve foreign policy aims and to violate the rules-based international order.

The main threat to our national security, as identified in the previous integrated review and defence Command Paper, has been significantly degraded without the UK armed forces firing a shot. We have built Ukrainian capacity, both through gifting and training. We have supported the Ukrainians in their planning and guarded against wider escalation through strengthening our commitment to NATO and increasing our defence spending accordingly. In that, the underpinning principle of the last Command Paper has been proven right. However, geopolitically, geo-economically and technologically, there is much more we have seen change and that we have learned from in the past few years. The Government have refreshed the integrated review accordingly, drawing out the necessity of hard power to deter adversaries, protect our interests and project our influence around the globe.