[Relevant documents: Seventh Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Transnational repression in the UK, HC 681, and the Government response, HC 1405; and Correspondence from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, on the Government response to the Committee’s report on Transnational repression in the UK, reported to the House on 29 October.]
That this House has considered the impact of foreign interference on security, trade and democracy.
I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate, and my co-sponsors for their support. Since I submitted my application for the debate, the profound and urgent national importance of this matter has only increased. Foreign interference now strikes at the very core of Britain’s democratic institutions, our economy and our national security.
This debate takes place against an extraordinary backdrop. Just last week, the United States released a national security strategy that represents nothing less than the wholesale rejection of the values and alliances that have underpinned British security for 80 years. That serves as a warning signal, threading through everything that I will say today. The world order that we built, and the certainty that we have relied on, are no longer guaranteed.
Let me be clear about what we are witnessing and what it means for the United Kingdom. The post-war settlement that Britain helped to forge, and the post-cold war structures that we helped to build, are eroding simultaneously. International institutions—the United Nations, where we hold a permanent Security Council seat; the World Trade Organisation, where we championed free trade; and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe—are receding in influence at precisely the moment when Britain needs them most. Their weakening leaves us—a medium-sized power that has always punched above its weight through alliances and institutions—dangerously exposed.
We live in a fractured world in which authoritarian states test boundaries with impunity, and Britain is squarely in their crosshairs. Russia’s war with Ukraine is not simply a regional conflict; it is on our doorstep, and it threatens the security architecture that has kept Britain safe. China has already made a grab for British infrastructure, from our nuclear power stations to our telecommunications networks. The United States’ new doctrine explicitly criticises European allies more harshly than it does adversaries, with senior officials accusing Britain and our European partners of “civilisational suicide”.
Europe is the most liberal, free and democratic continent on earth. That makes us a prime target. Sweden’s chief of defence put it starkly last month, when he said:
“Political polarisation in many countries in the west is…a candy shop for a hybrid-warfare warrior to exploit”.
Britain’s own political polarisation—the Brexit divisions are still raw, and trust in institutions is declining—creates exactly the type of vulnerabilities that our adversaries seek to exploit. The rejection of value-based alliances outlined in the national security strategy and espoused in Beijing and Moscow underscores precisely why Britain must now step forward as the champion of liberal democratic values.
I commend the hon. Member for securing this timely and important debate. Given the NSS and other challenges, we must move closer to European partners—we see what happens when there is division. I commend him for his work in Georgia in particular. Will he comment on the breakdown of the belief in the rule of law and democracy there?
I will come to Georgia later in my speech, but on the European aspect, the context of the national security strategy has, if anything, made it more urgent to work more closely with our European friends. The SAFE—Security Action for Europe—fund negotiations seem to have broken down. It would be good to get more clarity from the Government on exactly what assessment they have made of the benefit to British industry of the SAFE fund, in the light of the amount for which the European Union has asked for entry into that fund. Clearly, there is an urgent need to work more closely with our European friends on rearmament.
The institutions that I mentioned must adapt and evolve, but retreating into transactional geopolitics—treating alliances as protection rackets and viewing international law as optional—leads to disaster for a country of our size and position. Cyber-attacks, disinformation and economic coercion are now as potent as tanks and missiles. The Defence Committee reports rising numbers of cyber-incidents targeting British infrastructure, Government systems and private companies, but the threat is not merely digital. In July 2024, a parcel exploded in a logistics centre in Birmingham. The explosion would have been powerful enough to bring down a cargo plane, had the parcel detonated on board. Security services traced the plot to Russian-directed saboteurs. Their plan’s next stage? Attacking flights to the United States, using British territory as the launching pad for an attack that would cause more disruption than any terrorist attack since 9/11.
In March 2024, a warehouse in east London was set ablaze by Dylan Earl, a 21-year-old recruited online by Russia’s Wagner Group and paid in cryptocurrency. He was convicted after a video of him starting the fire was found on his phone, alongside a Russian flag and £34,000-worth of cocaine. His Wagner handler told him to watch the television series “The Americans” for tradecraft tips. The arson was meant as an audition. Earl wrote to contacts afterwards:
“They have a warehouse in Czech Republic to burn for 35 thousand”.
I thank the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for securing the debate. I have expanded my remarks beyond foreign interference, because the way Russia views what it is doing at the moment is more than that. It is a direct attack on a system and on our way of life. This is more than interference—it is conflict.
Across the world, the contest is under way between liberal democracies that trust their people and autocratic regimes that fear them. Nowhere exemplifies that more than Russia, a state built on the control and takeover of civil society. Russia views its democratic neighbours to the west as weak and vulnerable, to be divided and picked off one by one, but Russia is wrong and we must show it that it is wrong. It cloaks its aggression towards its former colonies in a sense of entitlement and ownership—a warped hangover from its imperial past.
Ukraine is on the frontline of this contest. That is why I am glad that this Government and this Parliament are committed to standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, and that our Government have increased military support for Ukraine to its highest level ever. This year we are providing £4.5 billion in financial aid and military support to Ukraine. However, while all wars must end in negotiation, we have to be clear that there should be no deal about Ukraine without Ukraine, and we must recognise that we will all have capitulated if Ukraine is forced to agree to unfavourable terms. If that happens, we will have capitulated to the idea that unprovoked aggression should be rewarded and that the victims of an illegal occupation should be collectively punished for standing in the way.
After so many years, it is easy to forget what Russian aggression and occupation mean: children forcibly taken from their families and transported for reeducation in Russia, prisoners of war raped and executed, and civilians publicly hanged in occupied towns simply for speaking out. We cannot live in a world where the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must. That is Russia’s world, and its success, in Ukraine and across Europe, would represent the death of our values and our way of life.
I will make the same entreaty that I made in the last debate. If hon. Members are going to criticise other hon. Members of this House, they should have informed them in advance; I trust that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) did so in relation to the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage). I call John Cooper.
Who is in charge of our national security, and who is a risk to our national security? Those are simple questions, but the answers are tough to determine. Take China, for example: this Labour Government are attempting to ride multiple horses—or should that be dragons? Whatever decision is taken on Beijing, it should be shaped here in this place, for perhaps no other foreign policy area is so delicate and holds such peril for national security.
Yet blundering into the powder keg of Anglo-Sino relations comes the SNP. Despite having no remit in foreign policy, Scottish Government Minister Richard Lochhead undertook a stealthy visit to Beijing in April under the cloak of trade promotion. What occurred is hard to determine, but worryingly it has since emerged that First Minister John Swinney gave what might be loosely called a letter of comfort to Chinese firm Ming Yang as it seeks to insert itself—possible kill switches and all—into our critical energy infrastructure. Alongside fellow Scottish Conservative MPs, I have signed a letter to the Security Minister asking what effect Mr Swinney opening up this new front might have on UK national security and international trade. That is in part because the Scottish Government have a dreadful track record in this area. Embarrassingly, former First Minister Nicola Sturgeon inked a deal with Chinese firms in 2016. She boasted of a $10 billion boost, but that deal fell apart when corruption concerns emerged regarding one of the firm’s parent companies.
There is more. John Swinney is just back from Dublin, where he was incorrectly hailed as the first head of a Government to meet the new President, Catherine Connolly. Although they style themselves as the Scottish Government, Holyrood are a devolved Administration—small beer, Madam Deputy Speaker, or perhaps small stout. But make no mistake: the missive from the Áras an Uachtaráin, the House of the President, cocked a snook at this House. Worse, Mr Swinney also met Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald. The Northern Ireland Secretary confirmed to me that the Windsor agreement allows for such discussions if they are confined to devolved matters, but Miss McDonald bragged, “We discussed our aims for constitutional change and will continue to work together.” As the House knows, the constitutional aims of the Shinners—so democratic that they dodge scrutiny in this place—are to damage Britain by ripping Northern Ireland out of the Union, and the constitutional aim of the SNP is to defy the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and to tear Scotland from that same Union.
These are dangerous times for democracies in Europe and across the world. I will not be alone in having heard one particular word used increasingly to describe our social and political state as a country over the last 10 years: “divided.” From Brexit to immigration, from the conflict in Gaza to LGBT+ rights, it feels as though we as a country are more divided than ever.
In a sense, Madam Deputy Speaker, division is a feature of democracy—so much so that when we vote in this, the mother of Parliaments, you quite literally shout “Division!”, and we divide off into our respective voting Lobbies. However, healthy division must be underpinned by a willingness to listen to other views, respect them even when we disagree passionately with them and, yes, sometimes accept that we are wrong. That is what I fear we have lost in this country—the ability to engage in the debate—and I fear that social media has much to do with that.
I see a democracy under pressure, not from internal division but from external actors looking to destabilise our way of life and our beliefs. It will not be a surprise to hon. Members or to our constituents that social media is used by foreign actors, particularly Russia, Iran and China, to actively undermine our democratic institutions and exploit the natural disagreements present in democracy to sow the seeds of division. As anyone who has been on Twitter recently will know, it is also increasingly being manipulated by its owner to promote a very specific—and, in my view, very dangerous—narrative.
Today, I want to focus my remarks on Russia and the impact of its state-affiliated and state-aligned online activities on our democracy. Earlier this week, the Foreign Secretary strongly reaffirmed our commitment to UK support for Ukraine against Russian aggression in her speech to commemorate the signing of the Locarno treaties here in London. Ukraine is fighting to defend western democracy against Russia’s illegal invasion, and is paying a high price to do so. As the Foreign Secretary recognised in her speech, though, while Russia’s war may be physically constrained, its offensive is playing out on multiple frontiers, including our very own social media feeds.
I thank the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for raising the existential threats from Russia and China, as well as more recently from the US with its national security strategy, which we heard of last week. I said earlier today on the Floor of the House that the special relationship is now well and truly over.
Foreign interference is not a new phenomenon, but it has undoubtedly become an increasing and urgent concern in recent years. Heightened aggression from hostile states and increased economic competition is creating a more polarised world in which those who seek to increase their power and influence are looking to maximise every possible avenue. Our increased reliance on digital infrastructure and the rise of social media and artificial intelligence, combined with an erosion of trust in established political systems and traditional media has opened up a significant space to be exploited.
Whether it be through espionage, cyber-attack, intellectual property theft, transnational repression, disinformation, electoral interference, foreign political donations or bribery, we are under attack on a daily basis. Regrettably, we have not responded quickly and coherently to that, and in some cases many remain naive to the threats posed.
Let us look at the behaviours of those who seek to undermine our society and our values, create global instability and remould the world on their own terms, and at how the Government have reacted in response. Russia’s war against Ukraine did not begin in 2022; it began in 2014 when Russian-backed militants seized towns and cities in the Donbas and Russian forces illegally annexed Crimea. The strategic defence review called Russia
“an immediate and pressing threat”
but that has been the case for decades.
When I visited Ukraine in 2018 for the first time as a Member of Parliament, I found a real and live war, and was shocked that there was so little discussion of it in our own media, and certainly within this Parliament. In fact, shockingly, the language used was of a “frozen conflict”, all because we wanted to continue to have supplies of oil and gas—business as usual. Despite the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, it took until the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and the death of Dawn Sturgess in Salisbury in March 2018 for the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 to be introduced to detain people at ports and borders to determine whether they are engaged in hostile state activity.
The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. Like some of our allies, we have had major issues with transnational repression, misinformation and disinformation, hostile cyber-attacks by our adversaries, spy ships surveilling our critical infrastructure and much more besides, which has cost British businesses and had a hugely detrimental impact on our national defence and security. In these increasingly tense times, when adversaries are testing our resolve, does the hon. Gentleman agree with the Defence Committee’s recommendation that we need a dedicated Minister for homeland security?
I have not had a chance to read that report, but I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has raised it, because it is now clearer than ever that we need a separate Minister and Department. That is a key point.
A cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights report describes China as a “flagrant” perpetrator of transnational repression. The strategic defence review states that China is
“likely to continue seeking advantage through espionage and cyber-attacks, and through securing cutting-edge Intellectual Property through legitimate and illegitimate means.”
Why, then, have successive Governments continued to let China get away with this behaviour? Put simply, failing to put China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme leaves a systemic gap in the UK’s national security and defence, and ignores the fact that the criteria have already been fulfilled. Can the Minister explain why the Government continue to refuse to close the gap, and why they will not make this urgently needed change?
Instead, this Government seem intent on appeasing China. Not for the first or second time, but for the third time, they have reportedly delayed their decision on whether to approve a controversial new Chinese embassy in central London, after they were expected to approve the plans for a vast mega-embassy. It cannot go ahead. Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hongkongers, local residents, US security and US financial services all demand to have the decision revisited. Surely China’s continued harassment and bullying over services to the UK embassy in Beijing, for example, is not a reason to kowtow.
In conclusion, foreign interference is a daily reality that touches our security, our economy and the integrity of our democracy, but warnings from parliamentary Committees and the intelligence community have simply not been translated into policy. They cannot continue to be ignored, and the Government cannot continue to hide from the uncomfortable truths about hostile states and their escalating interference against us all.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) on securing this important debate. At a time when our country faces profound geopolitical uncertainty, when hostile states are probing every weakness in our democratic and economic systems, and when the US national security strategy talks about
“cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”,
one truth stands out above all others: as the Government’s anti-corruption strategy published earlier this week recognises, Britain’s security is the foundation of Britain’s prosperity.
Before I progress any further, may I take this opportunity to commend the leadership of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis)? As the Security Minister, he has worked closely with the Government’s anti-corruption champion, the noble Baroness Hodge, and with staff at the Home Office’s joint anti-corruption unit. Together, they have done excellent work in completing the anti-corruption strategy.
I wish to focus my speech on foreign interference in our politics and elections, and how it goes to the heart of our much-cherished democracy. First, let me talk about paid access by foreign actors. Today, the greatest threats to our security do not always come in the form of tanks or missiles. Increasingly, they come through money, influence and covert networks operating quietly inside our financial system and even our politics.
Before coming to this place, I dedicated my professional life to tackling corruption. I have to say that I was therefore appalled to see a former British Member of the European Parliament charged and recently sentenced to 10 and a half years in prison for offences under the Bribery Act 2010. I take no pleasure in mentioning Nathan Gill, but I have a duty to be candid, honest and frank with Members of this House, so let us not forget that Mr Gill was paid bribes by Oleg Voloshyn—to parrot “meticulously scripted” Kremlin lines in Brussels, according to Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb’s sentencing remarks—and that Voloshyn, Gill’s handler, is a former Ukrainian MP whom we sanctioned in March 2023 for
Before I start, Madam Deputy Speaker, let me assure you, in relation to the comments made by the previous occupant of the Chair, that I will be mentioning a Member of this House and I have given him advance notice that I will be doing so.
Our democracy is under threat. We cannot and must not fail to defend it against the bad-faith actors who seek to attack it. Today I will concentrate the bulk of my remarks on Kremlin-linked Russian interference, starting with the long-time right-hand man of the habitually absent Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), Nathan Gill, who was at the very top of Reform UK in Wales. Mr Gill is now sitting in jail serving a sentence of 10 and a half years for taking Russian bribes from Putin’s operatives to parrot Kremlin propaganda about the war on Ukraine. The leader of Reform UK, the Member for Clacton, is desperately suggesting that Mr Gill was a bad apple, as he and his organisation scramble and evade following Gill’s bribery conviction, but that simply does not wash.
Gill was not the only pro-Brexit politician in Europe spreading Kremlin talking points about Ukraine. Indeed, the Member for Clacton himself echoed Moscow’s narratives on the war in Ukraine, accusing the west of “provoking” the war. It is also worth remembering his frequent appearances on Putin’s propaganda TV channel, Russia Today, between 2010 and 2014, on which he made no criticisms of the lack of democracy in Russia or its position on Ukraine.
The hon. Lady is making a powerful case about Reform UK speaking on Russia’s talking points. Of course, the biggest talking point of them all is that NATO is the enemy. When her leader says that the Green party believes we should leave NATO, is that not a Russian talking point?
That is not the Green party’s position. The Green party’s position, which I clarified in a point of order in this Chamber just last week, supports our membership of NATO at this time of extreme threat on Europe’s borders.
It has long been known that the Kremlin seeks to interfere and undermine democratic politics in other countries, with online bots and cyber-disinformation. The need is urgent. In June 2025 the Government published a strategic defence review, which stated:
“The UK is already under daily attack, with aggressive acts—from espionage to cyber-attack and information manipulation—causing harm to society and the economy.”
Russia was called
“an immediate and pressing threat”,
including in key areas such as cyber-space and information operations. These concerns are not new. Credible evidence of Russian interference in UK elections was flagged in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report. In 2022, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office put out a press release that revealed that a Russian spy agency had targeted UK national infrastructure in a “calculated and dangerous” hacking campaign, and that Putin was sowing
“division and confusion among allies.”
The Foreign Secretary at the time was Liz Truss, who said that she would not tolerate it, yet she, and the moribund Conservative Government of which she was a part, did not open an investigation into the ISC’s Russia report on Kremlin-linked influence in the UK.
Obviously, Liz Truss should never have been anywhere near the levers of high office, but why have this Government not acted as the US did? The 2017-19 Robert Mueller special counsel investigation was a criminal investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 US elections. We need something similar here. The US report concluded that Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election did occur in “sweeping and systematic fashion”, and that it “violated U.S. criminal law”. In 2016 we had the Brexit vote, which has so harmed and divided our country, and it is well known that the Kremlin wants a weakened, fractured EU, so where is our version of Mueller?
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for securing the debate and all other hon. Members who have spoken so thoughtfully.
The first duty of the state is to protect the freedom of its citizens. Today’s debate has highlighted how foreign states with malign intent are seeking to undermine our security, press their own economic interests through political interference, and take direct steps to subvert our democracy. I will focus my remarks on the threat to our democracy.
We are rightly proud of the UK’s history of continuous parliamentary democracy, yet functioning democracy is not an end state, but a continuous task that we in this House all share. At its heart is the belief that each person’s vote should have equal standing, and that that equality is the best defence against tyranny and the best protector of liberty.
Too often, however, the votes of our citizens are not equal, when the powerful, including other states, seek to buy influence or suppress opposition. The UK is beset by external threats that seek to undermine our democracy. Just today, we heard how the Hong Kong authorities have ramped up their campaign of extraterritorial intimidation against UK residents. My hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mr Reynolds) has highlighted that his constituent Carmen Lau has been subjected to the circulation of fake photographs to her neighbours. That follows similar letters that asked the same neighbours to take her to the Chinese embassy to receive a $100,000 bounty.
This Government need to demonstrate to the Chinese authorities that there are red lines when it comes to protecting our citizens. That should begin with the Government rejecting the application for the super-embassy, which would allow the Chinese authorities to spy more effectively on British residents. It should extend to clamping down on the Chinese use of cyber to attack our universities and steal intellectual property in this country; to giving real reassurance to students and others on our university campuses that they are free to express views and research the activities of China and the Hong Kong authorities without fear of intimidation; and—as we are acutely aware—to saying that spying on our Parliament is totally unacceptable.
First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) on securing today’s very important and timely debate. We live in unprecedented times, in which those who wish to undermine this great nation are doing so daily, and on multiple fronts. The need to co-operate more closely with our global allies is as strong as it has been since the second world war, and the United Kingdom must be prepared to combat the ever-evolving threats of tomorrow.
In the aftermath of the cold war and following the end of the conflict in the Balkans, we perhaps took peace in Europe for granted. The prospect of tank battles on the plains of Germany and the ever-present threat of a nuclear holocaust suddenly seemed like a distant memory, as though they were from another era. That illusion was shattered in 2014 when Russian paramilitaries crossed the border into Ukraine and took control of towns in the Donbas. Since then, Europe has been at war with its enemies, not just on the battlefields of Ukraine but in cyber-space and trade, and we have seen continued efforts to degrade our national security.
We should not shy away from who the malign actors are. Let us be quite clear that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea represent a very real threat to the United Kingdom. While their methods may vary, their intention is the same: to weaken our security, disrupt our democratic institutions, and undermine British values. China’s actions present an evolving challenge to our national security. Its activities span espionage, cyber-attacks, political influence operations, and exerting pressure through its trade, supply chain and investment decisions. We saw that very clearly in the spying case involving British citizens Chris Cash and Christopher Berry; the Government’s failure to clearly label China a threat collapsed a prosecution that had been years in the making. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy said that the handling of aspects of that case was best described as “shambolic”, and that the episode exposed “systematic failures”, and created
This has been an excellent debate. I extend my gratitude to the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for securing this debate on the pervasive challenge of foreign interference. The hon. Member made a very good speech, in which he spoke knowledgably and authoritatively about the complex nature of the threats we face, which, along with the range of points raised by Members, illustrates the diverse and evolving nature of the foreign interference threat landscape.
In just the last few years, we have seen attempts to influence our political system through: covert donations, as we saw with MI5’s disruptive alert on Christine Lee and the conviction of Reform UK’s leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, for bribery offences in November; the issuing of arrest warrants and bounties by the Hong Kong police on individuals for exercising their freedom of expression; Russian information operations spreading false pro-Kremlin narratives online to undermine support for Ukraine; and the recent and much-publicised concerns about activities in this place. As the Prime Minister said just last week, the Government are clear that China poses national security threats to the UK.
When these threats are left unchecked, they place at risk the things we value most about our country: our democratic values and freedom of expression, and our ability to pursue long-term economic growth. Upholding national security is the first duty of Government, and we continue to take all the measures necessary to disrupt these threats.
As Security Minister, I am deeply committed to using my position to cohere cross-Government efforts to make our country a harder target for these threat actors. The legislative foundation of the UK’s defence against foreign interference lies in the National Security Act 2023. The Act has overhauled our espionage laws and introduced a crucial new foreign interference offence, equipping our security and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to disrupt state threats in the UK.
The Prime Minister is absolutely committed to strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions. That is why he renewed the mandate of the defending democracy taskforce, and I am leveraging that taskforce to co-ordinate the delivery of the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan.
The Minister mentioned the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, of course, appointed Lord Mandelson to be our ambassador in America. For those seven months, someone had politically fatal kompromat on Lord Mandelson. I am not asking the Minister to give away any secrets, but could he tell us that he has personally investigated whether the presence of that kompromat left Lord Mandelson subject to foreign influence, or whether he knows the answer to that question one way or the other?
I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member. I would gently say that his intervention is not in keeping with the tone of what has been a good-natured and constructive debate, but he has asked the question and I can give him the assurances he seeks.
The action plan will deliver a protective security campaign to support those at risk to recognise, resist and report attempts of foreign interference, to strengthen existing legislation to mitigate the threat, and to co-ordinate action to disrupt the use of proxy actors. In line with our pledge to strengthen legislation, we are also introducing tougher rules on political donations through the elections Bill in order to protect our democracy. The Government believe that foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system, which is why the law is clear that foreign donations are not permitted. Yet as the tactics and techniques of foreign interference actors evolve, UK rules and safeguards also need to adapt.
Cross-Government work also continues at pace to counter foreign information operations. Our immediate focus is getting the Online Safety Act 2023 implemented quickly and effectively. The foreign interference offence in that Act places clear requirements on platforms to tackle illegal state-linked disinformation targeting the UK and our democratic processes. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is also driving a whole-of-society response to strengthening UK resilience against the threat, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has demonstrated relentless international leadership in imposing costs on Russian state-linked threat actors that seek to undermine our democratic elections and spread malign content through deceptive means.
The Minister is setting out the strong action that the Government are taking to target those threats. Does he think that social media companies are doing enough to ensure that their platforms are not being used by Russia and others to undermine democracy?
That is an entirely fair challenge. Like every Member of this House, I suspect, I would like social media companies to do more. I am working closely, through the defending democracy taskforce, with colleagues across Government, including in DSIT, to ensure that that is the case.
Since October 2024, the Government have sanctioned 31 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russia’s information warfare. Just yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced a further package of sanctions against five entities and two individuals for their role in attempting to destabilise international democracies and undermine international support to Ukraine through the spread of false and divisive narratives. Efforts are also under way to improve data collection on experiences of transnational repression in the UK and to ensure that victims receive appropriate support.
Hon. Members have made a number of very useful contributions. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) brought to bear a generation of service, and spoke powerfully about a number of issues, including the importance of our support for Ukraine. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) made clear his concerns about the threats from China and elsewhere. I think it fair to say, based on his contribution, that he is not a fan of the First Minister of Scotland. I will look closely at his letter. I was only sorry that today there was no quote from Sun Tzu—maybe next time.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) made a very thoughtful contribution and rightly raised his concerns about Russian attempts to undermine our democracy. Although I did not agree with the comments made by the hon. Member for Dundee Central (Chris Law), who is not in his place, about the nature of the special relationship, I agreed with what he said about Russia and Ukraine. It is absolutely vital that we maintain that cross-party agreement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) spoke incredibly well and in a very considered way, as he always does. I am grateful for his words about the publication just this week of the Government’s anti-corruption strategy. I pay tribute to Home Office officials for their work to deliver on that strategy and our commitments. He spoke powerfully and authoritatively about the impact of the Nathan Gill scandal. I am grateful for the work that my hon. Friend does in support of our national security, and I can tell him that the elections Bill will introduce tough new rules on political donations, including cryptoassets.
It just falls to me to thank everybody who has spoken in the debate. I found many of the contributions very compelling and interesting. We are in a changing global environment that is moving very quickly in the security context. Security is a shared priority for everybody in this House and everybody in this country, and it is important that we name these threats and talk about them in this space, so that we are doing our duty as parliamentarians to talk about the specific threats that are coming down the line.
I thank the hon. Members for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey), for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper), for Bracknell (Peter Swallow), for Dundee Central (Chris Law), for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) and for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns), who spoke so well. Some fantastic themes came out from their contributions: the ongoing threats from Russia and China; the role of social media in the disinformation space in particular, which is being driven by those countries and others; the use of crypto—it is extremely welcome to hear from the Minister that action will be taken on donations in crypto format; and the clear lines of exploration, shall we say, that Russia, China and others are making to reach British parliamentarians, British influencers and British policymakers on a constant basis. It is important that we talk about that here. The final theme, of course, is the connections between Reform UK and Russia. It is unfortunate that no Reform MPs are here today to answer those specific concerns, but it is significant that almost every speaker in the debate has raised them; those concerns are profoundly important.
Finally, I thank my party’s spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bridlington and The Wolds (Charlie Dewhirst), and the Minister for taking the time today, and thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the impact of foreign interference on security, trade and democracy.
That is not merely idealism; it is in the national interest. Britain’s prosperity depends on the rules-based international order. We are a trading nation—an island that lives by global commerce. We are a financial hub that requires stable international law. Britain’s power is at its greatest when multiplied through alliances and institutions. Liberal international institutions brought peace and prosperity on an unprecedented scale—and Britain was their architect. From the Atlantic charter to the United Nations, and from NATO to the Bretton Woods institutions, British statesmanship created the frameworks that defeated fascism, contained Soviet communism and enabled decades of prosperity.
This is hybrid warfare, and Britain is on the frontline. As Chatham House observes, what is publicly understood is just the tip of the iceberg. There is far more happening that the Government have chosen not to disclose, often for good reason. These attacks seek to destabilise British democracy internally, rather than defeat us militarily. They exploit our openness, our freedoms and our legal systems. Young men recruited on Telegram carry out sabotage, often unaware that their paymaster sits in Moscow. When caught, they are released by the courts, which lack sufficient evidence. This is not so much le Carré or Bond; it is espionage delivered via the gig economy.
We must also see China’s systematic penetration of British infrastructure as more than just a financial investment—it is strategic positioning. Huawei’s involvement in our telecommunications network sparked years of debate before partial restrictions were imposed. China General Nuclear’s 33% stake in Hinkley Point C nuclear power station gives Beijing influence over critical national infrastructure. Chinese ownership of British Steel, of swathes of student accommodation near sensitive facilities and of port infrastructure, and a potential new mega-embassy, all represent potential leverage.
The United States’ new national security strategy explicitly threatens economic warfare, even against its friends. Washington now imposes tariffs on its allies. The Trump Administration have already placed such measures on Britain. That should be viewed in combination with our botched post-Brexit trade position. Having left the EU single market, Britain faces economic pressure from multiple directions. We cannot and must not separate economic security from national security. Every foreign investment, every supply chain and every trading relationship carries potential for coercion if not handled with the utmost care.
Let me offer two international examples of the corrosive effect of foreign interference that should worry, if not terrify, British policymakers, because they show what happens when western resolve weakens. Georgia stands as a clear example of hybrid interference and democratic backsliding. A country that aspired to Euro-Atlantic integration and sent troops to fight alongside British forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has been pulled increasingly into Russia’s orbit through economic pressure, political interference and an ever-present military threat. Young Georgians take to the streets of Tbilisi, desperately protesting to protect their European future, while their leaders respond with water cannon and arrests on trumped-up charges.
In Sudan, we see foreign interference layered upon state collapse. British interests in the Red sea—through which 12% of global trade flows, including vital supplies to Britain—are directly threatened, yet we did nothing to prevent state failure or ensure early stabilisation. At the very moment when sustained UK engagement was most needed, this Government cut our overseas aid budget and hollowed out the very conflict prevention and stabilisation tools designed to prevent crises like this. Exacerbated by interference from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and others, we face regional instability and a humanitarian catastrophe, the scale and horror of which are hard to comprehend.
Russia’s influence on operations in eastern Europe is unmistakable. Across the Balkans most recently, and also in Moldova and Romania, Russian interference has been both brazen and routine. Ahead of Moldova’s most recent elections, the BBC reported voters flying in from Russia carrying thousands of euros in cash, which was allegedly handed out in exchange for people backing Moscow’s preferred candidate. These are not distant problems; they are British problems. Georgia’s struggle warns us what happens when we fail to support democratic allies and to counter foreign interference, and the tragedy in Sudan demonstrates the cost of inaction. Both show that Britain, having retreated from global engagement, now reaps the consequences. That is why we must stand up with our allies, and continue to live and promote our values, both at home and around the world.
One key way we can promote and protect those values is through our alliances. For 20 years, one of Vladimir Putin’s top objectives has been to undermine and break up NATO. The alliance is the cornerstone of British security, which makes reckless comments by individuals, including the new leader of the Green party about leaving the alliance, music to the Russian dictator’s ears. Russia has interfered in our domestic politics for years. Russia interfered in the Brexit referendum. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report documented credible open-source commentary suggesting Russian interference, but the Government of the time shamefully refused to investigate properly. As a result, we still do not know the full extent of Russian influence on the most consequential vote in modern British history.
Even more starkly, Russia has murdered British citizens on British soil. Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with polonium in London. Sergei and Yulia Skripal were attacked with Novichok in Salisbury, tragically leading to the death of Dawn Sturgess, too. Not only were those assassinations carried out on British soil, but we now know that they were messages. They demonstrated that Russia would violate British sovereignty with impunity. That makes it even more critical that our politics is free from Russian influence. Unfortunately, the recent trial of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales has exposed bribery in UK political movements. Until we have seen a thorough investigation of Reform UK’s wider funding, question marks will remain about that party’s links to the Kremlin.
This is not a minor issue. Russia is working every day to infiltrate and undermine our politics and our infrastructure. British train lines are surveilled. British infrastructure is mapped for sabotage. British political discourse is poisoned by disinformation, and British resolve is tested constantly. We are up to the test—our security services are among the world’s very best—but we must root out corruption and foreign interference with energy, resolve and openness. That makes the language of the new American national security strategy all the more alarming. The document’s bleak, even dystopian, worldview, echoed in recent days by the US President, should alarm us all. It trashes the values underpinning alliances that have guaranteed British security since the war. It seeks to interfere directly in European politics, and to fuel instability by calling for a cultivation of resistance to mainstream European political discourse. Essentially, it is endorsing nationalist populist parties such as Alternative für Deutschland, Le Pen’s Rassemblement National in France, and the Reform party here in Britain. It emboldens Russia and China to push further against British interests.
Most alarmingly, the NSS reserves its harshest criticism not for its adversaries but for allies. Christopher Landau, the US Deputy Secretary of State, posted that America can no longer
“pretend that we are partners”
with European countries, Britain included, that are pursuing policies “utterly adverse” to American interests. He listed climate policy, tech regulation, and alleged “censorship” as justifications. Russia’s reaction tells us everything. Putin’s spokesman praised the NSS, and Russians close to Putin endorsed Trump’s attacks on European allies. They sense an opportunity, and we must respond.
The UK must therefore take foreign interference more seriously than it has done in decades. We cannot rely on an America drifting towards transactional nationalism. We must prepare for a world where Britain and Europe stand together to succeed in a transformed global political and security landscape. That is why I was particularly disappointed by the Government’s recent decision to withdraw from negotiations on UK access to the EU Security Access for Europe fund, and I hope we can revisit that at a later time.
Britain must act with urgency on multiple fronts. We must strengthen our democratic resilience, implement the Russia report’s recommendations that the Government ignored, expose foreign interference wherever it exists, protect electoral integrity, and expose attempts by foreigners to bribe British officials. We must bolster our economic security, enhance our cyber defences and rebuild our conventional military capabilities. We must be out front in defending free trade, democratic integrity, and international institutions, even when our closest ally wavers. Britain shaped the world order. Britain championed the rules. Britain built the alliances. If we will not defend them, they will collapse and we will suffer first, and worst.
The world is entering an era defined by hybrid threats, authoritarian ambition and weak multilateralism. This Parliament must confront foreign interference with cross-party seriousness and honesty. The threats are real and the vulnerabilities are known: already British citizens have died, British sovereignty has been violated and British democracy has been attacked. The UK built a global system of rules to reject the notion that might is right. As Putin, Xi and now Trump attempt to reassert that very notion, it falls to us to stand firmly by our values to secure a fair, peaceful future at home and abroad.
I was pleased that we in the Defence Committee put out a joint statement reaffirming our commitment to Ukraine, and calling on the UK and our European allies to do more. We must do more, not only in supporting Ukraine but in countering the attempts by Russia and its autocratic bedfellows to destroy our democracy, pull apart our alliances and undermine our society. For that reason, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Lewes for securing the debate and for the opportunity to speak in it.
Russia believes that it is already at war with NATO, and so with us. While it competes on the battlefield in Ukraine with drones and missiles, it is also seeking to influence and interfere in our societies and communities. That reality is something that most people in this country do not yet understand. The recently published Defence Committee report on UK contributions to European security highlighted this as an area where further effort and cross-Government co-ordination are needed.
While our public are largely unaware, Russia seeks to slowly slice away at our defences and at the trust we have in one another, slice by slice, until we find that the freedoms, security and unity we have taken for granted have been carved away. Russia does this by subtly building relationships with local actors and influencers. This tactic is not new; it has a long history. In the ’60s, the KGB orchestrated a campaign to alienate West Germany from its allies by portraying it as a hub for Nazi antisemitism. The operation involved antisemitic graffiti and synagogue vandalism, emboldening far-right elements and sparking international outrage.
Today, Russia intervenes selectively and strategically to support far-right and far-left parties across Europe, while its intelligence farms out sabotage plots to criminals and opportunists. From Russian oligarchs socialising with Boris Johnson and the Brexit brigade to Kremlin-backed spending on pro-Brexit disinformation campaigns, Russia has long sought to influence and undermine our democratic system from the top.
Today, in this Parliament, there sits a party whose leaders have taken Russian bribes. Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, took at least £40,000 in cash from a pro-Kremlin operative; David Coburn, the former UKIP leader in Scotland and former Brexit party MEP, discussed a potential $6,500 payment from the same pro-Kremlin network. The hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) once vouched that his right-hand man was “decent” and “honest”. Now he insists that there are no pro-Kremlin links in Reform UK—so why do his parties keep being led by Putin’s puppets? I suggest that the hon. Member takes a look in the mirror and, for once, puts the country before himself and investigates Reform’s pro-Russia links.
Russia’s reach also extends to our streets, where it seeks, in the words of MI5 director general McCallum, “sustained mayhem”. In my own constituency, we have seen two Russia-linked attacks: an arson attack on a Leyton warehouse storing aid for Ukraine, and an Islamophobic graffiti campaign across east London, which targeted a mosque and religious schools locally. These attacks are Russian attempts to influence our politics, including our support for Ukraine. Most importantly, they are attempts to cause division among and within our communities.
As the Defence Committee’s report on hybrid threats highlights, our democratic openness makes us more vulnerable to Russia’s influence campaigns, but that does not make autocracies such as Russia stronger or more resilient than us. In the spirit of democratic honesty, we must make the case to the public that investing in our security is essential. Our security services must play an active role in countering attacks on democracy and elections. We must all make the case for increased defence spending, which is essential to ensure the safety and security of our democracy.
As Labour stands idly by, the SNP has created an effective boycott of our ally Israel. Former First Minister Humza Yousaf seems more concerned about Gaza than about Glasgow Pollok, which he is actually meant to represent as an MSP. Meanwhile, the SNP’s lack of financial support has undermined the defence industry north of the border to the extent that the Defence Secretary has called them
“a threat to our security”—[Official Report, 3 November 2025; Vol. 774, c. 620.],
so the threats to our national security are not all external. When will this Labour Government stop facilitating the Scottish Government’s damaging shadow foreign policy, show some backbone, and stop Britain being undermined by John Swinney—the pound-shop Parnell—and his fellow travellers?
Evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Committee identified Russian operations across every single conceivable channel and platform, including Minecraft. These operations include bot farms that produce fake accounts at a rate far faster than they can be banned, and use them to create significant noise around a particular issue, drowning out legitimate discussion and undermining trust in UK institutions.
If I had stood here and said even a few years ago that Russia had infiltrated my local Facebook groups to spread disinformation, as well as the local Facebook groups of many Members across this House, that would have been received with some scepticism. Now, if I may say so, we should be more sceptical of the fool who believes that Russia is not doing that. The corrosive effect that it has on community cohesion is immense, and it is happening every day on a hyper-local level. Russian troll factories are spewing out lies not to push any single political ideology, but simply to sow chaos and undermine faith in institutions. I fully welcome the Government’s decision to sanction a further seven entities and individuals for their role in destabilising Ukraine, but I also ask the Government to go further and consider what action can be taken within our own borders to curb this economy of disinformation.
I welcome the provision in the Online Safety Act 2003 to limit foreign interference as a priority offence, meaning that services must take proactive steps to identify and minimise users’ exposure to state-sponsored or state-linked disinformation aimed at interfering with the UK, but I question whether any social media company is living up to its obligations under the Act. I have asked to meet Meta to discuss the issue, but I am disappointed to tell the House that I have not yet been given that opportunity. I assume that all social media companies are aware of the threat of foreign interference and know that it is happening on their platforms, but I have not seen any evidence of their taking any action to stop it. If social media companies do not take action, then we must pursue them and force them to do so because our democracy is more valuable than their profits.
We cannot ignore the fact that Russian interference is clear and evident not only within the borders of our own country, but within the walls of this House and the political sphere across the great nations of this country. I am sure that I do not need to remind colleagues that the former leader of Reform in Wales is now behind bars for taking bribes to make pro-Russian statements. Reform is now refusing to conduct an investigation into pro-Russian interference in the party. That prompts a question: what are they hiding? That is, of course, a question we could have asked Reform Members today, had they shown up. Pro-Russian narratives are nothing new to Reform or its previous incarnations, the Brexit party and UKIP. In fact, during the 2024 election campaign, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) suggested that the EU and NATO had “provoked” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He said that he “admired” Putin. Madam Deputy Speaker, he is a Kremlin apologist.
The fight against Russia in Ukraine is morally right, but it is also strategically right, and the Government are correct to be unwavering in their support of Ukraine—for their future and for ours. Ukraine is defending Europe’s eastern flank. Any Government who neglect that approach neglect their first duty to the security of the public, and we must be in no doubt that Reform is a threat to that and to all of us.
A further aspect highlighted by the Royal United Services Institute report is the need to support civil society and media ecosystems that are directly targeted by such operations. It is not just about technical defences, but also about improving media literacy so that everyday citizens can be better prepared to spot deepfakes, fake news and misinformation. Yesterday, the Government released their national youth strategy and, amid all the fantastic announcements about funding for more youth facilities, a plan to address workforce challenges and give more young people a voice. I want to highlight specifically the commitment to embed media literacy into the curriculum and ensure that Ofcom can fulfil its obligations under the Online Safety Act to promote media literacy. Media literacy is important not just for young people—although it is—but for everyone, especially older people who may be more vulnerable to the effects of deepfakes and misinformation.
Our democracy rests on our ability to disagree with each other, but to remain a united country. We must not allow ourselves to be siloed. We must not refuse to listen to those whose views we do not share, but who we should nevertheless respect. Losing sight of the ability to disagree agreeably drives a wedge into the unity of this United Kingdom, and leaves us more vulnerable than ever to the narrative that hostile foreign actors would so like to see spread. We are a country of diversity, and proudly so. Our greatest strength must not be allowed to be exploited to become our greatest weakness. We must all of us in this place commit to fighting Putin’s corrosive influence over our democracy, wherever it is found. That starts by recognising the extent of the challenge we face.
The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report warned us as far back as 2020 of disinformation, political influence and aggressive cyber-operations. It criticised the UK Government’s response as playing catch-up, with unclear responsibility for defending democracy. Despite Russia’s malign intentions and behaviours, for years Russian state-funded broadcasters such as Sputnik and RT—Russia Today, as it was known—were given licence to disseminate disinformation during crucial elections and referendums. Yet, despite that, the UK Government continue to underfund the BBC World Service. It is time to step up and fully fund it again, because Russia is stepping into its place.
Russia has reportedly invested over $1 billion into ongoing disinformation campaigns aimed at diminishing western support for Ukraine, while recent events such as the 2024 Southport attacks and the summer race riots were both amplified by foreign interference. Of course, we now know that one of those recent investments was over £40,000 in bribes to the former leader of Reform in Wales, Nathan Gill, who is now spending more than 10 years in jail. We know through recent reports that at least eight other members of that party have made pro-Russia statements.
That is able to happen because of a fragmented institutional response from the Government. Their time- frames for handling disinformation are painfully slow. Each recent regulatory advance, such as the Online Safety Act, which the SNP does welcome, relies on reactive content takedowns that cannot match the speed at which hostile actors manipulate and spread disinformation. As was mentioned, the strategic defence review identified disinformation as a new top-tier threat across the UK, but there is still no single entity fully accountable for national cognitive security.
My first question is simply this: now that the threat has been identified—in fact, the evidence is overwhelming —what tangible steps are the Government taking to implement the shift from reactive responses to sustained strategic resilience? Will the establishment of a national disinformation agency be considered to enable a whole-of-society institutional response?
Furthermore, Russia has rightly been placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, yet China, despite clearly meeting the criteria, has not and remains on the lower “political influence tier”, along with most other countries. I am pleased to hear that more voices from across the House are starting to raise this issue, because the UK Government are clearly not currently budging. Shockingly, Members of this House have been sanctioned and spied on—I consider myself, among others, to have been spied on in that process. When that was exposed, we were not defended by the Government of the day or, indeed, by the Government currently in place. It was the Speakers of this House and the other House who banned Chinese diplomats and the ambassador from coming into Parliament.
“using his position of influence to promote…the spreading of disinformation and pro-Russian narratives which support Russia’s actions in Ukraine.”
Let us remember that Nathan Gill even hosted Oleg Voloshyn and oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk in the European Parliament, supposedly to talk about free speech in Ukraine. Medvedchuk is known in Ukraine as “the grey cardinal”, in a nod to his low profile and closeness to the Kremlin, and Vladimir Putin is the godfather of Medvedchuk’s daughter. Let us also remember that Medvedchuk flew to Moscow the day after his meeting with Gill to boast, in a one-to-one meeting with Putin himself, about the extent of Russia’s influence operation among western politicians, and that the Medvedchuk-Putin meeting was then broadcast on Russian television.
Medvedchuk and Voloshyn’s work was a clear influence operation to spread Kremlin narratives, undermine western support for Ukraine and subvert our democracy by paying a British politician to parrot their lines. Gill, Voloshyn, Medvedchuk, Putin—there is a straight line from a former Reform UK politician to the Kremlin. Putin’s coterie of cronies is exploiting our democracy, using useful idiots along the way to amplify its messages and undermine our institutions, yet Reform has the audacity to claim to be the party for patriots. It is nothing of the sort.
On lobbying, our regime is desperately in need of reform. Nothing shows the need for urgency more severely than the recent scandal involving an undercover reporter from Democracy for Sale posing as a Chinese AI investor, who gained access to political events, MPs and decision makers with seemingly no meaningful checks. The reporter was not who he claimed to be, yet he got far too close to the heart of our democracy. This should be the final warning that we need mandatory transparency for all lobbying activity; stronger revolving-door rules, so that privileged access cannot be immediately turned into private profit; and a modern foreign influence registration scheme that brings covert activity into the daylight, including activity linked to China.
The anti-corruption strategy confirms that the Government will keep the transparency of lobbying under review, including considering recommendations from the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee. That work must lead to concrete reform, not another cycle of scandal and regret. Influence without transparency is a security vulnerability. As the fake AI investor case shows, hostile states can exploit vulnerabilities that we leave open.
On political donations, the Government’s July elections policy statement set out important measures to limit foreign interference. That work is welcome, but we must go further. As a former financial crime compliance officer, let me be crystal clear: we should ban cryptocurrency donations outright. Crypto is the perfect vehicle for covert foreign funding—fast, opaque and hard to trace. In my mind, there is no democratic justification for allowing it. It is a solution in search of a problem. There is only one reason why political parties would encourage donations in crypto: to conceal their origin.
I refer Members to recent reporting that Reform UK—I notice it is unrepresented in the Chamber today—became the first party to start taking such donations. I have recently returned from a visit to Montenegro with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Our focus has been on looking at misinformation and disinformation, and how it is spread like a cancer by those who wish to undermine our institutions. While there, several local politicians and officials raised with me their concerns about British national George Cottrell, a well-known figure in the crypto world. Back in 2016, Cottrell was indicted in the US on 21 counts for crimes including money laundering, fraud and blackmail. He served eight months in prison for wire fraud after being caught in an FBI sting offering his services to undercover agents posing as drug traffickers. He is currently being investigated for his tax affairs by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. He was once described by the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) as being “like a son”.
Cottrell’s unlimited company, Geostrategy International, pumps out dubious polling and Reform UK talking points, but it does not file accounts or publish its clients. It is not a member of the relevant trade body and so is not signed up to the polling industry’s ethical codes. It claims to have offices in London, Montenegro, Switzerland and the US, where it is registered in the secrecy jurisdiction of Delaware. Companies with such little transparency should simply not be able to flood money into our politics, yet they seemingly could do so at the drop of a hat. Given that Cottrell has been accused of illegally financing a political party in Montenegro—accusations that he denies—I am deeply concerned about his proximity to Members of this House. It is a great shame that the hon. Member for Clacton is not here to explain the conduct of his right-hand man.
It is clear to me that Reform wants nothing more than to strip back the vital safeguards protecting our democracy from the long hand of dictators such as Vladimir Putin. Let us not forget, as has been mentioned, how the hon. Member for Clacton described Putin as a man whom he “admires”. That is one of many reasons why we need to ensure that the forthcoming elections Bill guarantees the independence of the Electoral Commission. If we are to have a genuinely independent electoral regulator, we need the commission to be free from ministerial direction, free from political pressure and properly resourced.
It was Boris Johnson’s Conservative Government that stripped the Electoral Commission of its independence in the Elections Act 2022. That followed the commission’s investigation into Johnson’s Downing Street refurbishment, its fining of the “Vote Leave” campaign for breaking spending limits in the run-up to the 2016 referendum, and a number of donation scandals involving Russian-linked individuals.
Political financing is a cross-party issue, but it should be this Labour Government who restore Electoral Commission independence, ensuring it can fulfil its obligations in the service of the British people. Across Europe, we are seeing active attempts by hostile states to manipulate elections. Britain must not be complacent. We must build a system that is resilient, transparent and modern. Foreign interference succeeds only where democracies are asleep at the wheel. Britain cannot afford to be one of them.
The upcoming elections Bill will be critical in addressing the dodgy influence of foreign money in UK politics, not least via cryptocurrency, on which I agree with the hon. Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell). Reform UK is the first British political party to accept donations in crypto, despite UK National Crime Agency investigators recently saying that cryptocurrency has turbocharged money laundering. The NCA also points out that the cryptocurrency backed by the Reform donor is used for the Russian war effort. Reform UK’s record £9 million crypto donation is just the latest offering from abroad. Last Sunday, The Observer reported that two thirds of the funds given to that organisation in this Parliament have come from donors with overseas interests.
That demonstrates why it is so urgent that the forthcoming elections Bill is robust in stopping dirty money. We have not yet seen the Bill, but as well as urgent controls to prevent big overseas donations, the Bill must, among other things, streamline national versus local spending limits with a per-seat cap on total spending, have a limit on major donations, give the Electoral Commission the power to prosecute and reinstate its independence. It is also crucial that we have rules requiring the submission of all online and offline advertisements to the Electoral Commission as soon as they are published, with data on who has sponsored the ad readily available to the public. As things stand, we get only partial transparency after an election has happened. That is too late.
Today’s debate is crucial. As we have heard, it has many strands: the impact of foreign interference on security, trade and our democracy. I reiterate the critical point that defending our democracy must mean the UK Government finally investigating Russian interference in our elections. Not to do so is effectively to send a message of permission, and that is intolerable. The stakes could not be higher. I urge the Minister to tell us when we will get the long-overdue Mueller-style inquiry into Kremlin-linked interference in our democracy.
China’s activities are eclipsed perhaps only by Russia’s. Vladimir Putin may be the President of Russia and perhaps the richest man in the world, based on hidden wealth, but above all, he remains the jilted KGB man from St Petersburg who has never accepted the break-up of the Soviet empire. In an eerie parallel with Adolf Hitler’s psychological response to the humiliation of Versailles, Putin has made it his life’s mission to restore Russia’s standing on the world stage. It is his doctrine to restore Russia’s borders to those of the Soviet Union and the Tsarist empire, as was evident from Russia’s invasion of Georgia in the first decade of this century, and from the invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
More recently, in Hungary, Moldova and Romania, we have seen clear examples of Russian interference in democratic activity. Most recently, the sabotage of railways in Poland shows Russia’s willingness to engage directly in interference in the critical infrastructure of countries. We have seen similar threats in this country. All of this activity comes straight out of the KGB playbook; it is a means of escalating intimidation intended to destabilise other states. The same is true of its attempts to interfere in our democracy.
Russia is constantly looking for useful idiots. Sometimes those are petty criminals and thugs like Dylan Earl, who burned down a warehouse in east London containing goods for Ukraine; sometimes it is suited criminals whose interest in money or power is greater than their loyalty to their political party or country, like Nathan Gill. The relationship between senior Reform politicians and Russia is of particular concern. The hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage)—I notified him that I would mention him this afternoon—initially denied any connection to Nathan Gill’s handlers, yet photographic evidence shows him consorting with the wife of Oleg Voloshyn.
Under the previous Conservative Government, there were commitments to tackle the flow of Russian money into London, but there was little action. I am sure that there is no connection, but at the same time, Russians in the UK were close to the Conservative party and provided it with funding during the previous Parliament. To their credit, a number of Conservative Members expressed concerns, yet those funds still supported Conservative elections, and the regulatory tightening did not take place. Perhaps these were wealthy Russians with strong Conservative values; if they were, then judging by the holiday companions of the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice), whom I have also notified, Russians like Lubov Chernukhin have switched allegiance, and are now entertaining the hon. Gentleman in their French Riviera châteaux instead of paying for tennis matches with the former leader of the Conservative party.
We must have more scrutiny of Russian money in British politics, but sadly, Russia is not the only declining superpower that wants to meddle in UK politics. Last Thursday, Trump’s national security strategy was published. There is much that we should worry about in that document, as many Members articulated earlier today during the urgent question, but the most arresting statement is the claim that the US Administration will cultivate
“resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”.
The Trump White House declares itself to be isolationist, and interested in the affairs of other countries only in so far as they affect America, yet for the UK and the EU, it makes a special exception. Let us be clear: this means that the Trump White House intends to meddle in the domestic politics of European nations, including the UK. We should not stand for this, just as we would not stand for it from Russia or China.
Just because the President is unhinged, it does not mean that he and his entourage are not a threat. There is a toxic set of anti-democratic forces around the President today who have ambitions every bit as imperial as Vladimir Putin, and the vice-president is the cheerleader-in-chief. Vested interests around Trump intend to meddle in our politics, urging him to use US national influence to bully the UK into serving its commercial interests, even when that would harm children here. They want to export to the UK the same toxic, violent and divisive politics that are doing such damage to America, and we should stand against that.
We see Elon Musk funding the legal bills of a convicted criminal. We see Donald Trump sustaining lies about safety on the streets of our capital city, and making racist attacks on its mayor. We see James Orr, who has been described by J.D. Vance as a national conservative sherpa, joining Reform UK and providing a bridge for funding between the UK and the US. Other Reform UK advisers have complex corporate directorships that could mask donations from US entities that would corrupt British politics.
These external threats are compounded by the perhaps more insidious political forces in our country that are enabling them. The hon. Member for Clacton blames the small boats on what he may call foreign courts, even though it was his irresponsible devil-may-care approach to Brexit that tore up partnerships that helped UK immigration authorities to exchange data and work together to prevent people trafficking. Meanwhile, Zack Polanski wants to take the UK out of NATO at the most fragile moment in European security since the early 1980s. Nothing would make Vladimir Putin happier.
I ask the Minister to respond to a series of opportunities. To address China’s threat, will the Government state some red lines, and say that they will have no tolerance of extraterritorial intimidation of UK residents? Will they further sanction Chinese Communist party officials involved in bounty hunting, and will they finally place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? To protect Russia from interfering in our politics, will they launch an investigation into Russian interference in the UK, following up on the ISC’s Russia report? Will they commit, given that the leader of Reform will not, to investigating Reform’s links to Russian money?
On wider reforms, will the Government commit, through the new elections Bill, to clamping down on excessive financial flows into British politics and tackle shell corporate structures, which are intended to shield those donations? Will they ensure scrutiny of access to Parliament through all-party parliamentary groups on dedicated countries, and other groups that allow people to come into Parliament under the guise of support for various issues? Will they regulate financial flows into the UK and its political parties from overseas and from Crown territories and dependencies?
Finally, in the light of the US’s recent outrageous statement, will the Government commit to an urgent review of the national security strategy and the strategic defence review to ensure that both can protect us from the stated goal of US interference in our politics?
“a crisis of public confidence and fuelled allegations of conspiracy at the highest levels of government.”
The Committee exposed gaps in communication, process and backbone at the heart of our Government. The implications for our national security are profound.
We come to the frankly extraordinary saga of the Chinese super-embassy at the Royal Mint Court. Tower Hamlets council rejected the plans on entirely legitimate grounds, yet unlike the previous Conservative Government, this Government chose to call in the application and seem determined to approve it. That is despite warnings from MI5, which is concerned about the site’s proximity to major communications cables. When that is paired with the fact that the embassy blueprint submitted to the council has basement rooms blanked out for security reasons, it raises serious questions. At a moment when China is increasing its activities against Britain, the Government should not be supporting this; instead, they should be firmly defending our national security and critical infrastructure.
I come to Russia. Though this threat is sadly more familiar to us, it is no less serious. The Intelligence and Security Committee described Russian interference as “the new normal”, and that should be a constant consideration for British security. It uses a combination of cyber-attacks, disinformation, covert influence and grey-zone and sub-threshold operations to attempt to destabilise western democracies and test our resilience. We saw that recently, when the Yantar vessel intentionally positioned itself near undersea cables and energy infrastructure and aimed lasers at RAF planes. Such provocations are designed not only to intimidate us, but to test how we respond.
Beyond those actions—the actions we are supposed to see—the Intelligence and Security Committee also notes that the business interests and financial activities of Russian oligarchs in the UK continue to provide opportunities for influence that must be robustly guarded against. That is why my party brought in the National Security and Investment Act 2021 and strengthened sanctioning powers. That has certainly improved our resilience, but the Kremlin’s methods are adaptive, and we must remain vigilant.
The threat from Iran is also increasing, and stems from an ideological opposition. That requires a tailored approach—one that does not allow Iran to be overlooked —in the context of wider disruption outside the middle east. MI5 has confirmed that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots were identified in the last two years alone, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, operating both at home and abroad, has demonstrated a willingness to target perceived opponents on British soil.
The Intelligence and Security Committee’s recent report on Iran highlights the extent of the challenges, which include, but are not limited to, a nuclear programme inching closer to capability, sophisticated espionage networks, credible kidnap and repatriation schemes, and a pattern of operations that disregards international standards. Despite the recent success of Israel in degrading the capabilities of Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, we must continue to confront the reality that Iran is an acute threat with its own global networks and its own methods of exerting pressure on Britain.
North Korea is often overlooked in debates about our national security, yet it poses a significant and evolving threat. Its cyber-activities go beyond the attack on NHS systems in 2017 and extend to attempts to access contract specifications, design drawings and project details from defence, aerospace, nuclear and engineering entities, as well as from medical and energy companies. Pyongyang’s covert digital operations have been used to distort public perceptions abroad, and to influence narratives in ways that serve its own interest. The regime has sought to deepen military links with other authoritarian states, complicating the broader strategic landscape, and its involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine is well documented. North Korea operates largely outside international norms. It is driven by secrecy and control, and is willing to exploit vulnerabilities wherever they arise.
We have heard some excellent contributions from across the House. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) for his excellent contribution and the concerns that he raised about the SNP Government in Edinburgh.
We should not underestimate the severity of the threats posed to this country by the likes of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Will the Minister outline the work that the Cabinet Office is doing with other relevant Departments to protect and enhance our national security? Will he pledge to build on the work of the last Government, who introduced measures such as the Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which provided powers to stop, question, search and detain people entering and exiting the UK to determine whether they had been engaged in hostile state activity?
As mentioned, the National Security and Investment Act introduced powers to investigate and intervene in company mergers, acquisitions and other deals that could threaten the UK’s national security. Other measures included the defending democracy taskforce, which aims
“to protect the democratic integrity of the UK from threats of foreign interference”;
the Elections Act 2022, which tightens rules to prevent foreign money from influencing UK elections; the National Security Act 2023, which introduced new offences relating to foreign interference and the foreign influence registration scheme; and finally the Procurement Act 2023, which introduced enhanced powers for public bodies to exclude suppliers from procurement on national security grounds.
I am grateful to have had the opportunity to contribute to the debate. Defence of the realm, and therefore national security, is the No. 1 priority of any Government. While we will continue to debate and scrutinise the detail, it is something that unites us all. His Majesty’s official Opposition will continue to work with the Government to ensure that we keep British people safe at home and abroad, and that we protect the United Kingdom from those who wish to harm us.
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) expressed her concern about Reform and sought to clarify her party’s position on NATO membership—although I confess that I am still a bit confused about whether the Greens are in or out. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), spoke about the threats from China and Russia. He raised a number of entirely reasonable and constructive points. I hope that he will understand that I simply do not have the time to address them all today, but I can assure him of the seriousness with which we take them, and of our absolute commitment to working with him and Members across the House to address them.
Finally, I warmly welcome the hon. Member for Bridlington and The Wolds (Charlie Dewhirst), in what was a very assured debut at the Dispatch Box; no doubt we will be seeing much more of him in that position. He will not be surprised to hear that I did not quite agree with his assessment of the collapse of the recent China trial, but let me say something about the point he made with regard to the embassy. As Members will know, I have to be incredibly careful about what I say, because there is a quasi-judicial process under way, but should the embassy be approved—and that is very much a decision for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government—it will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic footprint. That is one to ponder on further, I think.
To conclude, the threat from foreign interference touches on almost every part of our national life, and this Government are steadfast in their commitment to disrupting these threats while also ensuring that those at the greatest risk are able to recognise, resist and report suspicious activity. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 and the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce to our focused efforts against disinformation, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a harder target.
This Government’s clear commitment to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges; they are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt, deter and defeat foreign interference, protect our national security and keep the public safe—nothing matters more.