Football Governance Bill [HL]

Committee (4th Day) (Continued)

Clause 7: The IFR’s general duties etc

Amendment 67A

67A: Clause 7, page 5, line 26, at end insert— “(d) differential impact on regulated clubs participating in, or seeking to qualify for, competitions organised by international football bodies.”

My Lords, Amendment 67A in my name addresses a critical oversight in the Bill. It is intended to properly recognise the clearly differential impact of regulation on certain clubs, specifically those participating in or seeking to qualify for competitions organised by international governing bodies. This amendment is essential to ensuring that the unique challenges faced by Premier League clubs, especially in the context of UEFA and FIFA, are properly understood and accounted for.

I begin with the elephant in the room: UEFA’s refusal to endorse this regulatory regime. We know that UEFA has explicitly raised objections to the Bill’s provisions, warning that mandatory redistributions and other aspects of state interference risk breaching its rules on the autonomy of sport. This is no small matter. UEFA and FIFA hold significant leverage over clubs competing in their competitions, and they have made it clear that this leverage could be exercised if the Bill’s provisions conflict with their frameworks. Premier League clubs that qualify for European competition—clubs that have spent years building their competitiveness and investing in their success—are now being placed in an unenviable and unique position. They face the very real risk that this regulatory framework could put them in conflict with UEFA and FIFA, creating ongoing uncertainty and jeopardising their ability to compete on the European stage.

The consequences of such a conflict are potentially catastrophic, not just for the clubs involved, although it affects them uniquely, but for the reputation and stability of English football as a whole. The differential impact of the Bill in this respect is stark. Premier League clubs, particularly those involved in UEFA competitions, are the only entities at risk of disqualification due to regulatory conflicts. They are also the only clubs that must navigate both domestic regulation and the additional compliance burdens imposed by UEFA licensing. This small class of clubs is being asked to shoulder very specific, disproportionate burdens and risks that directly affect their operations, financial stability and competitive standing. Let us not forget that these clubs are the financial engine of the football pyramid. They generate billions in revenue, attract international investment and support grass-roots football through solidarity payments. Yet the Bill places them in a uniquely precarious position, where their ability to operate and succeed could be undermined by regulatory uncertainty and conflict with international governing bodies.

My Lords, I want briefly to support my noble friend’s comments and amendment. We have already set out our concerns about UEFA and FIFA’s objections. The Minister has suggested that our concerns are somewhat misplaced. Given the comments that have just been made, our concerns have unfortunately not been allayed. The fundamental issue is that, rightly or wrongly, the letter from UEFA and FIFA was in the papers; we have seen concerns that were raised.

Unfortunately, for whatever reason, the Minister has not been able to fully explain to the Committee exactly what has been said. She said that constructive conversations have happened. That is great news and we are all pleased to hear it but, up to this point, she has not been able to give us any detail to match the concerns that we have seen in this letter. Does she feel able today to give us a bit more detail and some categorical examples of where FIFA and UEFA have said that they are now happy with the Government’s position and happy with the Bill as it is? We could balance that with what we have seen in the papers and the press from the letter, and what we have heard in some—I am sure—well-intentioned comments from the Minister about what has been said, but with nothing tangible to back it up.

Does she have any correspondence with UEFA or FIFA, or any more tangible evidence that she can give us, to help us with the words she has been saying, which, I am sure, reflect conversations she may have had in meetings? This would give us some more tangible evidence that the issues that my noble friend has raised will not come to pass. Until we have that, we will have to return to this and, I am afraid, press the Minister for any more information she can give us.

My Lords, as the noble Baroness just said, could we have the answer tonight as to what the state of play actually is? If we get some assurance that, “Providing we do not do X and Y, which we hope is not the intention of the Bill, we are fine”, then this will get put to bed. If the Minister can see some way of assuring us, even if it had to be on Chatham House terms or something, that would help, because we do not want there to be a problem. If we can get that assurance out there, this issue will go away. Let us face facts: it just would not exist.

We want there to be a competition. Presumably, Europe wants the Premier League there. The reason why we have this Bill is about Europe. It was because of fans protesting that they were going to lose their competition and their traditions to Europe, and politicians saying, “We’ll intervene”, which most people agreed with. If we can get an assurance that there is something solid that means we would have to do something radically different to turn this bad scenario into a living nightmare, that is fine. We cannot guarantee the future; we can deal only with the Bill in front of us. If the Minister can give us those assurances she will have my full support.

My Lords, over the weekend, I and colleagues from across the Committee wrote to the Minister and sought to be very specific about the points that have just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and my noble friend Lady Brady. It would be helpful to the Committee—I mentioned this to the Minister this morning too—to put on record the specific concerns that could lead to differences of opinion between the two regulatory frameworks: the regulatory framework we are seeking to put into legislation and the regulatory framework that already exists within UEFA and in FIFA. Indeed, if the answer to all the points that I will raise is that there is no conflict, the Committee will be satisfied and so will I.

I would be grateful if we could have specific clarification on UEFA and FIFA’s position concerning the regulatory powers contained in the legislation. Given the extensive scope of the Bill’s powers and their potential impact on clubs and national teams participating in UEFA or FIFA competitions, I would be grateful if the Government could confirm whether UEFA and FIFA have been consulted on each of the following categories of powers: whether UEFA has specifically approved the proposed regulatory framework, particularly the revenue distribution backstop powers; the licensing framework and powers; the IFR’s independence; the IFR’s accountability mechanisms; the Secretary of State’s broad-ranging powers; the delegated powers; the financial oversight mechanisms; and the interaction between IFR rules and UEFA/FIFA regulations. If there are any areas where UEFA or FIFA has or will, in response to this request, express reservations or express modifications then I would be grateful if the Committee could be informed.

Have the Government commissioned expert legal advice on these issues? How has this impacted on the design of the legislation? How will potential conflicts between UEFA/FIFA regulations and these various powers be resolved, especially regarding revenue distribution arrangements, competition participation rules, financial monitoring requirements, the licensing system, and the extensive rule-making powers granted to the IFR? This clarification is essential for ensuring the smooth implementation of the new regulatory framework and avoiding any potential conflicts with existing football governance structures.

The Secretary of State’s powers identified in the Bill are: the power to specify competition subject to regulation, in Clause 2(3); the power to provide financial assistance to the IFR, in paragraph 36 of Schedule 2; the power to publish football governance statements, in Clause 11; the power to issue guidance to the IFR about the exercise of its functions, in Clause 13; the power to make regulations amending thresholds for ownership tests, in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1; the power to amend bodies to which the IFR can disclose information, in Clause 86(6); the power to make regulations about public authority information disclosure, in Clause 87(4); the power to make consequential amendments to legislation, in Clause 97; the power to extend provisions to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, in Clause 98; and the power to determine the IFR board’s remuneration, in Schedule 2.

I may not have covered all the IFR licensing powers, but I have gone through the Bill and the first is the power to grant, refuse or revoke operating licences, in Clauses 15 to 19, which will have a big impact on UEFA; the power to attach mandatory and discretionary licence conditions, which are unspecified, in Clauses 20 to 25; and the powers to specify conditions relating to financial resources, non-financial resources and fan engagement.

Then there are the IFR ownership and officer powers: the powers to determine the suitability of club owners and officers, in Clauses 27 to 32; the power to issue disqualification orders against unsuitable owners and officers, in Clause 38; the power to direct the removal of unsuitable owners or officers, in Clauses 39 to 40; the power to make ownership removal orders, in Clause 43; and the power to appoint replacement officers in certain circumstances, in Clause 42.

On the IFR financial and revenue powers, which again seem to stand in potential conflict with UEFA, there are: the power to require financial plans and corporate governance statements that differ from UEFA’s; the power to impose financial penalties for non-compliance; and the power to require the payment of the regulatory levy by a licensed club, in Clause 53.

There are the IFR revenue distribution backstop powers: the power to trigger mediation between competition organisers, in Clauses 57 to 60; the power to make binding distribution orders if mediation fails, in Clause 62; the power to specify the duration and revocation of distribution orders, in Clause 63; and the power to review and enforce compliance with distribution orders, in Clause 64.

There are heritage protection powers: the power to approve or refuse the relocation of club grounds, in Clause 48; the power to protect club names, crests and colours, in Clause 49; and the power to specify prohibited competitions, in Clause 45.

The IFR investigatory and enforcement powers are in the Bill: the power to require information from clubs and relevant persons; the power to appoint expert reporters to investigate clubs; the power to conduct investigations into potential infractions; the power to issue urgent decisions; and the power to impose sanctions, including financial penalties.

The key powers delegated to the Secretary of State are clearly matters that can potentially conflict with UEFA’s current rules and regulations, such as the definition powers: the power to define “specified competitions” that fall under regulation; the power to amend the definition of “serious criminal conduct”; the power to amend the definition of “season”; powers to make supplementary rules on any aspect of the Act; and the power to make rules about fan consultation requirements.