8A: Clause 24, page 38, line 23, leave out “aligning with” and insert “having regard to”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment to Clause 24, page 39, line 2, in the name of Viscount Trenchard, amends the role of international standards in relation to the growth and competitiveness objective.
My Lords, Amendments 8A and 8B were originally tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. In moving Amendment 8A, I remind your Lordships of the interesting debate on this matter in Committee on 1 February. I repeat that we are, in many fields, especially financial services, a leader in the formulation of international standards and best practice. The FCA says on its website:
“We contribute to and implement international standards, and supervise and enforce rules based on them in the UK”.
I believe that the UK’s influence in IOSCO, the recognised standard setter for securities regulation, has been enhanced now that we sit at the table in our own right, rather than as a member state of the EU. The same is surely true with regard to our influence within the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
I support the new competitiveness and growth objective—although I think it should have been of equal importance with the regulators’ primary and operational objectives—but I continue to believe that it is rather curiously drafted. I am still not sure what the Government mean by
“aligning with relevant international standards”.
First, the word “relevant” is very subjective. We all know that there is often a lack of consistency as to what different people consider relevant. I already worry that the competitiveness and growth objective will be subjugated to the primary objectives, depending on which standards the regulators may choose to exempt them from the need to have regard to.
Secondly, surely the amendment is drafted in a way that gives too much weight to policies developed outside the UK, which are claimed by some to be international standards. Does my noble friend want to see a position where the PRA, for example, can ignore the secondary objective on the grounds that it is following international standards, where those standards are not core to the primary objective? International standards are a highly subjective concept and it is not at all desirable for the UK to have to adhere to everything that claims to be an international standard. The competitiveness and growth objective is already circumscribed by its status as a secondary objective. Using the PRA as an example, this means that it has only to,
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Besides, it is not easy to define what is an international standard. As my noble friend said in Committee, the Basel capital standards have not always been followed universally—most notably by the United States, which pursued its own course for a considerable period. International standards are not matters of international law. Their implementation is always a matter of judgment for the home regulators, and therefore needs to be considered in the judgments they make on their primary objective.
My noble friend the Minister’s response on this matter in Committee was, I fear, a little disappointing, although she acknowledged that nuances of the UK market mean that the international standard is not appropriate. She added that it may be best for UK markets to go beyond the international standard. It is quite possible that I missed it, but I do not think my noble friend acknowledged that it is a largely subjective consideration as to what is relevant, and it is certainly subjective and lacking in clarity as to what international standards are.
I ask my noble friend whether she can at least bring back a definition for Third Reading if she does not consider that my amendment offers a reasonable solution, for “having regard to” is a lot less onerous than requiring “alignment with”. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 9 is similar to one I tabled in Committee and is intended to focus the secondary objective on the advancement of the UK economy through fair and efficient operation of financial markets.
It still concerns me that the Government’s wording can be interpreted as more about general profitability of financial services, rather than the positive nature of their operation on the economy. We got into a bit of a tangle about this in Committee when the Minister focused on how financial services made money out of clients. I hope the Minister can now appreciate the nuance and at least confirm that the primary intention of the secondary objective is benefit to the economy that is served by financial services, and not maximum income generation from financial services to the extent that it is of detriment to the economy.
A great deal of attention has gone into asking what regulatory issues have risked competitiveness. A key example is how the London market lost out in new insurance products when the regulator was too slow. Criticism has been levied about delays in SMCR approval of new staff. My Amendment 115 concerns an alarming example of harm to the economy and proposes a solution through a specific legislative amendment. It aims to fix a competitiveness and investment issue with listed closed-ended investment funds. As such, I declare my interests as both a director of the London Stock Exchange plc and a director of Valloop Holdings Ltd, which has potential interest in such listings.
For the last 14 months, a dire situation has been seriously affecting the UK economy and should have been resolved but has not. It has its origins in a face-value interpretation of an EU regulation that is part of the MiFID family, relating to how ongoing charges should be presented in collective investment schemes that invest in other funds and a desire to create a consistent cost disclosure framework in a somewhat inconsistent EU framework.
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I would dearly like the Government just to do this now or suggest that the FCA gives immediate interim guidance. It is an emergency. It should not need months and months of consultation. It is going back to what worked for years. Quick fixes are one of the things that Brexit is meant for but, instead, we are ruining ourselves for want of flexibility and action. If we cannot do regulatory repairs like this quickly, I do not see any point in a competitiveness objective. This issue shows a monumental lack of awareness from the Government and the FCA about the sharp end in the real economy. A dire problem has been left festering.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 10 and 112 in my name; I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. This is a bit of a diverse group, but Amendment 10 in particular heads in a similar direction to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted—a direction that seeks to lead towards a financial sector that meets the needs of the real economy rather than swallowing up the scarce human and capital resources that could be used to far better effect than creating complex financial instruments that, when they go down, threaten to take the rest of us with them.
Had it not been for events between Committee and Report, I might have chosen to sign the noble Baroness’s amendment instead of tabling my Amendment 10, which states that Clause 24—the growth and competitiveness clause to which the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred—should not be deleted from the Bill. It mirrors exactly the amendment tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, signed then by myself. However, in the light of events, I thought it really important that we tackle the “growth at any cost” foundation that underlies Clause 24: “Growth is infinite; let’s chase as much growth as we can”—which is, of course, the ideology of the cancer cell.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said:
“The secondary objectives of growth and competitiveness cannot be reconciled with the main role of ensuring financial stability and consumer protection”.—[Official Report, 1/2/23; col. GC 242.]
This is a position that we both hold. However, it was clear in Committee that there was no support from the Front Benches, and the issue might have been allowed to lapse. But then there were events that highlighted the many dangers of chasing growth in the financial sector. After several weekends of financial panic, emergency meetings and sudden bank rescues, parts of the real economy—in particular, the digital sector—were left highly uncertain of their financing. I am referring, of course, to the collapse and rescue of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse and Signature Bank, the first and last of those being mid-sized US banks and the middle one being a former European banking colossus.
My Lords, I will address the amendments proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. In some way, they are part of the whole privileging of the competitiveness objective, but I do not want to talk about that. I will talk specifically about his concern about aligning with international standards.
I suggest that the success of the development of international financial markets since the 1970s has been predicated entirely on the development of an international regulatory system. It was first stimulated by the Herstatt Bank crisis in the summer of 1974, which led to the establishment of the Basel committee on settlement risk. Since then, we have developed a whole international financial infrastructure of regulation—the Basel committees, IOSCO and, most importantly today, the Financial Stability Board. That, by the way, was a British idea that has greatly aided the stabilising of international financial markets.
These committees, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, pointed out, are not part of any form of international law or treaty. They are what is known in the trade as “soft law”. They are laws that countries agree it is in their mutual benefit to align with, and failing to align is against the benefit of individual countries as well as of the system as a whole. It has been the judgment of His Majesty’s Government that it is in the best interests of the United Kingdom to align with international standards.
But there are other international standards with which we align. Take the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force. Would the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, suggest that we do not align with the international anti-money laundering police? It is essential that we agree to align with this framework of international financial regulation, which we have been such an important element in creating.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I want to correct him for criticising me for opposing all international standards. The ones he has chosen to mention are not ones that I objected to specifically. I was just saying that in general international standards are not defined.
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“so far as reasonably possible, act in a way which … advances the competitiveness and growth objective”.
If the PRA considers that adherence to certain international standards is necessary, they are already covered by its primary objective. However, if an international standard is not necessary for the primary objective, why should such an international standard crowd out the competitiveness and growth objective?
As part of reviewing what should be included in cost redisclosures, the FCA asked the Investment Association —the principal trade body for the asset management industry in the UK—to provide new guidance. That guidance now requires that when a fund holds shares in listed closed-ended investment funds—also known as investment trusts—it should aggregate with the investing fund’s own charges all the underlying running costs that are incurred within the investment trust, including the listing and corporate costs, in the same way as it would were it to hold units in an unlisted open-ended fund. The IA took this line because the investment trust is regarded as a collective investment undertaking, and the EU regulation refers to collective investment undertakings.
At first sight, the cost disclosure might look reasonable, but it ignores the nature of investment trusts, which have publicly traded shares with a price set by the market: an investment trust is essentially like any other publicly traded company from an investment perspective. If a fund invests in the ordinary shares of a listed commercial company, the internal costs of that commercial company do not have to be shown in aggregated charges. For both listed commercial companies and listed investment trust companies, everyday running costs are disclosed in accounts, reflected in profit and ultimately in the share price, which embodies investors’ assessment of the company, including its underlying costs. However, the IA guidance instead equates investment trusts with open-ended funds, requiring internal running costs incurred at the investee investment trust level to be aggregated as a cost, setting aside the fact that, unlike with units of open-ended funds, investors have already factored such charges into the price that they are prepared to pay for the shares of the investment. Thus, for example, directors’ fees of an investment trust aggregate as an ongoing charge of the investing fund; the directors’ fees of a commercial company that is similarly invested in do not have to be aggregated. Likewise, various other corporate costs receive dissimilar treatment.
Therefore, that is an unfairness, but why does it matter beyond being anti-competitive, as if that is not enough? It matters because those corporate costs being in effect almost duplicated and put under the headline of “ongoing charges” suddenly elevated the ongoing charges of the fund investing into the investment trust, sometimes to levels where they hit cost ceilings put in place by various pension funds and other collective investment funds, or simply made fund managers cringe when the headline of accumulated charges suddenly looked more expensive and people started to think that they were doing something wrong. Hence, there became a disincentive to invest in investment trusts to avoid these unexpected changes, questions about them or hitting cost ceilings. A great deal of investment choice follows the headline and not deeper analysis, which separates and explains the varying nature of costs.
To make the point again, an ordinary listed commercial company, such as SEGRO plc, which invests in property, might now be deemed investable while the exact same property investments with the exact same costs, held for example by the investment trust Tritax Big Box fund, might be deemed not investable because one does not have to have its corporate costs regarded as ongoing charges and the other does.
I do not think it is a coincidence that, since the new guidance, there has been no real asset IPO and just a couple of small equity IPOs of investment trusts. At a stroke, something that has at times been regarded as a jewel in the London funding ecosystem—an expanding sector of listed funds investing into long term illiquid alternative assets such as renewable energy and other infrastructure—has been abandoned.
I just gave an example of two companies investing in property, with no intention to impugn either, but there are some sectors of the economy where using an investment trust to raise funds is the only route to capital—notably for new and innovative business in the environmental and social sectors: businesses such as HydrogenOne, which is leading investment into UK’s alternative energy, directly linked with our net-zero commitments.
It is also the case that investment trust exposures are typically more diversified and real than exposures via commercial corporates, which investors appreciate but now cannot access as they have been dropped from portfolios. This is a real loss to the UK economy that has been going on for 14 months. We have all read the news about companies switching listing from London for valuation reasons—and that is another story—but here it is not switching, it is simply regulatory asphyxiation.
Both the FCA and the Investment Association know and understand the problem. The IA thinks it should be fixed and has publicly written about it to the FCA. On the face of it, given that inherited EU legislation is the mix, I think it is more up to government and the FCA to fix it than the IA, even though it came up with the guidance. In any event, you go up the power chain to fix a disaster. It is also worth noting that there is no actual legislative EU definition of collective investment undertaking, only ESMA guidance, from which the FCA could distance itself, if only for this specific purpose.
The Government have been informed of this issue and, while dreaming up ways to help more investment in the productive economy is important for the Chancellor, all he has to do here is stop this extinction event. It is not about undermining transparency; it is about understanding what is and is not like-for-like. There are those who have been getting around it in some EU countries by saying that for cost disclosure purposes, an investment trust is a company not a fund, but investment trusts are not mainstream in EU countries; they use other channels for investment, so the issue is not really pursued.
The UK situation now is that we have essentially just clarified our law using definitions originating in soon-to-be-discarded PRIIPs and non-legislative EU guidance, front-running a wider-reaching FCA review and achieving nothing but harm. My amendment shows one way to fix it by amending the regulation so that all listed companies are treated the same for the assessment of accumulated ongoing charges. Investment trusts would then not be discriminated against by being improperly lumped together with open-ended funds whose value is not set through share price, nor by having a cost label attached, compared with competing commercial companies or funds in other countries, and the UK businesses reliant on the investment trust route could again raise the capital they need.
These US events came after President Trump watered down the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, better known as the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2018, reducing the supervisory oversight of banks with assets between $50 billion and $250 billion; the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to this watering down in his introduction to this group. However, just because someone else is doing the wrong thing and reducing controls and protections, it does not mean that we should chase after and try to compete with them. As David Enrich from the New York Timesput it, this was a
“crisis that has revealed the extent to which the banking industry and other opponents of government oversight have chipped away at the robust regulatory protections that were erected after the 2008 financial meltdown”.
What happened is that competitiveness had been advanced while security was lost and risk increased. A great many people had sleepless weekends as a result of that.
What has also become clear since Committee is how Credit Suisse clients withdrew nearly $69 billion from the bank in the first quarter of this year before its fire sale rescue by UBS in March. Of course, Credit Suisse had been hit by the insolvency of Greensill Capital—something that is rather close to home in your Lordships’ House—and the collapse of family office of Archegos Capital Management, which caused huge trading losses. However, the end came very quickly.
Clearly, in the digital age which SVB helped to fund, financial events can occur at a speed that was unimaginable even in 2007-08. I wonder whether, when wrapping up, any of the Front Benches are prepared to say that they believe that regulators today are truly prepared for the world in which they operate, a world that also faces the risks of other substantial shocks, as we have seen highlighted today with the Russian attack on the Kakhovka dam, geopolitical risks and, of course, environmental risks, since as we speak, Canada is essentially ablaze. That will undoubtably have enormous impacts on the insurance sector.
The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report from April reflects on the challenges posed by the interaction between tighter monetary and financial conditions, and the build-up of vulnerabilities since the global financial crash. It says that:
“The emergence of stress in financial markets complicates the task of central banks at a time when inflationary pressures are proving to be more persistent than anticipated”—
a statement which is particularly true within the UK. There are stresses from the shadow banking sector, the effect of geopolitical tensions on financial fragmentation, the risk of potential capital flow reversals, disruption of cross-border payments, impacts on bank funding costs, profitability and credit provision, and more limited opportunities for international risk diversification. The IMF concludes that there is a need to “Strengthen financial oversight”. This is all referring to events since we were in Committee. That is my case for Amendment 10.
My Amendment 112 is much more modest and addresses in a different way a point that I raised in Committee. I discussed the growing body of literature around too much finance, but in this amendment I am not asking the Government to agree with me on that; I am asking for them to prepare a report to consider the ideal size of the financial sector. What is the Goldilocks range for a financial sector, where we can afford the risks and supply the human resources and it serves the needs of the real economy?
As the House has heard before, I approach this question in the light of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute’s study from 2018, which found that the UK had lost £4.5 trillion over two decades because of its oversized financial sector—£67,500 per person. To bring this right up to the present day, in a study published last week, the global hiring website Climatebase has posted more than 46,000 jobs from over 1,500 organisations in the past two years. Of these, data science and analytics were the hardest to fill, taking an average of nearly four months to fill posts compared with three months for engineering roles.
This brings me back to Amendment 10, which would delete Clause 24. I did not have a chance to speak in Committee, but I suggest that Clause 24 as it stands is internally contradictory. It gives the FCA the duty of facilitating the international competitiveness and medium to long-term growth of the economy of the UK,
“including in particular the financial services sector”.
This clause talks of growing the economy of the UK and growing the financial sector. I posit that those two objectives are mutually contradictory. I refer to a Bank for International Settlements working paper from 2018, Why Does Financial Sector Growth Crowd Out Real Economic Growth? It is actually impossible to promote growth both in the real economy and in the financial sector. It comes back to—probably the easiest part of this to understand—the need to think about human resources. We all know the labour shortages and skills shortages that so many sectors of the UK economy are suffering, and we know that many skills are going into the financial sector when they could be going into other areas.
Tomorrow, your Lordships’ House will debate the report of our Science and Technology Committee titled “Science and Technology Superpower”: More Than a Slogan? I am not asking any Front-Benchers or the Government to agree with the claims that I am making here; what Amendment 112 asks for is a report to look at the evidence, so that the Government and the country can make considered judgments about what size financial sector we both need and can afford.