My Lords, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, the Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes.
241FC: After Clause 71, insert the following new Clause—
“Climate and nature offsets
In Schedule 2 to FSMA 2000 (regulated activities) after paragraph 9 insert—“Climate and nature offsets(9ZA) Selling, or offering or agreeing to sell, climate and nature offsets.””
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, for lending her name to this amendment. I am not at all wedded to the exact wording of it. I would welcome discussions with the Government about approaches to this issue; however, I stress that this is a really important issue that needs regulatory approaches.
Currently, my amendment would add these activities to Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000:
“Selling, or offering or agreeing to sell, climate and nature offsets”.
This would make them regulated activities and enable the setting of minimum standards by the FCA, the regulator. By “off-sets”, I have in mind the voluntary carbon market and the nascent market in biodiversity, where an entity voluntarily seeks to compensate for the greenhouse gas emissions or loss of biodiversity arising from its activities by reporting an equivalent amount of emissions reduction or removal, or biodiversity gains, outside of its boundary that it has purchased through a credit or a financial mechanism.
There are more formal markets, particularly in carbon, where participants are required to participate. These are compliance markets. It is not my intention to focus on those, although there have been incidents in such markets, where there may well also be a need for more oversight. Despite the mandatory nature of the market, there have been examples of fraud and mis-selling. There is a lack of transparency even in these markets.
I return to the voluntary market. By making the trade in climate and nature off-sets a regulated activity, the FCA could make rules setting out principles, standards or regulated guidance that off-sets must then meet. I am not seeking to tie the FCA’s hands by setting out what rules it should make; it is a complex issue. It will need to invest in relevant expertise and be led by evidence, but it does need to invest in that expertise.
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In the absence of regulatory oversight and clear standards, voluntary initiatives to try to address these issues have been proposed but these are relatively underresourced, their recommendations are voluntary and their funding is uncertain, coming primarily from the philanthropic sector. These are absolutely no substitute for the Government taking action to create a regulatory framework that can build confidence in these markets. The chair of one such initiative, the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, Annette Nazareth, has gone on record calling for government regulation, saying that while the best place for these rules is Governments, until Governments step up,
“we’re doing our level best to mimic what a government authority could do”.
The law firm Simmons & Simmons, Natural Carbon Solutions and many other commentators have also said that regulators will want to rapidly create their own regulations to govern this market and the participants in it.
My amendment is intended to achieve that. I fully recognise that much of the Bill is deregulatory and seeks to bring financial activity to the UK with an attractive regulatory regime. I am not proposing red tape for the sake of it—I understand the Government’s desires—but I hope I have shown that the lack of any regulatory regime for offsets undermines investor confidence, creates environmental risk and suppresses a market that has the potential to deliver both economic and environmental benefit.
The fact that we are able and willing to take new powers is evidenced in the Bill: Clause 65 gives His Majesty’s Treasury the power to regulate cryptocurrencies, as we have discussed, and recently HMT gave the FCA powers to regulate funeral plans, so we are not seeing a completely deregulatory agenda. Here, we are talking about a possible funeral plan for the whole planet: it is definitely appropriate to enable regulation in this market. A world-first, smart regulatory regime for voluntary offsets has the potential to bring investors to the UK and build confidence in a product that has all too often been perceived as the wild west of greenwashing. I am open to alternative drafting suggestions, but I ask the Minister to take note of the ask from insurers, pension funds, voluntary market participants and other financial operators and commit to taking a power to create a form of regulated market as a mark of robust quality. This could be a game-changer and the UK could lead in this area. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, for tabling this amendment. I totally agree with its necessity, which is why I have added my name to it. If we are to meet our statutory net-zero targets, carbon offsetting will become ever more important as we decarbonise and reach those emissions that are so hard to abate and the residual emissions that the noble Baroness spoke about.
Let me say at the outset, however, that carbon offsetting is not a solution to climate change. There is only one way to avoid catastrophic climate change, and that is to stop adding to the blanket of greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere that is already at a higher concentration than at any time since records began. Just for the record, the May peak of carbon dioxide in 2022 was a record 421 parts per million. The highest recorded over the previous 800,000 years for which we have records was just under 300 parts per million. This increase has happened in a blink of a geological eye, over just the last 150 years since the start of the Industrial Revolution. This Committee is not the time or place to go into the impact on our planet, save to say that catastrophic events are happening at a faster pace than even the most pessimistic predictions by scientists.
As we know, the biggest contributor to greenhouse gases is the burning of fossil fuels. The second biggest is deforestation. Putting an end to both these practices is well under way but is not going fast enough. I hope that more will be done through this Bill before it becomes an Act, because it deals with the money that fuels the release of those greenhouse gas emissions.
Until decarbonisation measures bite—and resistance to them is strong; we have seen that in some of the contributions to this Committee—carbon off-sets are one tool we have to mitigate the harm of climate chaos and the destruction of nature. The market demand for off-sets is exponential and the scope for fraud in the voluntary carbon market is massive. Greenwashing is rife. I will give one example: the recent chastisement of HSBC by the Advertising Standards Authority for misleading people with some of its claims to be carbon neutral. However, we need a functioning market to off-set hard-to-eliminate sources of greenhouse gases, which will leave residual emissions. It is the role of government to enable regulators to act, which is why this amendment is necessary and why I added my name to it.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Worthington and Lady Sheehan, and to offer Green support for this amendment, which is obviously urgently needed. I essentially agree with everything that the two noble Baronesses said, particularly the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, that off-sets are essentially a con that should not be used to trade off against continuing fossil fuel emissions. None the less, we are where we are and they are certainly going to happen.
The complexity is really well illustrated by a recent report by HSBC, which found that $246 billion-worth of hydroelectricity depends on water provided by threatened tropical cloud forests. We think about where the funding, support and credits should go, but to maintain that electricity supply, surely the people producing the electricity should fund that. This is also a carbon store. It is a real demonstration of the way that, as the Treasury’s own Dasgupta report illustrated, the economy is a complete subset of and entirely dependent on the environment, which we are fast trashing.
The problems with the current “wild west” system have been clearly demonstrated already. In a paper this week in the journal, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, the Berkeley Carbon Trading Project presented a study of nearly 300 carbon off-set projects, representing nearly 11% of global carbon off-set projects to date. It found that the projects were systematically overcrediting their results and delivering extremely dubious carbon off-sets. Apparently respected registries did not follow standards to make sure that projects were having a real and tangible impact on carbon levels. A particular area of difficulty was whether the projects would have happened anyway, whether or not the extra carbon credit was claimed.
I will make one final point. The noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, sought ways in which the Government might see this as an advantage. In this wild west, there is a need for extensive due diligence for any financial body to be able to claim that it has genuine, honest carbon credits that will deliver over the long term—because the climate emergency is of course a long-term project and not just for one year or five years. There is a significant cost for any company going into this and wishing to protect its reputation. If it is a regulated sector, that will make it a great deal easier for people to do due diligence and to rely on it, and not to have to do the work themselves at considerable cost, facing considerable complexity and carrying considerable risk.
We do not have a fixed view on this proposal and therefore will listen to the response of the Government. At an individual level, when invited to pay my off-sets to British Airways, I am deeply suspicious of them making any useful contribution. My general view on this Bill is that good regulation is important, because the problem with the financial services industry is that any areas of weakness can escalate into a significant wider impact. I take the point that this area of activity will almost certainly expand and there is a good prima facie case that it should be regulated.
My Lords, the Government recognise the potential for off-setting to enable businesses to address emissions that cannot be reduced through decarbonisation strategies. As the Climate Change Committee has set out, they can play an important role in the transition to net zero.
Done well, and centred around high integrity, climate and nature off-sets through voluntary carbon credits can increase climate ambition, help mobilise finance to developing countries and provide a credible tool for the 1.5 degree transition. Done badly, and without integrity at their core, the potential for “greenwashing” clearly exists. Therefore, it is important that the voluntary carbon credits used by companies reflect genuinely additional removal of or reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
The Government recognise that it is important to ensure the integrity of these markets if they are to play a role in mobilising investment. Concerns around the integrity of carbon and nature markets, from the supply of voluntary credits, their trading and green claims made by buyers through offsetting, must be addressed.
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The standards for what make a high-quality credit and what would ensure integrity in this market are still under development. This is a global challenge that needs a global solution that goes beyond the UK or the financial sector alone. That is why the Government are so supportive of work to improve the integrity of voluntary carbon markets internationally. We have been a major supporter, including financially, of both the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market and the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative. These are multi-stakeholder international initiatives launched under the UK’s COP 26 presidency. Both will launch their final outputs later this year, which will set out proposals for good practice in both the generation of high-quality credits and the use of such credits by organisations purchasing them in meeting their environmental targets.
The appropriate time to consider bringing this sector into regulation would be once these standards have been published and the Government have had the chance to consider and endorse them, in whole or in part. Any potential regulation can build on them. When considering any future regulations, it is also important to note that the selling or offering of climate and nature credits goes far beyond financial firms and intermediaries that could be appropriately regulated through financial services regulation. If the Government decide that this sector needs to be further regulated, we already have powers that we can use to bring the relevant financial actors under regulation through either the regulated activities order or the designated activities regime. Any new regulation must consider the end-users in the real economy who buy these off-sets and the producers of the off-sets themselves, many of which are outside the UK. It not simply a question of financial regulation.
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This amendment is supported by financial market participants. I put on record my thanks to Scottish Widows; Railpen—the Railways Pension Scheme; the Brunel Pension Partnership, which manages the assets for local government pension schemes in the south-west; and employees of the Environment Agency and the Church of England Pensions Board. These organisations collectively are responsible for more than £250 billion in assets; they have written to me in support of this amendment, and I am sure would welcome a meeting with government to discuss it further. They tell me that it is widely known that this market is not functioning well at the moment, and that the voluntary certifications and quality codes are not delivering the transparency, reliability and quality of off-sets for financing to flow freely into projects that could make a real difference in the fight against climate change and nature loss.
Given that, to achieve net zero, the majority of firms will have to rely on some form of tradable off-set or tradable credits for their residual emissions, which could be impossible to eliminate through actual investments, regulation of this market would serve the purpose of building trust for firms to allocate finance in this area—and I agree with them. Currently the market is relatively small, but it is growing and has increased fivefold since 2018, and many have called for it to scale further, including the former Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney. The Climate Change Committee estimates it to be a $2 billion a year market, accounting for 300 megatonnes of carbon dioxide per year—around 1% of global emissions and not far from the total contribution of the UK to the climate change problem, so it is not insignificant.
However, this market in climate mitigation or activities will not scale or endure without better regulated standards that can underpin confidence in the market. As the need to demonstrate a response to the growing climate risks increases, more and more companies and individuals will be tempted to buy their way to a cleaner carbon footprint or a cleaner reputation. Already, one-third of FTSE 350 companies include off-sets in their emissions reduction plans. Off-sets account for between 35% and 80% of their pledged emissions reductions—so it is a significant piece of financial architecture that people are relying on to get to net zero.
Companies will want to be seen to do the right thing, but this will be challenging. It is extremely difficult to assess whether emissions reductions being purchased are both real and durable. This offers an opportunity to unscrupulous providers to market poor-quality products to unsuspecting companies and investors. As I said, even the regulated carbon markets have seen examples of fraud and poor-quality off-sets entering markets. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the Europe-wide carbon market, the market had to be closed to overseas investments in credits, partly in response to an oversupplied market but also partly due to persistent questions about the quality of the credits entering the market.
The potential for mis-selling in this market is high. Some noble Lords may remember that, in 2011, a listed company on the Canadian stock exchange, the Sino-Forest Corporation, went bankrupt after an investigation revealed that the company’s claims were vastly out of line with reality on the ground. The case related to a standard forestry offering; it is far easier to verify whether the land has been purchased and the trees are there than it is to verify whether those forests are actually absorbing or storing carbon—an invisible commodity that we are essentially turning into a tradeable commodity. Similarly, how much biodiversity the forest may hold is a far harder thing to verify.
The difficulties of verifying this market make it very attractive for unscrupulous actors and, as excitement and financial flows increase in this market, that attractiveness to potentially rogue actors will only grow. One UK-based carbon market ratings agency has already reported that it believes that only 30% of offsets on the market are high quality, and 25%—one-quarter—could effectively be classed as having junk status. The Swiss-registered offset provider, South Pole, one of the largest in the market, had the integrity of its offering called into question by an article in Tages-Anzeiger in February this year. This sent shock waves through the industry, and a lot of attention has now been placed on the question of integrity.
Most of the focus of the carbon market quality checks is on credits generated in the biosphere—so-called nature-based solutions. Trees are the most common product to which you will find financial instruments attached, but carbon is stored in other ways, too, and it is even more difficult to verify some of those other sources of carbon store because they are far harder to count and track. Below-ground carbon in soils is one example: it is notoriously difficult to get a handle on exactly what is happening in the carbon cycle in soils. It is even harder with below-water carbon—blue carbon—stored in sea grasses and other marine ecosystems, where you cannot even see the commodity being sold. These difficulties are pronounced.
The Minister may say, “Don’t worry; normal regulations against fraud and corruption will be sufficient to protect against outright fraud and corruption”, but these markets are uniquely complex. Often the problem is not that actors are wilfully seeking to do wrong but rather that there is an unhelpful lack of independent standards in the market to help determine what constitutes an additional or biodiversity benefit. In that uncertainty, it is not just investors who will potentially find that their investments are not delivering what they expected; the whole planet is being short-changed. This is because the sale of an offset permits the continued emission of greenhouse gases, minus the guilt; and, if the offset purchase is not genuine, atmospheric concentrations, already at dangerously high levels, will continue to rise. As we saw in the latest assessment report from the IPCC, this is starting to imperil us all.
Independent observers of the integrity of this market have highlighted concerns. A report published on this topic by IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions—the global standard-setter for investment securities—explains in detail the issues with the quality of carbon credits and the lack of a uniform definition of what constitutes high quality. I will not run through them; there are at least 10 reasons why this market is complicated.
At the top line, there are questions about additionality—whether this action is genuinely additional to what would have happened anyway—and about permanence and the risk of reversal. There are risks of leakage: you may be protecting something in one area, but that activity is just displaced to somewhere else and the emissions still occur. There are concerns about double counting, registry and transparency. There are potential conflicts in the market, and there is a lack of legal clarity, no standardisation, poor data and, overwhelmingly, a very large risk of greenwashing and, from that, legal risks and potential litigation cases. We are not in a good situation today. The market is small now, but it will grow, and it is really timely to be considering whether the Government should take powers now to regulate it.
This is a volatile market, as you can imagine, such is the uncertainty, with the mis-selling of fraud and the mistaken assumptions. There have been plenty of studies into why that might be the case. I will touch on an example of why regulations are needed: pension funds. In the UK, they are now investing in forest carbon offsets for the long term. This relates to both defined benefit offerings, where there are some protections for savers, but defined contribution schemes are increasingly entering this market too.
The long-term future of the biosphere in a changed climate is deeply uncertain and pension fund advisers and managers need better guidance. They simply should not have to determine whether something they are being sold is correct with no guidance from government and no regulation. There could be risks from litigation, as I mentioned: should vendors of these products be hit with legal claims or go bankrupt, savers will be hit by that outcome.
Industry is also asking government to play its part. I will quote a substantial part of the recent report by Scottish Widows, Nature and Biodiversity: the Pensions Imperative, because it says it far better than I can:
“With companies potentially needing to put billions of pounds into offsets to meet their net zero commitments, the biggest barrier to date is the opacity of the voluntary carbon market. This breeds mistrust, particularly as a number of bad actors have been exposed in the past. What could really shift the dial here is the establishment of a UK regulator for carbon offsets. This could set quality standards that corporations looking to do the right thing could trust, enabling them to allocate money with confidence in these offsets having additionality and really delivering on those climate and nature goals”.
Finally, when I was a member of the Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, we produced a report entitled Nature-Based Solutions. The committee heard evidence from a cross-section of practitioners in the carbon credits sector, from both the science and financial communities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, said, we heard from the science community how difficult it is to quantify and monetise nature-based solutions. From the financial community, we heard that it needs a regulatory framework so that everyone can work on a level playing field and so that the market is less like the wild west—which it currently is.
I will conclude by quoting a conclusion of that report:
“We recommend that the Government provides clear regulatory standards for emerging carbon markets to ensure that any off-sets that are claimed are genuine”.
However,
“these markets will only deliver the desired results if they are properly regulated and verified to prevent inaccurate claims of carbon off-setting. Carbon and nature credits must be for benefits that are additional, measurable, and permanent”.
For carbon credits to have the impact we all want, they must have good governance backed by government.
The need for this amendment is obvious. The problems with off-setting both carbon and biodiversity are very clear. We should not be where we are, but we are where we are, and the amendment offers one way forward that would be good for the financial sector as well as for the planet.