Facial Recognition: Police Use

Before I call Sir John Whittingdale to move the motion, I would like to inform Members that the parliamentary digital communication team will be conducting secondary filming during this debate.

I beg to move,

That this House has considered police use of live facial recognition technology.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I am grateful for this opportunity to debate the police’s use of live facial recognition technology. I have to say that this debate is somewhat overdue.

Any fan of Hollywood movies would think that the use of facial recognition technology is widespread, as in “The Bourne Ultimatum” and “Spooks”, and that it is commonplace for MI5 and the CIA to tap into CCTV cameras across London. I do not believe that is correct— I hope it is not—but police forces are using facial recognition technology more and more. It was first used in 2017, and it is now commonly used by the Metropolitan police, South Wales police and now my own police force in Essex, which purchased two vans in August and use it regularly.

On 4 October, I accompanied police officers on a deployment in Chelmsford High Street, who were hugely helpful in explaining to me exactly how they use the technology and, importantly, what controls are in place. They told me that they had a watch list of 639 individuals who had been approved by the superintendent and were wanted for questioning in relation to offences such as violence against the person. They included people with outstanding warrants, suspects linked to county lines, suspected shoplifters in that particular part of the county, and those with a sexual harm prevention order.

In the course of the 30 minutes or so that I spent with those officers, they recorded 1,500 faces of people who passed by. The officers assured me that those images were matched against the watch list to see whether they registered a positive, and if they did not they were deleted in less than half a second. During the time I was there, there were approximately 10 positives, which led to a conversation: a police officer would go and have a polite exchange to find out why the person had registered positive, and they were checked against the Police National Computer or Athena. That morning, that led to two arrests.

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for securing this important debate. There are suggestions that this technology disproportionately misidentifies black people and people from other communities. Does he agree that the Government must give us more assurances and ensure that more black people are not criminalised? We know that black communities are over-policed and underserved.

I certainly agree that more assurances need to be given. That is actually one of the purposes behind requesting this debate. The hon. Lady is right that concerns have been expressed—

I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), but it goes deeper than that. There are at least three conditions that ought to apply, and I would be interested to hear from my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) whether Essex met them. First, these things always ought to be under judicial oversight; it should not simply be a police decision. Secondly, as he said, only the records of presumed guilty or actively sought people should be kept and, thirdly, that innocent people’s records should be destroyed straightaway. That should not be left to a guideline; it should be under legislative control and properly treated in that way.

I agree with my right hon. Friend. The problem at the moment is that we do not even have national guidelines. There is a complete absence, which I will come to later. I will give way to the shadow Home Secretary.

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. I would like to add some context to the question of racial bias. There were allegations of racial bias a few years ago. The system was tested by the national physical laboratory about two years ago and, at the settings used by the police, no racial bias was found. That was one of the conditions set in the Bridges litigation about four years ago, and I hope that gives my right hon. Friend and other hon. Members some reassurance on the question of racial bias. It has been tested by the national physical laboratory.

As I understand it, the number of false positives recorded depends to some extent on the threshold at which the technology is set.

The report by the national physical laboratory said that it had to be set at 0.6 for it to have fewer misidentifications, but there is no such thing as no misidentifications or people not being wrongly identified. It is also easy for a police service to lower that number. Because we have no judicial oversight, it is very problematic.

The hon. Lady is completely right. I think the police are generally being responsible in its use and setting the threshold as recommended, but that is another example where there is no requirement on them to do so, and they could lower it. Regarding deployment in Essex, the chief constable told me there was just one false positive.

I attended a meeting with Baroness Chakrabarti, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington, where Shaun Thompson, an anti-knife community worker, spoke to us. He had been held by the police for 30 minutes and forced to provide all sorts of identity documents, as a result of a false positive. On the extent to which it is occurring and whether racial bias is involved, there is some evidence that that is the case. That makes it all the more important that we provide assurances.

We have heard from several campaign organisations that are concerned about the use. They vary in the extent to which they believe it is a legitimate technology. Big Brother Watch has described live facial recognition technology as

“constant generalised surveillance”

and has said that it is

“indiscriminately subjecting members of the public to mass identity checks”

which undermines the presumption of innocence.

Liberty has gone further, saying:

“Creating law to govern police and private company use…will not solve the human rights concerns or the tech’s inbuilt discrimination…The only solution is to ban it.”

I do not agree with that, because I think there is clear evidence that it has a real benefit in helping the police apprehend people who are wanted for serious offences, but one of my major concerns is the lack of any clarity in law about how it should be used.

On precisely that point, some police forces in the UK take the view that GDPR has reach in this area. Does my right hon. Friend have a view on that?

My right hon. Friend has anticipated my next point extremely effectively. I was Minister at the time of the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which did not cover live facial recognition technology. At the same time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is the shadow Home Secretary, was the Minister for Policing and he made a speech about how valuable live facial recognition technology was. I therefore sought advice about how that fitted in with GDPR.

The advice that came back following consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office was that there is no blanket approval by the ICO for the use of LFR technology. Essentially, it should be judged on a case-by-case basis, but the ICO had expectations that data protection and privacy should be respected. It went on to say that the use of LFR can be highly intrusive and future uses of the technology may require updates, but that the ICO is monitoring it closely. That is only partially reassuring. Essentially, the ICO recognises that breaches of data protection could be possible, and is monitoring it, but there is no clear guideline to assist the police or anybody else with precisely how it should be used.

I am grateful to legal consultants Handley Gill, who wrote to me yesterday and who are involved in advising a number of people about the legality of the technology. They said that

“it is undesirable for individual Chief Officers and PCCs to have to engage in the wide ranging review and preparation of the necessary documentation, and that a move toward a common national approach (and choice of technology provider) would secure efficiencies and also enable closer monitoring…to ensure their efficacy and lawfulness.”

Although we are no longer bound by European Union law, the EU has brought in much more stringent controls than exist here.

Scotland’s chief constable said in September that it would be “an abdication” of her duty not to assess whether this AI tool could be used and that the force was “very much alive” to it, describing it as a crucial tool to “take violent perpetrators” off the streets. In my view, it is an exercise in balancing the need to tackle crime and keep people safe with the impact the tool may have on human rights and civil liberties. I believe the right hon. Gentleman wishes to introduce stringent restrictions on the use of such surveillance. If so, what are they, and is he seeking to follow similar European states’ legislation akin to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act?

The EU’s AIA lays down very strong controls—it almost goes too far—in that it restricts the categories of individual who can be sought under the watch list to quite a small number. The House of Commons Library points out that

“the AIA 2024 prohibits the use of ‘real-time remote biometric identification systems’ (such as LFR) in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement, unless such use is ‘strictly necessary’ for one of the following objectives”.

The list it provides includes the search for specific victims of abduction or trafficking; missing persons; the prevention of a substantial and imminent threat to life; the prevention of a genuine threat of a terrorist attack; or the localisation of a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence.

In Europe, the controls are strong, but in this country it is left largely to police officers to interpret the law and be reasonably confident. However, legal challenges are under way. Shaun Thompson, whom I met, is seeking judicial review of the police’s actions and the campaign organisations are also looking at legal challenges. There is a real need for clarity. Certainly, the sergeant of Essex police who is in charge of deployment told me that, in his view, it would be really helpful for the police to have clear guidelines. They would then not have to make those difficult decisions and could potentially satisfy a court that the use was proportionate and justified.

As far as I am aware, this matter has not been debated by Parliament before, and it should have been because there is a real need to seek clarity in the law. This may sound like science fiction, but ultimately there is a risk that it becomes possible for every CCTV camera in the country to be linked up, and there could be a watchlist of not 600 but millions of people. Concerns have been expressed by organisations such as Big Brother Watch—in this particular instance, that organisation could be well named—and I do not think any Member would wish to go down that route. I think most people recognise that there is some value in the technology, but there is a need for clarity. I am grateful to the shadow Home Secretary and particularly the Minister for Policing for coming to contribute, and I look forward to what they have to say.

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called in the debate, and it seems that everybody does.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I thank the right hon. Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) —or I could say my right hon. Friend, if he does not mind—for securing this debate. I have spoken to the Secretary of State and Ministers in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and there is an awareness that we need a lot of careful and considerate thinking on this issue. Obviously, a new Government have just come in and this is not a new issue, as the right hon. Member for Maldon said—LFR was first used in 2017, so there is a lot of clearing up that has to be done.

Live facial recognition changes one of the cornerstones of our democracy: an individual is innocent until proven guilty. With this technology, if the machine says an individual is guilty because they have been identified using live facial recognition, they then have to prove their innocence. That is a huge change in our democracy that nobody has consented to. We have not consented to it in this place, and as we police by consent as a society, that should really worry us all.

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way; I am looking forward to this debate and to concluding it for the Opposition later.

On the question of changing the burden of proof or undermining the concept that someone is innocent until proven guilty, the technology absolutely does not change that. What it does is give the police a reason to stop somebody and check their identity to see whether they are the person wanted for a criminal offence. It certainly does not provide evidence on which a conviction might be secured. In fact, it is no different from the police stopping someone because they are suspicious of them, and it is a lot more accurate than stop and search, about which I am sure the hon. Lady has views. It is simply a tool to enable the police to stop somebody and check their identity to see whether they are the person who is wanted. It certainly does not undermine the very important principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty.

The shadow Minister has hit on an important point regarding reasonable suspicion. What is reasonable suspicion? How have the police got to that point? If he is then going to make reference to watchlists, who is put on a watchlist? We know, for instance, that the Met police has hundreds of thousands of people on its system who should not be there. We know that the watchlist can consist of people it considers to be vulnerable, such as those with mental health issues. Anybody in this room could be put on a watchlist, so I am afraid the shadow Minister has not quite nailed the point he was trying to make.