European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) Regulations 2019

“amend the definition of ‘exit day’ … to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom”.

That power applies only where the day and time specified in the definition of exit day differ from that when the treaties will cease to apply.

Following agreement with the European Council last Friday, the day and time that the treaties cease to apply do now differ from that contained in the definition of exit day. However, the European Council decision identified two possible dates when the EU treaties will cease to apply. Consequently, the amendment to exit day reflects those two dates, applying the same condition, and, in doing so, ensures that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom. Only one day and time will apply at any given time.

It would be contrary to a natural reading of the words in subsection (4) to suggest that the power may not be exercised in this way to reflect the conditionality in the extension agreed with the EU. I would also draw attention to paragraph 21 of Schedule 7 to the Act, which puts beyond doubt that the powers in the Act may be used to deal with supplementary matters.

The effects of the instrument will apply across the domestic statute book, so it is important that I set out the details of what it will do and why. Currently, major changes to the domestic statute book reflecting our exit from the EU are due to take effect on exit day, which is defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as 11 pm on 29 March 2019, despite the extension terms that have now been agreed at the international level. These changes apply across a huge number of policy areas, from emissions trading to Europol. All the changes are designed so that our statute book works when we leave the EU. However, because in many cases they amend EU regulations they are inconsistent with the situation in which we remain a member of the EU for a couple more weeks or months.

My colleagues behind me have begged me not to use the words “I told you so” today, but I cannot resist. In May, I warned the Minister that,

“the negotiations … will be affected by the timetable”,

and that, given that,

“the negotiations could go on a bit later than everyone wants”,

having a particular date fixed in an Act of Parliament, passed in mid-2018, would be,

“a very unhelpful position for our negotiators to be in”.

I predicted—I promise these are my words in Hansard—that,

“the withdrawal agreement could contain a leaving date of a week or two … after the two-year period, which would allow the last-minute arrangements to be made”,

and continued,

“if that suits all the parties and if our Government would like to sign up to it, it would seem silly not to be able to do that”,—[Official Report, 8/5/18; cols. 37-38.]

without amending the Act.

Of course, it was not just me. Our own EU Committee said:

“The rigidity of the … deadline of 29 March 2019 … makes a no deal outcome more likely … enshrining the same deadline in domestic law would not … be in the national interest”.

Your Lordships agreed. By 311 votes to 233, we passed the amendment tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, by a tidy majority of 78. We are here today because the Government did not listen.

Unfortunately, we now face the same again, which is why the last part of our amendment calls on the Government to pursue any course of action in those negotiations sanctioned by a resolution of the Commons. We stress this because Ministers and Mrs May keep telling us that they will not be bound by today’s votes in the elected House, which might be a bit of a problem for them anyway, if Robert Peston is correct. He reports that the Cabinet Secretary and the Attorney-General informed Cabinet that if, at the end of the Letwin process, MPs passed a Motion mandating the Prime Minister to pursue a new route through the Brexit mess, whether a referendum, a customs union or another option, then the Prime Minister and the Government would be in breach of the Ministerial Code and the law if they failed to follow MPs’ instructions. The impression created by the Prime Minister that she could ignore the results of the indicative vote process is not true if those Ministers who briefed out of the Cabinet are to be believed. Perhaps it is because those briefings are right that the Government down the other end have just tried, shamefully, to end the indicative vote process, although they lost that vote. It is that reluctance to heed the views of MPs that makes the last part of our amendment so important, even if, as I said, it might be unnecessary should the law indeed require the Government to follow the outcome.