Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Considered in Grand Committee

Moved by

That the Grand Committee do consider the Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

My Lords, the Treasury has been undertaking a programme of legislation to ensure that after the end of the transition period there continues to be a functioning legal and regulatory regime for financial services in the UK. The Treasury is laying SIs under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to deliver this legislative programme and the majority of these SIs have already been approved in this place and in the House of Commons.

As part of this financial services legislative programme before exit day the Treasury laid the Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, commonly known as the Equivalence Regulations 2019. Those regulations were designed to ensure that if the UK left the EU without a transition period, the UK would have a fully functioning equivalence framework from exit day. The additional time afforded by the transition period has provided us with the opportunity to put in place supplementary measures in the Equivalence Regulations 2019 to ensure that the UK continues to have a robust and functioning equivalence framework for financial services, both during and after the end of the transition period.

The measures in the instrument being debated today complement the Equivalence Regulations 2019 by creating additional stand-alone powers in this instrument for the UK-relevant financial services regulators—the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority in this case—which are appropriate for those regulators in the transition period. They also make minor amendments to the earlier 2019 regulations, again as appropriate for the transition period. This SI will, finally, make minor amendments to add to the powers available to the regulators after the end of the transition period and to correct errors in earlier financial services EU exit legislation.

I am grateful that this SI was raised as an instrument of interest by the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its July report and for the question that the committee raised. I intend to address the question now and in the course of the debate.

The instrument being debated concerns the UK’s future regime for equivalence, a process to determine that another country’s regulatory and supervisory regime is equivalent to the UK’s corresponding regulatory framework. Recognising the regulatory equivalence of third countries is a key component of financial services regulation. Equivalence of determinations can help to reduce regulatory burdens on firms and can facilitate cross-border market access. This may lead to increased competition that can benefit both UK firms and consumers by engendering healthy market incentives to lower prices and offer innovative products.

At present, equivalence functions are performed by the European Commission and the European supervisory authorities. At the end of the transition period, these functions will be transferred to HM Treasury and the UK regulators as provisions in retained EU law. During the transition period, equivalence determinations can be made for EEA states via powers within the 2019 equivalence regulations. This instrument provides a UK equivalence framework that is appropriate for use during the transition period in relation to the EU’s existing framework. It allows the UK financial services regulators to complete the associated actions that mean that HM Treasury equivalence determinations taken during the transition period can take full effect at the end of that period.

My Lords, we have no room for manoeuvre on time for this debate, so I would be grateful if Peers could keep to time and ideally go slightly short.

My Lords, I refer to my interest set out in the register as a director of the London Stock Exchange.

I thank the Minister for introducing the regulations, but I admit that I got off to a bad start when looking at them. Helpful though it is to have tables in the schedule, I found it very awkward to have the regulations themselves drafted as an adjunct to a table that requires simultaneous viewing on different pages. I thought that I was in a puzzle book and having to take a cheat peek at the answers at the back.

First, I must consult the Schedule 1 list in the 2019 SI, and then I must cross-reference to table 1 in Schedule 1 of this SI—although it is unclear from reading Regulation 3 whether this refers to Schedule 1 of the 2019 instrument, as has just been referenced, or, as happens to be the case, Schedule 1 of this SI. I can find that out by discovering that Schedule 1 of the 2019 SI does not have a table. I must then repeatedly consult the table and look at each column to find out which paragraph of Schedules 2 and 3 and Schedule 1 of the 2019 SI are relevant. All of these instructions distract greatly from the clarity of Schedules 2 and 3, which really did not need all this obfuscation.

Aside from the structure, the SI seems to do what is necessary—although I reckon that it should have been part of the 2019 regulations to give regulators clarity. Unfortunately, this is all part of a patchwork that replicates, and makes even more confusing, the already tangled web of EU equivalence provisions that has evolved over time.

I hope that one day soon an overarching policy will be outlined on how the UK will balance openness, competitiveness, security and public interest in our future equivalence regime. This must reflect the needs not just of financial service companies in large countries but also the real economy companies that they serve, and encompass issues such as enabling trade at reasonable cost for the less developed countries. There can be a lot more to equivalence than first meets the eye, as was eventually realised with EMIR. At times, the benefits of equivalence may be needed within the country giving equivalence rather than the country gaining equivalence.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for introducing the debate today. It is good news to know that the Government are taking the necessary steps to ensure that a coherent and functioning financial services equivalence framework continues in the UK after the end of the transition period.

The position is complicated by the fact that the EU’s single market in financial services is only partly developed. It is therefore necessary for the Treasury to determine whether or not each member state has an equivalent regulatory regime for a particular firm or product to that which applies in the UK.

There are several problems with this approach. First, does it mean that arrangements similar to the EU passport system for particular individual firms are to be continued? Secondly, the products referred to in the SI seem to conform to the categories of products—or, rather, services—covered in individual European regulations. Would it not be simpler for the UK to set out its own regulatory regime based on equivalence of outcomes, and to allow all regulated service providers in a particular category to operate in the UK subject to satisfactory co-operation arrangements being established between the relevant member state or EEA country regulator and the FCA or the Bank of England?

Presumably, ESMA also needs to be involved, because it has taken over many powers from the member state regulators and will doubtless continue to expand its area of control. It may not be just ESMA: perhaps the EBA or EIOPA is the relevant European regulator for the firm or product concerned.

The SI does its job in avoiding a cliff edge and providing stability and continuity for financial companies and markets in the UK after the end of the implementation period. However, is it sensible to continue to grant equivalence on the basis of single European regulations? Going forward, do we want a regulatory system that is a clone of the EU system? How are we going to make equivalence decisions in respect of financial firms from third countries such as the United States, Japan and Australia, and others whose regulatory systems are not based on prescriptive EU-style legislation?

My Lords, I refer to my role as a director of a financial services company, as listed in the register.

We all know the importance of financial services to our economy: it is the highest exporting sector that we have. However, as this legislation indicates, we risk jeopardising its success. There is no denying the need for this legislation, but we are already into September: if a comprehensive deal is not agreed soon with the EU—and the omens do not look good—then the financial services industry risks being badly damaged.

I listened to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, talk about how much we could innovate and so on if we were free of EU regulations. But innovation in financial services is rarely a benefit; in fact, I am hard-pressed to think of an innovation since the invention of the hole-in-the-wall that has actually been beneficial.

Equivalence in regulation is imperative for trade with the EU to continue, and recognition of that equivalence has to be in place for transactions to continue. The Minister sounded confident that that will be the case within the required timescale. Can he explain why he is so confident that equivalence will be granted in the EU?

The political declaration sounded optimistic about the prospects for equivalence, with the implicit intention that cross-border service provision would continue. But can we now be assured that this is a view shared by both parties? The direction that the negotiations have been taking appears to be diverging somewhat drastically, and certainly progress is not being made.

More specifically, do the UK regulators have the capacity required to make the decisions on equivalence that they will be asked to make? Has a decision been taken on the level of charges that they can implement and whether this will be sufficient to cover the extra costs involved?

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving this necessary SI and I support the measures it contains. However, I have a number of questions—I will try to be brief, as requested.

Clearly, there is an assumption that a 12-month transition period is sufficient to reach the agreement necessary, but can my noble friend tell me what provision might be made should it not prove sufficient, as many of us are concerned about? Perhaps 12 months seemed to be enough at the time, but will it be?

I also ask my noble friend—I declare my interests as set out in the register—what impact there might be on defined benefit pension schemes in a no-deal scenario, regardless of these measures, which I assume and hope we will approve today, with respect to financial derivatives and remittance of payments, including assessment of the risk that clearing or margin requirements could be triggered, and what provisions the Government may be able to make in changes to derivatives documentation entered into by those funds.

Another important area is the third-country requirements for the purposes of EMIR and whether this might mean that counterparty risks from EU banks may no longer rely on the exemptions under EMIR when entering into derivatives with UK entities such as defined benefit pension schemes. I note that the FCA, the Bank of England and the PRA are involved and would be grateful to know whether there have been any discussions with the Pensions Regulator in this regard. That is particularly relevant here for UK pension schemes if their bank counterparty in the EU is relying on exemptions available to pension schemes under EMIR’s mandatory clearing obligation.

Finally, when the UK’s asset management industry enters into intragroup transactions with EU group companies, should it consider whether those EU companies will continue to be able to rely on the exemptions under EMIR and what impact this SI or other government plans may have on those entities?

My Lords, this instrument raises many more questions than it answers, as is increasingly the case with government business.

First, what does paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum mean when it states:

“The UK has now left the EU with a deal”?

Is that not at best disingenuous, if not downright deceitful? We have an agreement to leave; we do not have a deal.

At the end of June, M Barnier said that the political declaration committed us to use best endeavours to finalise our respective assessments by the end of June. The Commission sent 28 questionnaires to the UK covering the areas where equivalence is possible. At that time, only four had been returned. Where are we now? Are we not empowering ourselves to set out our terms for equivalence to third parties? This is of course necessary to enable us to deal with the world and to negotiate with the EU, but when will the industry get any clarity as to what equivalence will be agreed with the EU? Is there any prospect—which always seemed unlikely, and is much less so given the current mood music—that the EU will agree to any longer time for ending equivalence unilaterally than its current 30-day rule?

I turn to the impact of the changes in Scotland, which is the UK’s largest financial centre outside London. It is estimated that financial and related professional services account for 9.4% of the Scottish economy, something the Scottish National Party sometimes seems unaware of. According to Scottish Enterprise, there are 28,865 companies in the sector in Scotland, employing 247,000 people directly or indirectly and generating around £16.7 billion. UK in a Changing Europe also highlights the importance of financial services to Scotland. In Edinburgh, a conservative estimate of employment in financial services stands at 10.7% of the workforce. Indeed, Edinburgh employs a larger proportion of people in financial services than anywhere in the UK outside the square mile and Tower Hamlets, and significant numbers also work in financial services in Glasgow and West Dunbartonshire. Edinburgh has now risen 12 places in the 2020 global financial centres index to be ranked as the 17th most important financial centre in the world. It is home to the global headquarters of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Scottish Widows, and CYBG, which owns the Clydesdale Bank, Virgin Money and Yorkshire Bank, has its European headquarters in Glasgow.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for setting out so clearly the ramifications of these technical regulations, as he describes them. I have just a couple of questions, which are not dissimilar to those raised by other noble Lords. On page 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 2.3 states:

“At present equivalence functions are performed by the European Commission and the European Securities and Markets Authority ... At the end of the Transition Period these functions will be transferred to HM Treasury and the UK regulators as provisions in retained EU law.”

Clearly, they will be the regulators and will apply the equivalence regime but, in the event of an alleged breach being raised by a financial services company in the UK, which body will provide a remedy? My understanding is that currently the EU Commission is the watchdog and recourse can be had to the European Court of Justice. Which body do the Government imagine will provide an appeal and a remedy in the event of the regulations being breached?

My second question relates to my noble friend’s clear statement that the regulation before us today deals with retained EU law. As other noble Lords, not least the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, have said, the current regime is a matter of ongoing interest in the EU Commission. Concerns were raised in the Financial Times in the middle of August that it may take longer for firms based in London to gain access after Brexit. My final question to the Minister is: what will be the position on 1 January 2021 for any future changes to the equivalence regime in Brussels? Will firms based in the UK—any part of the UK, either Edinburgh or London—have blanket access to the whole of the European Union or will the Commission insist that negotiations take place on a country-by-country basis? The noble Lord, Lord Bruce, accurately stated that only a small number of questionnaires have been returned. They will obviously take some time to complete fully and accurately.

My Lords, this statutory instrument is clearly necessary to enable an equivalence regime for financial services to be in place following the transition period.

We all know that financial services are critical to this country’s GDP and tax base. Historically, the sector has provided more than 2 million jobs in the UK and more than £76 billion a year in tax revenue but, in the past, one-third of the sector has relied on EU clients, nearly half of whose business has been lost due to Brexit. I note with concern that, reflecting this shift, London, according to the think tank Z/Yen, which manages the index, has lost its position as the global number one financial centre to New York.

Even more concerning, both New York and London have been losing position, although London is losing it faster than New York. The rising locations are in Asia and the EU 27. One expert described these centres, especially the EU ones, as small black holes, growing rapidly as they sweep in new and transferred operations. We cannot afford to lose any more business. Equivalence matters. My party therefore supports the passage of this SI. We note that, like all the SIs dealing with equivalence, this one represents unilateral action by the UK, without which EEA firms could not continue to access the London markets. However, to deny that access would be extreme self-harm as we would be the losers. Essentially, this SI attempts to retain some parts of the status quo.

However, I want to confirm that the arrangements in Schedule 3, which relate to benchmarks, allow Libor to be replaced by risk-free reference rates set by the eurozone and non-eurozone EEA countries. The UK equivalent will be SONIA, the sterling overnight index average. Your Lordships will know that Libor has been a disgraced benchmark since American journalists exposed that it had been corrupted and manipulated for decades under the noses of the UK Government and regulators, who were blinded by their philosophy of light-touch regulation.