English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Report (1st Day) (Continued)

Amendment 49

49: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause— “Scrutiny of mayoral commissioners(1) The mayor of a combined county authority must establish, for each commissioner appointed by the mayor, a scrutiny committee composed of elected members of the constituent local authorities.(2) The purpose of each scrutiny committee is to review, assess and report on the exercise of the policy responsibilities of the commissioner to whom it relates.(3) Each scrutiny committee must have the following powers—(a) to require the mayor, the relevant commissioner, or any member of their staff to attend before the committee to give evidence;(b) to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of the commissioner’s functions;(c) to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations.(4) The mayor and the relevant commissioner must have regard to any report or recommendation made by the corresponding scrutiny committee under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment requires a mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions.

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 49, 95 and 96, and I have signed Amendment 182 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard.

In speaking to Amendment 49, I want to thank the Minister for having written to us last week—she proposed a whole raft of new amendments on the scrutiny functions. My amendment, which would require the mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions, is therefore rather out of date now, so I will not be pressing that.

However, I want to raise a broader question, because at times the rest of England seems to be following London, and at other times it is not. On this occasion—this relates to Amendment 95—in London, the mayor of London is required to hold a public meeting known as a People’s Question Time twice per financial year to answer questions from the public; that is in Section 48 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. I would like that to be replicated across all mayors in England so that something similar happens. I think that mayors are going to need—and I hope that they will want—to be held accountable for policy decisions they make. But the Minister might look at that issue of a people’s question time. We shall not reach it tonight for voting purposes, so I can consider what to do as a consequence of the Minister’s reply.

I feel very strongly about Amendment 96. I was a member of a regional development agency a number of years ago, and the RDA was required to turn up to every local council in its area once a year to answer questions from elected members, so that seems an entirely appropriate thing to do. I am suggesting only that a combined authority mayor should

“appear annually before each constituent local authority to answer questions from elected councillors”,

which would strengthen

My Lords, I rise to speak on cue to my Amendment 182, declare an interest as an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association and thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for supporting my amendment.

I welcome the Government’s amendment to establish overview and scrutiny committees. Why then have I persisted in my amendment for what I have called local public accounts committees? It is because the overview and scrutiny committees will focus only on scrutinising strategic authorities. I believe that we need to extend the focus of scrutiny from a single institution—the strategic authority—to the wider scrutiny of the place. The crucial difference between my amendment and the Government’s proposal is that my scrutiny committee would have the power to report not just on strategic authorities but on how effectively all local public service partners were collaborating in a place for the benefit of the public and the wider community.

Why is this so important? I will not go through the points that I made at length in Committee, but over the last four decades our public services have become increasingly fragmented, with the establishment of a myriad of disconnected, sometimes single-purpose agencies whose objectives and targets have on occasions overlapped and even conflicted. As we all know, those agencies have worked too often in silos. As a result, the public have struggled to access or even make sense of the disjointed services that are on offer. Money has been wasted because the silos do not work together to deliver the best value for money. At worst, people, sometimes children, have died because data and intelligence were not shared quickly enough to protect them.

In many places public service partners have worked very hard to break down these silos, but that is not uniformly the case. The prevailing culture in our public services has too often been one of competition rather than collaboration. I am convinced that for that to change we need in every local area a body with the power to scrutinise and report on how all public sector partners co-operate or do not co-operate for the good of citizens. If instead we establish overview and scrutiny and scrutiny committees which address only the performance of a single institution, we will reinforce the silo-based mentality that we have created for another generation—all for the want of adding a simple power for the overview and scrutiny committees to report on how the wider system is working.

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important issues concerning accountability and transparency within our evolving system of devolved governance. Amendments 49, 95 and 96 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, engage with the central principle that, where power is exercised, it should be subject to effective and visible scrutiny. I am sure that all noble Lords agree with that principle. These amendments would ensure that it extends directly to elected mayors.

Amendment 49 proposes dedicated scrutiny committees with powers to summons and to report. This reflects a desire to ensure that mayoral commissioners are properly held to account. Amendments 95 and 96 similarly seek to strengthen direct lines of accountability, whether through public-facing forums such as the People’s Question Time in London, which we have heard about, or through structured engagement with elected members of constituent authorities. We recognise the intent behind these proposals, particularly the effort to align arrangements more closely with established practices, as we have heard about on the Mayor of London.

Government Amendments 67 and 68 introduce substantial new schedules at a very late stage in the Bill. They set out an extensive and detailed framework for overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined county authorities. While the aim to strengthen scrutiny is clearly welcome, the scale and complexity of these provisions inevitably raise a number of questions that merit careful consideration. It is regrettable that this has been tabled at such a late stage in the parliamentary process of the Bill’s passage.

The proposed role for independent or external experts on scrutiny committees is notable. It would be helpful to understand more clearly who these individuals might be, how they are to be appointed and how their independence will be defined and safeguarded. Questions also arise as to whether there is sufficient capacity and expertise available across the country to support this model in practice. I look to the Minister for a response on these matters.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Shipley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for their amendments on scrutiny and accountability. These have been recurring themes during debates on the Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Pinnock, and the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Wallace, for their contributions to these discussions. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Bassam, for their very constructive engagement and the insights they have shared with me on this issue. While I appreciate the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, on the late introduction of these amendments, I felt that our discussions on scrutiny in Committee were too important for us not to respond as a Government.

In the English devolution White Paper, we committed to exploring a local public accounts committee model to provide a vehicle to scrutinise local public spending. This recognised that the powers afforded for local scrutiny were not commensurate to the increased scale of powers and responsibilities devolved to mayoral strategic authorities. Local scrutiny committees will replace overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined and combined county authorities, providing an enhanced scrutiny regime with stronger oversight and a broader remit to reflect the scale of mayoral responsibilities, with greater teeth to hold mayors to account.

To answer the points about some of the detail raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, as with the existing system, the chair of the committee must be from a different party from the mayor or be an independent person appointed through an open and fair competition. At least 60% of committee members must be councillors from constituent local authorities, rather than the current requirement that at least half of members must be local councillors. These committees must also reflect the political make-up of the area. They will be able to shape early decision-making and undertake value-for-money assessments across the full scope of a mayoral strategic authority’s work. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was particularly interested in that ability to shape decision-making before things came before the boards for decision.

To raise the quality of scrutiny, each local scrutiny committee will be required to consult independent expertise as part of their inquiries. We will set out in regulations that this should take the form of an independent panel. Where significant issues are raised, they will be able to share reports and recommendations with any government department or public body, and this will inform whether the Government need to take interventions to support an institution. To ensure that scrutiny is driven by local concerns, residents will be able to petition their local scrutiny committee to consider specific issues.

This system will exist in all mayoral strategic authorities except the Greater London Authority, where, as noble Lords have pointed out, there are specific arrangements for the London Assembly to continue to act as the scrutiny body. The London Assembly has the powers to question the Mayor of London, compel senior officials to attend and conduct investigations. Therefore, we do not intend to make any changes to the scrutiny arrangements in London at this time, but we always keep these things under review.

The enhanced regime will be introduced first in the established mayoral strategic authorities in 2027, before extending to all mayoral strategic authorities in 2028. We will continue to review the most effective models for local accountability, including exploring a local accounting officer model. These measures will ensure that the right checks and balances exist at local level to ensure that mayors and their administrations are held to account, with the interests of local people at the heart of the system. I commend these amendments to the House.

Amendment 182 relates to local public accounts committees. The Government have engaged significantly on these proposals. Feedback was clear from strategic authorities and the think tank sector: a new system of scrutiny must complement rather than duplicate existing arrangements. It could cut across other forms of local scrutiny, such as integrated care boards, and exactly who would be held accountable across tiers of local and national government could prove unclear.

The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, knows that I have carefully listened to and considered his proposals, and we will continue to keep local scrutiny under review as we develop devolved responsibilities. This will require a much wider consideration of other scrutiny bodies to ensure that we do not duplicate or confuse existing structures. I think there is room for further work on this, and I look forward to working with the noble Lord on his proposal.

For the time being, local scrutiny committees will have a clear focus, centred around a mayor’s areas of competence and general functions. They will conduct thematic inquiries and hold mayors to account on these issues. Local scrutiny committees also go further than the proposed model for local public accounts committees by including provision for sanctions for non-compliance, requirements to consult independent expertise, and a route for public engagement via petitions.

In regulations, we will set out further detail on the enhanced scrutiny regime. This will include which stakeholders outside a mayoral strategic authority should be within the purview of a local scrutiny committee. We will conduct extensive engagement on this next phase of work. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring they receive suitable parliamentary scrutiny. While this model differs from the previously envisaged form of local accounts committees, it will provide the right form of scrutiny to support measures brought forward in the Bill.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has indicated his wish to withdraw Amendment 49, but I will make just one comment on it. Local scrutiny committees will go further than the noble Lord’s amendments, as I think he has recognised, by creating sanctions for mayors and commissioners who fail to comply with asks from their committee.