It gives me great pleasure to present our Committee’s first report of this Session, “Gridlock or growth? Avoiding energy planning chaos”. I think it follows on very nicely from the statement we have just heard from the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, especially given some of the questions that followed. I thank my Committee colleagues for their diligence and proactive engagement throughout the inquiry, which has enabled us to produce a detailed report in a challenging timescale.
The Secretary of State, in his statement just now, addressed some of the concerns that we raised in our report about planning and the part it plays in ensuring that infrastructure is built, as he said,
“in the right places, so that we can effectively provide power where it is required.”
and at a cost that is affordable for domestic and business consumers. His focus on the serious problem of high energy prices for businesses is very welcome. The Committee has taken evidence on that, most recently yesterday when the Chemical Industries Association referred to a crisis in the UK’s industry caused by uncompetitive energy prices.
In our report, we considered the role of the strategic spatial energy plan. The Secretary of State told the House just now that it will be published next year. Again, we welcome that—it was recommendation in our report—but we want much greater clarity on both how the clean power 2030 action plan and the SSEP relate to grid connections and the development consent process. We found evidence of significant confusion over the role that grid connections have in determining securing planning consent and, similarly, the role that having planning consent can play in securing a grid connection. I was pleased to hear the Secretary of State make his commitment to the publication of the SSEP, but I encourage him to do so sooner rather than later.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the country made substantial investment in a super grid, a secure and modern energy infrastructure designed to meet the country’s growing energy needs. It was designed to give us 30 years of resilience. In the 1980s, the grid was already coming under strain and was in need of continued investment, so what did the Government do? They privatised it. Sir Malcolm Rifkind provided the rationale. He said that the energy industry
“should be able to make its own investment decisions based on its investment needs and on the resources that it can raise in order to fund that investment.”—[Official Report, 13 December 1988; Vol. 143, c. 790.]
Unshackled from the state, our energy infrastructure was expected to attract its own investment, but for our vital grid infrastructure the promised private funding just did not materialise.