Electricity Supplier Payments (Amendment) Regulations 2026

Over the next three years, the LCCC is expected to sign additional DPAs, which will drive the private sector investment required to bring forward further power carbon capture and storage projects by the mid-2030s. The LCCC will be the counterparty for these DPAs, as it was originally for CfDs, and funds have been included within the budgets to support this role.

The LCCC also signed its first low-carbon dispatchable CfD—LCD CfD—with Drax Power Ltd on 4 November 2025. This agreement will ensure that Drax generates electricity when needed between 2027 and 2031, thus bolstering our energy security. It is also a good agreement for consumers, saving them around £6 per year on their household bills compared to previous arrangements.

The Government also agreed heads of terms with EP Lynemouth Ltd on 6 February 2026 for an additional LCD CfD. If a full contract is concluded in the following month, this will further bolster our energy security by ensuring that Lynemouth continues to generate when needed between 2027 and 2031. Funds have been included in the budgets to support the LCCC’s role as the intended counterparty for this LCD CfD, as well as its role as counterparty for the existing contract with Drax Power Ltd.

The revenue collection contract with Sizewell C Ltd, the first project to use the regulated asset base—RAB—model for new nuclear, became effective on 4 November 2025, and funds have been included in the budget to cover the LCCC’s operational costs as a revenue collection counterparty for the RAB. As noble Lords can see, this all amounts to a large amount of additional work and activity for the LCCC, which is important in terms of this particular SI.

Turning to the ESC, the capacity market is tried and tested and is the most cost-effective way of ensuring that we have the electricity capacity we need now and in the future. It provides all forms of capacity and the right incentives to be on the system, delivering capacity when needed by increasing generation or by turning down electricity demand in return for guaranteed payments. The capacity auctions held to date have secured the capacity we need to meet the forecast peak demand out to 2028-29. A T-1 auction is currently ongoing and a T-4 auction will take place next week, securing most of the capacity we need out to 2029-30. In both the CfD and capacity market schemes, participants bid for support via a competitive auction that ensures that costs for consumers are minimised.

In the DPA, agreements are allocated through a process involving competitive assessment, followed by shortlisting then a final stage of bilateral negotiations between project developers and DESNZ. In the LCD CfD, contracts are agreed following a structured negotiation process between DESNZ and the generator. This process ensures that only those contracts are signed that offer value for money for consumers and include strict sustainability criteria.

Revenue collection contracts under the RAB model are agreed through a structured process involving DESNZ, Ofgem and the LCCC. These contracts provide a stable, regulated revenue stream to projects during construction and operation. In turn, we expect the RAB to lower the cost of financing for nuclear, one of the biggest drivers of new project costs, resulting in better value for money to consumers.

The LCCC and ESC’s effective administration of the CfD, the capacity market and other schemes to date has demonstrated their ability to deliver such schemes at least cost to consumers. It is in part for this reason that the LCCC has been working with DESNZ and other departments to develop new schemes for incentivising deployment of more low-carbon technologies. For example, the LCCC has supported DESNZ in the development of incentives for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. Although this has not been confirmed, contracts for such projects could potentially be entered into following a process established under the Energy Act 2013. Were DESNZ to move forward with this option, the LCCC would need to undertake activity to prepare for acting as the counterparty in the next three years. Consequently, funds have been included within the budget for this purpose.

The LCCC and ESC are mindful of the need to deliver value for money, as their guiding principle is to maintain investor confidence in the schemes they deliver while minimising costs to consumers. They have taken a number of actions to date to reduce costs, such as bringing expertise in-house rather than relying on more expensive outside consultants. It is because of actions like that that CfD operational costs per contract are expected to fall by 27.3% per CfD across the budget period, despite the growing size of the CfD portfolio. It is a similar narrative for the ESC, which expects the number of capacity market electricity meters to exceed 1.2 million over the budget period, a 450% increase on current meter numbers. It estimates that costs per meter will fall by 23% over 2025-26 to 2028-29. The operational cost budgets for both companies were subject to consultation, which gave stakeholders the opportunity to scrutinise and test the key assumptions in the budgets and, importantly, ensure that they represent value for money. Subsequently, the budgets remain unchanged.

In conclusion, to summarise this rather detailed and technical narrative, the LCCC has done a great job in managing as the counterparty for taking money in for contracts, giving money out and balancing between the two—and, indeed, when it runs a surplus it gives it back to the companies that are paying the money back in. Its activities have changed very substantially over the years, and the levy that goes into those companies has not changed since 2022. Therefore, it is right that the levy coming into the LCCC and the ESC for the expanded work that they do is reviewed, which is what the Government have done, to make sure that the LCCC can cover its costs for the relevant financial years up to 2029-30.

I assure the Committee that the Government are also mindful of the uncertainties involved in setting a budget for the next three years, such as world events impacting energy demand and policy decisions on new schemes that have not yet been taken. Consequently, DESNZ will keep the companies’ budgets under careful review throughout the budget period to ensure that costs to consumers are minimised. I commend these draft regulations to the Committee.

What we have heard so far in this debate, and I know it is early days, is that—

Secondly, this Government cancelled the previous Government’s full-system cost analysis of the energy system. This statutory instrument highlights that such an analysis is important and would help all of us in this Committee—indeed, all of us in the House—to understand the cost of energy. I ask the Minister to consider reintroducing it, certainly before any further legislation comes before the House.

Finally—I was not going to make this point but I think it is important—I echo the comments made by my noble friends. The Government have not fulfilled their pledge to cut energy bills by £300. Pushing the costs on to tax bills is simply sleight of hand. The truth is that the Secretary of State’s made-up promise to cut bills by £300 has become, understandably, a national embarrassment for the Government, so they have turned to the already-struggling taxpayer for a bailout of £7 billion.

With all that said, I promised to be brief and make only a few comments on this instrument. These are technical changes, and we on this side will not oppose them, but it has been exceptionally helpful for the Committee to hear the comments made by my noble friends and the noble Earl, Lord Russell; I look forward to hearing the Minister respond to them.